It was only through long hard work that the writer arrived at
conclusions which the reader may be disposed to accept as very
natural, under the circumstances. It is possible that the reader may,
nevertheless, be interested in the manner in which the suggestion here
advanced was reached.
The writer had for several years been working at the premier edition
of the fragments of Numenius, in reasonably complete form, with
translation and outline. After ransacking the accessible sources of
fragments, there remained yet an alleged treatise of Numenius on
Matter, in the library of the Escoreal, near Madrid. This had been
known to savants in Germany for many years; and Prof. Uzener, of
Bonn, in his criticism of Thedinga's partial collection of fragments,
had expressed a strong desire that it be investigated; it had also
been noticed by Zeller, and Bouillet, as well as Chaignet. If then I
hoped to publish a comparatively reliable collection of the fragments
of Numenius, it was my duty, though hailing from far America, and
though no European had shown enough interest therein to send for a
photographic copy, to go there, and get one, which I did in July, 1913.
I bore the precious fragment to Rostock and Prof. Thedinga in Hagen,
where, however, we discovered that it was no more than a section of
Plotinos's Enneads, iii. 6.6 to end. The manuscript did, indeed, show
an erasure of the name of Plotinos, and the substitution of that of
Numenius. After the first disappointment, it became unavoidable to ask
the question why the monk should have done that. Had he any reason
to suppose that this represented Numenian doctrine, even if it was
not written by Numenius? Having no external data to go by, it became
necessary to resort to internal criticism, to compare this Plotinian
treatment of matter with other Plotinian treatments, in other portions
of the Enneads.
This then inevitably led to a close scrutiny of Plotinos's various
treatments of the subject, with results that were very much unlooked
for. This part that we might well have had reason to ascribe to
Numenian influence, on the contrary, turned out to be by far
more Plotinian than other sections that we would at first have
unhesitatingly considered Plotinian, and, as will be seen elsewhere,
the really doubtful portions occur in the very last works of Plotinos's
life, where it would have been more natural to expect the most genuine.
However, the result was a demonstration of a progress in doctrines in
the career of Plotinos, and after a careful study thereof, the reader
will agree that we have in this case every element of probability in
favor of such a development; indeed, it will seem so natural that the
unbiased reader will ask himself why this idea has not before this been
the general view of the matter.
* * * * *
First a few words about the distinction of periods in general.
Among unreflecting people, for centuries, it has been customary
to settle disputes by appeals to the Bible as a whole. This was
always satisfactory, until somebody else came along who held totally
different views, which he supported just as satisfactorily from the
same authority. The result was the century-long bloody wars of the
Reformation, everywhere leaving in that particular place, as the
orthodox, the stronger. Since thirty years, however, the situation has
changed. The contradictions of the Bible, so long the ammunition of
scoffers of the type of Ingersoll, became the pathfinders of the Higher
Criticism, which has solved the otherwise insoluble difficulties by
showing them to rest on parallel documents, and different authors. It
is no longer sufficient to appeal to Isaiah; we must now specify which
Isaiah we mean; and we may no longer refer to the book of Genesis, but
to the Jehovistic or Elohistic documents.
This method of criticism is slowly gaining ground with other works. The
writer, for instance, applied it with success to the Gathas, or hymns
of Zoroaster. These appear in the Yasnas in two sections which have
ever given the editors much trouble. Either they were printed in the
meaningless traditional order, or they were mixed confusedly according
to the editor's fancy, resulting of course in a fancy picture. The
writer, however, discovered they were duplicate lives of Zoroaster, and
printing them on opposite pages, he has shown parallel development,
reducing the age-long difficulties to perfectly reasonable, and
mutually confirming order.
Another case is that of Plato. It is still considered allowable to
quote the authority of Plato, as such; but in scientific matters we
must always state which period of Plato's activities, the Plato of the
Republic, or the more conservative Plato of the Laws, and the evil
World-soul, is meant.
Another philosopher in the same case is Schelling, among whose views
the text-books distinguish as many as five different periods. This
is no indication of mental instability, but rather a proof that he
remained awake as long as he lived. No man can indeed continue to think
with genuineness without changing his views; and only men as great as
Bacon or Emerson have had the temerity to discredit consistency when
it is no more than mental inertia.
There are many other famous men who changed their views. Prominent
among them is Goethe, whose Second Faust, finished in old age, strongly
contrasted with the First Part. What then would be inherently unlikely
in Plotinos's changing his views during the course of half a century
of philosophical activity? On the contrary, it would be a much greater
marvel had he not done so; and the burden of proof really lies with the
partisans of unchanging opinions.
For example: in ii. 4 we find Plotinos discussing the doctrine of two
matters, the physical and the intelligible. In the very next book,
of the same Ennead, in ii. 5.3, we find him discrediting this same
intelligible matter. Moreover, in i. 8.7, he approves of the world as
mixture; in ii. 4.7 he disapproves of it. What do these contradictions
mean? That Plotinos was unreliable? That he was mentally incoherent?
No, something much simpler. By consulting the tables of Porphyry, we
discover of the first two, that the first statement was made during
the Amelian period, and the latter during the Porphyrian. Another case
of such contradiction is his assertion of positive evil (i. 8) and
his denial thereof (ii. 9). The latter assertion is of the Porphyrian
period, the former is Eustochian; while of the latter two, the first
was Eustochian; and the second Amelian. It is simply a case of
development of doctrines at different periods of his life.
* * * * *
Let us now examine Plotinos's various treatments of the subject of
matter.
The first treatment of matter occurs in the first Ennead, and it may
be described as thoroughly Numenian, being treated in conjunction with
the subject of evil. First, we have the expression of the Supreme
hovering over Being.[372] Then we have the soul double,[373] reminding
us of Numenius's view of the double Second Divinity[374] and the double
soul.[375] Then we have positive evil occurring in the absence of
good.[376] Plotinos[377] opposes the Stoic denial of evil, for he says,
"if this were all," there were no evil. We find a threefold division
of the universe without the Stoic term hypostasis, which occurs in the
treatment of the same topic elsewhere.[378] Similar to Numenius is the
King of all,[379] the blissful life of the divinities around him,[380]
and the division of the universe into three.[381] Plotinos[382]
acknowledges evil things in the world, something denied by the
Stoics,[383] but taught by Numenius, as is also original, primary
existence of evil, in itself. Evil is here said to be a hypostasis in
itself, and imparts evil qualities to other things. It is an image of
being, and a genuine nature of evil. Plotinos describes[384] matter
as flowing eternally, which reminds us unmistakably of Numenius's
image[385] of matter as a swiftly flowing stream, unlimited and
infinite in depth, breadth, and length. Evil inheres in the material
part of the body,[386] and is seen as actual, positive, darkness,
which is Numenian, as far as it means a definite principle.[387]
Plotinos also[388] insists on the ineradicability of evil, in almost
the same terms as Numenius,[389] who calls on Heraclitus and Homer as
supporters. Plotinos[390] as reason for this assigns the fact that the
world is a mixture, which is the very proof advanced by Numenius in 12.
Plotinos, moreover,[391] defines matter as that which remains after all
qualities are abstracted; this is thoroughly Numenian.[392]
In the fourth book of the Second Ennead the treatment of matter is
original, and is based on comparative studies. Evil has disappeared
from the horizon; and the long treatment of the controversy with the
Gnostics[393] is devoted to explaining away evil as misunderstood
good. Although he begins by finding fault with Stoic materialism,[394]
he asserts two matters, the intelligible and the physical. Intelligible
matter[395] is eternal, and possesses essence. Plotinos goes on[396]
to argue for the necessity of an intelligible, as well as a physical
substrate (hypokeimenon). In the next paragraph[397] Plotinos seems
to undertake a historical polemic, against three traditional teachers
(Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus) under whose names he was
surely finding fault with their disciples: the Stoics, Numenius, and
possibly such thinkers as Lucretius. Empedocles is held responsible
for the view that elements are material, evidently a Stoical view.
Anaxagoras is held responsible for three views, which are distinctly
Numenian: that the world is a mixture,[398] that it is all in all,[399]
and that it is infinite.[400] We might, in passing, notice another
Plotinian contradiction in here condemning the world as mixture,
approved in the former passage.[401] As to the atomism of Democritus,
it is not clear with which contemporaries he was finding fault.
Intelligible matter reappears[402] where we also find again the idea
of doubleness of everything. As to the terms used by the way, we find
the Stoic categories of Otherness or Variety[403] and Motion; the
conceptual seminal logoi, and the "Koinê ousia" of matter; but in
his psychology he uses "logos" and "noêsis," instead of "nous" and
"phronesis," which are found in the Escorial section, and which are
more Stoical. We also find the Aristotelian category of energy, or
potentiality.
In the very next book of the same Ennead,[404] we find another
treatment of matter, on an entirely different basis, accented by a
rejection of intelligible matter.[405] Here the whole basis of the
treatment of matter is the Aristotelian category of "energeia" and
"dunamis," or potentiality and actuality, Although we find the Stoic
term hypostasis, the book seems to be more Numenian, for matter is
again a positive lie, and the divinity is described by the Numenian
double name[406] of Being and Essence ("ousia" and "to on").
We now come to the Escorial section.[407] This is by far the most
extensive treatment of matter, and as we are chiefly interested in it
in connection with its bearing the name of Numenius at the Escorial,
we shall analyze it for and against this Numenian authorship, merely
noting that the chief purpose is to describe the impassibility of
matter, a Stoic idea.
For Numenius as author we note:
a. A great anxiety to preserve agreement with Plato, even to the point
of stretching definitions.[408]
b. Plato's idea of participation, useless to monistic Stoics, is
repeatedly used.[409] Numenius had gone so far as to assert a
participation, even in the intelligibles.[410]
c. Matter appears as the curse of all existent objects.[411] It also
appears as mother.[412]
d. Try as he may, the author of this section cannot escape the dualism
so prominent in Numenius;[413] the acrobatic nature of his efforts in
this direction are pointed out elsewhere. We find here a thoroughgoing
distinction between soul and body, which is quite Numenian, and
dualistic.[414]
e. Matter is passive, possessing no resiliency.[415]
f. We find an argument directed[416] against those who "posit being in
matter." These must be the Stoics, with whom Numenius is ever in feud.
g. Of Numenian terms, we find "sôteria,"[417] God the Father.[418] Also
the double Numenian name for the Divinity, Being and Essence.[419]
Against Numenius as author, we note:
a. The general form of the section, which is that of the Enneads, not
the dialogue of Numenius's Treatise on the Good. We find also the usual
Plotinic interjected questions.
b. Un-Numenian, at least, is matter as a mirror,[420] and evil as
merely negative, merely unaffectability to good.[421] While Numenius
speaks of matter as nurse and feeder, here we read nurse and receptacle.
c. Stoic, is the chief subject of the section, namely the affectibility
of matter. Also, the allegoric interpretation of the myths, of the
ithyphallic Hermes, and the Universal Mother, which are like the other
Plotinic myths, of the double Hercules, Poros, Penia, and Koros. We
find[422] the Stoic idea of passibility and impassibility, although not
exactly that of passion and action. We find[423] connected the terms
"nous" and "phronêsis," also "anastasis." The term hypostasis, though
used undogmatically, as mere explanation of thought, is found.[424]
Frequent[425] are the conceptual logoi of the divine Mind (the seminal
logoi) which enter into matter to clothe themselves with it, to produce
objects. We also have the Stoic category "heterotês,"[426] and the
application of sex as explanation of the differences of the world.[427]
d. Aristotelian, are the "energeia" and "dunamis."[428]
e. Plotinic, are the latter ideas, for they are used in the same
connection.[429] Also the myths of Poros, Penia and Koros, which are
found elsewhere in similar relations.[430]
On the whole, therefore, the Plotinic authorship is much more strongly
indicated than the Numenian.
The next treatment of matter in the Fourth Ennead, is
semi-stoical.[431] The opposite aspects of the Universe appear
again as "phronesis" and "phusis." We find here the Stoic doing and
suffering, and[432] hypostasis. Nevertheless, the chief process
illustrated is still the Platonic image reproduced less and less
clearly in successively more degraded spheres of being. Plotinos seems
to put himself out of the Numenian sphere of thought, referring to
it in abstract historical manner, as belonging to the successors of
Pythagoras and Pherecydes, who treated of matter as the element that
distinguished objects in the intelligible world.
The last treatment of matter[433] seems to have reached the extreme
distance of Numenianism. Instead of a dualism, with matter an original,
positive principle, Plotinos closes his discussion by stating that
perhaps form and matter may not come from the same origin, as there is
some difference between them. He has just said that Being is common
to both form and matter, as to quality, though not as to quantity. A
little above this he insists that matter is not something original, as
it is later than many earthly, and than all intelligible objects. As
to the Numenian double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence, he had
taken from Aristotelianism the conceptions of "energeia" and "dunamis,"
and added them as the supreme hypostasis, so as to form in theological
dialect the triad he, following Numenius and Plato, had always asserted
cosmologically (good, intellect, and soul): "The developed energy[434]
assumes hypostasis, as if from a great, nay, as from the greatest
hypostasis of all; and so it joins Essence and Being."
Reviewing these various treatments of matter we might call the
first[435] Numenian; the next[436] Platonic (as most independent, and
historically treated); the next[437] as Aristotelian; the Escorial
Section as semi-Stoic;[438] as also another short notice.[439] The last
treatment of matter, in vi. 3.7, is fully Stoic, in its denial of the
evil of matter.
How then shall we explain these differences? Chiefly by studying the
periods in which they are written, and which they therefore explain.
* * * * *
When we try to study the periods in Plotinos's thought, as shown in
his books, we are met with great difficulties, which are chiefly
due to Porphyry. Exactly following the contemporary methods of the
compilers of the Bible, he undiscerningly confused the writings of
the various periods, so as to make up an anthology, grouped by six
groups of nine books each, according to subjects, consisting first
of ethical disquisitions; second, of physical questions; third,
of cosmic considerations; fourth, of psychological discussions;
fifth, of transcendental lucubrations; and sixth, of metaphysics and
theology.[440] As the reader might guess from the oversymmetrical
grouping, and this pretty classification, the apparent order is only
illusory, as he may have concluded from the fact that the discussions
of matter analyzed above are scattered throughout the whole range of
this anthology. The result of this Procrustean arrangement was the same
as with the Bible: a confusion of mosaic, out of which pretty nearly
anything could be proved, and into which almost everything has been
read. Compare the outlines of the doctrines of Plotinos by Ritter,
Zeller, Ueberweg, Chaignet, Mead, Guthrie, and Drews, and it will be
seen that there is very little agreement between them, while none of
them allow for the difference between the various parts of the Enneads.
How fearful the confusion is, will best be realized from the following
two tables, made up from the indications given in Porphyry's Life of
Plotinos.
Porphyry gives three lists of the works of the various periods.
Identifying these in the present Ennead arrangement, they are to be
found as follows:
The works of the Amelian period are now i. 6; iv. 7; iii. 1; iv. 2; v.
9; iv. 8; iv. 4; iv. 9; vi. 9; v. 1; v. 2; ii. 4; iii. 9; ii. 2; iii.
4; i. 9; ii. 6; v. 7; i. 2; i. 3; i. 8.
The works of the Porphyrian period are now vi. 5, 6; v. 6; ii. 5; iii.
6; iv. 3-5; iii. 8; v. 8; v. 5; ii. 9; vi. 6; ii. 8; i. 5; ii. 7; vi.
7; vi. 8; ii. 1; iv. 6; vi. 1-3; iii. 7.
The works of the latest or Eustochian period are: i. 4; iii. 2, 3; v.
3; iii. 5; i. 8; ii. 3; i. 1; i. 7. (For Eustochius, see Scholion to
Enn. iv. 4.29, ii. 7.86, Creuz. 1, 301 Kirchhof.)
A more convenient table will be the converse arrangement. Following
the present normal order of the books in Enneads, we will describe
its period by a letter, referring to the Amelian period by A, to the
Porphyrian by P, and the Eustochian by E. I: EAAEPAEAA. II: PAEAPAPPP.
III: AEEAEAPPA. IV: AAPPPPAAA. V: AAEAPPAPA. VI: PPPPPPPPA.
This artificial arrangement into Enneads should therefore be abandoned,
and in a new English translation that the writer has in mind, the books
would appear in the order of their periods, while an index would allow
easy reference by the old numbers. Then only will we be able to study
the successive changes of Plotinos's thought, in their normal mutual
relation; and it is not difficult to prophesy that important results
would follow.
* * * * *
Having thus achieved internal proof of development of doctrines in
Plotinos, by examination of his views about Matter, we may with some
confidence state that the externally known facts of the life of no
philosopher lend themselves to such a progress of opinions more readily
than that of Plotinos. His biographer, Porphyry, as we have seen, had
already given us a list of the works of three easily characterized
periods in Plotinos's life: the period before Porphyry came to him,
the period while Porphyry staid with him, and the later period when
Plotinos was alone, and Porphyry was in retirement (or banishment?) in
Sicily.
An external division into periods is therefore openly acknowledged; but
it remains for us to recall its significance.
In the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about
that Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius?
The answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient
in the details of elementary education, however much proficiency
in more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought,
and personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His
pronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so
that he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite
authorship.[441] These peculiarities would to some extent put him in
the power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains
why he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.[442] These
editors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely
suggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add
glosses of his own,[443] not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian
pieces,[444] for he relied on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." Besides,
Plotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of
Numenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary
for Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and
Plotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote
a letter of Longinus on the subject;[445] but Porphyry does not deny
that among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus,
and the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of
Numenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14).
Having thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must
examine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general
trend of the Plotinic career.
His last period was Stoic practise, for so zealously did he practise
austerities that his death was, at least, hastened thereby.[446] It
is unlikely that he would have followed Stoic precepts without some
sympathy for, or acquaintance with their philosophical doctrines; and
as we saw above, Porphyry acknowledges Plotinos's writings contain
hidden Stoic pieces.[447] Then, Plotinos spent the last period of his
life in Rome, where ruled, in philosophical circles, the traditions of
Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.
That these Stoic practices became fatal to him is significant when
we remember that this occurred during the final absence of Porphyry,
who may, during his presence, have exerted a friendly restraint on
the zealous master. At any rate, it was during Porphyry's regime that
the chief works of Plotinos were written, including a bitter diatribe
against the Gnostics, who remained the chief protagonists of dualism
and belief in positive evil. Prophyry's work, "De Abstinentia," proves
clearly enough his Stoic sympathies.
Such aggressive enmity is too positive to be accounted for by the mere
removal to Rome from Alexandria, and suggests a break of some sort
with former friends. Indications of such a break do exist, namely,
the permanent departure to his earlier home, Apamea, of his former
editor, Amelius. We hear[448] of an incident in which Amelius invited
Plotinos to come and take part in the New Moon celebrations[449] of
the mysteries. Plotinos, however, refused, on the grounds that "They
must come to me, not I go to them." Then we hear[450] of bad blood
between this Amelius and Porphyry, a long, bitter controversy, patched
up, indeed, but which cannot have failed to leave its mark. Then this
Amelius writes a book on the Differences between Plotinos and Numenius,
which, in a long letter, he inscribes to Porphyry,[451] as if the
latter were the chief one interested in these distinctions. Later,
Amelius, who before this seems to have been the chief disciple and
editor of Plotinos, departs, never to return, his place being taken by
Porphyry. It is not necessary to possess a vivid imagination to read
between the lines, especially when Plotinos, in the last work of this
period, against the Gnostics, section 10, seems to refer to friends of
his who still held to other doctrines.
Now in order to understand the nature of the period when Amelius was
the chief disciple of Plotinos, we must recall who Amelius was. In
the first place, he hailed from the home-town of Numenius, Apamea in
Syria. He had adopted as son Hostilianus-Hesychius, who also hailed
from Apamea. And it was to Apamea that Amelius withdrew, after he
left Plotinos. We are therefore not surprised to learn that he had
written out almost all the books of Numenius, that he had gathered them
together, and learned most of them by heart.[452] Then we learn from
Proclus (see Zeller's account) that Amelius taught the trine division
of the divine creator, exactly as did Numenius. Is it any wonder, then,
that he wrote a book on the differences between Plotinos and Numenius
at a later date, when Porphyry had started a polemic with him? During
his period as disciple of Plotinos, twenty-four years in duration,
Plotinos would naturally have been under Numenian influence of some
kind, and we cannot be very far wrong in thinking that this change of
editors must have left some sort of impress on the dreamy thinker,
Plotinos, ever seeking to experience an ecstasy.
* * * * *
In this account of the matter we have restrained ourselves from
mentioning one of the strangest coincidences in literature, which would
have emphasized the nature of the break of Amelius with Plotinos, for
the reason that it may be no more than a chance pun; but that even as
such it must have been present to the actors in that drama, there is no
doubt. We read above that Amelius invited Plotinos to accompany him to
attend personally the mystery-celebrations at the "noumênia," a time
sacred to such celebrations.[453] But this was practically the name of
Numenius, and the text might well have been translated that Amelius
invited him to visit the celebrations as Numenius would have done; and
indeed, from all we know of Numenius, with his initiation at Eleusis
and in Egypt, that is just of what we might have supposed he would have
approved. In other words, we would discover Amelius in the painful act
of choice between the two great influences of his life, Numenius, and
Plotinos. Moreover, that the incident was important is revealed by
Porphyry's calling Plotinos's answer a "great word," which was much
commented on, and long remembered.
* * * * *
In thus dividing the career of Plotinos in the Amelian, the Porphyrian,
and Eustochian (98) we meet however one very interesting difficulty.
The Plotinic writings by Porphyry assigned to the last or Eustochian
period are those which internal criticism would lead us to assign to
his very earliest philosophising; and in our study of the development
of the Plotinic views about Matter, we have taken the liberty of
considering them as the earliest. We are however consoled in our
regret at having to be so radical, by noticing that Porphyry, to whom
we are indebted for our knowledge of the periods of the works, has
done the same thing. He says that he has assigned the earliest place
in each Ennead to the easier and simpler discussions;[454] yet these
latest-issued works of Plotinos are assigned to the very beginning of
each Ennead, four going to the First Ennead, one to the Second, three
to the Third, and one only to the Fifth. If these had been the crowning
works of the Master's life, especially the treatise on the First God
and Happiness, it would have been by him placed at the very end of
all, and not at the beginning. Porphyry must therefore have possessed
some external knowledge which would agree with the conclusions of our
internal criticism, which follows.
These Eustochian works make the least use of Stoic, or even
Aristotelian terms, most closely following even the actual words of
Numenius. For instance, we may glance at the very first book of the
First Ennead, which though of the latest period, is thoroughly Numenian.
The first important point is the First Divinity "hovering over"
Being,[455] using the same word as Numenius.[456] This was suggested by
Prof. Thedinga. However, he applied the words "he says" to Numenius;
but this cannot be the case, as a Platonic quotation immediately.
The whole subject of the Book is the composite soul, and this is
thoroughly Numenian.[457]