The Army of the Elbe moved forward to Chotetitz, Lhota and Hochweseley,
with an advanced-guard at Smidar.
The Guard Landwehr Division advanced to Kopidlno, a few miles west of
Hochweseley.
The Austrians remained in the positions of the preceding day, but sent
their train to the left bank of the Elbe.
Incredible as it seems, the Prussians were ignorant of the withdrawal
of the Austrians from the plateau of Dubenetz, and did not, in
fact, even know that Von Benedek had occupied that position. The
Austrians were supposed to be behind the Elbe, between Josephstadt
and Königgrätz. On the other hand, Von Benedek seems to have been
completely in the dark in regard to the movements of the Prussians. The
Prussian Staff History acknowledges that “the outposts of both armies
faced each other on this day within a distance of four and one-half
miles, without either army suspecting the near and concentrated
presence of the other one.” Each commander ignorant of the presence,
almost within cannon shot, of an enormous hostile army! Such a blunder
during our Civil War would, probably, have furnished European military
critics with a text for a sermon on the mob-like character of American
armies.
Supposing the Austrians to be between Josephstadt and Königgrätz, two
plans were open to Von Moltke’s choice. First: To attack the Austrian
position in front with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, and on
its right with the Second Army. This would have necessitated forcing
the passage of a river in the face of a formidable enemy; but this
passage would have been facilitated by the flank attack of the Crown
Prince, whose entire army (except the Ist Corps) was across the river.
It would have been a repetition of Magenta on a gigantic scale, with
the Crown Prince playing the part of McMahon, and Frederick Charles
enacting the _rôle_ of the French Emperor. Second: To maneuver the
enemy out of his position by moving upon Pardubitz; the occupation
of which place would be a serious menace to his communications. The
latter movement would necessitate the transfer of the Second Army to
the right bank of the Elbe, and then the execution of a flank march in
dangerous proximity to the enemy; but its successful execution might
have produced decisive results. This movement by the right would have
been strikingly similar to Von Moltke’s movement by the left, across
the Moselle, four years later. The resulting battle might have been
an antedated Gravelotte, and Von Benedek might have found a Metz in
Königgrätz or Josephstadt. At the very least, the Austrians would,
probably, have been maneuvered out of their position behind the Elbe.
Before determining upon a plan of operations, it was decided to
reconnoiter the Elbe and the Aupa. The Army of the Elbe was directed
to watch the country towards Prague, and to seize the passages of the
river at Pardubitz. The First Army was ordered to take up the line Neu
Bidsow-Horzitz and to send a detachment from its left wing to Sadowa,
to reconnoiter the line of the Elbe between Königgrätz and Josephstadt.
The Ist Corps was to observe the latter fortress, and to cover the
flank march of the Second Army, if the movement in question should be
decided upon. The remaining corps of the Second Army were, for the
present, to remain in their positions, merely reconnoitering towards
the Aupa and the Metau.
These orders were destined to be speedily countermanded.
Colonel Von Zychlinsky, who commanded an outpost at the castle of
Cerakwitz, reported an Austrian encampment near Lipa, and scouting
parties, which were then sent out, returned, after a vigorous pursuit
by the Austrian cavalry, and reported the presence of the Austrian army
in force, behind the Bistritz, extending from Problus to the village
of Benatek. These reports, received after 6 o’clock P. M., entirely
changed the aspect of matters.
Under the influence of his war experience, Frederick Charles
was rapidly developing the qualities of a great commander; his
self-confidence was increasing; and his actions now displayed the vigor
and military perspicacity of Mars-la-Tour, rather than the hesitation
of Münchengrätz.[11] He believed that Von Benedek, with at least four
corps, was about to attack him; but he unhesitatingly decided to
preserve the advantages of the initiative, by himself attacking the
Austrians in front, in the early morning, while the Army of the Elbe
should attack their left. The co-operation of the Crown Prince was
counted upon to turn the Austrian right, and thus secure victory.
With these objects in view, the following movements were promptly
ordered:
The 8th Division to be in position at Milowitz at 2 A. M.;
The 7th Division to take post at Cerakwitz by 2 A. M.;
The 5th and 6th Divisions to start at 1:30 A. M., and take post as
reserves south of Horzitz, the 5th west, and the 6th east, of the
Königgrätz road;
The 3d Division to Psanek, and the 4th to Bristan; both to be in
position by 2 A. M.;
The Cavalry Corps to be saddled by daybreak, and await orders;
The reserve Artillery to Horzitz;
General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld, with all available troops of the Army
of the Elbe, to Nechanitz, as soon as possible.
Lieutenant Von Normand was sent to the Crown Prince with a request that
he take post with one or two corps in front of Josephstadt, and march
with another to Gross Burglitz.
The chief-of-staff of the First Army, General Von Voigts-Rhetz,
hastened to report the situation of matters to the King, who
had assumed command of the armies on June 30th, and now had his
headquarters at Gitschin. The measures taken by Frederick Charles were
approved, and Von Moltke at once issued orders for the advance of the
entire Second Army, as requested by that commander. These orders were
sent at midnight, one copy being sent through Frederick Charles at
Kamenitz; the other being carried by Count Finkenstein direct to the
Crown Prince at Königinhof. The officer who had been sent by Frederick
Charles to the Crown Prince was returning, with an answer that the
orders from army headquarters made it impossible to support the First
Army with more than the Ist Corps and the Reserve Cavalry. Fortunately,
he met Finkenstein a short distance from Königinhof. Comparing notes,
the two officers returned together to the Crown Prince, who at once
issued orders for the movement of his entire army to the assistance of
Frederick Charles.
In order to deliver his dispatches to the Crown Prince, Finkenstein had
ridden twenty-two and one-half miles, over a strange road, on a dark,
rainy night. Had he lost his way; had his horse suffered injury; had he
encountered an Austrian patrol, the history of Germany might have been
different. It is almost incredible that the Prussian general should
have diverged so widely from the characteristic German prudence as to
make success contingent upon the life of an aide-de-camp, or possibly
the life of a horse. Even had the other courier, riding _via_ Kamenitz,
reached his destination safely, the time that must have elapsed between
the Crown Prince’s declension of co-operation and his later promise to
co-operate, would have been sufficient to derange, and perhaps destroy,
the combinations of Von Moltke.
Let us now examine the Austrian position. Derrécagaix describes it as
follows:
“In front of the position, on the west, ran the Bistritz, a little
river difficult to cross in ordinary weather, and then very much
swollen by the recent rains.
“On the north, between the Bistritz and the Trotina, was a space of
about five kilometers, by which the columns of the assailant might
advance. Between these two rivers and the Elbe the ground is broken
with low hills, covered with villages and woods, which gave the defense
advantageous points of support. In the center the hill of Chlum
formed the key of the position, and commanded the road from Sadowa to
Königgrätz. The heights of Horenowes covered the right on the north.
The heights of Problus and Hradek constituted a solid support for the
left. At the south the position of Liebau afforded protection on this
side to the communications of the army.[12]
“The position selected had, then, considerable defensive value; but it
had the defect of having at its back the Elbe and the defiles formed by
the bridges.”
On this subject, however, Hozier says: “The Austrian commander took the
precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges, a
river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating
army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the
river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special, as well as general,
conditions also came into play.... The heavy guns of the fortress
scoured the banks of the river, both up and down stream, and, with
superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the
passage of the Austrians.”
In considering the Austrian retreat, we shall find that neither of
these distinguished authorities is entirely right, or wholly wrong, in
regard to the defects and advantages of the position described.
The following dispositions were ordered by Von Benedek:
The Saxons to occupy the heights of Popowitz, the left wing slightly
refused, and covered by the Saxon Cavalry;
The 1st Light Cavalry Division, to the rear and left, at Problus and
Prim;
The Xth Corps on the right of the Saxons;
The IIId Corps to occupy the heights of Lipa and Chlum, on the right of
the Xth Corps;
The VIIIth Corps in reserve, in rear of the Saxons.
In case the attack should be confined to the left wing, the other corps
were merely to hold themselves in readiness. If, however, the attack
should extend to the center and right, the following dispositions were
to be made:
The IVth Corps to move up on the right of the IIId to the heights of
Chlum and Nedelist;
The IId Corps, on the right of the IVth, constituting the extreme right
flank;
The 2d Light Cavalry Division, to the rear of Nedelist;
The VIth Corps to be massed on the heights of Wsestar;
The Ist Corps to be massed at Rosnitz;
The 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions to take position at Sweti;
The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division, at Briza;
The Reserve Artillery behind the Ist and VIth Corps.
The Ist and VIth Corps, the five cavalry divisions and the Reserve
Artillery were to constitute the general reserve.
A slight attempt was made to strengthen the position by throwing up
entrenchments. Six batteries were constructed on the right, as well
as breastworks for about eight companies of supporting infantry. The
infantry breastworks, as well as the batteries, were constructed by
engineer soldiers, and were of strong profile, with traverses, and had
a command of eight feet. There was not the slightest attempt to have
the infantry shelter themselves with hasty entrenchments. Even the
earthworks that were constructed were of no use; for a misunderstanding
of orders caused the line of battle to be established far in advance of
them. On the left but little was done to strengthen the position before
the Prussian attack began.