THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (1ST BATTALION)
[Sidenote: 1st Batt. Sept. 1914.]
Meanwhile the 1st Battalion Grenadiers remained at Warley until
September 1914. In the middle of the month the Seventh Division was
formed, and the 1st Battalion Grenadiers was sent to Lyndhurst, near
Southampton, where the Division was assembling, and placed in the 20th
Brigade.
Major-General T. Capper, C.B., D.S.O., commanded the Division, which was
composed as follows:
_20th Infantry Brigade._ Brigadier-General H. G. RUGGLES-BRISE,
M.V.O.
1st Batt. Grenadier Guards.
2nd Batt. Scots Guards.
2nd Batt. Border Regiment.
2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders.
_21st Infantry Brigade._ Brigadier-General H. WATTS, C.B.
2nd Batt. Bedford Regiment.
2nd Batt. Yorkshire Regiment.
2nd Batt. Royal Scots Fusiliers.
2nd Batt. Wiltshire Regiment.
_22nd Infantry Brigade._ Brigadier-General S. LAWFORD.
2nd Batt. Queen's.
2nd Batt. Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1st Batt. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
1st Batt. South Staffordshire Regiment.
Brigadier-General H. G. Ruggles-Brise, who commanded the Brigade in
which the 1st Battalion served, was himself an old Grenadier.
It was generally considered that the Seventh Division was one of the
finest sent out. Most of the men in it, except the two Guards
battalions, had served for several years in India and the Colonies, and
were bronzed, seasoned men, thorough professional soldiers.
For artillery the Division had one brigade of horse and two of field
artillery, Brigadier-General H. K. Jackson, D.S.O., being in command.
The brigade of horse artillery consisted of two batteries only. No
howitzer brigade had been provided, but a heavy battery of old 4·7's was
added at the last moment. The transport had to be supplemented by
farm-carts, afterwards painted grey. The Divisional Cavalry consisted of
the Northumberland Hussars, originally commanded by Lord Ridley;
unfortunately he became too ill to go to the front, and Lieut.-Colonel
Cookson took his place.
The centre of interest was now shifting from France to Belgium. Confused
by the conflicting accounts which filtered through, the people at home
only grasped that the German advance on Paris had failed, and that there
was consequently a stalemate. But Sir John French knew that, even though
the Allies had won the race to the sea, there was every danger of the
German Army concentrating somewhere in the north and breaking through
the line, necessarily weak, of the Allied armies.
[Illustration: Ypres and the neighbouring country where the First Battle
of Ypres was fought. October and November. 1914.]
Although the Germans were in possession of the greater part of Belgium,
in their hurry to get to Paris they had been unable to dispose entirely
of the Belgian Army, which had been so troublesome in the first stages
of the war, and which had now retired into Antwerp. Consequently the
German General Staff determined to make good the lines of communication
by taking Antwerp and reducing all Belgium to ruins. As soon as this had
been done all the available troops were to force their way through the
Allied line and seize the northern part of France.
The capture of one of the largest towns in Belgium would be hailed with
the greatest enthusiasm in Germany, and would also nip in the bud any
scheme for sending British troops and guns to help the besieged Belgian
Army. Germany knew that at present we had no guns capable of competing
with hers, but if she delayed there was no reason why we should not
manufacture them up to any calibre.
But, undeterred by our lack both of men and guns, the British Government
had made up its mind to do _something_, at any rate, and the Naval
Division, which had been intended as a Reserve for the Fleet, were
accordingly despatched to Antwerp. This expedition was a glaring
instance of our lack of preparation in the early stages of the war.
Totally untrained, the men, many of them, knew nothing of the mechanism
of the rifles they were armed with; they had no transport, and were
given for their conveyance London motor omnibuses, with the familiar
advertisements still on them.
[Sidenote: Oct. 1914.]
This force was greeted with wild enthusiasm when it arrived in Antwerp
on October 4. Major J. A. C. Quilter, Captain A. E. Maxwell, and
Lieutenant W. R. C. Murray, all officers of the Grenadiers, were lent to
the Naval Division. Captain Maxwell was severely wounded in the
subsequent fighting, and afterwards died, but the other two returned
safely to England. Major Quilter, who remained attached to the Naval
Division, was killed later in the Dardanelles while in command of the
Hood Battalion.
With the monster German guns brought up against the town, the fall of
Antwerp was a foregone conclusion. The Belgian artillery was quite
outranged, and could make no sort of a reply, and the Naval Division had
no heavy guns at all. So one-sided was the contest that for the
defenders it was merely a matter of looking on while the huge shells
fell and gradually devastated the town. On October 8 Antwerp
capitulated, and there was a wild, confused rush by the inhabitants to
get away. The Belgian Army and the greater part of the Naval Division
managed to escape from the town, but about 18,000 Belgian troops and
15,000 British were forced up into Holland and interned.
Suddenly, when it had settled down to a sort of peace-manoeuvre life at
Lyndhurst, the Seventh Division received its marching orders. The
Government had decided to send it to help the Belgian Army. It was
practically the only available unit, except the Third Cavalry Division,
which was sent off a few days later.
It was a quiet, peaceful Sunday when the summons came. There had been so
many rumours and alarms that no one took much notice of them, and the
idea of departure had faded to a remote possibility. Passes had been
given to the men to remain out till 9.30, and a field-day was arranged
for the next day. Then came the order to embark at once from
Southampton. In an instant there was feverish bustle and energy
throughout the camps. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers marched off to
Southampton, and was joined there by many men who were out on pass, but
by the time the ship sailed all the Battalion was reported present.
[Sidenote: Oct. 4.]
Embarking on October 4, the Seventh Division succeeded in avoiding the
enemy's mines and submarines on its voyage to Zeebrugge, but the Cavalry
Division was unable to follow, and was diverted to Ostend instead.
The following is a list of the officers of the 1st Battalion Grenadier
Guards, who went out with the Battalion--all but a few of them were
killed or wounded:
Lieut.-Colonel M. Earle, D.S.O., Commanding Officer.
Major H. St. L. Stucley, Second in Command.
Lieut. Lord Claud N. Hamilton, Machine-gun Officer.
Capt. G. E. C. Rasch, Adjutant.
Lieut. J. Teece, Quartermaster.
Major the Hon. A. O. W. C. Weld-Forester, M.V.O., King's Company.
Captain the Hon. L. P. Cary (Master of Falkland), King's Company.
Lieut. W. S. Pilcher, King's Company.
Lieut. H. L. Aubrey-Fletcher, M.V.O., King's Company.
Lieut. J. H. Powell, King's Company.
2nd Lieut. R. O. R. Kenyon-Slaney, King's Company.
Captain the Hon. C. M. B. Ponsonby, M.V.O., No. 2 Company.
Capt. G. C. G. Moss, No. 2 Company.
Lieut. G. E. Hope, Signalling Officer.
Lieut. T. E. R. Symons, No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. S. Lambert, No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. M. A. A. Darby, No. 2 Company.
Capt. Lord Richard Wellesley, No. 3 Company.
Capt. G. Rennie, No. 3 Company.
Lieutenant the Hon. A. G. S. Douglas-Pennant, No. 3 Company.
Lieut. P. Van Neck, No. 3 Company.
Lieut. L. G. Ames, No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. W. R. Mackenzie, Transport Officer.
Major L. R. V. Colby, No. 4 Company.
Capt. R. E. K. Leatham, No. 4 Company.
Lieut. E. Antrobus, No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. S. Walter, No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. N. A. H. Somerset, No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. Sir G. Duckworth-King, Bart., No. 4 Company.
_Attached_--Lieut. J. G. Butt, R.A.M.C.
The crossing was made in the S.S. _Armenian_, which was fairly
comfortable, and the _Turcoman_, just a cattle-boat, with no
accommodation at all. The transports did not move out into the Solent
till after dark on the 5th, and reached Zeebrugge at six o'clock on the
morning of the 7th. Disembarking was none too easy a task, for the jetty
was much too small for ships of that size, and there were no cranes or
other appliances for unshipping the horses, which just had to be pushed
down gangways.
[Sidenote: Oct. 7.]
Entreaties were made to General Capper by a Belgian colonel and two
Staff officers, who had come as a deputation from Antwerp, that he would
bring the whole of the Seventh Division into that city. But Sir Henry
Rawlinson had already sent orders for the Division to go to Bruges at
once. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers made the journey in two trains, and
was billeted in the suburb of St. André. Crowds lined the streets, and
cheered each battalion lustily as it arrived. All the billeting was
arranged without any difficulty, as the Belgian authorities knew to a
man how many troops each village would hold.
That evening there was a "procession of humiliation" through the streets
of Bruges, a long train of old men and women following in the wake of
the priests, who were headed by acolytes swinging their censers. As they
walked slowly through the streets, chanting a litany, they made an odd
contrast with the masses of fighting men in khaki, and their array of
wagons and guns.
[Sidenote: Oct. 8.]
Next day the whole Division was ordered to march to Ostend, to cover the
landing of the Cavalry Division--a hot, tiring journey it was of fifteen
miles, over the usual paving-stones. At Leffinghe, on the outskirts of
Ostend, a defensive position was taken up and an attempt made to dig
trenches, but the men could not go very deep, as at three feet below the
surface they reached water.
[Sidenote: Oct. 9.]
Fortunately the Battalion was not called upon to hold them. Just before
daybreak it left the trenches and marched into Ostend, where it
entrained for Ghent. Sir Henry Rawlinson's plan was to operate on the
Germans' left flank and divert their attention from the Belgian Army,
which might thus, he hoped, be able to escape from Antwerp.
Indescribable confusion reigned in Ostend. The whole country-side had
swarmed in to see what was going on; the Cavalry Division was landing
while the Seventh Division passed through to get to the railway station,
and their movements were naturally hampered by the throngs of people
which surged over the streets and quays. General Capper took with him
the 20th and 22nd Brigades under Brigadier-Generals Ruggles-Brise and
Lawford, leaving the 21st, under Brigadier-General Watts, to march back
to Beernem, where it was to remain in reserve. Meanwhile, the Cavalry
Division was to operate in the direction of Thourout.
When the two brigades arrived at Ghent, they found that a small force of
French Marines and Belgian cyclists were already holding an outpost line
in front of the town. The Germans, it was reported, had just crossed the
Scheldt about ten miles to the east, and were moving north-west, with
the object of cutting off the Belgian Army and the British and French
Naval Divisions, which were evacuating Antwerp.
[Illustration: Route taken by the First Battalion Grenadier Guards
through Belgium in October 1914.]
A second outpost line was taken up by the two brigades in rear of the
French Marines, the 1st Battalion Grenadiers being in reserve. There
were no machine-guns, and the only ammunition was the 200 rounds carried
by each man. Though the artillery had been sent on the night before, it
did not arrive at Ghent till twenty-four hours after the infantry, owing
to the confusion there was on the railway line, part of which was in the
hands of the Germans.
No. 2 Company of the Grenadiers found one or two piquets blocking the
main road, and had a very busy time with the Belgian refugees who were
streaming out of Ghent all night long. The other three companies were
sent into billets in some large dye-works, but there were so few exits
that it was found it would take quite half-an-hour to evacuate the
place, so that it was nothing but a death-trap. Accordingly No. 4
Company billeted in a timber yard close by, while the King's and No. 3
bivouacked in an orchard by the roadside.
The nights were cold, and when the Battalion requisitioned for blankets,
huge rolls of velvet from the dye-works were issued by the Belgian
authorities. Some ten thousand francs' worth of velvet, it was
estimated, was damaged in this way. The men naturally did not mind what
they looked like as long as they kept warm, but as they lay asleep in
the yard, with rich velvet such as Velasquez might have painted wrapped
round their khaki, they presented a spectacle decidedly incongruous.
[Sidenote: Oct. 10.]
Nothing much happened during the next day, though there were occasional
alarms. Firing could be heard in the distance, but no shells or bullets
came in the direction of our troops. When it was dark the Battalion was
ordered to report to the commander of the outpost line. On the march
they met scattered bodies of the French Marines, who had presumably been
driven in, and when they got to Destelbergen it appeared that the
Marines had been withdrawn from this section, which was now only thinly
held by such men as could be spared by the Border Regiment on the left.
The King's Company was told to take over this section--by no means an
easy task in the dark. The frontage was nearly a mile, with the platoons
about six hundred yards apart, and the trenches were useless, being
merely shallow rain-shelters, hastily covered over. By working all night
the men succeeded in making some sort of a trench by dawn. Orders were
received that there could be no retirement in case of attack, and that
no support could be looked for.
It was a remarkable situation into which this quixotic operation had
forced us. Here was an isolated British Division, with practically no
base and with no available reinforcements, operating entirely by itself,
while large bodies of the enemy were reported in every direction. But
for the information, which was regularly supplied by the aircraft, such
a position would have become impossible. The aeroplanes were most
active, constantly spying out the enemy's movements, and the armed
motor-cars also did very useful work.
[Sidenote: Oct. 11.]
Spades and shovels were obtained from neighbouring cottages at daybreak
on the 11th, and the men managed to make really good trenches. But in
the afternoon the Battalion was withdrawn, and marched through Ghent.
The whole force was retiring, and No. 2 and No. 3 Companies formed the
rearguard to the two brigades. It was hardly expected that the Germans
would allow the force to get away without a severe fight, but nothing
happened, though the enemy was close at hand, and entered Ghent soon
after the mixed force of British, French, and Belgians had left the
town. Passing through Ghent at dead of night after the cordial reception
they had had from the inhabitants two days before, and with the
knowledge that the Belgians were being left to the tender mercies of the
Germans, was anything but a pleasant experience for the British Force.
Antwerp having fallen, the Seventh Division now got orders to make its
way back as fast as it could to Ypres, and there join up with the rest
of the British Army. This meant long marches and few intervals of rest,
but with the German force that had been freed by the capture of Antwerp
close behind, any delay was dangerous.
[Sidenote: Oct. 12.]
By dawn on the 12th, Ruggles-Brise's and Lawford's Brigades reached
Somergem, and in the afternoon they marched to Thielt by way of Aeltre.
At Oostcamp Watts's Brigade joined in and followed the others to Thielt.
As the Division drew near that place the halts became more and more
frequent--there were constant checks of as much as ten minutes, followed
by moves of less than a hundred yards. This was a very trying climax
after being up all night and marching all day. The last mile took two
hours, and it was not till 1 A.M. that the men reached their billets.
[Sidenote: Oct. 13.]
A burst of very heavy rifle-fire at 6 o'clock next morning in the very
centre of the town brought every one scrambling out of their billets,
with visions of outposts rushed and Germans in their midst. But it
turned out to be only a Taube, at which every one who had a rifle was
taking a shot. Eventually it was brought down about a mile off, the
Grenadiers, Scots Fusiliers, and Pom-Pom Detachment all claiming the
hit.
The whole Division started off for Roulers, followed by the Germans. On
its arrival at Pitthem, a force of the enemy was reported to be
advancing from the north and north-east. The baggage was therefore sent
on, and the 20th and 22nd Brigades were ordered to take up a position in
order to cover this change in the order of march. The Germans, however,
did not come on, and the march was continued. The Division reached
Roulers after dark--with the usual irritating and fatiguing halts. At
each village, as the Battalion marched through, the whole population
turned out and gave the men apples, cigarettes, and any other offerings
they could, but the lion's share naturally fell to the advance guard and
the leading battalion, and by the time the tail was reached the supplies
had generally given out.
By now the Germans had grasped that this was an isolated Division, and
were straining every nerve to catch it, so that the position at Roulers
was very precarious. The reports from the aeroplane scouts were
disquieting, and General Capper realised that every moment was precious.
[Sidenote: Oct. 14.]
Early next morning the Division marched out of Roulers, and not long
afterwards the Germans arrived; in fact, it was said that the rear-guard
was hardly clear of the town before the Uhlans were in it. No. 3 and No.
4 Companies, under Captain Lord Richard Wellesley and Major Colby,
formed the advance-guard.
Rain fell heavily all the way, and the roads were in a terrible state,
but the men's spirits were raised by the news that they were nearly in
touch with the Expeditionary Force. These forced marches had told on the
troops, and though in the Grenadiers not a man fell out, in some of the
battalions men were left behind--never to be seen again. Others,
determined not to fall into the enemy's hands, limped doggedly on in a
pitiable plight, some having even taken off their boots and tied their
puttees round their feet.
They reached Ypres at 2 P.M. on the 14th, and the King's, No. 3, and No.
4 Companies were detailed to find the outposts on the Menin and Messines
roads. As the companies moved out to take up their positions they
encountered several parties of Uhlans, which caused a good deal of
excitement among the men, as they were the first of the enemy's troops
actually seen. Some ammunition was expended without much result. But No.
4 Company at any rate accounted for four of these advanced cavalry.
In the evening a report was received that a German force of all arms,
estimated to be an Army Corps, was advancing on Ypres from the direction
of Comines. Their road was blocked by a platoon of the King's Company,
and most of the men were delighted at the prospect of a fight, although
those who knew the composition of a German Army Corps were not quite so
enthusiastic. Two platoons of No. 2 Company under Lieutenant T. E. R.
Symons were despatched to Voormezeele, about a mile in front of the
outpost line, to block the road and report at once any movements by the
enemy.
These were the first trenches dug on the Ypres battle-ground. The men at
that time imagined that they had only to scrape out temporary shelters
which would be sufficient protection for a night or two. They little
thought that they were laying the foundation of an intricate network of
trenches which would be constantly used for the next four years.
The first battle of Ypres which was now about to begin may be said to
fall into four clearly marked stages:
A. _Up to October 19_: the operations of the Second and Third Corps from
the La Bassée Canal in the south to Armentières and Ploegsteert Wood, in
which they forced their way forward in the face of always increasing
opposition; the Second Corps establishing itself on the high ground
south-west of Lille ("the Aubers Ridge"), although it was being held up
on its right by the strong German position of La Bassée; the Third Corps
continuing the line northward astride of the Lys. On their left the
enemy's cavalry threatened the passages of the Lys from Warneton
downward, but could not cross the river. Its operations connected up
those of the Second and Third Corps with those of the Seventh Division
and Third Cavalry Division, with which General Rawlinson, after
advancing eastward to assist in the retirement of the Belgian Army from
Antwerp, had fallen back to a position a few miles east of Ypres.
By the evening of October 19 the line of the Second Corps ran
approximately from east of Givenchy--Violaines--Lorgies--west of
Illies--Herlies to Le Pilly, while between it and the Third Corps was
General Conneau's French Cavalry Corps, somewhat to the left rear
of the Second Corps. The Third Corps had reached the line
Radinghem--Ennetières--Prémesques--Frélinghien--Le Gheer. The British
cavalry continued the line down the Lys to the Ypres--Comines Canal, and
was in touch with the right of General Rawlinson's command, which, after
attempting to advance on Menin on the morning of October 19, had been
forced to fall back to the position Zandvoorde--Kruiseik--Zonnebeke by
the appearance on its left of large forces of Germans, before which the
French cavalry (connecting General Rawlinson's force with the Belgians)
was falling back.
The situation, as it then stood, seems to have offered Sir John French
two alternatives for the employment of Sir Douglas Haig's Corps, which
had then completed its concentration in the area St. Omer--Hazebrouck:
he might utilise it to reinforce Generals Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney,
who were holding a long front, and whose troops had had over a week of
difficult, if on the whole successful, fighting, and lacked the numbers
needed for any further advance. Reinforcements thrown in on this quarter
might have saved Lille, and enabled the French, in co-operation with
whom the British were acting, to outflank the Germans opposed to them in
the neighbourhood of Loos and Arras. Ever since the battle on the Aisne
had reached a deadlock in the middle of September, it had been the
object of the Allied forces to outflank the German right, while the
Germans had by continually reinforcing and prolonging their threatened
flank succeeded in thwarting this effort. It is this double prolongation
of the opposing lines, first by one combatant, then by the other, which
is called "the Race to the Sea," and of which the first battle of Ypres
was the culminating point.
The other alternative was to send in this force farther to the left to
carry out a wider turning movement than the mere move round what seemed
then the German right south of Lille, and by pushing forward east of
Ypres in the direction of Bruges to outflank the German line far more
effectively. It is a little difficult to ascertain from the evidence at
present available what exactly was known as to the opposition to be
expected in such a movement. It would seem that the full strength of the
German force available, consisting of several of the newly formed
Reserve Corps (raised since the beginning of the war), was hardly
appreciated. The idea, prevailing at the British Headquarters, was that
if used on the extreme left flank in this way Sir Douglas Haig's part
would be essentially offensive; but as things turned out, he was
speedily thrown on the defensive, and forced to fight a most desperate
battle to prevent greatly superior forces of Germans forcing their way
through Ypres to the Channel ports. Badly as the Second and Third Corps
needed help, it was most fortunate that, when the German attack began,
it found the First Corps, advancing past Ypres, in its path.
B. _From October 20 to October 28_: the operations in this phase have a
two-fold character. On the left Sir Douglas Haig endeavoured to advance
first of all north of, and then through, General Rawlinson's troops;
and, though to some extent successful, he encountered ever-increasing
opposition, so that by October 28 the British in this quarter (east of
Ypres, north of the Ypres--Comines Canal) had been definitely thrown on
the defensive, and were hard put to it to hold their own against the
repeated attacks of considerably superior forces. Meanwhile, on October
20, the Germans had developed a powerful counter-attack against the long
and attenuated line held by the Second and Third Corps. The left of the
Second Corps at Le Pilly was driven in, and simultaneously General
Pulteney's troops were ousted from Ennetières and Prémesques, and these
losses, coupled with the great superiority of the German forces opposed
to them, compelled the Second and Third Corps to retire. Thus the
valuable tactical position of the Aubers Ridge was lost, and the Second
and Third Corps compelled to retire to the line Givenchy--Richebourg
l'Avoué--Neuve Chapelle--Bois Grenier--Houplines--Le Gheer. At the same
time the cavalry north of the Lys was gradually pressed back to the line
St. Yvon--east of Messines--Hollebeke--Zandvoorde. Fortunately at this
critical time the arrival of the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps
provided a much-needed assistance, but, despite this, the village of
Neuve Chapelle was lost on October 27, and a counter-attack on October
28 failed to regain possession of it.
C. _From October 29 to November 10_: in this period the operations north
of the Lys, where the German attacks reached their maximum in force,
were of the greatest importance, fresh troops being constantly put in.
South of that river the fighting gradually diminished in intensity, the
German attacks being held up by the Second Corps, part of which was
relieved by the Indian Corps (the Meerut Division, which arrived in the
line on October 31), and the Sixth Division of the Third Corps. A little
ground was lost, but nothing of real importance. North of the river the
intensity of the fighting increased greatly, and on October 29 the
Germans attacked in great strength, but were only able to gain a little
ground. Two days later, on October 31, they renewed the attack with the
utmost vigour, and made a determined effort to reach the Channel ports.
The line of the First Division about Gheluvelt was broken, and the
Division fell back. General Lomax and the greater portion of his staff
were killed, while the casualties in the rank and file were enormous.
The day was saved by Brigadier-General Charles FitzClarence, V.C., who,
quickly realising the peril of the situation, ordered the 2nd Battalion
Worcestershire Regiment to retake Gheluvelt, although they were not
under his command. The First Division gallantly rallied, and regained
some of the ground that had been lost, but not without desperate
fighting and very heavy losses. At the same time the Fourth Division of
the Third Corps was very hard pressed at Le Gheer, but managed to retain
its ground after hard fighting and a successful counter-attack. On
November 1 the cavalry, after a most magnificent resistance at Messines
and Wytschaete, was finally dislodged from the Messines Ridge. By this
time French reinforcements were arriving in large numbers, and they took
over the line between the left of the cavalry and the right of Sir
Douglas Haig's command (into which the Seventh Division had now been
absorbed), but their repeated counter-attacks on the Messines Ridge, and
between Wytschaete and the Ypres--Comines Canal were unsuccessful. After
October 31 the fighting north of the Ypres--Comines Canal did not reach
the same intensity till November 11, but the Germans made repeated
attacks, and forced the line back a little at several points. It became
necessary to relieve the Seventh Division, whose infantry had been
reduced to about a quarter of its original strength, and this was done
by putting in about a dozen of the scarcely less exhausted battalions of
the Second Corps, which had just been taken out of the line north of La
Bassée for a well-earned rest. By November 5 the right of Sir Douglas
Haig's line, south of the Ypres--Menin road, was held by the equivalent
of a division from the Second Corps, the First Division being in his
centre, and the Second on his left, though all three divisions were much
intermingled.
By November 10 the cavalry, supported by a few battalions of the Second
Corps, had taken over a line west of the Messines Ridge, and on the left
of the Third Corps. From the Douve southward to La Bassée the line was
approximately established as it remained through the winter of 1914-15,
the Third Corps being astride the Lys, while the Fourth Corps (the
Eighth Division, which had by this time arrived) continued the line from
about Bois Grenier to beyond Neuve Chapelle, the Indian Corps being on
the right.
D. _November 11 to 20_: November 11 was the next most critical moment of
the battle after October 31; on this day took place the great attack of
the Prussian Guard, which broke through the line of the First Division
near Veldhoek and penetrated into the Nonne-Bosschen, but was checked
there, and then dislodged by a counter-attack by the 52nd Oxfordshire
Light Infantry, perhaps the most dramatic of all the individual episodes
of the battle. On this day the line of the Third Division south of the
Ypres--Menin road was also violently assailed, and some ground was lost;
but the net result of the day was the failure of the great German effort
to break through, and from that moment the fighting north as well as
south of the Lys tended to diminish in intensity. The Germans made a few
more attacks, but none in such strength or determination as those of
October 31 and November 11, and about November 15 the French began to
take over the positions in "the Ypres salient," so obstinately defended
by Sir Douglas Haig for nearly four weeks. It may be gathered from the
accounts of the fighting of the subsequent months that the Germans were
for the moment exhausted, that their supplies of ammunition were running
low, and that the attack of November 11 represented their last
bolt--until more could be forged. Thus if the Allied effort to outflank
the German right and roll up their line had been unsuccessful,
defensively the first battle of Ypres was a great success, the German
effort to break through being definitely and decisively defeated.
November 20 may be taken as the end of the battle, as it was on that day
that the last unit of Sir Douglas Haig's command was relieved by the
French, the British line then extending approximately from Givenchy in
the south to Keniwel in the north. During this fourth phase the
operations on the line from the Douve to the La Bassée Canal had been of
the character of "normal trench warfare," neither side attempting any
major operation.
[Sidenote: Oct. 15.]
Ypres was to be held at all costs till the First Corps arrived--those
were Sir Henry Rawlinson's orders. There were no other British troops in
the neighbourhood when the Seventh Division arrived there, except the
Third Cavalry Division, which had been sent on in the direction of Menin
to reconnoitre. The Eighty-seventh French Territorial Division was at
Ypres, and the Eighty-ninth at Poperinghe (both under General Bidon),
while the Belgian Army had reached the Forest of Houthulst.
At first General Capper decided to post the Seventh Division from
Zonnebeke to Langemarck, asking the Eighty-seventh French Territorials
to hold, for the moment, the line from Zonnebeke to Hollebeke; there
they would get into touch with Allenby's Cavalry Division, which was on
the left of the Third Corps. Operating on the left of the Seventh
Division, Byng's Cavalry Division would keep touch with the Belgians and
French Marines.
But these orders were afterwards cancelled when it was clear that Menin
would be the probable line of advance. General Capper made the Seventh
Division change places with the Eighty-seventh French Division, so that
it now took up the line from Zonnebeke to Hollebeke, with
Ruggles-Brise's Brigade on the right, Watts's in the centre, and
Lawford's on the left. Four German Army Corps were now rumoured to be
operating somewhere in Belgium, but where exactly no one knew.
[Sidenote: Oct. 16.]
A piteous sight confronted the 1st Battalion Grenadiers as it marched
eastward towards Zandvoorde on October 16, after a quiet day in billets
on the outskirts of Ypres. On the roads it met the whole civilian
population of the neighbouring towns and villages, which was in flight
before the advancing enemy. Old men and women ran breathless; children
trotted by their mothers' sides; some had all their worldly possessions
in carts drawn by ponies or dogs; others were pushing wheelbarrows
loaded with all the goods they could carry away. All had a look of
terror in their eyes, and all hurried madly to safety, spurred on by the
thought of the blazing villages that lay behind them.
The advance-guard of the Brigade was formed by the King's and No. 4
Companies under Major Weld-Forester and Major Colby. Progress was very
slow, even after daybreak, as there was a fog, and every wood by the
roadside had to be thoroughly cleared. A few shots were exchanged with
Uhlans, but there was no serious resistance, and the Brigade entered
Zandvoorde at 11 A.M. Two miles from Zandvoorde, meanwhile, No. 3
Company under Lord Richard Wellesley had been ordered to Hollebeke to
protect the right flank of the Brigade; this Company rejoined the
Battalion later on.
At Zandvoorde a strong defensive position was taken up, facing east; it
had a good field of fire, and there was a fairly wide stream two hundred
yards from the trenches. The King's and No. 4 Companies were in the
front trench, and No. 2 and No. 3 in reserve. That night the enemy
played his old tricks, and kept every one awake, with a few snipers
firing at intervals into different parts of the line. The men were then
new to such devices, but it was not long before they learned to
distinguish between sniping and an organised attack.
[Sidenote: Oct. 17-18.]
The following day the whole Brigade was ordered to advance and occupy
the ridge Kruiseik--America, with its right bending back to Zandvoorde,
the Scots Guards having occupied Kruiseik the night before. At night
villages could be seen burning in every direction, set on fire by the
Germans, and this was taken as an indication that the enemy was
preparing to attack.
[Sidenote: Oct. 19.]
On the 19th orders were received for an advance by the Seventh Division
on Menin and Wervicq; it was reported that the enemy was in no great
strength, and that his forces consisted principally of Landsturm, with
no artillery. The attack was to take place in three phases:
First phase: by the 22nd Brigade on the left against an advance position
at Kleythoek.
Second phase: by the 20th and 21st Brigades against Gheluwe.
Third phase: by the whole Division against Menin and Wervicq.
Sir John French, in his despatch of that date, said:
I considered, however, that the possession of Menin constituted a
very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the
advance of the rest of the Army, so I directed the General Officer
commanding the Fourth Corps to advance the Seventh Division upon
Menin and endeavour to seize that crossing on the morning of the
18th.
It was no easy task that was allotted to Sir Henry Rawlinson, for he had
nothing to fall back upon. The cavalry under Byng was hardly strong
enough to do more than feel for the enemy, and there was therefore only
the French Territorial Division at Ypres as a reserve. There was nearly
twenty miles of front for the Seventh Division to operate on, and no one
knew when the First Corps would arrive.
The advance of the Seventh Division began in the morning. The 1st
Battalion Grenadiers deployed for an attack on Gheluwe and Kruiseik,
with No. 2 and No. 3 Companies in the firing-line, and the King's and
No. 4 in support. The men were extended to eight paces, and each company
had a frontage of half a platoon; the Battalion was thus in sixteen
lines, with 200 yards between each line, during the preliminary advance
under artillery fire.
When about half the Battalion was on the move, the order to advance was
countermanded, for news had arrived that a large force of all arms was
advancing from the direction of Courtrai. Lawford's Brigade, which had
reached Kleythoek, was strongly attacked on its left flank and compelled
to fall back with heavy losses. The advance on Menin had been found
impracticable; Sir Henry Rawlinson suddenly realised that with a single
infantry division it was sheer madness to attack an enemy force which,
according to our airmen's reports, was far stronger than Sir John French
had anticipated. Being the pivot on which the whole Division had to
turn, Ruggles-Brise's Brigade had not gone far when the countermanding
order came, but the left of the Division had to retire some distance
before it was in line facing the right way.
Ruggles-Brise's Brigade retired to its former position, which consisted
of a semicircular line running from Zandvoorde through Kruiseik to the
cross-roads on the Ypres--Menin road. To the 1st Battalion Grenadiers
was allotted a frontage of nearly a mile, from and including the village
of Kruiseik to the cross-roads, on the left being the Yorkshire Regiment
from Watts's Brigade and on the right the Border Regiment. No. 2 and No.
3 Companies were in the firing line, and No. 4 and the King's Company in
support.
A circular salient is not easy to hold, and after the greater part of
the day had been spent in improving the trenches and putting out barbed
wire under intermittent and ineffective shell-fire, orders were received
to withdraw the line. This withdrawal was necessitated by the Divisional
order to send back two battalions as Divisional Reserve. This left only
the Grenadiers and Border Regiment to occupy the whole line. After
consulting General Ruggles-Brise, Lieut.-Colonel Earle decided to
withdraw Nos. 2 and 3 Companies and convert the support trenches into
the firing line. This meant altering the trenches a good deal, as those
used for the supports were too wide and shallow. The whole situation
had, however, changed, and the Division was now on the defensive.
[Sidenote: Oct. 20.]
Improvements in the line generally were made next day. Besides being
deepened, the trenches were made narrower by driving wash-poles into the
bottom about three feet apart, closing up the intervals with doors,
shutters, straw hurdles, etc., and then filling up the space behind with
earth. This work was practically finished, when it had to be stopped
because a reconnaissance was sent out in front with a battery of R.H.A.
(13-pounders) to support it, and no sooner had the battery opened fire
than it was itself attacked by much heavier artillery from the direction
of Wervicq.
For an hour a constant stream of shrapnel and high explosive poured over
our trenches. There was one short lull, when our R.H.A. Battery ran
short of ammunition, and the Germans, thinking they had knocked the
battery out, also ceased fire. On realising their mistake, they began
again with renewed energy. High-explosive shells were bursting all down
the trenches, back and front, but luckily none landed actually in them;
and though a cottage by the side of the road caught fire, the removal of
the wood and straw lying near the trench averted all danger. Very
grateful the Grenadiers were for the close touch which F Battery under
Major Head managed to keep with them during these anxious days'
fighting. It was a perfect example of how artillery and infantry should
co-operate.
In the afternoon the enemy launched his infantry attack, preceded by
scouts and snipers, and covered by artillery and machine-gun fire.
Almost for the first time the Germans were now distinctly seen, and
there was something almost reassuring in the fact that they looked like
ordinary beings. Hitherto they had seemed a sort of mysterious bogey,
something far away on the black horizon, an evil force associated with
burning houses and fleeing inhabitants. Though their attack was all
according to the book, they never succeeded in reaching our trenches. In
many places they managed to advance under cover to within 200 yards of
our position, but the attack was half-hearted and therefore failed.
The machine-guns under Lord Claud Hamilton were posted on the right of
the Battalion, and remained there for seven days, day and night, without
relief, under continual fire from the enemy's artillery and
machine-guns. During this strenuous time they fired 56,000 rounds, and
inflicted considerable loss on the enemy.
By dusk the Germans had established a considerable force within striking
distance, and the whole British line stood to arms till about 9 P.M.,
expecting an assault any moment. Why with such enormous advantages the
enemy did not make a more determined attack it is difficult to
understand. They outnumbered our troops by four to one, and had an
overwhelming superiority in artillery. But while the Seventh Division
were all seasoned professional soldiers, the German Corps consisted
mostly of Landwehr, that is, second-line troops or men retired from the
active army.
Nothing happened till midnight, when the enemy suddenly opened a heavy
fire, and in places began half-hearted assaults, which were easily
repulsed. He kept up a continuous and comparatively useless fire for an
hour, but with our men the control of fire was excellent. During these
spasmodic attacks the R.H.A. Battery, which was just behind the village
of Kruiseik, did most effective work, bursting groups of shrapnel with
great accuracy and rapidity over the German lines, at a range of only
eight hundred yards. The Seventh Division was occupying more ground than
it could properly hold, but with so few troops General Capper had no
alternative. Two platoons of No. 2 Company were furnished during the
night to support the King's Company in the fire trenches, but even with
their help it found the greatest difficulty in filling its part of the
line.
[Sidenote: Oct. 21.]
There was some shelling in the early morning of the 21st, but nothing
serious happened till the afternoon, when the enemy at last attacked,
apparently, all along the line. So long was the line General Capper was
now holding that he found it impossible to keep any reserves. At first
the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards was in Divisional Reserve, but it was
soon wanted, and was sent up into the firing line in the morning. When
appeals for help came afterwards from various quarters, General Capper
had only the cavalry to send. The Northumberland Hussars were despatched
to fill the gap between the 20th Brigade and the Third Cavalry Division,
and when the right flank of the Division needed strengthening the
Divisional Cyclist Company was sent thither.
By this time the First Corps had arrived, and had been sent up to the
north of Ypres. As it turned out, that spirit of dash which won Sir John
French his reputation in South Africa proved the saving of the
situation. Had he been of a more cautious disposition, he would
undoubtedly have sent the First Corps to reinforce General
Smith-Dorrien, who was in great difficulties farther south. Its despatch
north of Ypres, originally with the idea of a general advance, saved the
Seventh Division from utter destruction.
The position of the line was now as follows: the First Corps from
Bixschoote to Zonnebeke; the Seventh Division from Zonnebeke to
Zandvoorde; then Byng's Cavalry and Allenby's Cavalry up to the left of
the Third Corps.
About mid-day the 21st Brigade was heavily attacked, and
Brigadier-General Watts sent back for reinforcements. There were none.
Some companies had to be sent in support, and General Ruggles-Brise
ordered No. 2 and No. 3 Companies of the Grenadiers to go to its help.
Two companies of Scots Guards had already been sent to Zandvoorde to
fill up a gap on the right, occasioned by the withdrawal of the 5th
Cavalry Brigade, while the remaining two companies were with the
Divisional Reserve at Gheluvelt. These continual demands for
reinforcements naturally weakened the 20th Brigade considerably. Under
heavy shell-fire the Scots Guards started off, but the attack on the
21st Brigade died away, and after they had gone about a mile they were
ordered to return, as they might be wanted any moment to support their
own Brigade.
Meanwhile the line held by the Grenadiers was heavily shelled, not only
by the Germans but by our own guns, which were firing short. The men
naturally were infuriated by this, but fortunately the mistake did not
last long, as the artillery was soon able to correct its own distance.
During the night the German machine-guns had been brought up close, one
at least being placed in a house 150 yards from our trenches, and the
covering fire from these was most disconcerting. It was generally
oblique, and enabled the German infantry to approach with far fewer
losses than on the previous day. An infantry attack was made, but was
not pressed home, and except for spasmodic bursts of rifle-fire the
night was again fairly quiet.
[Sidenote: Oct. 22.]
Having been in the trenches for four days and nights, the King's and No.
4 Companies were relieved by No. 2 and No. 3 Companies. Aircraft reports
that the enemy was massing troops near America seemed to presage an
attack, but except for the inevitable sniping nothing happened in that
part of the line, the attack that day being directed against the 22nd
Brigade and also against the First and Second Divisions farther north.
The relieved companies had not been long in their dug-outs, however,
before two platoons of No. 4 Company under 2nd Lieutenant Walter and 2nd
Lieutenant Somerset were ordered to occupy some trenches vacated by the
21st Brigade on the left, while the King's Company was sent up to
Kruiseik to reinforce No. 2 Company.
[Sidenote: Oct. 23.]
The position of the Seventh Division was now becoming most precarious,
holding doggedly on as it was to a line seven miles long, with every man
in the trenches. General Lawford's 22nd Brigade had been attacked by a
large force and obliged to give ground; this made an ugly dent in the
line, and placed the 21st Brigade in an acute and perilous salient. To
help the hard-pressed Seventh Division Sir Douglas Haig now sent along
the Second Division, which had been relieved by the French Ninth Corps.
Owing to the heavy mist on the 23rd neither side could use artillery
till 9 A.M., when the enemy began to bombard the Kruiseik salient. The
day's attack was directed against the 21st Brigade, and the Wiltshire
Regiment had some desperate fighting. The two platoons of the Grenadiers
which had been sent up the night before were attacked by two battalions
of Germans, but they held their ground and never gave an inch. They
suffered severely, however, and 2nd Lieutenant Walter and 2nd Lieutenant
Somerset were both killed before these platoons were withdrawn. The
whole line of trenches was bombarded incessantly, and all day the German
guns swept the rear of the line so as to catch the supports as they came
up.
A message was sent to the Grenadiers about 2.30 from the Border Regiment
on the right to say that their trenches had been blown in, and they
might want help. Accordingly the King's and No. 4 Companies were ordered
to move across to a position in rear of the Border Regiment, so as to
support them if necessary. No sooner had they left their dug-outs and
fallen in than they were heavily shelled, though they were well out of
sight of the German gunners.
Incidents like this gave rise to stories of spies behind the British
lines, who could telephone to the enemy's gunners the exact position of
bodies of our troops. But had the Germans had any means whatever of
obtaining information they could hardly have failed to know that,
instead of the large forces they imagined to be opposed to them, there
was nothing to bar their way to Calais but a single unsupported British
Division.
When the leading platoons of the two companies of the Grenadiers reached
the position indicated, which was the ridge in rear of the Borderers'
trenches, they came under the concentrated fire of batteries from three
different directions, and suffered some loss. So heavy was the fire that
they found it impossible to remain on the ridge, and as the Border
Regiment had not definitely asked for support the King's Company was
ordered to retire. It retired in good order and in slow time, though
under heavy fire all the way. Lieutenant H. L. Aubrey Fletcher and
several men were wounded, but the casualties were not so heavy as might
have been expected. Fortunately the enemy burst their shrapnel too high,
and the ground was so soft that the high-explosive shells did little
damage except when they got a direct hit.
[Sidenote: Oct. 24.]
A violent attack was made next day on the salient formed by the British
line, which at last began to show signs of giving way. After some
desperate fighting the Wiltshire Regiment was driven in, and the Germans
got possession of Polygon Wood. Ruggles-Brise's Brigade was heavily
engaged, as the enemy's attack was being pressed home with great vigour,
especially on the left of the Battalion, where the Germans were trying
to break through between the Grenadiers and the Yorkshire Regiment. No.
4 Company, under Major Colby, was therefore ordered to counter-attack.
Great difficulties were added to its task by the tobacco-drying
grounds--ready-made wire entanglements on which the men's packs and
accoutrements caught while the German machine-guns were practically
enfilading them. But, in spite of everything, Major Colby succeeded in
driving back a much larger body of the enemy, and thus making that part
of the line secure.
It was a brilliant bit of work, and was specially mentioned by General
Capper in his report. But it was very costly: Major Colby, Lieutenant
Antrobus, and a hundred men were killed, and Captain Leatham was
wounded. The only officer of this company who escaped unhurt was
Lieutenant Sir G. Duckworth-King.
In the evening news arrived that the First Corps was attacking the enemy
on the left, and this somewhat relieved the situation. The reserve
trenches came in for severe shelling during the night, but, as it
happened, there was only a platoon of No. 2 in reserve at the time. It
had a curious experience, which might have had serious results. Two
companies of the Queen's had been sent up to the reserve dug-outs.
Somehow the report was spread that the Germans had got into Kruiseik,
and an alarm was raised. The platoon from the Grenadiers stood to arms,
and as it waited saw in the moonlight a line of men with fixed bayonets
advancing on their flank. They were preparing to meet them with the
bayonet when they suddenly realised that they were friends. Major
Stucley leaped from the trench, and went himself to explain matters to
the two companies, which returned to their original position.
[Sidenote: Oct. 25.]
The Germans were reported next day to be entrenching all along our
southern front and opposite Zandvoorde. About sunset the Grenadiers were
attacked, and one platoon from No. 2 Company under Lieutenant Lambert
became isolated, the enemy having taken the trench on its right and also
the houses behind it. Three messengers were sent back to Battalion
Headquarters for help, but only one got through, and he was wounded.
Lieut.-Colonel Earle sent up a platoon of No. 3, and the houses in the
rear of the line were partially cleared.
A determined attack developed later that night, and a mass of men was
seen advancing on the left. A voice called out, "Don't shoot! We are the
South Staffords." But the German helmets could be distinctly seen
against the glow from a burning farm; a heavy fire was opened on them,
and slowly they disappeared. As a matter of fact two companies of the
South Staffords had come up to the Battalion as a reserve that night,
and the Germans must have known it. In the morning forty or fifty dead
Germans were counted in front of the platoon under Lieutenant Lambert,
and 200 prisoners were captured by the Scots Guards in a house in rear
of the line. Viscount Dalrymple and Captain Fox, with two companies of
the Scots Guards, cleared all the Germans out of the village, and
restored the line.
During the night Lord Claud Hamilton, whose guns were in action all
night, saw a body of men moving in fours down the road behind him, and
naturally thought they were men of the Brigade. But as they passed a
burning house he saw the German helmets, and turned one of his guns on
them, while the other gun continued to engage the enemy in front. He was
relieved before dawn by Lieutenant Gladwin of the Scots Guards with a
fresh team of men, who took over the Grenadier machine-guns. Soon after
he took charge Lieutenant Gladwin was killed.
[Sidenote: Oct. 26.]
The First Division had now taken over the line from Reutel to the Menin
road, so that the Seventh Division held only the section from the Menin
road through Kruiseik to Zandvoorde. But this salient had become more
and more acute and dangerous, and General Capper decided to readjust the
line and reduce the salient as far as he could. To withdraw from a
position when at close grips with the enemy was a task requiring careful
staff work, but it was successfully carried out that night.
Before dawn the King's Company took over the fire trenches with a
platoon of No. 3 under Lieutenant Van Neck, while a platoon from No. 2
under Sergeant Boyles occupied a trench about 200 yards to the left. One
platoon of the King's Company was 300 yards to the right of the rest of
the company, and another 300 yards farther to the right were the Scots
Guards.
A terrific shelling of our trenches began early in the morning, and
reached such a pitch that the men counted as many as sixty shells a
minute on each small trench. The whole of the enemy's artillery fire was
concentrated on Kruiseik. Gallantly our men held on, in spite of the
fact that again and again the shells blew in the trenches and buried
half-a-dozen men at a time, all of whom had to be dug out with shovels.
Some of them had as much as three feet of earth on top of them, and many
were suffocated before they could be rescued.
So violent were these attacks that by mid-day the Germans had broken
through the line held by two companies of the South Staffords, which had
been sent to relieve the Border Regiment. By 2.30 P.M. the enemy had
gone through the gap, and had managed to get in rear of two companies of
the Scots Guards, which suddenly found themselves surrounded and fired
at from all directions. Although the Scots Guards still fought on, they
were captured by degrees in small parties, and the survivors were
finally made prisoners, including Lieut.-Colonel Bolton, Major Viscount
Dalrymple, and Captain Fox. Finding his flank exposed, Lieut.-Colonel
Earle at once gave orders to the Grenadiers to retire, but this order
did not reach the fire trenches for a long time, and was never received
by the King's Company at all. Meanwhile, General Ruggles-Brise ordered
the guns back to their old position on the Zandvoorde Ridge, and having
collected the remainder of the Scots Guards, the Gordons, and the
Borderers, he returned to the hollow west of Zandvoorde.
The position now seemed hopeless for the King's Company and the other
two platoons, for the Germans had got round both flanks, and the rest of
the Battalion was retiring. Lieutenant Pilcher, one of the officers of
the King's Company, managed to get back to Battalion Headquarters, only
to find that the Battalion had retired. He started to return at once,
but the Germans were closing in on the company, and as there were no
communication trenches, he had to advance in the open with the enemy on
each side of him. However, he got through to Major Weld-Forester, and
told him of the retirement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Hope, the signalling
officer, who had been ordered to retire with the rest of the Battalion,
turned back on his own initiative to warn the King's Company, and even
got some of the First Division to come to its assistance.
At first Major Weld-Forester had determined to hold on grimly to his bit
of the line, but it now seemed clear to him that he ought to join in
retirement. To do this meant going clean through the Germans, who were
now firmly established in the village and outhouses--but on the other
hand to remain meant being surrounded and captured. So he quickly
decided to retire and join the rest of the Battalion. He knew he could
rely on his men to do anything or go anywhere, and trusted to their
discipline to carry through even such a desperate plan as this of
forcing a way through the Germans.
Having explained the whole situation to his officers and N.C.O.'s, he
sent an orderly to Lieutenant Van Neck, and told him to retire at the
same time. But the message never reached this officer, nor did the
platoon of the King's Company which was 800 yards away receive the
order. The result was that these two isolated platoons continued to
fight on until they were overwhelmed by the advancing German masses.
Meanwhile, through the village came the King's Company, with Major
Weld-Forester at their head, bayonets fixed and in perfect order. On
they came, straight through the Germans, who were at first dumbfounded
by the reckless daring of the enterprise. Soon the enemy collected
themselves, and the machine-guns began rattling from the windows; but
friend and foe were so intermingled that it was difficult for them to
fire, and it would have taken better men than the Germans to stop the
men of the King's Company, when they had made up their minds to get
through. Many casualties there were, of course, but Major Weld-Forester
succeeded in joining the Black Watch that night, and linked up with the
rest of the Battalion next morning.
The same night the retirement of the whole Division was carried out
successfully, and it took up a second position running through the
crossroads near Gheluvelt. The remainder of the Grenadiers, under
Lieut.-Colonel Earle, retired in good order through the First Division
and went into billets on the outskirts of Ypres, where they were joined
next morning by what was left of the King's Company. After five days and
nights in the trenches without relief the men were utterly worn out, but
in spite of their hard fighting and heavy losses their spirits were not
depressed nor their discipline in any way relaxed.
[Sidenote: Oct. 27.]
On the 27th the 1st Battalion Grenadiers moved from billets outside
Ypres to a bivouac in Sanctuary Wood, just south of the Menin road.
Ruggles-Brise's Brigade was withdrawn from the Basseville River, and the
battalions were reorganised. When the roll was called, it was found that
the losses in every battalion had been considerable. The 1st Battalion
Grenadiers had lost 9 officers and 301 men, the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards 17 officers and 511 men, the 2nd Gordon Highlanders 3 officers
and 159 men, and the 2nd Border Regiment 17 officers and 431 men. What
remained of the Seventh Division was now transferred to the First Corps
under Sir Douglas Haig.
A report was received that the Twenty-seventh German Reserve Division
had been ordered to take the cross-roads south-east of Gheluvelt, and
the 20th Brigade was ordered to relieve the 22nd Brigade just south of
the Menin road. General Ruggles-Brise placed the Grenadiers in the front
line next to the road, with the Gordons on their right, while the
remnants of the Borderers and Scots Guards were left in support. Guides
were furnished by the 22nd Brigade, and General Ruggles-Brise, who knew
the ground well, since it was next to his old Headquarters, met them at
the cross-roads. As the trenches were very inadequate, most of them mere
scratches, and some even facing the wrong way, the Grenadiers were
ordered to withdraw at daybreak, if there was no attack, so as to evade
shell-fire. As the day dawned, General Ruggles-Brise returned to his
Headquarters, where he was met by the Brigade-Major, who told him that
an attack was expected at dawn, and that he had received instructions to
bring up the two supporting battalions.
On the way up the Scots Guards were so unlucky as to have a shell burst
right into one of their companies, causing some twenty casualties. 2nd
Lieutenant Gibbs was killed, and Captain Kemble and Lieutenant Lord
Dalhousie severely wounded.
It was a melancholy scene through which the Grenadiers marched off. Some
ten days before, when they passed through Gheluvelt, they had been
greeted by the inhabitants; now it was a deserted ruin. Most of the
houses and the church had been demolished, and such buildings as
remained looked like dolls' houses, when the fronts have been removed.
The roadway was full of great shell-holes, and some carcasses of horses
added to the dreariness of the picture. Arrived at their destination,
Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Companies were put in the firing line, and the King's
Company in support. It was practically dark, and as the trenches were
very bad they had to dig themselves in as well as they could.
The German General Staff was now getting impatient. In spite of their
immense superiority in numbers and in guns, the Germans had succeeded
only in making dents in the line, and had not yet broken through. So
they determined to mass their guns and infantry at certain parts of the
line, and drive a wedge through--one of the points selected being the
left of the line held by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers near the
cross-roads. Every one on the British side knew of the projected attack,
from General Headquarters down to the latest-joined drummer boy, but
foreknowledge was of little use, as there were no reserves available.
[Sidenote: Oct. 29.]
At 5.15 A.M. on the 29th--a densely foggy morning--the Battalion was
heavily shelled by our own guns; presumably the fire was intended for
the German infantry, which was known to be somewhere near. Although
every possible precaution had been taken against an attack at dawn,
there was no sign of any movement on the part of the enemy, and after
the Battalion had waited for an hour and a half, the report of an
intended attack was dismissed as untrue. The question then arose as to
what should be done to obtain food for the supporting battalions. They
had been hurried up in the dark, and no provision had been made for
their rations, nor was it possible to bring food up in wagons to
positions in such close proximity to the enemy. The Brigadier decided
that, as the expected attack had not been made, it would be best to send
these two battalions back to get their food, so that on their return
they would be prepared to remain in the front trench, and meet any
attack that might come later in the day.
They had been gone hardly half-an-hour when the Germans opened a very
heavy fire, and in the mist which was still clinging to the ground
rifle-fire was poured upon the Grenadiers from the left rear. It was at
once realised that the enemy had managed to penetrate the line between
the two Divisions. To meet this enfilade fire the left flank of the line
turned back, and before long the whole Battalion was forced to leave the
fire trenches and occupy the support trenches, which were far too deep
for the men to fire from.
Major Stucley, the second in command, dashed off at once with Captain
Rasch, the Adjutant, to bring up the King's Company, the only support
available. In place of the shell-fire, which had practically ceased,
there now arose a steady rifle and machine-gun fire from the houses to
the left and even the left rear of the Battalion. Swinging round to the
left, the King's Company, headed by Major Stucley, steadily advanced for
about two hundred yards, when it came to the support trench occupied by
No. 2 and No. 3 Company. Major Stucley at once grasped the gravity of
the situation. The King's Company had already suffered many casualties,
as it came up across the open, and the enemy's machine-guns were pouring
a murderous fire into the other two companies--No. 4 Company under
Captain Rennie still remained in the fire trenches on the right. The
problem was how, with three companies and no reserve, to stop a force
ten times as numerous. The Germans had taken all the houses near the
Menin road, and the thin line of Grenadiers, with their left turned back
to face the road, was all there was to stop the rush of the enemy.
And indeed it was a formidable rush. They came on in such numbers that
an officer afterwards said the attacking force reminded him of a crowd
coming on the ground after a football match. Shoulder to shoulder they
advanced, much in the same way as their ancestors fought under Frederick
the Great, and though for spectacular purposes at Grand Manoeuvres their
mass formations were very effective, in actual warfare against modern
weapons they proved to be a costly failure.
The German General Staff had studied the question of the attack with the
usual German thoroughness. It had carefully considered whether it should
adopt the formation evolved by the British Army from the South African
war or not, and had come to the conclusion that the personal equation
played too large a part in an advance in extended order, and that for a
conscript army the only possible formation was close order, in which the
small percentage of cowards would be carried forward by the great
majority of brave men. Nevertheless, in spite of their solid phalanxes,
it was said that the German officers advanced with revolvers in their
hands, to shoot men who lagged behind.
For our men the difficulty was to shoot the Germans quick enough. Ever
since the South African war the men had been taught to fire at a little
brown smudge on a green background painted on the target, an artistic
triumph of the musketry authorities, supposed to represent all that a
man would be able to see of his enemy in a modern battle. But here were
full-length Germans not a hundred yards off, alarmingly visible, and in
such numbers that even for the worst shot there was not the slightest
difficulty in hitting them, especially as they were often three or four
deep. In spite of this, however, the apparently hopeless impossibility
of stopping so many, and the futility of killing a few out of such a
crowd, made some of our men sometimes shoot very wildly.
Major Stucley disdained all cover and dashed forward at the head of the
King's Company, determined to save the situation. In the hail of bullets
he fell shot through the head, and soon afterwards Captain Lord Richard
Wellesley was killed in the same way. Major Weld-Forester, Captain
Ponsonby, and Lieutenant the Hon. A. G. S. Douglas-Pennant, who had
necessarily to expose themselves, were wounded. Captain Ponsonby
recovered, but Major Weld-Forester and Lieutenant Douglas-Pennant died
two days later.
Finding it impossible to stay in the front trench any longer, No. 4
Company retired to the brickyard. Captain Rennie, who commanded them,
was never heard of again. Still the Grenadiers held doggedly on to their
support trench for another hour, until it was found that the Germans had
got round their left and were enfilading the whole trench. Bullets
seemed to be coming out of the mist from all directions, and the enemy
to be on every side. Captain Rasch, who was now the only officer left
above the rank of lieutenant, decided to get out of the trench and
retire to the small wood near the brickyard. The order was given, and
the Grenadiers--what was left of them--retired to the wood and formed up
on the other side.
In the meantime the First Division on the left, almost annihilated by
superior numbers, had been forced back. This made the position of the
Grenadiers still more untenable, but General Capper was gathering
together what reinforcements he could to save the line.
Seeing what straits the Grenadiers were in, the Gordon Highlanders on
the right sent what reserves they had to help, and a company arrived
under Captain Burnett. The Grenadiers and Gordons formed one line, and
advanced gallantly, but when they got near the wood they came under the
fire of a German machine-gun, which enfiladed them. Undaunted by this
bad start, and determined to regain their former trenches, Captain Rasch
and Captain Burnett led their men on through the wood. There was
something particularly gallant in the way this remnant of a battalion,
with one reinforcing company, was not content to hold its own, but
actually undertook a counter-attack when it knew the enemy was in vastly
superior numbers. It was the men themselves, inspired by the few
remaining officers, that were carrying out this counter-attack.
Back through the wood they went, and gained the north side of the
brickfields, but the Germans, at first taken by surprise at this bold
stroke, rallied and drove them out. A second time our men
counter-attacked, and this time they forced their way past the
brickfields to a hedge running parallel with the road. They got into the
ditch on the south side of the Menin road, and were joined there by two
platoons of the Gloucester Regiment, which came up as a reinforcement.
In that ditch they remained till the order came to retire. Captain Rasch
and Lieutenant Pilcher took their handful of men--all that remained out
of the splendid Battalion nearly 1000 strong, which had marched out from
Ypres less than a fortnight before--and got into a trench some three
hundred yards east of the windmill.
The Scots Guards meanwhile, supported by the Queen's, were sent through
the south of Gheluvelt, and succeeded in driving the enemy back and
almost regaining the ground originally held by the Grenadiers and
Gordons. When night fell, the 20th Brigade was holding precisely the
same ground that it had occupied in the morning.
There can be no doubt that the Germans were completely deceived as to
our strength, and that what misled them was the more than gallant manner
in which the Grenadiers held on to the trenches in the morning, and the
almost reckless audacity with which the Grenadiers and Gordons attacked
later. The enemy was apparently quite unaware how threadbare this part
of the line was. These continual counter-attacks gave the impression
that there must be large reserves in rear, which made the Germans think
it unwise to push on. Had they only known that there were no reserves at
all, and that all that lay between them and Ypres were just the remains
of a battalion, with hardly an officer or non-commissioned officer left
alive, the result of the battle, and all that depended on it, would
undoubtedly have been very different.
The losses among the officers of the Grenadiers were very heavy.
Lieutenant-Colonel Earle was severely wounded during the engagement,
and, while dressing his wounds, Lieutenant Butt, R.A.M.C., was shot
through the head. Colonel Earle was afterwards reported to be lying in a
house some two hundred yards in rear of the Battalion Headquarters
dug-out. Several men volunteered to carry him back, but as the enemy
were within a couple of hundred yards of the house this would have meant
certain death, not only for the stretcher-bearers but for Colonel Earle
himself. So it was decided to leave him where he was. The total list of
casualties among the officers of the Battalion was:
Lieut.-Colonel M. Earle, (Commanding Officer), wounded and prisoner.
Major H. St. L. Stucley, (Second in Command), killed.
Lieut. J. G. Butt, (Medical Officer), killed.
Major the Hon. A. O. W. C. Weld-Forester, (King's Company), killed.
Lieut. H. L. Aubrey-Fletcher, (King's Company), wounded.
Lieut. J. H. Powell, (King's Company), wounded.
2nd Lieut. R. O. R. Kenyon Slaney, (King's Company), wounded.
Captain the Hon. C. M. B. Ponsonby. (No. 2 Company), wounded.
Lieut. G. E. Hope, (Signalling Officer), wounded.
2nd Lieut. R. S. Lambert, (No. 2 Company), wounded.
Captain Lord Richard Wellesley, (No. 3 Company), killed.
Captain G. Rennie, (No. 3 Company), missing, reported killed.
Lieutenant the Hon. A. G. S. Douglas-Pennant, (No. 3 Company),
killed.
Lieut. P. Van Neck, (No. 3 Company), killed.
Lieut. L. G. Ames,(No. 3 Company), wounded.
Major L. R. V. Colby, (No. 4 Company), killed.
Capt. R. E. K. Leatham, (No. 4 Company), wounded.
Lieut. E. Antrobus, (No. 4 Company), killed.
2nd Lieut. S. Walter, (No. 4 Company), killed.
2nd Lieut. N. A. H. Somerset, (No. 4 Company), killed.
That night the Battalion went into billets at Hooge, half-way to Ypres,
with only four officers and a hundred men left, exclusive of transport.
The officers were Captain Rasch, Lieutenant Pilcher, Second Lieutenant
Darby, and Second Lieutenant Sir G. Duckworth-King.
[Sidenote: Oct. 30.]
Men who had been left in the trenches, not knowing of the order to
retire, kept arriving in driblets during the night, and the strength of
the Battalion had risen by next morning to 250 men. But, with most of
the officers and N.C.O.'s killed or wounded, the whole machinery of the
Battalion had disappeared, and Captain Rasch had to do what he could to
reorganise the remnant into a fighting unit. Ruggles-Brise's
Brigade--with the exception of the Gordon Highlanders, who had been
ordered to report themselves to General Bulfin--were placed in reserve
to the other two brigades of the Seventh Division.
Repeated attempts to penetrate the line were made by the Germans
throughout the day. For each attack preparation was made by very heavy
shell-fire, and the ground in rear of our forward line was thoroughly
searched, apparently with a view to harassing any reinforcements that
might be sent up to the firing line.
The Grenadiers had just settled down for the night when the Battalion
was ordered to fall in and move off with the rest of the Brigade to
occupy a new defensive position. Later in the war, when a battalion had
been knocked to pieces as the Grenadiers had been the day before, it was
picked out and given a rest, but in those early days this was
impossible, as every man was continually wanted to check the renewed
attacks of fresh enemy troops. The Germans were constantly throwing into
the attack fresh battalions at full strength, whereas in the British
Army the term "Battalion" meant two or three hundred worn-out men who
had been fighting daily for the last ten days or so.
Eventually, after a long, circuitous march, the Battalion was put into
dug-outs in Brigade Reserve at 3 A.M. Orders were received that the
First and Second Divisions, with the Cavalry Brigade, were attacking the
following day, and that the 20th Brigade was to remain in its position
until 6.30 A.M., when it was to leave one battalion in support of the
left portion of the line, and move the rest to a central position where
it could rapidly support any part of the line held by the Seventh
Division.
[Sidenote: Oct. 31.]
On the 31st, the day that Sir John French described as the most critical
in the whole battle of Ypres, the remnant of the Seventh Division was
holding a line from the Ypres--Menin road, in front of the cross-roads
at Veldhoek, to a point 500 yards north of Zandvoorde. At 1 A.M. it was
decided to push the Scots Guards and Borderers up, and entrench them
close behind the left of the 21st Brigade.
Directly day broke the Germans began a terrific shell-fire all along the
front, and by 8 o'clock shells were bursting ceaselessly on and over the
line. Towards noon word came that the 21st and 22nd Brigades had been
shelled out of their position and forced to retire. In rear of the 21st
Brigade the Scots Guards and Borderers still held their line, and
General Ruggles-Brise himself led up the Grenadiers in prolongation of
this line, with the hope of stemming the German advance.
This movement had to be carried out very hurriedly, with no opportunity
of reconnaissance, and the Battalion lost rather heavily in crossing the
reverse slope of a hill in front of gun position. When it had gained the
ridge through the woods, it was found that to be of any use the
Grenadiers would have to push forward, and occupy the trenches vacated
by the 21st Brigade. This they managed to do, in spite of very heavy
shell-fire, and three or four of the most forward trenches on the right
of the 21st and the left of the 22nd Brigades were occupied just in time
to meet a portion of the German attack, now being delivered on the
Gheluvelt--Zandvoorde frontage.
By the time it had reached and occupied the trenches, the strength of
the Battalion was scarcely fifty of all ranks, and this handful of men
had to confront thousands of Germans, with the additional handicap of
having its right flank exposed, as the enemy had gained the 22nd
Brigade's trenches. It was fortunate for us that the attack, wonderfully
brave as the Germans were, was apparently quite disjointed and
unorganised. No officers could be seen leading the men, who advanced in
dense masses to within three hundred yards of the trenches, and were
simply mown down by the fire of the Grenadiers.
Things now seemed to be going better for us, when suddenly the
right-hand trench reported that the Germans were streaming through a
wood, and, crossing the Veldhoek--Zandvoorde road, were working their
way immediately to our rear. All our reserves had been used up by this
time, and the only thing to do was to hang on somehow till nightfall,
sending word at once to the Division of what had happened. As no
communication had been established since the re-occupation of the
trenches, Captain Brooke, the Staff Captain on the 20th Brigade Staff,
who had come up to see how things were, got out of the trench and,
finding a loose horse, galloped off, and told General Capper. General
Capper went off to ask General Bulfin for help, but already the 4th
Guards Brigade--which included the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers--was
advancing to make a counter-attack through the wood.
When he got back to the Grenadiers in their trenches, Captain Brooke was
surprised to find them still holding their own and quite happy. They
were successfully beating off repeated German attacks to their front.
The 4th Guards Brigade evicted the enemy from the wood, and it was then
decided to withdraw the Grenadiers, the 21st Brigade being ordered to
take over their trenches.
Thus ended one of the most desperate days of fighting in the whole war.
As has been already said, it seems incredible that the Germans, with
their vast numbers of men and their great superiority in guns, should
not have broken through the line. They were very near doing it; indeed,
so critical did the situation become at one time, that General Capper
issued a provisional order that, if the line became untenable, the
Brigade was to fall back on a new line extending from one mile east of
Zillebeke to the fifth kilo on the Ypres--Menin road.
As the Battalion marched back with the Scots Guards, two guns were seen
in the rear of the trenches, standing all by themselves. It looked at
first as if they had been abandoned. But closer inspection showed that
every single man and horse of the team was there--dead. The gunners had
remained gallantly at their posts to the last. Men from the Grenadiers,
the Scots Guards, and the Bedford Regiment were sent to rescue the guns,
and bring them to a place of safety.
The Grenadiers returned to the shelters at the Château Herenthage, which
they had occupied during the morning. There the officers found that
their shelter had during their absence been blown to pieces by a
high-explosive shell, and it was plain that, had they remained in
reserve that day, there would have been no officers left at all in the
Battalion.
The action of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers on this day was afterwards
described by the G.O.C. Seventh Division in his report as mainly
instrumental in restoring the battle south of the Ypres--Menin road.
The total strength of the 20th Brigade was now reduced to 18 officers
and 920 men, constituted as follows: the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, 5
officers (the four previously mentioned and the transport officer,
Lieutenant Mackenzie) and 200 men, commanded by Captain Rasch; the 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards, 5 officers and 250 men, commanded by Captain
Paynter; the 2nd Border Regiment, 5 officers and 270 men, commanded by
Captain Warren; and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 3 officers and 200 men,
commanded by Lieutenant Hamilton.
[Sidenote: Nov. 1.]
Very heavy shell-fire opened the morning of November 1. One
high-explosive shell stripped off the whole back of the house occupied
by the Brigade Headquarters, which was thereupon moved to shelters in
the Château Herenthage wood. An infantry attack followed, but it was
only feeble, and the Grenadiers remained in a wood south of Herenthage
in Brigade Reserve. There they prepared a second line of fire-trenches,
and improved the existing dug-outs, while the wood was shelled at
intervals with high explosives.
[Sidenote: Nov. 2.]
The brunt of the attack at that part of the line was borne next day by
the Border Regiment, which held on to its trenches so gallantly and
unflinchingly, in spite of a murderous enfilade fire, that it received a
special message from General Capper. In the evening it was relieved by
the Grenadiers. During the heavy shell-fire, with which the enemy
searched the ground in rear of our trenches, General Ruggles-Brise was
severely wounded, and Major A. Cator, the Brigade-Major, took over
command of the Brigade.
[Sidenote: Nov. 3.]
The men had now managed to put out a little wire in front, and it seemed
unlikely that the Germans would be able to make much impression on the
line. The trenches, which were good and continuous, were held by the
Grenadiers on the right and the Scots Guards on the left. There was a
weak spot on the right of the Grenadiers near the wood, but this was
well covered by the Gordon Highlanders in rear.
In the afternoon of the 3rd, the Scots Guards reported the enemy to be
massing in the woods in front of them, while parties were observed
moving towards our right, and our guns turned a heavy fire on to them.
Though no attack developed, a few parties of the enemy advanced in a
half-hearted way, more as if they were carrying out a reconnaissance.
The Brigade suffered some casualties during the day from shells and
snipers, and Lieutenant Sir G. Duckworth-King, who had almost
miraculously come unhurt through the last ten days' fighting, was at
last wounded.
[Sidenote: Nov. 4.]
A draft of 100 men under Lieutenant C. Mitchell arrived next day, and
considerably added to the strength of the Battalion. There was a great
deal of indiscriminate shelling and sniping, and Lieutenant G. E. Hope
was wounded in the head by a sniper.
[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]
On the 5th there was heavy shell-fire as usual, and some trenches were
blown in. The 20th Brigade was relieved on that day by the 7th Brigade,
and marched through Ypres, which was being shelled as far as Locre. The
men found the march very fatiguing, for they had had little sleep for
many days, and had been digging or fighting all the previous night.
Owing to the incessant shell-fire, it had been found impossible to
organise the Battalion into any recognised formation during the period
from October 29 to November 5. If fifty men were wanted for the
trenches, some one had to go round the dug-outs and collect them. There
was no company, platoon, or even sectional organisation. In spite of
this everything went well, a result due to the splendid spirit shown by
the men themselves.
[Sidenote: Nov. 6.]
At daybreak the Brigade reached Locre, weary with the long march, but
very glad to get away from the constant roar of shells and rifle-fire.
As every available house and shed was already occupied by the French,
the church was opened and the Grenadiers and part of the Scots Guards
billeted there. The march was resumed in the afternoon through Bailleul
to Meteren, where the Brigade went into billets.
The Grenadiers were now reorganised into a single Company as follows:
HEADQUARTERS
Officer Commanding and Adjutant, Captain RASCH.
Quartermaster, Lieut. J. TEECE.
The King's Company, Lieut. Lord CLAUD HAMILTON.
No. 1 Platoon, Lieut. MITCHELL.
No. 2 Platoon, 2nd Lieut. M. A. A. DARBY.
No. 3 Platoon, Lieut. W. R. MACKENZIE, (Transport Officer).
No. 4 Platoon, Sergeant C. JONES.
Company Sergeant-Major, Drill-Sergeant J. L. CAPPER.
Company Q.-M. Sergeant, Colour-Sergeant T. W. BROWN.
[Sidenote: Nov. 7-8.]
On November 7 the Battalion did an hour's steady drill. There was
something very fine and at the same time pathetic in the remnants of
this decimated Battalion going through their drill with the
determination to maintain the high standard of discipline no matter how
small their numbers might be. Next day the whole Brigade attended divine
service for the first time since they had left England, and as there was
no chaplain, the Brigadier, Major Cator, read the service. In the
afternoon the Brigade was drawn up in square facing inwards, and General
Capper addressed it. He expressed his admiration of the way in which it
had fought round Ypres, and told the men that they had upheld the
splendid traditions of their regiments.
The fact that the flower of the German Army was defeated by the British
Expeditionary Force, that is to say, the original army that existed
before the war, will always make the first battle of Ypres particularly
interesting to students of military history. Although it can hardly be
claimed as a decisive victory, there is small doubt that the result
influenced the whole course of the war, for had the Germans, when they
turned their whole strength on Ypres, been able to force their way to
the coast, the subsequent operations of the British Army would have been
considerably affected.
Two battalions of the Grenadiers fought at Ypres, and each covered
itself with imperishable glory. Never before in the long history of the
regiment had so many casualties befallen them in a single action; never
before had so large a force of the Grenadiers been almost annihilated.
Each battalion had gone into battle with a great reputation to
maintain--a reputation won in centuries of fighting, carried forward in
almost every campaign in which the British Army has taken part, and all
the officers and men were fully conscious of their responsibility. Old
Grenadiers well knew that every nerve would be strained to uphold the
traditions of the regiment; but no one dared to hope that the
illustrious past could be enhanced, and that these two battalions of the
regiment would increase their fame in divisions in which every battalion
distinguished itself.
The part taken by the 1st Battalion in the defence of Ypres, when with
the Seventh Division they repelled attacks from forces eight times their
number, will ever remain a precious memory to be handed down to future
generations.
Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, in an order which he issued to the
Seventh Division, said:
After the deprivations and tension of being pursued day and night by
an infinitely stronger force, the Division had to pass through the
worst ordeal of all. It was left to a little force of 30,000 to keep
the German Army at bay while the other British Corps were being
brought up from the Aisne. Here they clung on like grim death with
almost every man in the trenches, holding a line which of necessity
was a great deal too long--a thin exhausted line--against which the
prime of the German first-line troops were hurling themselves with
fury. The odds against them were eight to one, and when once the
enemy found the range of a trench, the shells dropped into it from
one end to the other with terrible effect. Yet the men stood firm
and defended Ypres in such a manner that a German officer afterwards
described their action as a brilliant feat of arms, and said that
they were under the impression that there had been four British Army
Corps against them at this point. When the Division was afterwards
withdrawn from the firing line to refit, it was found that out of
400 officers who set out from England there were only 44 left, and
out of 12,000 men only 2336.
Major-General Capper, in a report on the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, which
he sent later to Lieut.-General Pulteney, commanding the Fourth Corps,
wrote as follows:
This Battalion fought with the utmost tenacity and determination in
a most exposed position at Kruiseik in front of Ypres, being
subjected to an almost ceaseless heavy artillery fire and repeated
attacks by the enemy for a week. Owing to the length of front to be
held, no relief could be found for troops in the trenches. During
this fighting Major Colby's Company of this Battalion
counter-attacked the enemy, who had almost successfully attacked the
line. In the counter-attack this Company lost four officers killed
and wounded, only one officer and forty-five men returning unhurt,
but this Company succeeded in driving back a very much larger
hostile force. This Battalion lost very heavily in the three weeks'
fighting before Ypres. I consider that the resolution and gallantry
of this Battalion, obliged to take its share in holding a height
which was the pivot of all the operations in this part of the field,
was most noble and devoted and worthy of its highest traditions.
Later on, in the same operations, though weakened in numbers, and
with few officers, the Battalion exhibited gallantry in a
counter-attack near Gheluvelt, where it was mainly instrumental in
restoring the battle south of the main Ypres--Menin road; and
subsequently the same tenacity as it had shown at Kruiseik in
holding a very difficult and exposed part of the Brigade line in the
final position in front of Ypres.
The Battalion remained at Meteren until the 14th, and spent most of its
time in reorganising and re-equipping. On the 10th a draft of 401 men
arrived with the following officers: Major G. W. Duberly, Captain the
Hon. R. Lygon, Lieutenant E. S. Ward, and Lieutenant C. A. V. Sykes; and
on the 11th, 133 men originally intended for the 2nd Battalion arrived
from the Base Camp under Lieutenant C. L. Blundell-Hollinshead-Blundell
and Lieutenant C. V. Fisher-Rowe. These additions brought the strength
of the Battalion almost to its usual proportions.
Meanwhile Field-Marshal Sir John French had visited the Brigade, and saw
the remnants of the battalions which had formed the original Seventh
Division. He congratulated both officers and men on the fine work they
had done round Ypres.