Notwithstanding the heavy rain, the muddy roads, and the late hour at
which the orders had been received, the divisions of the First Army
were all at their appointed places soon after dawn. The Army of the
Elbe pushed forward energetically, and at 5:45 o’clock its commander
notified Frederick Charles that he would be at Nechanitz between 7
and 9 o’clock, with thirty-six battalions. The First Army was at once
ordered forward.
The 8th Division marched on the left of the high road, as the
advanced-guard of the troops moving upon Sadowa.
The 4th and 3d Divisions marched on the right of the road, abreast of
the 8th.
The 5th and 6th Divisions followed the 8th on the right and left of the
road respectively, while the Reserve Artillery followed on the road
itself.
The Cavalry Corps had started from Gutwasser at 5 o’clock, and it now
marched behind the right wing to maintain communication with the Army
of the Elbe.
The 7th Division was to leave Cerekwitz as soon as the noise of the
opening battle was heard, and was to join in the action according to
circumstances.
The divisional cavalry of the 5th and 6th Divisions was formed into a
brigade, and a brigade of the Cavalry Division was attached to the IId
Corps.
[Illustration: BATTLEFIELD OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.]
About 7:30 the advanced-guard of the Army of the Elbe reached
Nechanitz, where it encountered a Saxon outpost, which retired after
destroying the bridges.
About the same time the 8th Division advanced in line of battle upon
Sadowa. The Austrian artillery opened fire as soon as the Prussians
came in sight. The latter took up a position near the Sadowa
brickfield, and skirmishing began.
The 4th Division took up a position at Mzan, on the right of the 8th,
and its batteries engaged in combat with the Austrian artillery.
The 3d Division formed on the right of the 4th, near Zawadilka.
The 5th and 6th Divisions formed line at Klenitz; one on each side of
the road.
The Reserve Cavalry was stationed at Sucha.
At the first sound of the cannon Von Fransecky opened fire upon the
village of Benatek, which was soon set on fire by the Prussian shells.
The village was then carried by assault by the advanced-guard of the
7th Division.
There was now a heavy cannonade all along the line. The heavy downpour
of the last night had given place to a dense fog and a drizzling rain;
and the obscurity was heightened by the clouds of smoke which rose from
the guns. Frederick Charles rode along the right wing, giving orders to
respond to the Austrian batteries by firing slowly, and forbidding the
crossing of the Bistritz. His object was merely to contain Von Benedek,
while waiting for the weather to clear up, and for the turning armies
to gain time.
At 8 o’clock loud cheering announced the arrival of the King of Prussia
upon the battle field. As soon as Frederick Charles reported to him
the condition of affairs, the King ordered an advance upon the line
of the Bistritz. The object of this movement was to gain good points
of support for the divisions upon the left bank of the Bistritz, from
which they might launch forth, at the proper time, upon the main
position of the enemy. The divisions were cautioned not to advance too
far beyond the stream, nor up to the opposite heights.
The Austrian position differed slightly from the one ordered on the
eve of the battle. The Saxons, instead of holding the heights eastward
of Popowitz and Tresowitz, found a more advantageous position on the
heights between Problus and Prim, with a brigade holding the hills
behind Lubno, Popowitz and Tresowitz. Nechanitz was held merely as an
outpost. The remaining dispositions of the center and left were, on
the whole, as ordered the night before; on the right they differed
materially from the positions designated.
Instead of the line Chlum-Nedelist, the IVth Corps took up its position
on the line Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes, 2,000 paces in advance of the
batteries that had been thrown up.
The IId Corps formed on the right of the IVth, on the heights of
Maslowed-Horenowes.
The Ist and VIth Corps and the Cavalry took their appointed positions,
and the Reserve Artillery was stationed on the heights of Wsestar and
Sweti.
In the language of the Prussian Staff History: “Instead of the
semi-circle originally intended, the Austrian line of battle now
formed only a very gentle curve, the length of which, from Ober-Prim
to Horenowes, was about six and three-fourths miles, on which four and
three-fourths corps d’armee were drawn up. The left wing had a reserve
of three weak brigades behind it, and on the right wing only one
brigade covered the ground between the right flank and the Elbe. On the
other hand, a main reserve of two corps of infantry and five cavalry
divisions stood ready for action fully two miles behind the center of
the whole line of battle.”
The strength of the Austrian army was 206,100 men and 770 guns. At this
period of the battle it was opposed by a Prussian army of 123,918 men,
with 444 guns. The arrival of the Second Army would, however, increase
this force to 220,984 men and 792 guns.
The 7th Division, which had already occupied the village of Benatek,
was the first to come into serious conflict with the Austrians. The
attack, beginning thus on the left, was successively taken up by the
8th, 4th and 3d Divisions; and the advanced-guard of the Army of the
Elbe being engaged at the same time, the roar of battle extended along
the entire line.
In front of the 7th Division were the wooded heights of Maslowed, known
also as the Swiep Wald. This forest, extending about 2,000 paces from
east to west, and about 1,200 from north to south, covered a steep
ridge intersected on its northern slope by ravines, but falling off
more gradually towards the Bistritz. Against this formidable position
Von Fransecky sent four battalions, which encountered two Austrian
battalions, and, after a severe struggle, drove them from the wood. Now
was the time to break the Austrian line between Maslowed and Cistowes,
and, turning upon either point, or both, roll up the flanks of the
broken line. The advanced battalions were quickly reinforced by the
rest of the division; but all attempts to _débouche_ from the wood were
baffled. Heavy reinforcements were drawn from the Austrian IVth and
IId Corps, and a furious counter-attack was made upon the Prussians.
Calling for assistance, Von Fransecky was reinforced by two battalions
of the 8th Division; but he was still struggling against appalling
odds. With fourteen battalions and twenty-four guns, he was contending
against an Austrian force of forty battalions and 128 guns. Falling
back slowly, contesting the ground inch by inch, the Prussian division,
after a fierce struggle of three hours, still clung stubbornly to the
northern portion of the wood. Still the Austrians had here a reserve of
eleven battalions and twenty-four guns, which might have been hurled
with decisive effect upon the exhausted Prussians, had not other events
interfered.
As soon as the 7th Division had advanced beyond Benatek, the 8th
Division advanced against the woods of Skalka and Sadowa. Two bridges
were thrown across the Bistritz, west of the Skalka wood, by the side
of two permanent bridges, which the Austrians had neglected to destroy.
The reserve divisions (5th and 6th) advanced, at the same time, to
Sowetitz, and the Reserve Artillery to the Roskosberg. As soon as the
8th Division crossed the Bistritz, it was to establish communication
with the 7th Division, and turn towards the Königgrätz highroad. The
woods of Skalka and Sadowa were occupied without much difficulty; the
Austrian brigade which occupied them falling back in good order to the
heights of Lipa, where the other brigades of the IIId Austrian Corps
were stationed. On these heights, between Lipa and Langenhof, 160 guns
were concentrated in a great battery, which sent such a “hailstorm
of shells” upon the advancing Prussians as to check effectually all
attempts to _débouche_ from the forests.
The 4th Division advanced from Mzan, and the 3d from Zawadilka, soon
after the 8th Division moved forward. The retreat of the Austrian
brigade from Sadowa had uncovered the flank of the outposts, and
compelled the withdrawal of the troops successively from Dohalitz,
Dohalica and Mokrowous to the main position westward of Langenhof
and Stresetitz, and these outposts were consequently gained by the
Prussians with slight loss. Further advance of the 4th and 3d
Divisions was, however, prevented by the rapid and accurate fire of the
Austrian batteries.
The advanced-guard of the Army of the Elbe had gained the left bank of
the Bistritz, part of the left wing crossing by the bridge of Nechanitz
(which had been repaired with gates and barn doors) and part by wading
breast-deep across the stream. The right wing of the advanced-guard
was obliged to march down stream to Kuncitz, where it crossed, after
dislodging a small force of Saxons and repairing the bridge. The Saxon
outposts were all driven back to the main position, and the Prussian
advanced-guard occupied the line Hradek-Lubno, thus covering the
crossing of the main body. The Prussians succeeded in throwing only
one bridge at this part of the field; and as the entire Army of the
Elbe was obliged to cross upon it and defile through Nechanitz, the
deployment was necessarily slow.
At 11 o’clock the Prussian advance had been checked. The Army of the
Elbe was slowly forming in rear of the line Hradek-Lubno. The First
Army, advancing, as we have seen, by echelon of divisions from the
left, had gained the position Maslowed-Sadowa Wood-Mokrowous, thus
executing a wheel of about an eighth of a circle to the right. The
immediate object of the advance had been practically gained, it is
true, by the occupation of the line of the Bistritz, and the conversion
of the strong advanced posts of the Austrians into good points of
support for the Prussians. Yet Fransecky was sorely pushed on the left,
and the 8th Division was suffering so severely from the fire of the
Austrian guns, that Frederick Charles deemed it necessary to order
the 5th and 6th Divisions to move up to the Sadowa wood. All attempts
of these fresh troops to gain ground towards the heights of Lipa were
repulsed, and the Prussian advance again came to a standstill. A
counter-attack by a single Austrian brigade against the Sadowa wood
(made without Von Benedek’s permission) was repulsed.
The position of the First Army was now critical. The last battalion
of the infantry reserves had been brought into action. Von Fransecky
was on a desperate defensive. The other divisions were all subjected
to a furious, crushing fire from nearly 250 pieces of artillery,
which the Austrians had brought into action on the heights from Lipa
to Problus; while, owing partly to the wooded ground, partly to the
difficulty of crossing the stream, and partly to the inefficiency of
the Prussian artillery officers, only 42 guns were on the left bank
of the Bistritz to reply to this formidable cannonade. Only a portion
of Frederick Charles’ guns were brought into action at all; and their
long range fire from the positions west of the Bistritz was ignored by
the Austrian batteries, whose entire energy was devoted to a merciless
pelting of the Prussian infantry.
The statement of the Prussian Staff History that the center was in no
danger, seems, therefore, to savor more of patriotism than of candor.
To advance was impossible. The infantry was suffering terribly from the
Austrian fire; the artillery was feebly handled; and the cavalry could
render no assistance. There was danger that the army would be shaken
to pieces by Von Benedek’s artillery, and that the demoralized troops
would then be swept from the field by the comparatively fresh infantry
and cavalry of the Austrians. The King and his generals eagerly scanned
the northern horizon with their glasses; and, with the intense anxiety
of Wellington at Waterloo, waited for tidings from the army on the
left, and strained their vision for a sight of the advancing columns.
The question of retreat was discussed. The Reserve Cavalry was ordered
up to Sadowa, apparently with a view to covering the withdrawal of the
army to the right bank of the stream. It was now past 1 o’clock. It was
resolved to hold the line of the Bistritz at all hazards, and a heavy
artillery fire was kept up. In the meantime, events on other parts of
the field were already beginning to extricate the First Army from its
perilous situation.
At 11:30, the 14th and 15th Divisions of the Army of the Elbe having
come upon the field, an attack was ordered upon both flanks of the
Saxons. The 15th Division, followed by a brigade of cavalry, moved,
through Hradek, against Ober-Prim. The 14th Division moved on the
heights east of Popowitz, through the forest, against Problus. The
advanced-guard, between the two divisions, moved to the attack, pushing
its flanks forward, for the double purpose of avoiding the heavy
fire from the enemy’s front and masking the movements of the turning
divisions. The Prince of Saxony, believing it a favorable opportunity
to assume the offensive, attacked the Prussian advanced-guard with
a Saxon brigade. The attack, though made with great spirit, was
repulsed. Again the Prince attacked, this time with two brigades;
but the advancing Saxons being struck on the left flank by the 15th
Division, were driven back with heavy loss, and Ober-Prim was carried
by the Prussians. General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld had succeeded in
bringing 66 guns to the left bank of the Bistritz, and he now pushed
them forward to within 2,000 paces of Nieder Prim, upon which they
concentrated a heavy fire, under cover of which the place was carried
by a regiment of the 15th Division. The 14th Division, having gained
possession of Popowitz and the wood east of that village, now joined
the 15th Division in a concentric attack upon Problus. The Prince of
Saxony had not only observed the preparations for this attack, but he
had also observed the arrival of the Prussian Second Army at Chlum;
and he now, at 3 o’clock, ordered a retreat to the heights southwest
of Rosnitz. The troops at Problus, acting as a rear-guard, offered a
stubborn resistance to the advancing Prussians; but they were driven
from the village, and the advance of the 14th and 15th Divisions was
checked only by the artillery fire of the Saxons and the VIIIth Corps,
stationed on the hills north-east of Problus.
During this time the Second Army had been working great results. At 8
o’clock Von Alvensleben, commanding the advanced-guard of the Guard
Corps, at Daubrowitz, heard the cannonade in the direction of Benatek.
Without waiting for orders, he at once put his command in march for the
scene of conflict, notifying his corps commander of his departure, and
sending word to Von Fransecky that he would be at Jericek by 11:30. The
rest of the corps quickly followed, marching straight across country,
up hill and down hill, pushing through the heavy mud with such restless
energy that several of the artillery horses dropped dead from fatigue.
The advanced-guard arrived at Jericek at 11 o’clock, and at the same
hour the heads of the columns of the main body arrived at Choteborek,
to which point the Crown Prince had hurried in advance of the troops.
The VIth Corps advanced from its position, near Gradlitz, in two
columns. The 12th Division marched, _via_ Kukus and Ertina, to the
heights east of Rosnow, detaching a battalion and a squadron to
mask the fortress of Josephstadt. The 11th Division marched, _via_
Schurz, to Welchow. As soon as it neared the latter place Von Mutius,
commanding the corps, ordered both divisions to keep connection and
march to the sound of the cannonade. The troops pushed on “over hills,
meadows and ditches, through copses and hedgerows,” across the swampy
valley of the Trotina, part of the troops crossing the stream by the
single bridge, and part wading breast-deep through the water. At 11
o’clock the 11th Division arrived at the heights north of Racitz, and
came under the fire of the enemy’s batteries.
At 8 o’clock the Vth Corps began its march, _via_ Schurz and Dubenitz,
to Choteborek; and at 11 o’clock its advanced-guard was approaching
that village.
The Ist Corps did not start until 9:30. It marched _via_ Zabres,
Gross-Trotin and Weiss Polikau; and at 11 o’clock it had not yet
reached Gross-Burglitz.
Thus, at 11 o’clock, the only troops that had reached the Trotina were
the Guards and the VIth Corps; and they were still two and one-half
miles from the left wing of the First Army. In three hours the Second
Army had been so concentrated as to reduce its front from twenty-two
and one-half miles to nine miles; and it now occupied the line
Burglitz-Jericek-Choteborek-Welchow.
The Crown Prince, from his station on the heights of Choteborek, about
four and one-half miles from Maslowed, had an extended view towards the
valley of the Bistritz; and notwithstanding the rain and fog, he could
trace the direction of the contending lines by the smoke of the burning
villages and flashes of the guns. It was evident that his columns
were marching in such a direction as to bring them directly upon the
flank and rear of the Austrian troops already engaged; but, though the
formidable heights of Horenowes appeared to be occupied by only one
battery, it seemed probable that the passage of the Elbe by the Crown
Prince was known by Von Benedek, and that the troops on the Austrian
right were waiting behind the crest of the hills, to spring forward
into action when the Prussians should undertake to cross the swampy
valley between the Trotina and the heights of Horenowes. The different
divisions were ordered to direct their march upon a prominent group of
trees on the Horenowes hill.
The Austrians were now in a position of extreme danger. The heights
of Horenowes, which seemed to offer such a formidable obstacle to the
advance of the Crown Prince, had been left almost defenseless. As
we have seen, the Austrian IVth and IId Corps had taken up the line
Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes, and the space between the right flank
and the Elbe was guarded by only one brigade and two battalions. To
make matters worse, the IVth and IId Corps had been drawn into the
fight with Von Fransecky in the Swiep Wald, and, facing west, they now
presented a flank to the advancing columns of the Crown Prince. The
advance of these two corps beyond the line Chlum-Nedelist had carried
them far beyond support; and now, with the Prussian Second Army within
two and one-half miles of them, their reserves were fully three miles
away.
Von Benedek discovering that these two corps had not taken up their
designated positions, sent orders, before 11 o’clock, to their
commanders, to fall back to the positions originally assigned to
them. Unfortunately, the commander of the IVth Corps, ignorant of the
approach of the Crown Prince, and flushed with his success against
Von Fransecky, thought it an opportune moment to assume a vigorous
offensive against the Prussian left, and would not make the movement
ordered until he had sent a report to that effect to his chief. The
projected offensive was disapproved, and the former order was repeated.
The two corps now retired to the positions originally designated, the
movement being covered by the fire of 64 pieces of artillery posted
on the plateau of Nedelist. The withdrawal had been delayed too long;
for the Crown Prince already had 48 guns in position between Racitz
and Horenowes, the Prussian infantry was advancing, and the Austrian
movement partook, consequently, of the nature of a retreat. Yet it is
greatly to the credit of the Austrian troops that they were able to
execute a flank movement--and a retrograde movement, too--under the
fire of the enemy; though they had been in action fully three hours.
At noon Von Benedek received a telegram from Salney, _via_ Josephstadt,
announcing the approach of the Second Army. At this very moment the
guns of the Crown Prince were playing upon the Austrian right flank.
The advanced-guard of the 1st Division of Guards had debouched from
Zizilowes at 11:15 A. M.; its right flank being covered by the
cavalry brigade which had covered the left of the 7th Division. The
advanced-guard of the 2d Guard Division, (which had been separated from
the main body by the Reserve Artillery of the 1st Division cutting
into the column on the road) without waiting for the arrival of its
comrades, joined the 1st Division in its attack upon Horenowes. At noon
the 12th Division had captured the Horicka Berg, the 11th Division had
driven the Austrians from Racitz, and the Guards were advancing upon
Horenowes. The withdrawal of the Austrian IId Corps had been covered by
40 guns posted east of Horenowes, which kept up a heavy fire upon the
Prussians. But the Guards easily carried Horenowes, the position of the
great battery was turned, the hostile infantry was advancing upon its
flank, and the artillery was forced to retire. The 12th Division, in
the meantime, had captured Sendrasitz, cutting off the Austrian brigade
which had been covering the right flank. The 11th Division then moved
up to a position north of Sendrasitz, on the left of the Guards, and
the latter advanced to Maslowed. The Prussians now had 90 guns on the
heights of Horenowes; and most of these pieces were hurried forward
beyond Maslowed, within 1,300 paces of the Austrian position, where
they prepared the way for the infantry assault by a vigorous cannonade.
When the Guards advanced, the Austrian IVth Corps was still engaged in
taking up its new position. Unchecked by the fire of more than 100 guns
in position west of Nedelist, the Guards crushed the two battalions
on the left of the IVth Corps, and penetrated into the gap; the left
wing rolling up the flank of an Austrian brigade, and pushing on in
the direction of Sweti; while the right wing, changing front to the
right, stormed the village of Chlum, which, though the key of the
Austrian position, was occupied by only a single battalion. As the
Guards advanced, the force under Von Alvensleben, which had constituted
the advanced-guard in the morning, moved forward in echelon on their
right. A brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, which, by some mistake,
had been left at Cistowes, and was now marching to the new position of
its corps, was struck by Von Alvensleben, and driven to the westward of
Chlum with heavy loss. Simultaneously with the Guards, the VIth Corps
advanced upon the enemy, the 11th Division capturing Nedelist, and the
12th driving the cut-off Austrian brigade into Lochenitz. The Austrians
made several determined attacks from Langenhof and the Lipa wood upon
the Prussians in Chlum; but though they fought with great bravery and
penetrated into the village, they were repulsed by the Guards, who
then seized Rosberitz and the forest of Lipa. The 1st Austrian Reserve
Cavalry Division, consisting of five regiments, charged the Prussians
south of Chlum. The brigade on the left consisted of two regiments of
cuirassiers, and was formed in double column: the one on the right was
composed of two regiments (one of cuirassiers and one of lancers),
formed in double column, with a regiment of cuirassiers following as a
second line. The charge was repulsed by four companies of the infantry
of the Guard. It is remarkable that in this case, the cavalry came
within 200 yards of the infantry before the latter opened fire.
At 3 o’clock matters had, consequently, changed very much for the worse
with the Austrians. On the left, the Saxons had been driven from their
position; on the right, the Prussian Guards and VIth Corps occupied the
line Rosberitz-Nedelist-Lochenitz. The Austrian IVth and IId Corps had
been defeated, and were retreating upon Wsestar, Sweti, Predmeritz and
Lochenitz. The 1st Division of the Guards had captured 55 guns, and had
seized the key of the Austrian position. The Austrian IIId Corps was
sandwiched between the Guards and the First Army. Yet the position of
the Guards was full of danger. In the valley of Sweti-Wsestar-Rosnitz
were the two intact corps of Austrian reserves, with more than 70
squadrons of cavalry; and between Wsestar and Langenhof were massed
the powerful batteries of the reserve artillery, which kept Rosberitz
and Chlum under a heavy fire. The main body of the 2d Division of the
Guards was just ascending the heights of Maslowed. There were no other
troops within a mile and a quarter upon whom they could depend for
assistance.
Von Benedek, who had taken his position between Lipa and Chlum,
hearing of the occupation of the latter village by the Prussians,
could scarcely believe the surprising news. As he rode hurriedly
toward Chlum, the information was rudely corroborated by a volley from
the Prussians, which mortally wounded an aide-de-camp, and seriously
injured several other members of his escort. There was no longer any
doubt. Victory was now out of the question, and it was necessary to
take prompt measures to save the right wing from annihilation, and to
prevent the retreat of the rest of the army from being cut off.
A brigade of the Austrian Ist Corps was sent to reinforce the Saxons
near Problus, and another brigade of the same corps was sent against
the Lipa wood and the heights west of Chlum. The latter brigade,
reinforced by a brigade of the IIId Corps and fragments of the IVth
Corps, made three desperate attacks upon the advanced-guard of the 2d
Division and part of the 1st Division of the Prussian Guards at these
points, only to recoil, completely baffled, before the deadly fire of
the needle gun. The IIId Corps no longer had any intact troops; it was
between two fires; it began its retreat, and abandoned the village of
Lipa to the Prussians. On the left, the main body of the 1st Division
of the Guards was engaged at Rosberitz with the Austrian VIth Corps.
Advancing resolutely to the attack, the Austrians dislodged the Guards
from the village after a bloody struggle; but as they halted at the
outskirts of the town to re-form for another assault, the Guards were
reinforced by the advanced-guard of the Ist Corps. At the same time,
the commander of the Prussian VIth Corps, leaving the 12th Division
engaged with the Austrians at Lochenitz, half-wheeled the 11th Division
to the right, and advanced from Nedelist upon Rosberitz. The Austrian
IId Corps was already in retreat. A counter-attack of the Guards and
the Ist Corps drove the Austrians out of Rosberitz; and the 11th
Division striking them on the flank routed them with heavy loss. The
11th Division then attacked a brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, which
had taken up a position near Sweti to protect the reserve artillery.
The brigade and the artillery were driven back to the village, which
was carried by assault, many cannon being captured. The Vth Corps
reached Horenowes at 4 o’clock, and was designated as the general
reserve of the army.
The full tide of Prussian success had now set in. The 16th Division
had not yet crossed at Nechanitz, but the 14th and 15th Divisions had
defeated the Saxons and the Austrian VIIIth Corps, and the allies were
in retreat. Both of the Austrian flanks had been crushed, and the First
Army was now actively engaged in an attack upon Von Benedek’s front.
The aide-de-camp sent by the Crown Prince to announce his approach
had been delayed by the condition of the roads and the necessity of
making a long detour, and did not arrive at the royal headquarters
until late in the afternoon. The Crown Prince’s advance was first made
known to the commander of the First Army by the flashes of the Prussian
guns on the heights of Horenowes. Soon after, the Prussian columns
were seen ascending the heights of Maslowed. The fire of the Austrian
guns in front perceptibly diminished, and it was evident that some of
the batteries had changed front to the right. It was clear that the
Second Army had struck the Austrian flank; and at 3:30 o’clock the
King ordered “an advance all along the line” of the First Army. The
retreat of the Austrian Xth Corps had begun, but it was concealed by
the nature of the ground, and covered by the line of artillery, which
devotedly maintained its position, and kept up a heavy fire, until its
own existence was imperiled by the advance of the foe. The Xth Corps
had passed well beyond the danger of infantry pursuit when the advance
of the First Army was ordered. The Austrian artillerists held to their
position until the enemy was almost at the muzzle of the cannon, and
then withdrawing to Rosnitz and Briza, with all the guns that their
stubborn defense had not compelled them to sacrifice, again opened
fire upon the Prussians. The cavalry, too, devoted itself to the task
of covering the retreat. The Prussian cavalry, which had been delayed
by the blocking of the bridges by the artillery, and the crowding of
the roads by the infantry, now appeared in the front of the pursuers,
and fierce cavalry combats took place near Langenhof, Stresetitz and
Problus. Though eventually overmatched, the Austrian cavalry made
a noble fight, and, at the sacrifice of its best blood, materially
assisted in covering the retreat of the army.
Frederick Charles, bringing up 54 guns to the heights of Wsestar
and Sweti, opened fire upon the new line of Austrian artillery. The
Austrian batteries replied with spirit, until the advance of the 11th
Division upon Rosnitz and Briza compelled them to withdraw, with
the loss of 36 guns. Still undaunted, the artillery took up a new
position on the line Stösser-Freihofen-Zeigelshag. Here all available
guns were brought into action, and under their fire the Prussian
pursuit virtually ended. Withdrawing in excellent order to the line
Placitz-Kuklena, the Austrian artillery kept up a duel with the
Prussian guns on the line Klacow-Stezerek until long after darkness had
set in.
The Prussian Staff History says: “The behavior of the cavalry and the
well-sustained fire of the powerful line of artillery at Placitz and
Kuklena, proved that part, at least of the hostile army still retained
its full power of resistance.
“It is true that affairs behind this line of artillery bore a very
different aspect. At first the corps had, for the most part, taken the
direction of the bridges northward of Königgrätz, but were prevented
from using them by the advance of the Prussian extreme left wing. This
caused the different bodies of troops to become promiscuously and
confusedly mingled together. The flying cavalry, shells bursting on all
sides, still further increased the confusion, which reached its climax
when the commandant of Königgrätz closed the gates of the fortress.
“Hundreds of wagons, either overturned or thrust off from the highroad,
riderless horses and confused crowds of men trying to escape across the
inundated environs of the fortress and the river, many of them up to
their necks in water--this spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout,
immediately before the gates of Königgrätz, was naturally hidden from
the view of the pursuing enemy.”
A prompt pursuit would, however, have been impracticable, even if
the Prussians had fully appreciated the extent of the Austrian
demoralization. The concentric attacks, so magnificently decisive on
the field, had produced an almost chaotic confusion on the part of
the victors themselves. Owing to the direction of their attacks, the
Second Army and the Army of the Elbe were “telescoped” together; and
the advance of the First Army had jammed it into the right flank of
the former and the left flank of the latter. At noon the front of
the combined Prussian armies had been more than sixteen miles long.
The front of this great host was now but little more than two miles;
and men of different regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and even
armies, were now indiscriminately mingled together. Aside from this
confusion, the exhaustion of the Prussian soldiers precluded pursuit.
Most of them had left their bivouacs long before dawn, and it had
been a day of hard marching and hard fighting for all. Many had been
entirely without food, all were suffering from extreme fatigue, and
several officers had fallen dead on the field from sheer exhaustion.
As a result of the exhaustion of the Prussians and the excellent
conduct of the Austrian cavalry and artillery, Von Benedek slipped
across the Elbe, and gained such a start on his adversaries that for
three days the Prussians lost all touch with him, and were in complete
ignorance of the direction of his retreat.
Thus ended the great battle of Königgrätz. The Prussian losses were
9,153, killed, wounded and missing. The Austrians lost 44,200, killed,
wounded and missing, including in the last classification 19,800
prisoners. They also lost 161 guns, five stands of colors, several
thousand muskets, several hundred wagons and a ponton train. The sum
total of the killed, wounded and missing (exclusive of prisoners) in
this battle was 27,656.
It is not necessary, for the present, even to sketch the retreat of the
Austrian army upon Olmütz and Vienna; the masterly march of Von Moltke
to the Danube; the Italian disasters of Custozza and Lissa; and the
campaign in which the Army of the Maine defeated the Bavarians and the
VIIIth Federal Corps.[13] Königgrätz was the decisive battle of the
war. Austria could not rally from her disaster, and twenty-three days
after the battle the truce of Nikolsburg virtually ended the contest.