commencement of the war, that Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of
despatches from Mr. Foster, acquainting him with the proposed repeal of the
Orders in Council by the British Government, immediately opened a
communication with Major-General Dearborn, commanding the American forces
on the frontier of Lower Canada, for the purpose of concluding an
armistice, until the Congress should determine upon the proposals
transmitted to them by Mr. Foster. An armistice of about three weeks did
accordingly take place; and whatever might be the advantage arising from it
to the American commanders and their troops, from the time and opportunity
it afforded them of increasing their means of attacking the Canadas, it is
obvious that the cessation of hostilities was of far more importance to Sir
George Prevost, by enabling him to mature his preparations for defence. In
fact, at the very time the armistice was negotiating, a regiment had
arrived in the river from the West Indies; and after the conclusion, and
during the continuance of it, considerable reinforcements of men and
supplies were forwarded to Upper Canada, where they armed before the
resuming of hostilities, and materially contributed towards defeating the
attempts which the enemy afterwards made to invade that province.
Intelligence of the conclusion of the armistice was despatched to General
Brock on the 12th August, by Brigade-Major Sheckleton, and must have
reached him at Amherstburg before he left that place for Fort George, where
he arrived the 6th September; but, whatever may have been General Brock's
opinion of the policy of the measure, we do not find in his letter of the
7th September to Sir George Prevost, that the receipt of that intelligence
had at all interfered with any intention he had previously entertained of
"sweeping" (according to the Reviewer's assertion) "the Niagara line of the
American garrisons, which he knew were then unprepared for vigorous
resistance."[29] In fact, as that letter states, the armistice was to
terminate the _next day_; and so far was General Brock from being in a
situation to act offensively, that he states his expectation of an almost
immediate attack, and of his having sent to Amherstburg to Colonel Proctor,
as well as to Colonel Vincent at Kingston, for reinforcements, to enable
him to meet it; expressing at the same time his hope, that if he could
continue to maintain his position for six weeks longer, the campaign would
terminate in a manner little expected in the United States.
Upon the expiration of the armistice, Sir George Prevost resolved to
continue, for a time at least, and until his resources would better enable
him to pursue a contrary line of conduct, the same defensive system which
he had previously determined upon; and which he had been originally induced
to adopt, in consequence of the peculiar circumstances in which he was
placed at the commencement of hostilities, and of the war having been
undertaken, on the part of the United States, so much in opposition to the
opinions and wishes of a considerable portion of its population. In a
private letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, of the 2d August,
1812, upon the subject of the proposed armistice, he particularly refers to
the opinion of Mr. Foster, respecting the policy of the defensive system.
"Mr. Foster," he says, "submits the propriety of our abstaining from an
invasion of the United States' territory, _as only in such event could the
American government be empowered to order the militia out of the States_."
As a further ground for this line of conduct, and a confirmation of the
propriety of his own opinion in adopting it, he quotes in a subsequent
communication to General Brock, of 30th August, 1812, the opinion of his
Majesty's Government on the subject. "The King's Government having most
unequivocally expressed to me their desire to preserve peace with the
United States, that they might uninterruptedly pursue, with the whole
disposeable force of the country, the great interests committed to them in
Europe, I have endeavoured to be instrumental in the accomplishment of
those views; but I consider it most fortunate to have been enabled to do so
without interfering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you
_men, money, and stores of every kind_." It cannot be matter of surprise
that Sir George Prevost should persevere in his defensive system, even
after the termination of the armistice, and when from the manner in which
the Government of the United States had received the communication of the
repeal of the Orders in Council, it was evident that they meant to continue
the war for other objects; for it ought to be considered, that up to that
period, the only reinforcements of troops received by him were the 103d,
nearly a boy-regiment, and the first battalion of the Royals from the West
Indies, the latter incomplete, from the capture of part of their numbers,
on board of one of the transports, by an American frigate. In consequence,
however, of this addition to the force in the Lower Province, Sir George
Prevost was enabled immediately to strengthen the army in Upper Canada, by
detachments from the 49th regiment, Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, and Royal
Veterans; but it must be evident that the total accession of strength in
both Provinces was not sufficient to warrant a departure from a system,
which had been adopted after the fullest deliberation, and upon a just
calculation of the means necessary to meet the American warfare. The
grounds of Sir George Prevost's opinion on this head had been stated to
General Brock, in his letters to him of the 7th and 10th July, before
referred to; and as a further confirmation of the necessity of adhering to
it, in his communication to General Brock, of the 17th September, Sir
George Prevost acquaints him, that in his last despatches from Lord
Bathurst, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th July, 1812, he
is told by him, "That his Majesty's Government trusts he will be enabled to
suspend, with perfect safety, all extraordinary preparations for defence,
which he may have been induced to make, in consequence of the precarious
state of the relations between Great Britain and the United States."--As
this opinion of the British Government was evidently founded upon their
belief, that the revocation of the Orders in Council would either prevent
war, if not declared, or lead to an immediate peace, had hostilities
commenced, it was plain that no further reinforcements could be expected to
be even ordered from England, until accounts should arrive there of the
reception which the intelligence of the revocation of the Orders in Council
had met with from the Government of the United States. As this could not
well be before the end of September, there was not the slightest prospect
of any addition being afforded to the force in the Canadas before the
ensuing year; and it was therefore certain, that the Commander of the
forces would until that period be completely left to his own resources for
the defence of those Provinces.
To husband those resources became, under these circumstances, his imperious
duty. The posture of affairs in Lower Canada, as he had stated to General
Brock, in his letter of the 17th September, particularly on the frontier of
Montreal, required every soldier in that Province, and no further
reinforcements could be sent by him to the other. Not aware of any
advantage which could arise from offensive operations against America, to
compensate for the loss they might occasion, and for the consequent
insecurity to the Provinces which he was defending, Sir George Prevost
continued to urge upon General Brock, and after his death, upon his
successor, General Sheaffe, the necessity of adhering to a defensive
system; nor does it appear from any part of the correspondence between
these officers and Sir George Prevost, that they had any particular object
in view, which that policy restrained them from pursuing. Previous to the
armistice, and to the capture of Hull's army at Detroit, General Brock had
in his letters of 3d and 26th July, 1812, before referred to, given his
reasons, which were evidently independent of the consideration of any
instructions from Sir George Prevost, why he did not meditate offensive
operations against the American frontier; and subsequent to the capture of
Detroit, and after his arrival at Fort George in September, it has been
clearly shewn, that his situation and means precluded him from such
measures, except at a great risk, and for the accomplishment of inadequate
objects.
The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by
General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from
Fort George; in which he says, "that although he had learnt from deserters,
(but which information he had reason afterwards to think, as he
acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction
prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that
therefore much might be effected against such a body at that moment; that
keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and _aware of the policy of
permitting such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he
did not_ CONTEMPLATE _any_ IMMEDIATE ATTACK." Two strong inferences
naturally arise from this letter--the one, that General Brock must have
considered the instructions received from Sir George Prevost, as to
defensive measures not _positive_, as the Reviewer has thought fit to state
them to have been, but _discretionary_; the other, that General Brock
himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive
operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That
this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack
been made on Fort Niagara, or had that general sweeping of the American
garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an
achievement) been attempted, there cannot be a doubt but that this invasion
of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own
frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states
bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the
prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier,
and who were known to be dissatisfied, and anxious to return to their
homes, would in the event of an attack upon their territory, not only have
cheerfully remained to repel the aggression, but would have been further
obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without
such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware
of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold
out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to
commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through
their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that
finding their militia could no longer be kept together, and that the season
was fast approaching, when all offensive operations must cease, the
American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-concerted
expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though
attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant
Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and
was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province
of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the
battle of Queenstown, and complete as had been the overthrow of the enemy,
they still remained in sufficient force on the opposite territory, to make
an immediate attack upon their frontier, notwithstanding the dismay with
which the critic seems to think the Americans were filled,[30] something
more than hazardous. Out of the small force of less than 900 regular troops
which we had on the field that day, nearly 100 of them were killed or
wounded, and many were necessarily engaged in guarding the prisoners, whose
numbers amounted to more than our own regular force. The enemy had received
reinforcements in their line during the day of the action, and others were
constantly arriving. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered at,
that Major-General Sheaffe should not have listened to the suggestions of
any of his officers, if such were made, and the fact is more than doubtful,
to cross over immediately after the action, when according to the
Reviewer's sagacious opinion, "Fort Niagara might have been taken, and the
whole of the Niagara line cleared of the American troops!"
Such an attempt might indeed have averted the insinuation levelled by the
critic against General Sheaffe and Sir George Prevost as _lovers of
armistices_, but would have evinced great want of military judgment and
prudence in General Sheaffe, and have hazarded all the advantages gained by
the gallant and able conduct of his lamented predecessor, and strengthened
and confirmed at Queenstown by himself. General Sheaffe was, therefore,
wisely contented with having foiled a second attempt of a superior force to
invade the Province; and, anxious to secure its future preservation, he
willingly acceded to a proposal for an armistice, which he knew, under the
circumstances of his situation, would be of incalculably more benefit to
himself than to the enemy. It must be evident to every one at all
conversant with military subjects, that to those who are carrying on a
defensive warfare, which their inferiority of force and means of every
description has obliged them to adopt, a suspension of hostilities must be
infinitely more beneficial than to the opposite party. General Sheaffe was
fully aware of the importance of this measure to the safety of the
province, which on the death of General Brock was entrusted to him, since
he was in daily expectation of receiving supplies of clothing, and other
articles which were indispensable for the militia, who had become much
dissatisfied from the want of those articles. Reinforcements of troops were
also on their way to him; and, in fact, these supplies and reinforcements
did arrive during the continuance of the armistice, and materially
contributed to foil the further efforts of the enemy to invade the
Province. It may also be added, that the armistice was further expedient in
the first instance, when its duration was limited to three days, for the
purpose of affording time for carrying into effect the proposed exchange
of prisoners, the removal of those that were wounded, and the passing over
to the enemy's side the militia paroles. Some portion of time was also
necessary for performing, without any hostile interruption, the last
tribute of respect to the memory of the gallant Commander who had then
lately fallen. The subsequent prolongation of the armistice to an
indefinite period, although it was in the power of either party to
terminate the same by thirty hours notice, perfectly coincided with
Major-General Sheaffe's system of defensive warfare, and permitted him to
leave Fort George for a short time, and proceed to York, where his presence
was indispensable for the purpose of being sworn in, and assuming the civil
government.
It has been thought necessary to say thus much in vindication of this
measure, from a sense of justice to a gallant and meritorious officer,
although it was adopted without any reference to, and without the consent
or approbation of Sir George Prevost. The Reviewer has indeed thought fit
to characterize the armistice[31] as one for which no reason, civil or
military, was ever assigned; whereas it was notorious to the army employed
on the Niagara line that General Sheaffe was influenced in this step by
the motives and circumstances already stated, all of which were immediately
communicated by him to Sir George Prevost. If any thing further were
necessary to be adduced in vindication of the policy of the defensive
system, of which these armistices formed a part, and which the Reviewer has
thought fit so groundlessly to denominate short-sighted and ill-judged,
although attended with results so favourable to the safety of both
Provinces, it will be found in the complete approbation expressed by his
Majesty's Government. In Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of
the 4th July, 1812, written before the intelligence of the declaration of
war, by America, had reached England, his Lordship says, "The instructions
given by you to Major-General Brock and Sir John Sherbrooke, cautioning
them against any premature measures of hostility, or any deviation from a
line of conduct strictly defensive, meets with the full approbation of his
Royal Highness the Prince Regent."
In a subsequent despatch of the 10th Aug., Lord Bathurst approves of the
general principles upon which Sir George Prevost intended to conduct the
operations of the war, by making the defence of Quebec paramount to every
other consideration, in the event of invasion. In a later despatch of the
date of the 1st October, 1812, his Lordship says, "I have it in command
from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most
unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for
defending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to which you have
had recourse for deferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to
actual hostility." On the subject of the armistice, he adds, "The desire
which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the
subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own
feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Government,
and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to
receive their cordial concurrence."
In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812,
acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Prevost, which
announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock,
and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the
conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his
Lordship adds--"I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that
in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his
command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have
contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada."
In Lord Bathurst's despatch of the 16th November following, he says, "The
measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the
Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, appear well
calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter."
Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability
displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a
complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with
regard to "the practical illustration of the tendency"[32] of Sir George
Prevost's defensive system, is directly in opposition to the facts, both as
respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his orders, and
the effect produced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof
of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two expeditions,
of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieutenant Dewar
to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of
these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the
preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the
Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General
Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians a
strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was
consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan
territory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not
Colonel Procter's orders been _discretionary_ instead of _positive_. It is
certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the
employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offensive
operations jointly with the Indians; because such a course of proceeding
was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his
Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his
command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a
cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the
district committed to his charge; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's
use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retaining
the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our
remaining in possession of the Michigan territory, and up to the time of
the unfortunate retreat and consequent capture of Colonel Procter's
detachment at the Moravian village.
Having thus briefly adverted to the principal occurrences of the first
campaign in Upper Canada, it becomes necessary to say a few words with
regard to those of the Lower Province, during the same period; and which,
being under the _immediate direction of Sir George Prevost_, the Reviewer
has thought proper to characterize as _utterly insignificant_.[33] Almost
immediately after intelligence of the war had arrived at Quebec, Sir George
Prevost repaired to Montreal, for the purpose of providing for the defence
of that frontier; and having established a cordon of troops in the
situations most exposed to attack, between the St. Lawrence and the
Richelieu rivers, consisting of all the flank companies of the 49th and
100th regiments, together with three battalions of embodied militia, and
one of Canadian voltigeurs, which last four corps had been raised and
disciplined previous to the war, he returned to Quebec, in order to meet
the Provincial Parliament. The legislature had been summoned, principally,
for the purpose of obtaining from them an act authorizing the circulation
of army bills, a measure to which from his deserved popularity with that
body, they did not hesitate to accede, and without which, from the want of
specie, it would scarcely have been possible to carry on the public
service. To many of the arrangements and measures of Sir George Prevost,
for reinforcing and strengthening Upper Canada, as well as for guarding
the approaches to the Lower Province, reference has already been made. The
whole summer had been unceasingly employed in these important objects, and
the greatest exertions had been made to transport and convey to Kingston,
by the tedious route of the St. Lawrence, against the current, and along a
frontier much exposed to the enemy, the various supplies which the
exigencies of the Upper Province demanded; all of which, by the judicious
and able arrangements made by him for that purpose, arrived safe and
without loss, or with very inconsiderable molestation.
In the month of August Sir George Prevost again repaired to Montreal, in
order that he might be ready to take the field, should the movements of
General Dearborn, who commanded the enemy's forces on that frontier,
indicate any intention of attacking our line of defence, which had been
entrusted to the charge of Major-General de Rottenburg. General Dearborn
having, on the 16th November, advanced from Plattsburg to Champlain town,
close upon our frontier line, thereby threatening the front of
Major-General de Rottenburg's position, Sir George Prevost, upon the
receipt of this intelligence, crossed the St. Lawrence with a considerable
proportion of the force then at Montreal, in order to strengthen the point
thus threatened, and established his head-quarters at Chambly, where he
remained for several weeks. Whether this movement on the part of General
Dearborn was made in the expectation of finding that no effectual
resistance would be offered by the Canadian population to his further
advance into the Province, or with the view of preventing the sending of
reinforcements from the Lower to the Upper Province, he was equally
disappointed in both these objects. The able measures adopted by Sir George
Prevost in the disposition of the regular troops, as well as of the
militia, who displayed the most ardent spirit of loyalty, and the most
resolute determination to repel every attempt of the enemy to invade the
Colony, induced the American Commander in Chief to abandon any further
intention of advancing. After pushing forward a few reconnoitring parties
which were invariably forced to retreat without effecting their object, he
was ultimately compelled, by the advanced season of the year, to close the
campaign, and to put the army into winter quarters.