THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (2ND BATTALION)
[Illustration: The Grenadier Guards at Ypres.]
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt. Oct. 1914.]
Having completed its detrainment, the First Corps, under Sir Douglas
Haig, was concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck. Sir John French
had now to make up his mind whether he would use it to strengthen his
line, which was much longer than his numbers warranted, or send it to
the north of Ypres. He decided that the greatest danger was that the
Germans might carry out a wide turning movement on his left flank, and
he sent the Corps north of Ypres accordingly. The French cavalry were to
operate on Sir Douglas Haig's left, and the Third Cavalry Division,
under General Byng, on his right.
[Sidenote: Oct. 15-20.]
After two nights in billets at Hazebrouck, the 2nd Battalion marched on
the 17th to Boeschepe. Two days afterwards arrived Captain M. E.
Makgill-Crichton-Maitland, Captain R. H. V. Cavendish, M.V.O.,
Lieutenant J. S. Hughes, Lieutenant I. St. C. Rose, and Captain C. R.
Champion de Crespigny, who was appointed Staff Captain to the 4th
Brigade.
The officers of the 2nd Battalion were now as follows:
Lieut.-Colonel W. R. A. Smith, Commanding Officer.
Major G. D. Jeffreys, Second in Command.
Capt. E. J. L. Pike, Adjutant.
Lieut. C. W. Tufnell, Machine-gun Officer.
2nd Lieut. A. K. S. Cunninghame, Transport Officer.
Lieut. J. H. Skidmore, Quartermaster.
Major G. C. Hamilton, No. 1 Company.
Capt. C. Symes-Thompson, No. 1 Company.
Lieut. J. S. Hughes, No. 1 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. W. R. Bailey, No. 1 Company.
Major Lord Bernard Gordon-Lennox, No. 2 Company.
Lieut. I. St. C. Rose, No. 2 Company.
Lieut. C. M. C. Dowling, No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. F. W. J. M. Miller, No. 2 Company.
Capt. E. G. H. Powell, No. 3 Company.
Capt. R. H. V. Cavendish, M.V.O., No. 3 Company.
Lieut. Lord Congleton, No. 3 Company.
Lieut. F. G. Marshall, No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. R. Gerard, No. 3 Company.
Capt. M. E. Makgill-Crichton-Maitland, No. 4 Company.
Capt. E. D. Ridley, No. 4 Company.
Lieut. F. G. Beaumont-Nesbitt, No. 4 Company.
Lieut. M. G. Stocks, No. 4 Company.
It was a cold raw morning on the 20th, when the Battalion marched at 5
A.M. to St. Jean, a small village to the north of Ypres, where it was
ordered to take up an entrenched position, with the Coldstream on the
right, and the 5th Brigade on the left. Matters were complicated by the
fact that the French looked upon this part of the line as theirs.
However, eventually matters were arranged, and British and French troops
settled down together to a pouring wet night.
[Illustration: Lieutenant-Colonel W.R.A. Smith C.M.G. Commanding 2nd
Battalion. Died of wounds received at Festubert 19 May 1915.]
[Sidenote: Oct. 21.]
There was another move next morning. The Battalion assembled at 5.30,
and marched to a position near Hanebeek Brook, about two miles west of
Zonnebeke, where the 4th Brigade concentrated. Then the whole Brigade
advanced about half a mile towards Passchendaele with the 3rd Battalion
Coldstream on the left, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the
right--each battalion having two companies in the firing line, and the
rest in support, while the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was in reserve.
About 2.30 Lord Cavan, finding that the two Coldstream battalions had
drifted somewhat apart, ordered up the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers into the
centre of the line. As they made their way across ploughed fields, they
came in for a great deal of unaimed rifle-fire, but suffered very little
loss.
About 400 to 500 yards east of Zonnebeke--Langemarck road the three
battalions dug themselves in for the night, since news had been received
that large German forces were advancing through Houthulst Forest. Before
long the sky was lit up in all directions by the farms which the enemy
was burning. By this illumination the Germans attempted a
counter-attack, and came on shouting, "Don't fire, we are the
Coldstream." It was characteristic of the German thoroughness of method
to master this regimental idiosyncrasy, and say Coldstream and not
Coldstreams. But the Battalion had not fought for two months without
learning the enemy's tricks, and as spiked helmets could be distinctly
seen against the glow of the burning farms, they fired right into the
middle of the Germans, who hastily retired.
[Sidenote: Oct. 22-23.]
Before daylight next morning the companies in the firing line were
relieved by those in support. The whole Brigade then set itself to
improving the trenches and consolidating the position. It turned out
that on the left the First Division had been held up, while on the right
the 22nd Brigade was in a tight place. Consequently the situation was
distinctly uncomfortable. The trenches, composed of isolated holes which
held two or three men apiece, were exposed from the left to enfilade
fire, but there the Battalion had to remain for two days, shelled
intermittently. They suffered many casualties. While making his way down
the firing line, Captain Maitland was forced to walk a great deal in the
open, and was wounded in the head by a sniper, who succeeded in hitting
several other men. In the evening Lieutenant Donald Miller, who had come
out originally with the Battalion, and had fought all through the
retreat, was killed by a high-explosive shell.
[Sidenote: Oct. 24.]
On the 24th the Second Division got orders to take up the ground
occupied by the Seventh Division, from Poezelhoek to the
Becelaere--Passchendaele road, and the First Division was relieved by
French Territorial troops, and concentrated about Zillebeke.
At the same time the 4th Brigade was relieved by a Brigade from the
Sixth French Army under General Moussy, and the men of the Grenadiers
watched the French attack Passchendaele with much interest. Though the
attack was met with a heavy artillery and rifle fire, and made but
little progress, the personal gallantry of General Moussy himself and
his staff, who exposed themselves freely while close up to the front
trenches, made a great impression on all the officers and men of the 2nd
Battalion. After dark this French Brigade took over the trenches, and
the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers moved back about two miles to a farm, where
the men managed to snatch a couple of hours' sleep. At 5.30 A.M. it
started off again, and after a circuitous march of about six miles
reached Eksternest, where it formed the reserve of the 6th Brigade.
Here, at last, it had a thorough rest in barns, outhouses, and
elsewhere, with plenty of straw to lie on, while a fowl-house
constituted No. 3 Company Headquarters.
[Sidenote: Oct. 25.]
The Battalion paraded, much refreshed, at 6.30 next morning, but did not
move off till 9. It advanced towards the Six Cross Roads, and halted
behind Polygon Wood. In the afternoon it was ordered to attack the
enemy's position near Reutel, passing over the trenches held by the 5th
Brigade, while the Irish Guards were to advance on the same position
from the north-west. The Orders were:
The attack will begin at 3 P.M. 4th Guards Brigade will have for its
objective the Reutel Spur. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards will
commence its advance at once as far as the line of trenches now held
by the 5th Brigade. At 3 P.M. its scouts will pass that line, and
the battalion will endeavour to establish itself in such a position
that it can by its fire materially assist the main attack which will
be delivered from the south and south-west.
The 2nd Batt. Grenadiers will work round the stream at once as
verbally ordered until their right reaches a point one company's
length beyond the forks of the two streams. At 3 P.M. it will be
prepared to attack the R. of Reutel from S.W. During this operation
the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers will specially detail a half company to
protect its right. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream will follow the
Grenadiers and act in close support of them. They must also give
special orders about their right flank. The 3rd Battalion Coldstream
will be in reserve in a covered position at Six Cross Roads. It is
quite understood that the time is short, but this operation must be
carefully carried out without hurry. Brigade Headquarters will be at
Six Cross Roads at 2.45 P.M.
Advancing in artillery formation, the Battalion came in for a great deal
of rifle-fire, but fortunately no shells. Major Lord Bernard Lennox had
taken advantage of the halt in the morning to reconnoitre the line of
advance thoroughly, and was able to lead the companies to their
destinations. There was no great difficulty in reaching the trenches,
but when the Battalion advanced another 150 yards it came under a very
heavy cross-fire; only one platoon of No. 2 Company actually crossed the
5th Brigade trenches. The other companies were held up before they
reached the firing line. The Bedfords on the right, unable to carry on
the advance, retired again to the trenches, and the Irish Guards on the
left were also held up.
Darkness was now coming on, and it seemed madness to attempt to take a
strong position in a thick wood where no one knew precisely the position
of the trenches, or how strongly they were held. So Lieut.-Colonel Smith
directed No. 2 Company to fall back and take over a trench from the
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, with the Highland Light Infantry on the left
and the Royal Scots Fusiliers on the right. A platoon of No. 1 Company
was added to the right of No. 2. Its position was along the front edge
of the private grounds of a fine château, which was then intact.
Three times during the night, which was very dark and windy and rainy,
the Germans attacked--at 9 P.M., at midnight, and at 3 A.M. But the
position was fairly secure, and each time they retired. It is doubtful
whether they ever intended to press the attack home, and possibly they
were only trying to locate the exact position of our trenches--not a
very difficult task, as they were but 300 yards off.
That evening the following message was received from Sir John French:
The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief wishes once more to make it
known to the troops under his command how deeply he appreciates the
bravery and endurance which they have again displayed since their
arrival in the northern theatre of war. In circulating the official
information which records the splendid victory of our Russian
Allies, he would remind the troops that the enemy must before long
withdraw troops to the East and relieve the tension on our front. He
feels it is quite unnecessary to urge officers, N.C.O.'s, and men to
make a determined effort and drive the enemy over the frontier.
[Sidenote: Oct. 26.]
Digging started with a will in the trenches early next morning. It had
come to be a regular habit with the battalions which had been through
those first months of the war, at once to dig themselves in deep in any
new position, no matter how soon they might have to move on. They had
learned by experience that the labour was well worth while. On this
occasion the trouble was that the deeper the men dug the wetter the
ground became, and soon they were up to their ankles in mud. But the sun
came out about mid-day, and helped to dry up the ground.
No regular attack was made that day, though there was constant shelling,
and the Battalion therefore had comparatively few casualties. German
snipers were very busy, but did little damage; our men took every
opportunity of retaliating; and Lieutenant I. Rose was reported to have
been particularly successful in accounting for the enemy marksmen. The
howitzers paid less attention to the trenches than to the Château. On
this unfortunate building the high-explosive shells dropped with
monotonous regularity, but the little tower still remained standing. The
Battalion Headquarters, which were behind the Château, had a decidedly
warm time, getting the benefit not only of the shells from the
howitzers, but of all the stray bullets that went wide of the trenches.
[Sidenote: Oct. 27.]
Most of the next day was spent in mending the line and consolidating the
position, for there were weak spots, which the Divisional Staff
discovered, usually between Brigades. Barbed wire was now to be had, and
orders were issued for entanglements to be put up in front of each
trench. In the afternoon the companies of the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers
in reserve were sent to take over the trenches of the 3rd Battalion
Coldstream, and to stay there until they were relieved by the Black
Watch at midnight. Both these reliefs were carried out successfully and
without any casualties, though the task was by no means easy, owing to
the thickness of the wood and consequent bad communications.
Sir John French had now placed what remained of the Seventh Division and
the Third Cavalry Division under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig, who
redistributed the line thus:
(A) The Seventh Division from the Château east of Zandvoorde to the
Menin road.
(B) The First Division from the Menin road to a point immediately west
of Reutel village.
(C) The Second Division to near the Moorslede--Zonnebeke road.
[Sidenote: Oct. 28.]
The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers now moved back about a mile to
Nonne-Bosschen Wood, and having slept there returned the next morning
under howitzer fire across two fields to the northern edge of Polygon
Wood, where it remained until the 6th Brigade passed through it to
attack Reutel Ridge. Then it moved forward in support, and dug in round
a farm. Before it had gone far the 6th Brigade was fiercely attacked,
and succeeded in driving the enemy off with some loss, though unable to
advance farther itself. The 4th Brigade was not wanted, and spent a
quiet afternoon near the Farm--"quiet" in this case being a comparative
term, denoting that they were not directly under fire, for our own
howitzers were only twenty yards off, and kept firing ear-splitting
salvos all day.
[Sidenote: Oct. 29.]
Having received orders the night before to be ready at a moment's
notice, the Battalion was under arms soon after dawn next day. But it
was not until much later that it got instructions to move to the other
side of the Racecourse Wood, and entrench a position almost at right
angles to the line of trenches in front. It turned out that the Seventh
Division on the right had been driven back, and though most of the
ground had been regained there was still a risk of the Germans pushing
through. Meanwhile, Captain Ridley was ordered to take No. 4 Company,
and support the Cameron Highlanders near the Château. He sent up two
platoons into the trenches on their right, and kept the rest in support.
They came in for a good deal of shell-fire, but were not seriously
attacked.
[Sidenote: Oct. 30.]
Except for No. 4 Company the Battalion was in Corps Reserve next day
with the Irish Guards, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream were
in the trenches. But about 3 P.M. the Brigadier, Lord Cavan, got news
that there had been a serious break in the line about two miles to the
right, _i.e._ the south, and was instructed to send up the battalions,
which he had in reserve, to report to General Bulfin, commanding the 2nd
Brigade.
Lord Cavan went himself to see General Bulfin at his Headquarters, and
was directed to despatch these battalions southwards to protect the
right flank of the 2nd Brigade. Accordingly the 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers, Irish Guards, and Oxfordshire Light Infantry marched off
from Polygon Wood towards Klein Zillebeke, and Captain Ridley was
ordered to withdraw No. 4 Company and join the remainder of the
Battalion as it moved off. The orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Smith were
to reinforce the cavalry, which was holding a line very lightly north of
the Château de Hollebeke.
By dusk these battalions were astride of the Klein Zillebeke--Zandvoorde
road, the Grenadiers on the right and the Irish Guards on the left, with
their left thrown forward a little, to keep touch with the right of the
2nd Brigade. Lord Cavan went on ahead with his Staff, to see that the
whole line was made continuous. On going forward to inspect the position
which the cavalry was holding, Lieut.-Colonel Smith found that it was on
a forward slope, which seemed to him untenable, and he thought this a
good opportunity for making a fresh disposition. So he arranged with the
cavalry that it should continue to hold its line, while the Battalion
dug in, in its rear. A new line, which consisted as usual of a series of
deep narrow holes with no parapet, was accordingly made, with the right
on the railway, and the left on the Klein Zillebeke road.
Major Lord Bernard Lennox with No. 2 Company was on the right, Major
Hamilton with No. 1 in the centre, and Captain Powell with No. 3 on the
left; one platoon from No. 4 under Sergeant Hutchings was posted on the
Klein Zillebeke road; and the rest of the company went to Battalion
Headquarters, north-west of the wood between the railway and Klein
Zillebeke. Supplies and ammunition were brought up, and by 1 A.M. the
Battalion was well dug in. The cavalry then withdrew from the trenches
in front and retired. Meanwhile the Irish Guards had dug trenches,
prolonging the line to the left.
[Sidenote: Oct. 31.]
Sir John French in his despatch describes the afternoon of October 31 as
the most critical moment in the whole battle. By sheer weight of numbers
the Germans endeavoured to break through the line, and their immense
superiority in guns encouraged them to hope that they would be able to
beat down any opposition. The greater part of the Second Division was
still on the Moorslede--Zonnebeke road, on the left of the First
Division, while the three battalions detached under Lord Cavan remained
on their new line.
After a long wet night in the trenches, the 2nd Grenadiers were to have
a still longer day's fighting--a day, too, in which they were most of
the time "holding on by their eyelids." As soon as day dawned, they were
deluged by a rain of shells, to which our artillery could make no sort
of reply. Some troops of the French Ninth Corps tried to advance through
the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and Irish Guards, and attack the enemy's
position, but the shell-fire was so intense that they never succeeded in
getting beyond the line of trenches. Most of them took refuge in the
trenches, while some dug new ones.
The shells came crashing through the trees continuously, and
Lieut.-Colonel Smith decided to move the Battalion Headquarters back
about one hundred yards. Particularly violent was the bombardment of No.
2 Company, of which the trenches, being near the railway, were no doubt
easily located by the enemy's artillery, directed with deadly effect by
a captive balloon. Two high-explosive shells landed in one trench, and
killed and buried a number of men. Lieutenant Rose had a marvellous
escape. He was actually buried, but was dug out just in time. Major Lord
Bernard Lennox wisely withdrew part of his company into the support
trenches for a time, and no doubt thus saved many lives.
About 11 A.M. Lord Cavan sent the following message:
Keep on repairing your trenches. If any quiet intervals, begin
communication trenches zigzag to your rear, so that to-morrow
infantry can keep out of main trench during heavy shelling hours and
easily man it when required. Can you possibly push an Observation
Post forward to any point from which it could see and report?
It looked as if the Germans were going to attack this part of the
position about mid-day, but eventually they moved northward. Early in
the afternoon Lieut.-Colonel Smith received a message from Lord Cavan
that the enemy had broken through the line to the left of the Irish
Guards. Soon afterwards came this further message:
The situation is extremely critical. You are to hold your ground at
all costs. Sir Douglas Haig relies on the Grenadiers to save the
First Corps and possibly the Army.
After such a call as that, Lieut.-Colonel Smith at once determined to
put every available rifle in the trenches. The few men that still
remained in reserve were accordingly sent up to the front trenches. No.
3 Company was very much extended, although a platoon from No. 4 had
already been sent to support it. Captain Powell sent a message to say
that he might not be able to stay without more support, and Colonel
Smith replied that he must hold on at all cost. Lieut.-Colonel Smith
then reported the measures he had taken to Lord Cavan, who replied:
Splendid. Hang on like grim death. You may yet save the Army.
It was undoubtedly a case of hanging on, while this terrific bombardment
continued, but the Grenadiers had not wasted their time the night
before, and had dug themselves in deep. It was to their good digging
that Lieut.-Colonel Smith afterwards ascribed the fact that they never
gave an inch, although it was certainly an advantage to them that the
position was partly concealed owing to the nature of the ground. The
enemy plastered the whole locality with shells, but only in a few cases
were they able to locate the actual position of the trenches. The
Germans were reported meanwhile to have driven back the First Division
from Gheluvelt, thus exposing the left flank of the Seventh Division.
The Headquarters of the First and Second Divisions had been shelled,
General Lomax had been mortally wounded, and several Staff Officers
killed. Such heavy casualties among the Staff, in the middle of a
battle, naturally dislocated the machinery of the Higher Commands.
However, about 2 P.M. Lord Cavan sent word that the situation was
easier, and that he was sending up the Oxfordshire Light Infantry on the
left of the Irish Guards.
Constant anxiety had been felt about the right of the position occupied
by the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers. A high railway embankment, beyond which
was a small wood, made it very difficult to keep up communication,
especially when the shelling was so severe, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith
sent a message to Lord Bernard Lennox: "Is your right still in touch
with 4th Hussars? Brigadier pressing for a reply." To which Lord Bernard
answered, "Yes."
At 2.40 Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent the following request to the
Headquarters of the 4th Brigade:
Wood just short of D E near Canal is full of Germans, also Château
de Hollebeke. Can you turn on guns, please? My advance posts have
been driven in.
The Canal was dry, and formed no obstacle; and though there were a few
British cavalry this side of the embankment, they were not enough to
stop an attack. The French were said to be coming up to strengthen this
part of the line, but they did not arrive. Of all this fortunately the
Germans knew nothing, and instead of attacking this weak spot, they
directed their energies to the centre of the section of the line held by
the Grenadiers.
About 3 o'clock the enemy advanced in force through the wood near the
railway, but was met with such a withering fire from No. 1 Company that
he did not succeed in getting very far. An hour later Lord Cavan sent
this message:
Well done. If absolutely forced back, retire as on parade with your
proper right, that is your left retiring, on line of railway. Put up
the best fight you can on edge of wood.
[Sidenote: Nov. 1.]
There was no need to retire, however, although there was one moment at
which the situation seemed critical, for the Germans brought up some
field-guns, and plastered the trenches with every conceivable kind of
shell.
The shelling stopped shortly after dark, and the men were able at last
to look out over their trenches, and survey the scene by the lights of a
farm which was blazing in the centre of the line. They saw a spectacle,
which later on grew more and more familiar. What had once been a field
was now a mass of trenches; the whole place had been ploughed up by
shells, and the hedges were all torn up and burnt and blown to bits.
[Sidenote: Nov. 1.]
During the night the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was relieved by a regiment
from the French Sixteenth Corps, and retired at 4 A.M. to the rear of
Zwarteleen, where the men thought they were going to get some rest, but
before very long they were on the move again. Sir Douglas Haig had sent
a message which Lord Cavan circulated as follows:
The German Emperor will arrive in the field to-day to conduct
operations against the British Army. The G.O.C. First Corps calls
upon all ranks once more to repeat their magnificent efforts and to
show him what British soldiers really are.
All the enemy's efforts were now concentrated on smashing the left of
the Irish Guards' trenches with high-explosive shells, and firing with
wonderful accuracy they gradually blew the trench in bit by bit, and
knocked out their machine-guns. At 3 P.M. Lord Cavan heard a report that
the Irish Guards were retiring, and that they had only about 200 men
left. He sent orders at once that they were at all costs to hold on to
the wood 200 yards in rear of their old line. The French were told to
stay where they were, as in the event of a withdrawal the whole British
line was to pivot on them on the elbow of the Canal. The highest praise
was afterwards given by the British Generals to the French for the way
in which they held their trenches all day, in spite of the fact that
their left was in the air.
An urgent appeal for help now reached Lord Cavan from one of the Corps
Staff, stating that the Northamptonshire Regiment was being driven back
and needed support. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was immediately sent
off with orders to report itself to General Bulfin, who was to be found
in a wood three-quarters of a mile south-west of Herenthage. But by the
time the Battalion arrived there General Bulfin had been wounded, and
Lieut.-Colonel Smith could not find out what it was he was expected to
do.
In the meantime Lord Cavan received orders to assume command of the
whole section from the east edge of the wood to the French left. In
these strenuous days it was no uncommon thing for an officer to be told
in the middle of a battle to take over command of a force during a
difficult operation--a war ordeal, for which peace training had supplied
no practice. To take over the command of a Division is no easy matter at
any time, but to do it at a critical moment, with heavy fighting going
on, demands a man of more than ordinary capacity. Lord Cavan galloped up
with his Brigade-Major, Major the Hon. W. P. Hore-Ruthven; on arrival at
General Bulfin's Headquarters he found that everything had been
momentarily disorganised by the sudden departure of the wounded General.
Officers of all sorts were asking for orders. The Germans were breaking
through. Perplexing problems of every description were submitted for
instant solution. Shells were falling in the immediate neighbourhood of
the Divisional Headquarters. Very slowly Lord Cavan drew out his
cigar-case, and having carefully selected a cigar, proceeded to light
it, turning it round to see that it was evenly lighted. This had a
wonderful effect on all present, for it not only enabled Lord Cavan
himself to concentrate his thoughts on the problem, and to see clearly
the most pressing needs of the moment, but it also inspired all the
officers with confidence. As a Staff Officer, who was present, said
afterwards, that cigar saved the situation.
On the left the Sussex Regiment was in touch with the Seventh Division,
and stood firm. The Northamptonshire Regiment, Gordon Highlanders, and
Oxfordshire Light Infantry had all been pressed back from their advanced
trenches, though the enemy had not got beyond them. Lord Cavan at once
ordered the Grenadiers to leave their packs at the farm in the rear of
the Brown Road, and to clear the wood south-east of that road at the
point of the bayonet.
Thereupon Lieut.-Colonel Smith launched the Battalion with fixed
bayonets into the wood. It was very thick in places, and there was
always a risk of some company getting lost. The Germans, it was found,
had left the wood, but only recently, as was evident from the number of
dead. That the difficult manoeuvre, entrusted to the Battalion, was
carried out most successfully was due to the excellent manner in which
the four Captains led their men. One platoon of Major Hamilton's
company, which went beyond the wood and was enfiladed by machine-guns,
had to remain under cover of a bank till dark, when it retired and
joined the main line. With this exception the companies--No. 1 under
Major Hamilton, No. 2 under Lord Bernard Lennox, and No. 3 under Captain
Powell--all managed to reach the edge of the wood in perfect order. No.
4 under Captain Ridley was in support.
This advance had the excellent effect of establishing confidence. Lord
Cavan was able to reorganise the line of defence for the night, and, by
blunting the salients of the wood facing south-east, to reduce the
garrison. The result was that he withdrew two battalions--one, the
Sussex Regiment, was placed in reserve; the other, the Gordon
Highlanders, was sent back to the 20th Brigade, to which it belonged.
As soon as it was dark, the Germans tried to set the wood on fire, but
fortunately did not succeed, though there were isolated fires in various
parts of it. It was an awkward position and very difficult to hold, as
the Germans were so close, but orders were received for the battalions
to dig in where they were. To officers, who had been taught from their
early youth that one of the essentials of a trench line was a good field
of fire, this digging in a thick wood, where the field of fire was never
more than from fifteen to twenty yards, seemed an absurdity. But ideas
on this subject had been considerably revised by the war--besides, in a
long line of trenches running several miles, battalions of course must
join up with each other, and cannot choose a position for themselves.
At 10 o'clock that night, No. 4 Company, under Captain Ridley, was
directed to take over the position held by a company of the Gordons on
the left, but finding that the trench had almost vanished after a day's
work by the German artillery, it dug a new one slightly in rear, which
was not finished until 3 A.M.
[Sidenote: Nov. 2.]
This was the situation on the Monday morning: the Northamptonshire
Regiment was in touch with the Seventh Division on the left; the
Oxfordshire Light Infantry and Grenadiers, slightly intermingled, were
in the centre, and the Irish Guards on the right--all holding the
south-east edges of the wood. Four vigorous attacks on the line--at
8.45, 11, 2, and 5.45--were delivered by the Germans, preceded by heavy
shelling, especially on the left. The attack at 11 looked dangerous at
one time, when the Germans got within twenty-five yards of our trenches,
but our fire was very steady, and they could make no farther headway.
The 2 o'clock assault partially developed, but the one at 5.45, just
after it got dark, was the most serious.
It was directed against Captain Ridley's Company and against the
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, and the enemy advanced with a beating of
drums and blowing of horns. The night was cold, with some light from the
moon. As the enemy came on, an incident that was never explained took
place. The firing almost died down, and this message, sent from no one
knew where, was passed along the line: "Don't fire. The Northamptons are
going to charge." It so happened that Lieut.-Colonel Smith and Major
Jeffreys were in that part of the trench at the time, and directly they
heard the mysterious message they realised it was a German ruse. They
yelled at the men to go on firing. The fire was at once taken up and
continued, while the attack died away. Next day Lieut.-Colonel Smith
tried to discover where the fictitious order started, but in vain.
All night the enemy could be heard digging away, in some places near to
our trenches. At 1 A.M., No. 4 Company was sent back in reserve, being
relieved by a company of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, which next
morning reported that 300 dead had been found in front of the trench.
Some were found within a few yards of our line.
On Monday evening, the night of the attack, this special order from the
Commander-in-Chief was circulated:
The Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief has watched with the deepest
admiration and solicitude the splendid stand made by the soldiers of
His Majesty the King in their successful effort to maintain the
forward position which they have won by their gallantry and
steadfastness. He believes that no other Army in the world would
show such tenacity, especially under the tremendous artillery fire
directed against it. Its courage and endurance are beyond all
praise. It is an honour to belong to such an Army.
The Field-Marshal has to make one more call upon the troops. It is
certainly only a question of a few days, and it may be of only a few
hours, before, if they only stand firm, strong support will come,
the enemy will be driven back, and in the retirement will suffer
losses even greater than those which have befallen him under the
terrific blows by which, especially during the last few days, he has
been repulsed.
The Commander-in-Chief feels sure that he does not make his call in
vain.
J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief to the British Army in the Field.
[Sidenote: Nov. 3.]
A comparatively quiet interval followed. There was intermittent shelling
next day, though nothing very serious, and the snipers on both sides
kept up a lively fusillade. The trenches meanwhile were deepened and
improved. Some new orders with regard to the coming fighting were also
issued. Each battalion had two companies in the firing line and two in
support, and the captains were told that they must rely on their own
supports if they wanted any help. There was a Cavalry Brigade in
reserve, but Lord Cavan did not wish to call on it unless it became
absolutely necessary. Another warning against the enemy's tricks was
sent to the men in this message from G.O.C. First Corps:
First Cavalry Division reports that in the attacks on them the
Germans wore British uniforms, especially kilts, and when
approaching our trenches shouted, "Don't fire; we are short of
ammunition," and similar expressions. All troops in the trenches are
to be warned of this practice by the enemy.
An instruction was issued also for the making of circular redoubts,
about twenty-five yards in rear of the existing line of trenches, with
the object of stopping a rush if the line should be pierced.
[Sidenote: Nov. 4.]
An artillery duel--rather one-sided--occupied the next two days. A
German aeroplane having located the trenches, the enemy's guns became
very busy, though mostly against the support trenches, chiefly with the
object of "searching the ground." Early in the afternoon the First
Division reported that the enemy was attacking from the direction of the
woods south of Gheluvelt. The artillery had been turned on them, and
preparations were being made to meet the attack, but nothing came of it.
The shelling stopped at nightfall, and the Battalion settled down to a
pitch-dark, pouring wet night in the trenches, which were all in wet
clay and marshy ground, and the men's sole consolation was that the
Germans must be having just as bad a time.
[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]
By the 5th it began to be thought in the firing line that the enemy had
abandoned all attempt to break through the line, but in reality he was
waiting only for reinforcements. He had succeeded in making a dent in
the line near Messines, and was now determined to throw the whole weight
of his superior numbers on Ypres. He chose for his point of attack Klein
Zillebeke, the junction between De Moussy's French Division and the 4th
Brigade, or rather the four battalions under Lord Cavan.
[Sidenote: Nov. 6.]
Shelling began with renewed vigour as soon as the sun had cleared away
the next morning's mist, and just before mid-day significant
instructions were received from Lord Cavan:
"Your position must be retained at all costs," he said in a message
sent out at 11.50. "Redoubts must be occupied, every spare man and
tool employed to make secondary trench. I trust you after splendid
defence of last few days to maintain it to the end."
And in a second message a few minutes later:
"Have asked Seventh Division to do everything possible to help you
with artillery fire."
Evidently the Brigadier expected a determined attack on that part of the
line, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith made his dispositions accordingly. Early
in the afternoon he got a report from the Irish Guards that the French
Division on their right had been driven in. Immediately afterwards came
a message from Major Hamilton that the Irish Guards themselves had been
driven in, and that his right was consequently in the air.
Major Hamilton's Company was now bearing the brunt of the attack, and
was in a very critical position. Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent word to ask
him whether he needed any help. He replied: "Hughes only wants a few
men, and I have sent him up one section. Bailey is lining road 200 yards
to my front. O.C. Oxfords promised support if necessary."
Shortly afterwards it was reported that the Germans had reached Brown
Road, and were advancing round the right rear of the Battalion.
Lieut.-Colonel Smith at once posted Lieutenant Tufnell with one
machine-gun on the Brown Road, to guard the ride through the wood across
which the enemy would have to pass, to get behind our line of trenches,
telling him to use his own discretion as to the position he should take
up. Lieutenant Lord Congleton was also sent with one platoon to stop the
Germans from getting through a gap which was reported to the right rear
of the Battalion. Lieutenant Tufnell apparently decided that he would be
able to get a better target for his machine-gun, and at the same time
guard the ride, if he accompanied Lord Congleton. He accordingly took up
a position from which he could command the advancing enemy, but had not
been there long before he was mortally wounded.
At this point Lieut.-Colonel Smith reported to Lord Cavan that it was
urgently necessary that a farm to his front should be destroyed, as
there were machine-guns firing from it. He received the reply that if it
were humanly possible the howitzers would do as he asked.
Two companies of the Sussex Regiment were now sent up to support the
right of the line, and helped to hold things together, but the situation
was most critical. The enemy had driven back De Moussy's French
infantry, and consequently there was a bad dent in the line. Lord
Cavan's troops were still holding on with their right in the air when
the Household Cavalry was called in to retrieve the situation. Lord
Cavan sent off Captain R. C. de Crespigny, his Staff Captain, at full
gallop to Sanctuary Wood with orders to the Household Cavalry to come up
at once. Colonel Wilson immediately ordered his men to mount, and
galloped round by Maple Copse to within 500 yards of Brigade
Headquarters, where they dismounted and fixed bayonets. Into the midst
of the Germans they dashed, headed by Colonel Gordon Wilson.
Throwing in the cavalry at the critical moment to save the situation has
from time immemorial been a recognised tactical manoeuvre, but in this
case the Household Cavalry fought as infantry, and very splendid
infantry they made. They swept forward to the attack with all the
precision of an infantry battalion, and soon Klein Zillebeke was filled
with British, French, and German troops fighting at close quarters. When
it came to hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans could not stand up against
the splendid men of the Household Cavalry, and they were gradually
driven back till the line was restored. This gallant charge of the
Household Cavalry on foot, Lord Cavan afterwards said, not only
prevented the 4th Guards Brigade from being cut to pieces, but also
saved Ypres. Colonel Gordon Wilson and Colonel Hugh Dawnay were killed,
and the Household Cavalry lost a large number of men, but the situation
was retrieved.
While this was going on, No. 1 Company Grenadiers, which was on the
right, had been practically wiped out. Since the withdrawal of the Irish
Guards, almost every man had been killed or wounded by shell-fire.
Sergeant Thomas, who commanded the right platoon of No. 1, remained at
his post after the Irish Guards had gone, until he had only three men
left, when he withdrew to Brown Road. During that time he was twice
buried by shells, and had three rifles broken in his hand. Sergeant
Digby was mortally wounded, and was never seen again.
Lord Cavan telephoned: "Hang on tight to Brown Road. Try and get touch
with half battalion Sussex Regiment sent to farm at Irish Guards H.Q."
Lieut.-Colonel Smith passed this on to Captain Powell, adding: "Are you
in touch with the Sussex?" to which Captain Powell replied: "Yes, I am
in touch with Sussex, who prolong my line to the right, bent back to
right rear."
In the meantime, Lieutenant Lord Congleton, finding how weak the right
of the line was, had moved his platoon to the right of the Sussex. He
had lost a number of men, but at the same time had managed to collect
several Irish Guardsmen. They had no rifles or ammunition, but he placed
them at intervals among the men of his platoon, and went and collected
rifles for them himself from the casualties. Then he went round a second
time with an orderly and collected ammunition. By this means he was able
to hold the gap all through that night, and next day was specially
mentioned by Lieut.-Colonel Smith, who wrote that the intelligent way in
which he handled his platoon on his own initiative was beyond all
praise.
Much help towards keeping the right of the line intact was also given by
Colonel Davies, commanding the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who
throughout the afternoon kept sending up any men he happened to have in
reserve.
When darkness fell Lord Cavan gave Lieut.-Colonel Smith these
directions:
Can you establish a line between the Brown Road and your original
line so as to keep touch for certain with battalions on your left? I
want to make sure that my line for the night is in touch all along.
I have ordered two battalions to establish the line of the Brown
Road up to south-west edge, where I hope to establish touch with the
French. I have told General Kavanagh he can withdraw his Cavalry
Brigade directly the whole of the Brown Road is established.
The new line was arranged about midnight, and at 1 A.M. the men began to
dig, although they were dead tired. The trenches were completed by 4
A.M.--a fine performance on a pitch-dark night, with the additional
handicap of the trees.
[Sidenote: Nov. 7-9.]
For three days the battalions remained in their trenches at Klein
Zillebeke without any direct attack being made. Shelling went on all day
with monotonous regularity, but on the whole little damage was done,
though the German howitzers made spasmodic efforts to demolish the
trenches, and occasionally managed to blow in a bit of trench and bury
some men. The nights were comparatively quiet except for some sniping,
and though the mornings were generally foggy, anything in the way of
dirty weather was welcomed by the men, as it made artillery observation
impossible.
[Sidenote: Nov. 10.]
The shelling increased enormously on the 10th, and owing to the right
having been thrown back, that part of the trenches was open to enfilade
fire from the German guns. By this time their artillery had the range of
our trenches pretty accurately, and obtained a large number of direct
hits. Further, the wood, always a trouble, became more and more
difficult to hold: trees cut down by the shells fell crashing to the
ground, and made communication impossible. About mid-day the bombardment
became terrific, and it seemed as if it would be impossible for any one
to live under the storm of shells.
A heavy loss this day was the death of Major Lord Bernard Lennox, who
was killed by a high-explosive shell. For three months he had been in
the thick of every engagement, always cheerful, and making the best of
every hardship. He was one of the most popular officers in the Brigade
of Guards, and his death was very keenly felt by every one.
Lieutenant M. G. Stocks was also killed by a shell, and Lieutenant Lord
Congleton, who had so distinguished himself only a few days before, was
shot through the heart. Lieutenant H. R. C. Tudway was hit in the head
by a shell, and died a few days later. Captain Powell was buried by
another shell, and was only just saved in time and brought in. Captain
Ridley was wounded in the back, but after being attended to in the
dressing-station was able to return to his company.
There was considerable delay in collecting the wounded. It was
impossible to attempt to work by day, and the difficulties of carrying
stretchers by night were increased by the fallen trees.
That night the Battalion went into Corps Reserve, and bivouacked in
dug-outs. Lord Cavan, in writing an account of the day's fighting, said:
The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers made a wonderful stand to-day against
enfilade fire of the worst description. They stuck it out simply
magnificently.
The King subsequently telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief:
The splendid pluck, spirit, and endurance shown by my troops in the
desperate fighting which has continued for so many days against
vastly superior forces fills me with admiration. I am confident in
the final results of their noble efforts under your able command.
GEORGE R.I.
Sir John French replied:
Your Majesty's most gracious message has been received by the
officers and men of Your Majesty's Army in France with feelings of
the greatest gratitude and pride. We beg to be allowed to express to
Your Majesty our most faithful devotion and our unalterable
determination to uphold the highest tradition of Your Majesty's
Army, and to carry the campaign to a victorious end.
Lord Kitchener telegraphed:
The splendid courage and endurance of our troops in the battle in
which you have been engaged during the last few days, and the
boldness and capacity with which they have been led, have
undoubtedly given the enemy a severe blow, successfully frustrating
their efforts. Let the troops know how much we all appreciate their
services, which worthily maintain the best traditions of our Army.
Having been placed in Corps Reserve for four days, officers and men of
the Battalion were under the impression that they were going to have a
quiet time for that period, sleeping in peace at night and resting
during the day. But they were mistaken. In reality, they spent three of
the nights marching about the whole time, and each day they were moved
up in support of this or that part of the line, to the invariable
accompaniment of considerable shelling. To begin with, the relief took
most of the first night, and it was not till 5 A.M. that the Welsh
Regiment and Munster Fusiliers finished taking over the trenches. Then
at last the Battalion was able to march over to the dug-outs at
Bellewaardes Farm, north of Hooge.
[Sidenote: Nov. 11.]
The worst of it was that those placed in reserve were at the beck and
call of any General who wanted reinforcements. At one time the Battalion
was placed under four Generals, and received different orders from each,
which came about because the units in front got hopelessly mixed, and
the battalions were constantly changed from one brigade to another. For
instance, when the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers arrived at Bellewaardes,
Lieut.-Colonel Smith rode over to see General Monro, who congratulated
him on the good work his men had done, and said he would come round
later and say a few words to them. By the time Lieut.-Colonel Smith
returned, he found that the Battalion had been ordered to move to a wood
north-east of Hooge Château, in order to be in a position of readiness
to reinforce the line near Polygon Wood, where the Prussian Guard was
reported to have broken through. He sent one company up into the wood,
and scattered the rest about the grounds of the Château. It was chiefly
shrapnel-shelling that they were exposed to during this operation, and
there were few casualties.
In the afternoon orders were received to support an attack which was to
be carried out by the Sussex Regiment, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, and
Gloucester Regiment. They were to retake the trenches which had been
captured by the Prussian Guard in the morning, south-west of Polygon
Wood. The Battalion was severely shelled, as it crossed the open ground
towards the wood east of Hooge in artillery formation, and had thirty to
forty casualties in a few minutes. Then Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent Major
Jeffreys forward to find General FitzClarence, under whose orders the
Battalion had been placed.
The enemy now began to shell this spot with shrapnel, and with every one
underground it was no easy matter to find the General or his Staff.
Major Jeffreys was joined by Lieut.-Colonel Smith; they searched and
searched in vain, and came across Major Corkran, Brigade-Major of the
1st Brigade, who had been engaged on the same fruitless errand. Deciding
to wait, Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent Major Jeffreys back to the Battalion,
where he found Captain Pike, who was almost immediately afterwards
wounded by a shell.
Meanwhile the Battalion had been waiting for hours under shell-fire, and
had suffered about thirty further casualties. It was now night,
pitch-dark, and pouring with rain; and to assemble the men, who were
spread out in artillery formation, was by no means easy, but Major
Jeffreys managed to get them together near Nonne-Bosschen Wood.
Eventually Lieut.-Colonel Smith found General FitzClarence, and got
permission to give the men a meal before taking them up to the front.
Having returned to the Battalion, he marched it back to the Château
grounds, where after some delay the cookers arrived, and the men settled
down to a meal in the pouring rain. Lieutenant the Hon. W. R. Bailey was
appointed Adjutant in Captain Pike's place, and at once took over his
duties.
[Sidenote: Nov. 12.]
After an hour's sleep the Battalion started off again at midnight, and
marched ankle-deep in mud and slush to the Headquarters of the 1st
Brigade, where it received its orders for the attack in which it was to
operate with the 1st Battalion Irish Guards, Royal Munster Fusiliers,
and Gloucester Regiment.
These orders were:
The following move at 2.15 A.M., to position of readiness at S.W.
corner of Polygon Wood--2nd Battalion Grenadiers, 1st Battalion
Irish Guards, Royal Munster Fusiliers. Left of Grenadier Guards and
right of Irish Guards at S.W. corner of Polygon Wood, both in column
of route heading south. Royal Munster Fusiliers on edge of wood just
in rear of centre. When ordered to move from position of readiness
to attack, Grenadiers will lead in file, passing along western side
of trench and shooting any enemy met with either in or out of it.
Irish Guards to follow Grenadiers in same formation, Royal Munster
Fusiliers to follow Irish Guards. When trench has been cleared,
Battalions will occupy and hold it till further orders. Attack will
be ready to start any hour after 4 A.M. All movements to be made
quickly and silently. Reports to H.Q. 1st Guards Brigade. Captain
Fortune, Black Watch, will act as guide to Grenadiers. Battalions in
rear will keep touch with Battalions in front of them. Gloucesters
will fill gap as at present.
At 3 A.M. these battalions started. It had been arranged that the Irish
Guards should lead as far as Polygon Wood, and General FitzClarence and
his Staff walked at their head. In spite of the darkness the battalions
kept well together. They were marching down a muddy lane when suddenly
some shots were heard in front, and General FitzClarence halted his
force and went to see what was going on. The advance began again slowly,
they reached the west edge of the wood, and the Grenadiers got into the
ditch at the edge. Then came the news that General FitzClarence had been
mortally wounded. Colonel Davies arrived next with the Oxfordshire Light
Infantry, having reconnoitred the positions; he had found that the
Germans were in great strength, with wire entanglements in front and
several machine-guns.
The question now arose: What should be done? Was it wise to carry on the
attack with no General in command? Eventually the matter was referred to
Brigadier-General Westmacott, commanding the 5th Brigade. He decided
that it would be best to abandon the attack, as after this delay there
would not be enough time for it to develop before daybreak. He therefore
ordered the battalions back behind the wood, west of Nonne-Bosschen
Wood, and determined to hold a new line. Colonel M'Ewen of the Camerons
was sent for, to take command of the Brigade.
The work of digging the new line was entrusted to the Gloucesters, but
as they were not strong enough to hold it, No. 4 Company Grenadiers
under Captain Ridley was sent up to reinforce them. Tired as the men
were, they dug for their lives, and by 6 A.M. had managed to dig
themselves well in. The rest of the Battalion returned to the Château,
where it was found that in the darkness one platoon of No. 1 Company and
the Battalion Headquarters had gone astray. However, they arrived next
morning.
After having been placed under several different Brigadiers, the
Battalion was finally ordered by Colonel Cunliffe Owen to move with the
Irish Guards to the wood on the Menin road, and there dig itself in. Off
it went, and began digging again till the dawn broke, when the shelling
started again as usual. This was the only day on which the Battalion had
no rations, the constant moves having disorganised the transport, but
enough bully beef was procured to give the men something to eat.
[Sidenote: Nov. 13-14.]
During the day the Battalion remained in its trenches. There was the
inevitable shelling and sniping, but little damage was done. In the
evening it moved back to within a mile of the Château, and was just
settling down when it received orders to move on to Sanctuary Wood--so
called because it had never been shelled. After some delay, it got to
the wood in the middle of the night, finding there some howitzers which
had been attracted by the name. The officer in command explained that
they had been shelled out of every place they had visited hitherto by
the bigger guns of the enemy. Before long, however, the German artillery
located the howitzers, and at once began to shell the wood. While Major
Hamilton was in his dug-out, a high-explosive shell brought the whole
structure down on him, and he was dug out, unconscious, only just in
time. Not long afterwards Lieutenant Dowling was wounded.
In the middle of the next night the Battalion was ordered to return to
the trenches and join the 4th Brigade. Its four days' "rest" was over,
and all ranks welcomed with enthusiasm the prospect of getting back to
the trenches!
[Sidenote: Nov. 15-16.]
Next day the Battalion marched back through Zillebeke to Lord Cavan's
Headquarters, and was at once sent back into the trenches, part of which
it had held the week before. The companies were sent up on each side of
the Cavalry Brigade, which was holding a line across Brown Road, and the
Battalion was therefore split up into two portions. Nos. 4 and 2
Platoons of No. 3 Company were on the left of the cavalry, and Nos. 1
and 2 Companies on the right; the only reserve there was consisted of
two platoons of No. 3 Company, and so they "carried on" for two days
without any happenings of great importance. The weather meanwhile became
very cold, and there were continual snow blizzards.
[Sidenote: Nov. 17.]
On November 17 the Germans made their last serious attack on Ypres. The
day opened with a terrific bombardment, evidently heralding a determined
attack. The shelling went on steadily all the morning, and about 1 P.M.
the attack started, the brunt of it falling on No. 1 and No. 2
Companies. No. 2 in particular was very hard pressed. Captain
Symes-Thompson was killed, and Lieutenant Lee-Steere, who took over the
command, sent back word that they were running short of ammunition.
There were but two platoons in reserve, and they numbered only thirty
men, but Lieut.-Colonel Smith sent them up under Captain Cavendish with
some ammunition. By the time they arrived Lieutenant Lee-Steere had been
killed. Captain Cavendish sent back a message that the enemy was
apparently entrenching in a spinney about four hundred yards to our
front, and that his numbers were estimated at 500. About this time the
enemy attacked in great force, but was quite unable to make any headway
against our rifle-fire. The spirits of the men were wonderful, and they
fought on, quite unaffected by the terrible casualties caused by the
shell-fire amongst their ranks. Captain Cavendish was surprised at
suddenly hearing a burst of firing intermingled with shouts of laughter.
It turned out that some Germans, who had lain down in a slight fold in
the ground when their attack failed, were trying to crawl back, and the
men of Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were firing at them as they went. The
enemy was now becoming very numerous in front, and the situation was
reported to Lord Cavan by Lieut.-Colonel Smith, who received this reply:
Call on 1st Battalion Coldstream for help if required at once.
Brigade Headquarters knocked to bits, so have shifted to farm
north-west of wood, on Figure 17 of K 17, in dug-out.
A little while afterwards the situation was easier, and on hearing that
the line was still intact, Lord Cavan sent the message:
Well done. Hope you got my memo, _re_ calling on 1st Battalion
Coldstream at once if necessary, now in the wood alongside of you.
You must use them to help both yourself and the Irish Guards. When
called on let me know. Am turning all the artillery on the wood to
your front. I have no means of communication left except orderlies.
The 1st Battalion Coldstream at that time consisted of a draft of 300
men under Captain G. Edwards, which had just arrived from England, the
Battalion having been practically wiped out in the Prussian Guard attack
of November 4.
No. 1 Company was now in a bad way, and Captain Hughes sent back an
urgent request for more ammunition. But, as most of the pack animals had
been killed in the morning's bombardment, it was a problem how to send
it. Major Jeffreys collected as many orderlies as he could find, loaded
them up with all the ammunition they could carry, and himself led them
along to the trenches. This was no easy matter, as not only was the
ground they had to cross under shell-fire, but the whole place was
knee-deep in mud. The last fifty yards to the trenches they had to
crawl.
The firing had been kept up practically all the afternoon, and some idea
of the amount of ammunition expended may be gathered from the fact that
No. 1 Company alone fired 24,000 rounds. This was the first time our men
saw the hand grenades which were to play such a large part in trench
warfare. Little puffs of smoke had been occasionally seen bursting on
the bodies of the Germans, and these proved to be caused by hand
grenades of a primitive type, which exploded when hit by our bullets.
By the evening the German attack had died down. The enemy had lost very
heavily, and realised, apparently, that the line was too strongly held
for any frontal attack to succeed:
The casualties amongst the officers of the 2nd Battalion were
unfortunately heavy:
Captain E. J. L. Pike (Adjutant), wounded.
Lieut. C. W. Tufnell (Machine-gun Officer), killed.
Capt. C. Symes-Thompson (No. 1 Company), killed.
Major Lord Bernard Gordon-Lennox (No. 2 Company), killed.
Lieut. I. St. C. Rose (No. 2 Company), wounded.
Lieut. C. M. C. Dowling (No. 2 Company), wounded.
2nd Lieut. F. W. J. M. Miller (No. 2 Company), killed.
2nd Lieut. J. H. G. Lee-Steere (No. 2 Company), killed.
Capt. E. G. H. Powell (No. 3 Company), wounded.
Lieut. H. R. C. Tudway (No. 3 Company), killed.
Lieut. Lord Congleton (No. 3 Company), killed.
Captain M. E. Makgill-Crichton Maitland (No. 4 Company), wounded.
Captain E. D. Ridley (No. 4 Company), wounded.
Lieut. M. G. Stocks (No. 4 Company), killed.
The 2nd Battalion had been fighting incessantly from October 21 to
November 16. Day and night it had been attacked by an enemy greatly
superior in numbers. As it had never for a moment been able to leave the
front line, its sleep had been broken and scanty. Yet well aware that no
reinforcements were available, the Battalion had throughout realised
that it must continue to hold the line, and had faced its task with the
utmost determination. Even when it was in reserve, it had taken part in
serious engagements, but this to a certain extent was an experience
which it shared with the other battalions of the 4th Brigade.
The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers had been most fortunate in its neighbours
during these strenuous days, and the men soon found that the other
battalions in the Second Division were as stout fighters as themselves.
The 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in
particular was known throughout the Division as one of the best
battalions in the Expeditionary Force, and the Grenadiers knew from
experience that it could be relied upon to hold a trench to the last
man.
But perhaps the branch of the service which won the men's admiration
most of all was the artillery. Outnumbered and outranged, the Second
Division artillery fought on, and time after time saved the situation.
Its supply of shells, compared to that of the German artillery, was
ridiculously small, and yet never for a moment did it fail to respond
when called upon to support the infantry attacks. According to all
preconceived theories it should have been wiped out altogether, and in
fact many batteries were annihilated. But the Grenadiers knew that as
long as there were any men left alive the guns would be served.
[Sidenote: Nov. 19.]
The first battle of Ypres may be said to have ended on the 19th,
although naturally the enemy continued his shelling. Some of No. 1
Company's trenches were blown in, but there were no infantry attacks. In
the evening the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was relieved by the 3rd
Battalion Coldstream and marched to St. Jean, where one company went
into billets, and the other three lay in the open and made themselves as
comfortable as they could with straw, which they took from the ricks at
the farm close by. Curiously enough, the farmer some twelve months later
sent in a claim for compensation for the straw that had been taken. The
few remaining officers managed to get into one room at the farmhouse.
It was bitterly cold, and there were several degrees of frost and two or
three inches of snow on the ground. Before leaving, Lieut.-Colonel Smith
sent the following message to Captain Cavendish:
If it is possible, will you try and identify some of the units which
attacked you yesterday? Perhaps you could get a few shoulder-straps
after dark, but you are not to risk life to get them. I do not want
to support you unless it is necessary, but I can send a platoon of
the Coldstream to a place near Irish Guards' support if you would
like it. You will be relieved by Coldstream to-night about 8 P.M.
after your teas, and will come to Brigade Headquarters where you
will get instructions. The men of the Coldstream now with you should
come back at the same time.
The shoulder-straps referred to in this message were duly secured and
forwarded to the Intelligence officer of the Division. The Germans who
had attacked the day before were from the Fifteenth Corps.
Lord Cavan, in a private letter to Colonel H. Streatfeild, commanding
the Regiment, wrote:
No words can ever describe what the devotion of the men and officers
has been under the trials of dirt, squalor, cold, sleeplessness, and
perpetual strain of the last three weeks. Their state of efficiency
still can, I think, be gauged by the fact that twelve attacks have
been repulsed and two companies of Grenadiers fired twenty-four
boxes of ammunition on the 17th, so persistent were the enemy's
assaults. We are told we are to be relieved very soon and sent right
back for a good fortnight to refit and reclothe and reorganise. We
came into this theatre 3700 strong, and we shall go back about 2000,
but nothing finer to my mind has ever been done by human men. I
really should cry if the Germans got into Ypres before we go. On the
17th before the attack they threw over 200 big shells in and around
my Headquarters and for one and a half hours it was pretty horrible,
but the dug-outs saved us, though my signal officer and 13 men were
wounded and 2 killed at the door of my dug-out. The smell of the
explosion was horrible. One shell pitched in our signal cart and
blew the limber 55 yards away from the body.
The 2nd Battalion remained at St. Jean the next day, and in the evening
received orders to move back and refit on the following night:
The Brigadier is directed by Sir Douglas Haig to inform the 4th
Guards Brigade that their relief will definitely take place
to-morrow night 20th/21st for certain. He also wishes it to be
explained that by sticking to their positions for an extra day, the
whole British Expeditionary Force has benefited to the extent that
their front is now narrowed to the line La Bassée--Wytschaete,
whereas if the relief had taken place yesterday it would have had to
extend from La Bassée to the Canal.
The following orders for concentration of troops when relieved from the
trenches were issued:
(1) Battalions not in the trenches, viz. 2nd Battalion Grenadiers,
Irish Guards, Herts Battalion, will march in the above order under
Lieut.-Colonel W. R. A. Smith, Grenadier Guards, on Ypres level
crossing J 13 A, thence by road passing J 12, the south edge of J
11, southern portion of I 15.14, thence through I 13 A, thence to
Ouderdomm. Starting-point road junction at Y of Ypres. Time, 4 P.M.
(2) All first-line transport, except pack animals, which will
accompany Battalions, will march under Brigade Transport Officer
Captain Gough to Ouderdomm, in time to arrive there by 2 P.M. It
will be met by Captain R. de Crespigny, who will point out
bivouacking areas to units.
(3) Units will arrange to have a meal waiting for them on arrival at
Ouderdomm; after eating this they will march independently to
Meteren, where they will go into billets. The three battalions under
Lieut.-Colonel Smith will march together under his orders. The route
from Ouderdomm to Meteren _via_ Westoutre--Montnoir--La Manche.
(4) Officers commanding all units will be responsible that the route
that they have to follow is reconnoitred by daylight.
[Sidenote: Nov. 20.]
Orders were first sent for these battalions to start at 4 P.M., and
later the time was altered to 10.45 P.M. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers
arrived at the rendezvous in plenty of time, and as the Hertfordshire
Territorials did not turn up, Lieut.-Colonel Smith waited for it till
past midnight, and then marched off. It was bitterly cold, and owing to
the frozen state of the road extremely slippery. On account of the
accumulation of guns and transports, the battalions were forced to march
in single file down the side of the road, and to pass miles of wagons
before they were able to march in fours. At 3 A.M. they had some tea,
and arrived at their destination at 8.30, when they went into billets.
LETTER FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL THE EARL OF CAVAN TO THE OFFICER
COMMANDING THE GRENADIER GUARDS
The 2nd Battalion moves back to-night about 15 miles with the rest
of the Brigade to refit, reorganise, and rest. It leaves the line
intact, and, in spite of great loss and untold sufferings and
hardships, it fought the battle of Nov. 17 with as good a nerve as
the battle of the Aisne. It has perhaps had the hardest time of any
of the four battalions, as its rest days in Corps Reserve were
entirely taken up with marching and making counter-strokes at
various parts of the line.
I can never express what I think of the great courage and endurance
shown by officers and men during the defence before Ypres, and I
should like to put on the regimental records not only my sense of
pride at being their Brigadier, but my debt to the Battalion for
their great devotion to their duty. The men have all kept up a
respectable appearance, which has been an example, considering that
it has been absolutely impossible to change an article of clothing
for four weeks. It is hoped that some officers and men may be able
to get home for a few days' complete rest and change.
(Signed) CAVAN, Brigadier,
Commanding 4th Guards Bgde.