NOT ALL AFFECTIONS COMMON TO SOUL AND BODY.

How then arise these affections common to the soul and the body? Shall

we then say that desire derives from the desire-appetite,[293] anger

from the anger-appetite, or in short, every emotion or affliction from

the corresponding appetite? But even so, they will not be common, and

they will belong exclusively to the soul, or to the body. There are

some whose origin needs the excitation of blood and bile, and that the

body be in some certain state which excites desire, as in physical

love. On the contrary, however, the desire of goodness is no common

affection; it is an affection peculiar to the soul, as are several

others. Reason, therefore, does not allow us to consider all affections

as common to soul and body.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 218 / 382 题