To the south along the coast they never met with much success. When

they had first gone out to Narragansett Bay on a trading voyage in

1623, for instance, the Indians there disdained their meagre offerings.

The Narragansett were much too happy with the goods being furnished

by the Dutch traders from Manhattan. Both the Narragansett and their

neighbors, the Pequot, held on to their furs for the Hollanders, and

they were powerful enough to get away with it. They had Dutch guns

and powder, as well as the Hollanders themselves if need be, to back

them up. In fact, by 1625 the Dutch had a fortified trading post on

an island in Narragansett Bay and two similar forts near-by on the

mainland.

Governor Bradford, in exasperation, gave out a warning that all the

region along the coast to the southeast of Plymouth was English

territory. He as much as demanded that the New Netherlanders stop

trading there. But it was useless. The Dutchmen simply ignored the

warnings. However they did offer to enter into direct trading relations

themselves with Plymouth and sent a mission there in 1627, with sugar,

linen and other goods, to talk it over.

This mission was headed up by Isaack de Rasieres, the chief trader as

well as the Secretary of New Netherland. Rasieres appears to have had

an ulterior motive in making the visit. He brought along a stock of

wampum, the strings of highly polished shell-beads that the Dutchmen

had been accustomed to getting from the Narragansett and the Pequot.

With wampum, Rasieres pointed out to the Pilgrims, he had been doing a

great business among Indians who didn’t have the means of manufacturing

it, especially along the Hudson River where Henry Hudson himself had

first discovered strings of shell-beads circulating as a kind of money.

The Hollander cannily suggested that wampum might be used to just as

great advantage on the Kennebec by the Pilgrims. No doubt, by this

means, he hoped to direct their attention more to Maine and away from

the Dutch trading preserves in Long Island Sound and the Narragansett

country. Offering to sell wampum to the Englishmen at a fair price,

probably he hoped also to keep them from dealing direct for it with the

Narragansett and the Pequot.

Although the Pilgrim fathers were a bit suspicious of Rasieres’

motives, nevertheless they did find the shell-money to be most

“vendable” on the Kennebec. So much so, in fact, that in a very

short time with the aid of this medium of exchange they were enabled

to cut off the fur trade of that region from the fishermen and other

independent traders who had been accustomed to barter there. In the

meantime they also developed their own sources of wampum among some of

the Massachusetts coastal tribes who, as it turned out, also possessed

the means of manufacturing it.

The Pilgrims secured their rights up the Kennebec River by obtaining

a patent to a strip of land fifteen miles wide on both sides of that

river. They built a trucking house at Cushenoc (Augusta) which they

kept stocked with coats, shirts, rugs, blankets, corn, biscuit, peas,

prunes, and other supplies. With the help of wampum for exchange they

drove a brisk trade among the Abnaki Indians in those parts. In 1630

they extended their operations even farther north, setting up a trading

post on the Penobscot River at Pentagoet, now Castine, Maine.

The Penobscot trading post originated as a private venture for which

the Pilgrim, Isaac Allerton, along with some partners in England

promoted a patent. Allerton, once a London tailor, had risen in

prominence at Plymouth in New England to stand second only to the

governor. It would appear that he and his overseas partners shared

the rights to trade in the territory north of the Kennebec with other

leading Pilgrims in return for the loan of wampum, shallops, supplies

and servants.

But the partnership accounts became jumbled, because of Allerton’s

financial deceits according to the Pilgrims. And Edward Ashley, the

“profane young man” sent out from England as factor, didn’t help things

by his personal conduct.

Actually, young Ashley did well enough in the bartering department,

acquiring over a thousand pounds of beaver and otter the first season.

However he seems to have gone native in the most offensive sense to

the Pilgrim fathers, living “naked” among the savages and committing

“uncleannes with Indean women.” Also, it was discovered, he was trading

shot and powder with the savages and not even accounting for the

profits from this unholy trade.

Such behavior, of course, could not be countenanced. Ashley was

arrested and shipped back to England by the Plymouth partners, while

they themselves took over complete operating control of the enterprise.

All of which was not to Isaac Allerton’s liking. Deserting the

partnership, he retaliated by setting himself up as a competitor in

Maine. In 1633 he settled some “base fellows” in a new trading post at

the mouth of the Machias River, close by the present Canadian border.

There he did his best to cut off Plymouth’s commerce with the more

northerly tribes who were then taking their furs to the Penobscot and

Kennebec trucking houses.

The Pilgrims had other competitors in Maine also. In 1630 a trading

post was established at Pemaquid Point under a patent obtained by two

English merchants for twelve thousand acres between the Damariscotta

and Muscongus Rivers. About the same time John Oldham and Richard Vines

obtained a grant at the mouth of the Saco River, which remained a most

profitable fur trading center for some years.

Then there was the Laconia Company, organized by Sir Ferdinando Gorges

and Captain John Mason to put new life in their Piscataqua colony.

Laconia, described as a vast hinterland area of rivers and lakes, was

an extension of their original patent to the “Province of Maine.”

Gorges and Mason now planned to send cargoes of Indian trucking goods

up the Piscataqua River into Laconia, to Lake Champlain, to be bartered

for peltries. Thus they hoped to compete with the Dutch and the French

for the hinterland trade.

Captain Walter Neale, as governor of the Laconia Company, and Ambrose

Gibbons, as factor, did very well from 1630 to 1633, establishing

several trading posts on the Piscataqua River. But they never reached

Lake Champlain. Maybe they had it confused with Lake Winnepesaukee.

In any case, as they discovered, the rivers of Maine flowed from the

north, not from the west, and they couldn’t penetrate deep enough into

the interior to tap the hinterland trade of the Dutch and the French.

Probably the most dangerous of the Pilgrims’ rivals in Maine about this

time was the trading post on Richmond’s Island off Cape Elizabeth.

Thomas Morton, the jolly host of Merrymount, had traded here as early

as 1627. After his banishment from America one of his most roguish

associates, Walter Bagnall, took over the island and is said to have

gained 1,000 pounds sterling from his trade in a period of three years.

Then this “wicked fellow” was murdered by the natives.

Bagnall’s successor, John Winter, also did a flourishing business on

Richmond’s Island as factor for some English merchants, employing some

sixty men at one time in both fishing and fur trading activities. The

records indicate that he was about as unscrupulous in his dealings as

was his predecessor, cheating and otherwise mistreating the Indians

at every turn. He charged them at the rate of thirty-three pounds for

a hogshead of brandy which cost him seven. For powder which cost him

twenty pence per pound he raised the rate to three shillings in trade.

But the natives preferred his goods.

In spite of such competition, however, Maine became the Pilgrims’ chief

source of furs. In one period of two years the trading post at Cushenoc

alone is known to have gathered in more than 7,000 pounds of beaver.

The route of the beaver-laden shallops from the Maine coast was indeed

Plymouth’s life-line. Wampum played no small role in the success of

this extended operation which was so vital to the colony’s existence,

although the tight control exercised over the fur trade by the Pilgrim

fathers was the main factor.

Always the peltry traffic had been invested in certain leaders at

Plymouth who managed the whole trade in the interests of the communalty

in order that the Pilgrims’ debt to the merchants in England might be

paid. In 1627 William Bradford, Isaac Allerton, Edward Winslow, Miles

Standish and a few others in partnership undertook to assume this

entire indebtedness. In return, these “undertakers” were to enjoy any

and all profits from the traffic in peltries for six years. They were

empowered to do what they pleased with all furs and trucking goods

in the common store, and they alone were to use the colony’s trading

posts, truck houses and shallops.

From that time forward the Plymouth Plantation enjoyed real economic

success. In 1628 furs to the value of 659 English pounds were exported

in one cargo. Although no total figures are available for 1628 to 1630,

a very large amount of peltry went to England according to Governor

Bradford. From 1631 to 1636 over 12,000 pounds of beaver and 1,000

pounds of otter were shipped, most of which brought 20 shillings a

pound and none less than 14 shillings. Bradford said that the beaver

alone during these years brought 10,000 pounds sterling and that the

otter was more than sufficient to pay all costs of transport and

auction. Considering the size of the plantation this was indeed big

business.

In spite of the financial bungling of the partnership’s agents in

England, and even outright irregularities there, the debt was paid off.

Additional profits from the sale of beaver skins bought many other

things the Pilgrims needed, and in the end it was the earnings from the

fur trade that provided the foundation for Plymouth’s next economic

development, cattle farming.

In the meantime the Pilgrims’ profitable trade in furs on the Maine

coast and on rivers leading to the interior was jealously regarded by

the French who, after all, considered that territory within their own

limits. And neighboring French traders were doing something about it.

X

_A Border Fixed on the Coast of Maine_

The planting of trading posts farther and farther up the coast of Maine

by the New Englanders did not go unchallenged by the French. Although

in English eyes it had been well established ever since Captain

Argall’s raids in the Bay of Fundy that English claims to the coast now

extended well above the 45th parallel, even to the St. Lawrence valley,

no such admission had ever been made by the French. There were always

French traders in Acadia (Nova Scotia) who envisaged their preserves

as extending well down the coast of Maine and who intended to resist

further encroachments in those parts.

In fact, as it came about, these fur traders protected and maintained

the French claim to much of this coastal region during an incident of

the Thirty Years’ War which put most of New France under the English

flag for three years, from 1629 to 1632.

Prior to this episode the affairs of New France had reached a turning

point. In 1627 Samuel de Champlain’s difficulties became acute. That

year the Iroquois, his irreconcilable enemies, renewed their bloody

savagery in the interior, while along the coast the English were

closing off the very entrance to the valley of the St. Lawrence with

their plantations and trading posts and their increased shipping.

Although Champlain’s company had a good season in furs, collecting

22,000 that summer which could be sold in France at ten francs

each, the expense of operation had made the outlook none too bright

relatively for the shareholders who expected huge returns. Besides the

salaries of the Viceroy in France and of Champlain as his lieutenant

governing the colony, interpreters now cost as much as a thousand

francs a season and sailors six hundred, while factors and other

servants came correspondingly high. And there were other increased

expenses that bid fair to cut deep into profits.

As a result the directors of the company made things difficult for

their governor on the St. Lawrence. They particularly balked at his

urgent request for extra funds to strengthen the fortifications of

Quebec, even though only a wooden palisade and a few small cannon

protected the French trading post.

Champlain, with characteristic fortitude, made the best of his

difficulties. But he was most uneasy about the English at his doorway.

And well he might be!

As early as 1620 Sir George Calvert, English Baron of Baltimore, had

adventured a plantation in Newfoundland. Three years later King James

granted him quasi-regal proprietorship of the southeastern peninsula

of that island between Trinity and Placentia Bays. In 1627 he came out

with his family, built a fine house at Ferryland, and showed every

intention of establishing a great fur trading and fishing colony in the

form of a British dominion at this strategic gateway to New France.

Still more alarming were the activities of a Scotsman, Sir William

Alexander, who had been stirred by accounts of the founding of New

Spain, New France, New Netherland and New England to attempt the

founding of a New Scotland. In 1621, with complete disregard for French

claims, the English king had granted to him all the vast peninsula

between the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of St. Lawrence! Today that

would be Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and part of Quebec Province. This

princely domain was to be divided into feudal-type Scotch baronies

complete with a hierarchy of hereditary titles.

Alexander’s attempts to establish permanent trading posts in New

Scotland, or Nova Scotia, were failures until 1628. That year

seventy-two of his colonists managed to set up for business at

Poutrincourt’s old quarters at Port Royal in the Bay of Fundy. There

they found themselves to be the near neighbors of a young French

fur trader at Cape Sable named Charles de la Tour who was under the

impression that the country belonged to him.

Monsieur La Tour had inherited his rights from Saint Just after that

pioneer finally returned to France in 1623. Since then he had been

living the independent life of a wilderness lord with French retainers

and aboriginal subjects, and he had no intention of yielding his estate

or fur-trading privileges to anyone, much less foreigners.

La Tour did not immediately attempt to oust Alexander’s Scots from Port

Royal as he was on much the weaker side at the time, but he did stand

firm and unsubmissive at Cape Sable and he resisted all efforts of the

English to bring him over to their side. This was not easy, for nearly

all of New France was soon in the hands of the enemy.

In 1628 a French colonizing fleet sent out by the Company of New France

under the aegis of Cardinal de Richelieu was captured by privateers

boldly operating in the Gulf of St. Lawrence with English letters of

marque. In another year Champlain’s worst fears were realized when this

same fleet of privateers, under the leadership of the Kirke brothers,

appeared before Quebec in force enough to insure its capitulation.

Champlain himself was taken prisoner at Quebec. But under the terms

of the surrender he marched out of the fort with his arms and all of

his own furs, as did other head men. The factors, servants and workmen

were allowed to take but one beaver skin each before the English took

over the factory. Then, after running up the English flag, the Kirkes

were said to have driven an immediate trade with Indians and others

remaining about the fort for some 2,000 skins in addition to those they

found in the storehouse. They even ended up with the pelts they had

allowed the starving garrison under the terms of surrender, taking them

in trade for food.

Sir William Alexander, uniting his interests with the Kirkes to form

the Scottish and English Company for the peltry trade of New France,

sent out a second fleet to Port Royal in 1629 under the command of his

son. When the fleet arrived nearly half the people who had been left at

Port Royal the year before were found to have died from one cause or

another. But young Alexander relieved the survivors, strengthened the

fort, and put new life into the colony. His vessels managed to acquire

a satisfactory number of pelts in the Bay of Fundy during that summer.

He also captured a French ship. And as further proof of the substance

of New Scotland he took back on his return voyage an Indian chief of

the region who wanted to conclude an alliance with the English king.

In the meantime it developed that shortly before Champlain’s

capitulation a treaty of peace had been signed between England and

France. But, although King Charles agreed very soon to restore Quebec

to the French under the terms of the treaty, the negotiations dragged

on for three years. During that time the Scottish Company continued

to drive a great trade for pelts on the St. Lawrence and elsewhere,

while the French pressed not only their claims to furs appropriated

from stores at Quebec after the actual signing of the peace treaty

but insisted also upon the return of all of New France. That included

Acadia of course and the evacuation of the fort at Port Royal.

At first, Charles was not disposed to disturb Alexander in his

occupation of “Nova Scotia.” In fact he encouraged the Scot to further

efforts in that direction. However, he needed gold at the time much

more than he needed another Scotland, so he was not reluctant to do a

little bargaining. When his wife’s brother, the French king, agreed to

pay a long overdue and substantial dowry, Charles agreed to return Port

Royal to the French. Sir William’s dream was thereupon finished. The

Scots demolished their fort, and young Alexander surrendered Port Royal

to the Chevalier Isaac de Razilly who had been sent out by the Company

of New France as governor of all Acadia.

This was a tremendous victory for Charles de la Tour and his French

fur traders, who had not only stubbornly maintained themselves during

the incident of the Scottish occupation of Acadia, but had managed

harassments intended to hinder further encroachments up the coast of

Maine by the Englishmen in those more southerly parts.

In 1631 the Frenchmen had paid a visit to the Pilgrims’ most northerly

outpost at Pentagoet on the Penobscot. Taking advantage of the absence

of the factor and most of his company, they were able to surprise a few

“simple” servants by a ruse. First, pretending they had “newly come

from the sea” and that their vessel was in need of repairs, a “false

Scot” among them fell to admiring the Englishmen’s muskets. Then,

talking the servants into letting them examine the guns, they gained

possession of the Englishmen’s weapons and promptly made away with

some four or five hundred pounds worth of Pilgrim goods, including

three hundredweight of beaver.

In time, however, after the ousting of the Scots from the Bay of Fundy,

the Frenchmen were able to do more than simply harass the Englishmen on

the coast of Maine. The truck house at Machias in Maine, built by Isaac

Allerton in 1633, was even more of a challenge than the Penobscot post

had been. Allerton had no sooner settled his traders there than “La

Tour, governor of the French in those parts, making claim to the place,

came to displant them, and finding resistance, killed two of the men

and carried away the other three and the goods.”

Allerton himself later went to Port Royal to protest. But he was

told by La Tour that “he had authority from the king of France, who

challenged all from Cape Sable to Cape Cod, wishing them to take notice

and to certify the rest of the English, that, if they traded to the

east of Pemaquid, he would make prize of them.” When Allerton asked to

see Monsieur La Tour’s commission the Frenchman replied that “his sword

was commission sufficient, where he had strength to overcome; where

that wanted, he would show his commission.”

And the French made good on their challenge, for in 1635 Monsieur

Charles d’Aunay, one of Governor Razilly’s lieutenants, came in a

man-of-war to the Pilgrims’ trading post on the Penobscot. By a show

of this force he took possession of the trucking house in the name of

the King of France. Making an inventory of the goods he found there at

prices he set himself, d’Aunay “made no payment for them, but told them

in convenient time he would do it if they came for it. For the house

and fortification etc. he would not allow nor account anything, saying

that they which build on another man’s ground do forfeit the same.”

Then he put the English traders in a shallop and sent them back to

Plymouth.

The Pilgrim fathers were enough upset about the loss of their goods and

trading post to do something violent about it. With the approval of

the Massachusetts Bay Colony, but without much in the way of material

assistance from their Puritan brethren, they hired “a fair ship of

above 300 tun well fitted with ordnance” to retake Pentagoet. This

ship was under the command of a Captain Girling. If the captain was

successful he was to have 700 pounds of beaver; if not, nothing. Along

with him went Captain Miles Standish and twenty Plymouth men in their

own bark to resettle their trading post after Girling had driven out

the French.

It would appear, however, that the French must have had notice of the

impending attack. So firmly were they entrenched behind earthworks

that Captain Girling’s gunfire could not dislodge them and all the big

ship’s powder was exhausted without effect. No landing was attempted.

Standish, frustrated, returned to Plymouth in his bark, and Captain

Girling went his own way.

The French now remained in permanent possession of what was soon known

as the “Mission of Pentagoet.” And so the line was finally drawn as a

practical matter between the English and the French on the Maine coast,

although England continued to maintain officially that it was more

northerly, at the 45th parallel.

Mutual distrust, born of the religious differences between

English Puritan and French Catholic, often erupted in charges and

counter-charges that sometimes threatened security on either side of

the line. In fact, fear of possible French aggression was in part

responsible for the eventual formation of the New England Confederation

in 1643. On the other side of the picture however, there was much

guarded trade between Frenchman and Englishman as it suited their

pocketbooks. As a matter of fact the Puritans actually traded with

the French conquerors of Pentagoet shortly after d’Aunay captured the

Pilgrim trading post.

But, even so, this coastal border created by the rival fur traders of

these two nations was maintained with only minor variations for years,

even after competition for the beaver trade was no longer the reason

for its existence.

Acadian fur traders and the rivers of Maine and Massachusetts that ran

in the wrong direction had effectively contained the English on the

northern coasts. The St. Lawrence River route to the interior, to the

great lake country that teemed with fur-bearers, remained safe to the

French traders, who resumed their profitable westward penetration of

the hinterland.

It remained to be seen, however, if the French could prevent the Dutch

of New Netherland and the English of Virginia from draining off this

hinterland trade. The Connecticut, Hudson, Delaware, and Susquehanna

Rivers all ran in the right direction to tap it.

XI

_The Bay of Virginia_

When Sir George Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, founded his province of

“Avalon” in Newfoundland he was partly motivated by religious urgings.

Being a Catholic convert he earnestly wanted to provide a haven in

the new world for the persecuted Catholics of England. But this court

favorite, who as the son of a humble Yorkshire farmer had figuratively

pulled himself up by his own bootstraps to ennoblement, was also a

profit-minded promoter. He expected a rich return on his newly gained

proprietorship.

Pelts and palisades: The story of fur and the rivalry for pelts in early America · 第 9 / 19 段