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SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE LATE LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR GEORGE PREVOST, BART.
PARTICULARLY OF HIS SERVICES
IN
THE CANADAS;
INCLUDING
A REPLY TO THE STRICTURES ON HIS MILITARY CHARACTER,
CONTAINED
IN AN ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW FOR OCTOBER, 1822.
"Either this is envy in you, folly, or mistaking; the
very stream of his life, and the business he hath
helmed, must upon a warranted need give him a better
proclamation. Let him be but testimonied in his own
bringings forth, and he shall appear a statesman and a
soldier. Therefore you speak unskilfully; or if your
knowledge be more, it is much darkened in your malice."
MEASURE FOR MEASURE.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, STRAND;
AND
T. EGERTON, WHITEHALL.
1823.
J. M'Creery, Printer,
Tooks Court, Chancery Lane.
SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE LATE LIEUT.-GENERAL
SIR GEORGE PREVOST, BART.
_&c. &c._
The character and conduct of individuals in high and responsible
situations, will naturally and necessarily be the subject of free and open
discussion. The conduct of a soldier is more particularly exposed to this
scrutiny. His success or his failure is a matter of such powerful interest
to his country, that he generally receives even more than his full measure
of approbation or of blame. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of forming
a correct judgment on the merits of military operations, there is perhaps
no subject upon which public opinion expresses itself so quickly and so
decidedly. Disappointed in the sanguine hopes which they had entertained,
and mortified by the consciousness of defeat, the public too frequently
imagine cause for censure, and without a competent knowledge of the facts
necessary to enable them to form a sound and satisfactory judgment,
unhesitatingly condemn those who have perhaps passed in their service a
long life of anxiety and labour. But while, in the moment of irritation,
they are thus disposed to impugn the conduct of their military servants,
they are no less ready, on more deliberate inquiry, and a fuller
understanding of the facts, to grant them a candid and generous acquittal.
These observations are peculiarly applicable to the case of the late
Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, who, after having devoted to his
country thirty-five of the best years of his life; after having
distinguished himself in many gallant actions; and after having preserved
to the crown of Great Britain some of its most valuable foreign
possessions, was called upon, at the close of his honourable career, to
answer charges which vitally affected his reputation, and which he was
prevented by death from fully and clearly refuting.
Painful as it was to the friends of Sir George Prevost to allow a single
stain to rest upon the memory of so brave and distinguished a soldier, more
especially when they possessed the means of removing every doubt as to his
conduct, they yet considered an appeal to the candour and justice of his
country as unnecessary. The violent prejudices which at one period existed
against the late Commander of the Forces in the Canadas were gradually
wearing away; his memory had been honored by a just tribute of his
Sovereign's regret and approbation; and the scenes in which he had been so
conspicuous an actor, had ceased to be a matter of general interest. Under
these circumstances, the relatives of Sir George Prevost would confidently
have entrusted his reputation to the unprejudiced judgment of posterity,
had they not seen, with equal regret and indignation, a late attempt to
revive the almost exploded calumnies and misrepresentations of which he had
been the victim. That the Quarterly Review[1] should have lent its pages to
an attack like this, will, upon the perusal of the present volume, excite
the surprise of every candid person; and it is chiefly for the purpose of
correcting the mis-statements into which the Reviewer has been led, that
the following pages are presented to the public.
Before entering more particularly upon the subject of Sir George Prevost's
conduct, so wantonly attacked in the article above alluded to, it may not
be thought improper briefly to advert to his father's services and to his
own early history. From his military career, previous to his appointment to
the chief command in British North America, it will clearly appear that he
was not without reason selected by his Majesty's Government for the
discharge of that important trust.
Major-General Augustin Prevost, the father of the late Sir George Prevost,
was by birth a citizen of Geneva: he entered the British service as a
Cornet in the Earl of Albemarle's regiment of Horse Guards, and was present
at the battle of Fontenoy, where he was wounded.
Having attained the rank of Major in the 60th regiment in 1759, he had the
honor of serving under General Wolfe, and received a severe wound in the
head, whilst gallantly forcing a landing, twenty miles above Quebec, under
the immediate command of General Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester. Upon
the reduction of Canada, Major Prevost was promoted to the rank of
Lieutenant-Colonel, and served with reputation at the capture of Martinique
and the Havannah. In 1775, he was appointed to the command in East Florida,
and, in 1778, he eminently distinguished himself by his defence of
Savannah, against the attack of a very superior force of French and
Americans, under the Comte d'Estaing and General Lincoln. The garrison
consisted of only 2,300 men, while the force of the besiegers amounted to
8,000, supported by a fleet of twenty-two sail of the line. Such, however,
was the determined energy of Major-General Prevost, and of the British
soldiers and sailors under his command, that the enemy were compelled to
abandon the enterprize, after thirty-three days' close siege.[2]
In 1780, Major-General Prevost, after having served twenty-two years in
North America and the West Indies, returned to England, to enjoy the
pleasing consciousness of having always discharged his duty with zeal and
effect. His health was much impaired by a long residence in climates
unfavorable to an European constitution, and, on the 6th May, 1786, he
died, at Greenhill Grove, near Barnet, in the sixty-third year of his age.
In 1765, Major-General Prevost married, at Lausanne, a daughter of M.
Grand, of that place;[3] and, on her husband's departure to America, Mrs.
Prevost accompanied him thither. George, their eldest son, was born while
General Prevost was stationed in the province of New Jersey, on the 19th
May, 1767. Being designed by his father for the military profession, he
was placed with that view at Lochee's academy, at Chelsea, and his
education was finished at Colmar, on the continent. He obtained his first
commission in the 60th regiment, and being removed upon promotion to the
28th foot, he joined that corps at Gibraltar in 1784. He obtained his
majority in 1790, and early in 1791, he took the command of the 3d
battalion of the 60th regiment at Antigua. In March, 1794, he was promoted
to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the 60th, and, in 1795, he proceeded to
Demerara, and from thence to St. Vincent's, at that time attacked by the
French. He was there actively employed in suppressing the Carib
insurrection, and in resisting the French invasion, and at the storming of
the Vigie he commanded a column. In October, 1795, he was ordered to
Dominica, to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Madden in the command of the troops
in that island; but in January, 1796, he resumed the command of the 3d
battalion of the 60th regiment at St. Vincent's, where he was twice
severely wounded in successfully resisting the enemy's progress towards the
capital of the colony, after the defeat of Major-General Stewart at
Colonary. In consequence of his wounds, Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost obtained
leave to return to England. The sense which the inhabitants of St.
Vincent's entertained of his services was warmly expressed in an address
from the Council and House of Representatives in that island.[4]
On his arrival in England, Lieutenant-Colonel Provost was appointed
Inspecting Field Officer. In January, 1798, he obtained the rank of
Colonel, and proceeded in the same year to the West Indies as
Brigadier-General. In 1798, he was removed from the command of the troops
at Barbadoes to St. Lucie, as Commandant, where he was afterwards appointed
Lieutenant-Governor, in compliance with a request from the inhabitants.[5]
Brigadier-General Prevost continued to perform the duties of Governor of
St. Lucie until the peace of 1802, when that colony was restored to the
French. The address which he received from the inhabitants of the island on
his departure, fully evinces the popularity which he had acquired;[6] while
the letters addressed to him, and to Colonel Brownrigg, Secretary to H.R.H.
the Commander in Chief, by Sir Thomas Trigge, at that time Commander of the
Forces in the West Indies, satisfactorily prove that he merited the
confidence reposed in him by Government.[7]
In July, Brigadier-General Prevost arrived in England, when the government
of Dominica was immediately offered to him by Lord Hobart. Having accepted
the appointment, he embarked for that island in the following November, and
landed there on the 25th of December, 1802.
In the following year, he volunteered his services on the expedition
against St. Lucie and Tobago, and served as second in command under
Lieutenant-General Grenfield, who in his general order, after the capture
of Morne Fortunee, thus mentions his conduct upon that occasion:--
"To the cool and determined conduct of Brigadier-general Prevost and
Brigadier-General Brereton, who led the two columns of attack, may be
attributed the success of the action; but to Brigadier-General Prevost it
must be acknowledged, that to his counsel and arrangements the Commander of
the forces attributes the glory of the day."[8]
The important services of Brigadier-General Prevost upon this expedition,
received numerous tributes of approbation from distinguished military
characters;[9] and even the French Commander could not refrain from
expressing the esteem and admiration with which he regarded his generous
enemy.[10] Upon the successful termination of this affair,
Brigadier-General Prevost returned to his Government at Dominica, where
nothing worthy of notice occurred until the 22d February, 1805, when an
unexpected attack was made by a French squadron from Rochefort. The result
of that attack was highly creditable to the valour and military talents of
the Governor, who after having, with the few troops under his command,
disputed inch by inch the landing of the French force, amounting to 4,000
men, and covered by an overwhelming fire from the ships, succeeded in
effecting a retreat to the fort of Prince Rupert. The French Commander in
Chief, after vainly summoning him to surrender, reimbarked the whole of his
troops, and sailed to Guadaloupe.[11]
The terms in which H. R. H. the Commander in Chief was pleased to express
his sense of General Prevost's conduct upon this occasion, were highly
gratifying to his feelings.[12] In consequence of his gallant and
successful defence of the Colony, General Prevost received a communication
from the Speaker of the House of Assembly,[13] conveying to him the thanks
of that body, and informing him that a Thousand Guineas had been voted by
them for the purchase of a sword and a service of plate, to be presented to
him in testimony of their gratitude and approbation.[14] A similar
testimonial to the conduct of General Prevost upon this occasion was given
by the Patriotic Fund, who voted him a sword of the value of one hundred
pounds, and a piece of plate, of the value of two hundred pounds, "for the
distinguished gallantry and military talents which he had displayed."[15]
From the West India Planters and Merchants General Prevost likewise
received a piece of plate to the value of three hundred guineas.[16]
In July, 1805, General Prevost returned to England.[17] Soon after his
arrival he was created a Baronet, and was subsequently appointed
Lieutenant-Governor of Portsmouth.
In February, 1808, he was selected to command a brigade destined to
reinforce Nova Scotia, where he succeeded Sir John Wentworth as Governor,
and in December, 1808, he left Halifax, in order to assist in the reduction
of Martinique. The expedition sailed from Barbadoes on the 28th of January,
1809, and on the 30th, the troops were landed on the island of Martinique.
Sir George Prevost was second in command under General Sir George Beckwith,
and to him the management of all the active operations was confided. The
result of this expedition was, that the French troops were driven into Fort
Bourbon, where they held out until the 24th of February, when the surrender
of that fort completed the conquest of the island.[18]
Upon the conclusion of this short but brilliant campaign, Sir George
Prevost passed a few days at Dominica, where he was received with many
demonstrations of joy. Addresses were upon this occasion presented to him
by the House of Assembly of Dominica, and by the merchants and inhabitants
of St. Christophers.[19]
In the month of April the army returned to Halifax, and from this period
until his appointment to the chief civil and military command in British
North America, in 1811, upon the resignation of Sir James Craig, Sir George
Prevost remained in Nova Scotia, esteemed and beloved by all ranks of the
inhabitants. On his departure for his new government, he received the most
gratifying addresses from the inhabitants of Halifax,[20] and from the
clergy of Nova Scotia, &c. &c.[21]
Upon the arrival of Sir George Prevost at Quebec in 1811, he found much
dissatisfaction and discontent existing in the Lower Province. The
inhabitants were divided into two parties, termed the English and the
Canadian, and the feelings of hostility with which they viewed each other,
had unfortunately not been allayed by the policy which the late Governor in
Chief, Sir James Craig, had thought it necessary to adopt during his
administration. To such a degree had this party spirit been carried, and so
doubtful had he been of the disposition of the Canadians, that it had been
thought inexpedient to call out the militia, lest they should make an
improper use of the arms to be intrusted to them. Under these
circumstances, it was evidently the duty of Sir George Prevost to
conciliate, by every means in his power, the confidence and affection of
the Canadians, more particularly as in case of hostilities with America,
it would have been impossible to preserve Lower Canada without the cordial
support of its inhabitants. Sir George Prevost therefore did not hesitate
to adopt a system which the true interest of the Province seemed so
imperiously to require. He anxiously endeavoured to unite the two adverse
parties, and to soothe the irritation which not only threatened the
tranquillity of his government, but even the safety of the colony itself.
In the distribution of the patronage which he enjoyed, he resolved to be
guided solely by a consideration of the public good, and when offices
became vacant, he bestowed them, with a due regard to the merits of the
individuals, indifferently upon the English and the Canadians.
The beneficial effects of these measures became every day more apparent.
The Governor in Chief speedily acquired the confidence of all ranks of
people, who submitted with cheerfulness to the privations and sacrifices
which they were soon afterwards called upon to endure. In numerous
instances he received from the inhabitants, both collectively and
individually, the strongest proofs of their zeal; and he had the
satisfaction of seeing them united in their attachment to his government,
at a time when the preservation of the colony depended upon such feelings.
Having thus given a brief sketch of the situation in which the Governor in
Chief found the Province of Lower Canada upon his arrival, and of the views
and objects which he entertained respecting it, we shall proceed to point
out the conduct which he pursued, when, from the aspect of affairs, it
became evident that hostilities with America could not be long delayed. No
sooner had Sir George Prevost assumed the chief command of the Canadas,
than he became sensible of the necessity of placing those provinces in the
most efficient state of defence; and he therefore applied himself with the
utmost vigour and vigilance to call forth all their resources. It is
difficult to believe that the unwearied exertions of Sir George Prevost,
with a view to this important object, should have been altogether unknown
to the writer in the Quarterly Review. But supposing him to have been
ignorant of them, yet without access to the private and confidential
correspondence which took place between Sir George Prevost and his
Majesty's Government, or to the communications which passed between him and
the officers under his command, it was impossible that the Reviewer could
form a correct opinion upon the subject. And yet he has not hesitated
boldly to assert, that, "in the winters of 1811 and 1812, although the
designs upon the Canadas were openly avowed in the American Congress,
except the embodying of the militia of the Lower Province, Sir George
Prevost made _not the slightest preparation for defence_."[22] The
following statement will show the degree of credit to which this assertion
of the Reviewer is entitled.
In the month of September, 1811, Sir George Prevost arrived in Canada, and
in the same month, proceeding from Quebec to the district of Montreal, he
inspected the different forts and military positions in that neighbourhood,
and on the American frontier. Soon after his return to Quebec in the
November following, he communicated confidentially with the
Adjutant-General of the forces in England, upon the apprehended hostilities
with America. In December he proposed to Lord Liverpool, then Secretary of
State for the Colonies, the raising a corps of Fencibles, from the
Glengarry settlement in Upper Canada; and in his correspondence with
Admiral Sawyer, who commanded on the Halifax station, he requested that a
ship of war might be sent, on the opening of the navigation, to the St.
Lawrence. In the month of February, 1812, another communication was made to
the Secretary of State's Office, in which Sir George Prevost expressed a
hope, that the proceedings in Washington would justify him, in making
preparations to repel the threatened attack. Those preparations had been
commenced as early as November, 1811, by forwarding arms and ammunition to
the Upper Province. During the winter of 1811 and 1812, and the spring of
the latter year, frequent communications passed between the Commander of
the forces and Major-General Brock, who commanded in Upper Canada,
respecting the preparations which would be necessary in the event of a war.
It was proposed to reinforce Amherstburgh, and Fort George; and supplies of
provisions, cavalry-arms, accoutrements and money, were directed to be
conveyed to Upper Canada. Accoutrements and clothing for the militia in the
Canadas, were requested from the British Government. Another schooner was
directed to be built, to increase our marine on Lake Erie. Captain Gray,
Deputy Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, was despatched to the Upper
Province, in order to assist in forwarding these defensive preparations;
and Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers, was directed to proceed to
Amherstburgh, to inspect the works of that fort, which the Commander of the
forces had ordered to be put in a tenable state. The propriety of
strengthening and fortifying York was submitted to Government; and the
commanding engineer was directed to make the repairs, which his report on
the different forts and posts in Upper Canada, had stated to be necessary.
In addition to these measures, a reinforcement from the 41st regiment, and
five companies of the Newfoundland Fencibles, left Quebec in the month of
May for the Upper Province.
On the 31st March, Sir George Prevost addressed a private and confidential
letter to Major-General Brock, in which his sentiments respecting the
approaching war, and the policy to be adopted in meeting it, were clearly
detailed. One passage in this letter merits a more particular notice, since
it is highly important, not only as repelling the accusation of the
Reviewer respecting the want of preparation for the war, but also as
containing an answer to another charge, which will afterwards be noticed.
The paragraph in the letter is as follows: "You are nevertheless to
persevere in your preparations for defence, and in such arrangements as
may, upon a change in the state of affairs, enable you to employ any
disposeable part of your force _offensively_ against the common enemy."
Independently of all these various communications with the officer
commanding in Upper Canada, respecting the measures to be pursued in the
event of war, and of the supplies of men, arms, money, stores, and
provisions, which, with a view to that event, had been afforded to Upper
Canada; much correspondence had previously taken place, and many
difficulties had been removed with regard to the supply and transport of
the Indian presents to the Upper Province, upon the due furnishing of which
very materially depended the support which we might expect to receive from
the Indians, in case of a rupture with America.
From this statement, drawn from the original correspondence, and from
official documents, it is evident, that even in contemplation of
hostilities, an event by no means certain, and which the British Government
were so far from thinking probable, that they discouraged any measure of
extraordinary expense to meet it, the Commander of the forces did, as far
as rested with him, during the winter of 1811 and 1812, and for months
prior to the declaration of war, make every preparation for defence,
consistent with the means which he possessed. All the requisitions of
Major-General Brock which the Commander of the forces had the power to
grant, were promptly complied with; nor was the slightest intimation ever
given by that invaluable officer, that any measure, either suggested by
himself or which ought to have occurred to the Commander of the forces, for
the preservation of the Upper Province, in the event of its being attacked,
had been overlooked or neglected. The same vigilant foresight will be found
to mark the conduct of Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province. One of the
first measures of his government, in contemplation of war, was an
application to the legislature of Lower Canada, in February, 1812, for an
act to new model the militia laws, and which might enable him to call forth
a proportion of the population into active service. Averse as the Canadians
had hitherto been to grant any power of this description to former
Governors, and repugnant as many of the clauses which it was intended to
introduce into the bill, were to the habits and feelings of the people,
such was the deserved popularity acquired by Sir George Prevost, from the
conciliatory policy, which, as before stated, he had adopted towards the
Canadians, immediately upon his arrival amongst them, that he obtained from
the Legislature nearly all that he had required. Before the end of May,
1812, a sum exceeding 60,000_l._ was placed at his disposal for the militia
service; and he was authorized to embody 2,000 Bachelors, between the age
of eighteen and twenty-five years, for three months in the year; and in
case of invasion, or imminent danger of it, to retain them for a year. In
case of war, he was empowered to embody if necessary, the whole militia of
the Province. Under that law, a force of 2,000 men, from the finest and
most efficient class of the militia, was embodied on the 13th May, so to
remain for three months, unless the then state of affairs should render it
expedient to retain them longer. A corps of Canadian voltigeurs, under the
command of Major De Salaberry, of the 60th regiment, consisting of between
300 and 400 men, had likewise, been raised and disciplined; and 400
recruits for the Glengarry Fencibles, had, before the 1st June, been
assembled at Three Rivers, in Lower Canada. The advantages arising from
thus embodying the militia prior to the war, were incalculable, and it may
be confidently asserted, materially contributed to the preservation of the
Canadas.
The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they
had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian population to
Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from
the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they
believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse
than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most
active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was
declared, was a severe disappointment to the American Government; and was
one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards
experienced in every attempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia
force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion
of the regular troops, than he could otherwise have been justified in
parting with, to the Upper Province; while, at the same time, it afforded
him the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guarding the different
passes and roads into Lower Canada, with a description of men perfectly
well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with the mode of
warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower
Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able
disposition of this new force, together with the assistance of the regular
troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with
the instructions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all
unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were
pursued upon this occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the
full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from
Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lordship informed
Sir George Prevost, that "the preparations for defence which he had made
upon _the first intimation_ of eventual hostility with America, and which
he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's
entire approbation."
After charging Sir George Prevost with negligence, in not preparing to meet
the threatened hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion,
that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau du Lac, and Isle aux Noix,
which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George
Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he
entirely overlooked and neglected.[23] The fact is, that the occupation of
Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the
Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake
Ontario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force
could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the
command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the
war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be
apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which
the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended
movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their
attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting
the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the
small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the
occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional
security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either
before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance
was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was
examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line
of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after
the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was
afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the
waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost,
of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas,
would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau
du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the
intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when
the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole
line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was _occupied and fortified_; and had
it not been for the defeat which part of General Dearborn's army met with
from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Lawrence,
that post would have presented a formidable obstacle to the advance of the
enemy.
The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post, has been considerably
lessened[24] since the defence of the Canadas by the French, in consequence
of the facility with which Lower Canada may now be entered by the various
routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States
has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or
principal barrier between the two countries. The occupation of this post
was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the
war; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was
enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the
reinforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more
effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix
became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in
which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed
schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of
the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations
on Lake Champlain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little
importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early
part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to
obtain possession of it.
Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did _not_ do, by way of
preparation for the defence of the Canadas before the war, the Reviewer
proceeds to point out what _was_ done by him after the commencement of
hostilities. And here we find the same want of candour which distinguishes
the remarks to which we have already adverted.[25]
In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this
period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on
the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue
it.
The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known,
was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most violent
opposition, by a comparatively small majority. The northern and eastern
states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most affected by the
British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were
constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to
every person at all conversant with what was passing in the United States
at this time, that a contest undertaken in opposition to the sentiments and
wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which
Great Britain might, without any sacrifice of national honor, so easily
concede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must
necessarily be of short duration. This was the opinion entertained by the
most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as
well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Prevost concurred.
It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government
on this head were in unison with those of the Commander of the forces.
Under these circumstances, and with these impressions, it became the
obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to
avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries,
and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to
defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the
Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and
opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those measures of
aggression against the British Provinces, which they had constantly
predicted would be attended with discomfiture and disgrace. In his
adherence to this defensive system, Sir George Prevost was encouraged and
supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the
British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best
qualified by their knowledge and situation to form a correct judgment on
the propriety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also
the more necessary, in consequence of the inadequacy of the means possessed
by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the
Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular
force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men; the law for
embodying the militia had only been recently passed; and the population,
which had been previously considered as not well affected, had neither been
armed nor accustomed to discipline for many years. The military chest was
exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least,
considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make
in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for the
defence of her Dominions in North America. These difficulties neither
depressed nor discouraged the ardent and active spirit of Sir George
Prevost. Although he fully coincided in opinion with that able and
judicious officer Sir James Craig, that in the event of a war with America,
Quebec should be the object of primary consideration; yet the defence of
the whole line of frontier between the Canadas and the United States,
occupied his early and serious consideration. That frontier comprehended a
distance of more than 900 miles, every part of which he determined to
dispute inch by inch, and to defend by every means in his power.
It was in pursuance of the defensive line of policy which had been so
wisely determined upon, as well with reference to his own resources, and
the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, as to the views and
instructions of the British Government, that the Commander of the forces
immediately after the commencement of the war, gave general instructions to
those in command under him, to abstain from any unnecessary and uncalled
for act of hostility upon the American territory. Notwithstanding these
general instructions, much was of course left to the discretion of those
who received them, in availing themselves of any fair opportunity of
retaliating upon the enemy the aggressive warfare they might attempt, by
attacking, wherever it might be done with any reasonable prospect of
success, the contiguous forts and possessions of the Americans.
The private letter of 31st March, 1812, to Major-General Brock, from which
an extract has already been made, evidently shews, that Sir George Prevost
never meant to restrain the officers in command under him from acting upon
the offensive, whenever circumstances were such as would justify their
departure from the defensive system. Of these circumstances they were the
best judges. That this was the light in which Sir George Prevost's
instructions were viewed by Major-General Brock, appears by the following
extract from a letter addressed by him to the Commander of the forces, on
the 3rd July, 1812, at which time he was fully aware of the defensive line
of policy which had been adopted:
"The account received, first through a mercantile channel, and soon after
repeated from various quarters, of war having been declared by the United
States against Great Britain, would have justified, in my opinion,
offensive operations. But the reflexion, that at Detroit and St. Joseph's,
the weak state of the garrisons would prevent the Commanders from
attempting any essential service connected in any degree with their future
security, and that my only means of annoyance on this communication, was
limited to the reduction of Fort Niagara, which could be battered at any
future period, I relinquished my original intentions, and attended only to
defensive measures."
That Captain Roberts, the commanding officer at Fort St. Joseph's, acted
from a sense of this discretion thus entrusted to him, there cannot be a
doubt, as in his official letter to the Adjutant-General, announcing the
capture of Michilimachinac, he does not allude in the slightest degree to
his having acted contrary to his orders. The approval of his conduct in
general orders is likewise a convincing proof that Sir George Prevost
considered that he had acted up to the spirit of his instructions whatever
they might have been, and that he had used a sound discretion respecting
them.
It however clearly appears by the above letter, that Captain Roberts acted
altogether from the orders he received from Major-General Brock, who was
fully aware, as it has been already shewn, of the sentiments of Sir George
Prevost, and who did not hesitate to give Captain Roberts the discretionary
order, which led to the attack and capture of the fort.
It will be seen from the preceding pages, that the approaching hostilities
with America had been the subject of frequent communication between Sir
George Prevost and Major-General Brock, for several months _prior to the
commencement_ of the war; and that, in more than one letter to which
reference has been made, the precautions necessary to be taken, and the
system and line of defence to be adopted in the event of war, had been
clearly and distinctly pointed out. Possessed then, as Sir George Prevost
knew General Brock to be, of his sentiments on this subject, and aware that
he would receive from the North West company, from whom he had himself
derived the information, the earliest intelligence of the actual
declaration of war, an immediate further communication of his sentiments
was unnecessary. On the day, however, on which the intelligence of that
event reached Quebec, the 25th June, 1812, a letter was despatched to
Major-General Brock from the Adjutant-General, communicating the
information; and as soon as the important arrangements respecting the Lower
Province, and particularly those for the defence of Quebec had been
completed, Sir George Prevost proceeded to Montreal. Upon his receiving at
that place a despatch from Mr. Foster, our late minister at Washington,
with an official notification of the war, he immediately afterwards, (on
7th July,) and within a fortnight after the first intelligence of it had
reached him at Quebec, sent off his first despatch to Major-General Brock.
This was followed by another on the 10th of the same month by Colonel
Lethbridge, who was sent to take the command at Kingston; and in both these
letters every instruction and information which Sir George Prevost's
situation afforded, or enabled him to give, were sent to the Major-General.
That these despatches did not reach General Brock until the 29th of the
month was owing to circumstances over which Sir George Prevost had no
control. It must be observed, however, that General Brock received the
despatches several days before he set off to join the army opposed to
General Hull, although the Reviewer[26] gives his readers to understand
that it did not arrive until after General Hull's capture.
The above statement will afford a full and satisfactory answer to the
misrepresentations of the Quarterly Reviewer,[27] and to the unwarrantable
insinuation by which they are accompanied, if indeed any answer were
wanting to assertions in which the writer has directly contradicted
himself. The Reviewer states, "that Sir George Prevost sent no instructions
whatever to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of
the war:"--and further, "that he, General Brock, was only restrained from
the measure of attacking Fort Niagara, _by the perplexity of his situation,
in being left without orders_." It is singular that the writer should have
forgotten, that only five pages before, he had stated[28] that "_on the
receipt_ of the intelligence of the American declaration of war,
Major-General Brock, who commanded the troops in the Upper Province
_immediately_ despatched DISCRETIONARY orders to the British officer in
charge of Fort St. Joseph's, to act either _offensively_ or otherwise
against the enemy at Michilimachinac, as he should find advisable." If
General Brock was justified in giving these discretionary orders to act
offensively as circumstances might require, it follows that he must have
considered a similar line of conduct open to himself; and yet, in the face
of this statement, the Reviewer gravely endeavours to persuade his readers,
that General Brock was in perplexity with regard to the measures which he
should pursue.
The Reviewer's insinuation, that Sir G. Prevost sent no instructions to
General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war, with
the intention of leaving that officer to act on his own responsibility,
cannot be passed over in silence. It has been already proved, by
incontrovertible facts, that the contemptible motives thus attributed to
the Commander of the forces, could not possibly have existed in his mind;
and the attempt to impute to him a conduct so dishonorable ought therefore
to be marked with the severest reprobation. No two persons could more
sincerely respect and esteem each other than these gallant and high-minded
individuals. Sir George Prevost had early evinced his opinion of General
Brock's merits and talents, in a private communication to him of the 22d
Jan. 1812, several months before the war; and the reply of General Brock to
that communication, was sufficient evidence of the sentiments he
entertained towards the Commander, under whom he expressed himself to be so
desirous of serving. Indeed, the utmost confidence and cordiality
prevailed between these officers, as is amply manifested in the
correspondence before referred to; and wherever a difference of opinion did
exist, General Brock never hesitated to yield to what he expressed and
considered the superior knowledge and experience of the Commander in Chief.
The conduct of Sir George Prevost in his communications with General Brock,
after receiving intelligence of the war, was not attended with any of those
consequences which the Reviewer has asserted. Upon this head General
Brock's correspondence with the Commander of the forces is conclusive.
The first letter from that officer, after the receipt of the intelligence
of the war, is dated the 3d July, at Fort George; the extract from which,
already given, is a convincing proof, that whatever might have been his
intention in moving from York to Fort George, he was not restrained from
the measure of attacking Fort Niagara by any deficiency of instructions
from the Commander of the Forces.
The next letter from General Brock is from Fort George, dated 12th July,
and states that the enemy were constructing batteries at the different
points of the frontier; that he was making exertions to counteract their
views; and that the arrival, that morning, of the Royal George and the
vessels under convoy, bringing various pieces of ordnance, would give him a
decided superiority. Not a single word is said in this despatch of any wish
or intention on the part of the Major-General to invade the American
territory. Major-General Brock's next letter of the 20th July states, that
the enemy had evidently diminished his force, and appeared to have no
intention of making an immediate attack. This letter also communicated the
intelligence of General Hull's invasion of the Province. It likewise
contained details of General Brock's means of defensive warfare, and
expressed some apprehension for the fate of the troops under his command,
should the communication be cut off between Kingston and Montreal; which
apprehension was entertained by him on the supposition, as he stated, that
"the _slender means possessed by Sir G. Prevost would not admit of
diminution, and consequently that he could not look for reinforcements_."
The same letter acknowledged the receipt of the Adjutant General's
communication from Quebec, of 25th June, of the declaration of war. In the
succeeding despatch from General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, dated 26th July,
from Fort George, that officer writes as follows: "I have not deemed it of
sufficient importance to commence active operations on this line by an
attack on Fort Niagara; it can be demolished, when found necessary, in
half an hour, and _there my means of annoyance would cease. To enable the
militia to acquire some degree of discipline, without interruption, is of
far greater consequence than such a conquest_."
The next letter from the Major-General, dated from York, the 28th July,
principally relates to the approaching meeting of the legislature, and
mentions his intention of detaching a force for the relief of Amherstburg.
A letter from the same place, written on the following day, communicates
the surrender of Michilimachinac, and particularly acknowledges the receipt
of Sir George Prevost's despatches of the 7th and 10th July, written _after
the declaration of war_, and before alluded to. General Brock also states
his intention of embarking immediately in the Prince Regent, (the vessel
which had been built and equipped since the month of March preceding), for
Fort George, from whence he should speedily return to York. On the 4th
August, a short letter was addressed by General Brock to Sir G. Prevost,
from York, principally upon the proceeding of the legislature, regarding
the militia laws, and on the following day he set off for Amherstburg, from
whence he did not return until after the glorious termination of Hull's
invasion. It was, therefore, from a consideration of the nature of his
resources, and of the necessity of maturing and husbanding them, and from
a conviction that Niagara would easily fall whenever he should be inclined
to attack it, and not from any doubt arising from want of instructions,
that General Brock abandoned the attempt.