While, therefore, asserting that a simple principle does know itself,
we must examine into the possibility of this.[98] Otherwise, we would
have to give up hope of real self-knowledge. But to resign this would
imply many absurdities; for if it be absurd to deny that the soul
possesses self-knowledge, it would be still more absurd to deny it of
intelligence. How could intelligence have knowledge of other beings,
if it did not possess the knowledge and science of itself? Indeed,
exterior things are perceived by sensation, and even, if you insist, by
discursive reason and opinion; but not by intelligence. It is indeed
worth examining whether intelligence does, or does not have knowledge
of such external things. Evidently, intelligible entities are known
by intelligence. Does intelligence limit itself to knowledge of these
entities, or does it, while knowing intelligible entities, also know
itself? In this case, does it know that it knows only intelligible
entities, without being able to know what itself is? While knowing that
it knows what belongs to it, is it unable to know what itself, the
knower, is? Or can it at the same time know what belongs to it, and
also know itself? Then how does this knowledge operate, and how far
does it go? This is what we must examine.