When[176] (Theodor) tells (Socrates) that evils would be annihilated
if men practised (Socrates') teachings, the latter answers that that
is impossible, for evil is necessary even if only as the contrary of
good. But how then can wickedness, which is the evil of man, be the
contrary of good? Because it is the contrary of virtue. Now virtue,
without being Good in itself, is still a good, a good which makes us
dominate matter. But how can Good in itself, which is not a quality,
have a contrary? Besides, why need the existence of one thing imply
its contrary? Though we may grant that there is a possibility of the
existence of the contrary of some things--as for instance, that a man
in good health might become sick--there is no such necessity. Nor does
Plato assert that the existence of each thing of this kind necessarily
implies that of its contrary; he makes this statement exclusively of
the Good. But how can there be a contrary to good, if the good be
"being," let alone "above being"?[177] Evidently, in reference to
particular beings, there can be nothing contrary to "being." This is
proved by induction; but the proposition has not been demonstrated
as regards universal Being. What then is the contrary of universal
Being, and first principles in general? The contrary of "being" must
be nonentity; the contrary of the nature of the Good is the nature
and principle of Evil. These two natures are indeed respectively the
principles of goods and of evils. All their elements are mutually
opposed, so that both these natures, considered in their totality,
are still more opposed than the other contraries. The latter, indeed,
belong to the same form, to the same kind, and they have something in
common in whatever subjects they may be. As to the Contraries that are
essentially distinguished from each other, whose nature is constituted
of elements opposed to the constitutive elements of the other, those
Contraries are absolutely opposed to each other, since the connotation
of that word implies things as opposite to each other as possible.
Measure, determination, and the other characteristics of the divine
nature[178] are the opposites of incommensurability, indefiniteness,
and the other contrary things that constitute the nature of evil. Each
one of these wholes, therefore, is the contrary of the other. The being
of the one is that which is essentially and absolutely false; that of
the other is genuine Being; the falseness of the one is, therefore, the
contrary of the truth of the other. Likewise what pertains to the being
of the one is the contrary of what belongs to the being of the other.
We also see that it is not always true to say that there is no contrary
to "being," for we acknowledge that water and fire are contraries, even
if they did not contain the common element of matter, of which heat and
cold, humidity and dryness, are accidents. If they existed alone by
themselves, if their being were complete without any common subject,
there would still be an opposition, and an opposition of "being."
Therefore the things that are completely separate, which have nothing
in common, which are as distant as possible, are by nature contrary.
This is not an opposition of quality, nor of any kinds of beings; it is
an opposition resulting from extreme distance, and from being composed
of contraries, thereby communicating this characteristic to their
elements.