PACIFISM, DEFENCE, AND "THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WAR."
Did the Crimean War prove Bright and Cobden wrong?--Our curious
reasoning--Mr. Churchill on "illusions"--The danger of war is not the
illusion but its benefits--We are all Pacifists now since we all desire
Peace--Will more armaments alone secure it?--The experience of
mankind--War "the failure of human wisdom"--Therefore more wisdom is the
remedy--But the Militarists only want more arms--The German Lord
Roberts--The military campaign against political Rationalism--How to
make war certain.
The question surely, which for practical men stands out from the mighty
historical episode touched on in the last chapter, is this: Was the fact
that these despised men were so entirely right and their triumphant
adversaries so entirely wrong a mere fluke, or was it due to the
soundness of one set of principles and the hollowness of the other; and
were the principles special to that case, or general to international
conflict as a whole?
To have an opinion of worth on that question we must get away from
certain confusions and misrepresentations.
It is a very common habit for the Bellicist to quote the list of wars
which have taken place since the Crimean War as proof of the error of
Bright and Cobden. But what are the facts?
Here were two men who strenuously and ruthlessly opposed a certain
policy; they urged, not only that it would inevitably lead to war, but
that the war would be futile--but not sterile, for they saw that others
would grow from it. Their counsel was disregarded and the war came, and
events have proved that they were right and the war-makers wrong, and
the very fact that the wars took place is cited as disapproving their
"theories."[8]
It is a like confusion of thought which prompts Mr. Churchill to refer
to Pacifists as people who deem the _danger_ of war an illusion.
This persistent misconception is worth a little examination.
* * * * *
The smoke from the first railway engines in England killed the cattle
and the poultry of the country gentlemen near whose property the
railroad passed--at least, that is what the country gentleman wrote to
the _Times_.
Now if in the domain of quite simple material things the dislike of
having fixed habits of thought disturbed, leads gentlemen to resent
innovations in that way, it is not astonishing that innovations of a
more intangible and elusive kind should be subject to a like unconscious
misrepresentation, especially by newspapers and public men pushed by
commercial or political necessity to say the popular thing rather than
the true thing: that contained in the speech of Mr. Churchill, which,
together with a newspaper comment thereon, I have made the "text" of
this little book, is a typical case in point.
It is possible, of course, that Mr. Churchill in talking about "persons
who profess to know that the danger of war has become an illusion," had
not the slightest intention of referring to those who share the views
embodied in "The Great Illusion," which are, _not_ that the danger of
war is an illusion, but that the benefit is. All that happened was that
his hearers and readers interpreted his words as referring thereto; and
that, of course, he could not possibly prevent.
In any case, to misrepresent an author (and I mean always, of course,
quite sincere and unconscious misrepresentations, like that which led
the country gentlemen to write that railway smoke killed poultry) is a
trifling matter, but to misrepresent an idea, is not, for it makes that
better understanding of facts, the creation of a more informed public
opinion, by which alone we can avoid a possibly colossal folly, an
understanding difficult enough as it is, still more difficult.
And that is why the current misrepresentation (again unconscious) of
most efforts at the better understanding of the facts of international
relationship needs very badly to be corrected. I will therefore be very
definite.
The implication that Pacifists of any kind have ever urged that war is
impossible is due either to that confusion of thought just touched upon,
or is merely a silly gibe of those who deride arguments to which they
have not listened, and consequently do not understand, or which they
desire to misrepresent; and such misrepresentation is, when not
unconscious, always stupid and unfair.
So far as I am concerned, I have never written a line, nor, so far as I
know, has anyone else, to plead that war is impossible. I have, on the
contrary, always urged, with the utmost emphasis that war is not only
possible but extremely likely, so long as we remain as ignorant as we
are concerning what it can accomplish, and unless we use our energies
and efforts to prevent it, instead of directing those efforts to create
it. What anti-Bellicists as a whole urge, is not that war is impossible
or improbable, but that it is impossible to benefit by it; that conquest
must, in the long run, fail to achieve advantage; that the general
recognition of this can only add to our security. And incidentally most
of us have declared our complete readiness to take any demonstrably
necessary measure for the maintenance of armament, but urge that the
effort must not stop there.
One is justified in wondering whether the public men--statesmen,
soldiers, bishops, preachers, journalists--who indulge in this gibe, are
really unable to distinguish between the plea that a thing is unwise,
foolish, and the plea that it is impossible; whether they really suppose
that anyone in our time could argue that human folly is impossible, or
an "illusion." It is quite evidently a tragic reality. Undoubtedly the
readiness with which these critics thus fall back upon confusion
of thought indicates that they themselves have illimitable confidence in
it. But the confusion of thought does not stop here.
I have spoken of Pacifists and Bellicists, but, of course, we are all
Pacifists now. Lord Roberts, Lord Charles Beresford, Lord Fisher, Mr.
Winston Churchill, The Navy League, the Navier League, the Universal
Military Service League, the German Emperor, the Editor of _The
Spectator_, all the Chancelleries of Europe, alike declare that their
one object is the maintenance of peace. Never were such Pacifists. The
German Emperor, speaking to his army, invariably points out that they
stand for the peace of Europe. Does a First Lord want new ships? It is
because a strong British Navy is the best guarantee of peace. Lord
Roberts wants conscription because that is the one way to preserve
peace, and the Editor of _The Spectator_ tells us that Turkey's great
crime is that she has not paid enough attention to soldiering and
armament, that if only she had been stronger all would have been well.
All alike are quite persuaded indeed that the one way to peace is to get
more armament.
Well, that is the method that mankind has pursued during the whole of
its history; it has never shown the least disposition not to take this
advice and not to try this method to the full. And written history, to
say nothing of unwritten history, is there to tell us how well it has
succeeded.
Unhappily, one has to ask whether some of these military Pacifists
really want it to succeed? Again I do not tax any with conscious
insincerity. But it does result not merely from what some imply, but
from what they say. For certain of these doughty Pacifists having told
you how much their one object is to secure peace, then proceed to tell
you that this thing which they hope to secure is a very evil thing, that
under its blighting influence nations wane in luxury and sloth. And of
course they imply that our own nation, about a third of whom have not
enough to eat and about another third of whom have a heart-breaking
struggle with small means and precariousness of livelihood, is in danger
of this degeneration which comes from too much wealth and luxury and
sloth and ease. I could fill a dozen books the size of this with the
solemn warning of such Pacifists as these against the danger of peace
(which they tell you they are struggling to maintain), and how splendid
and glorious a thing, how fine a discipline is war (which they tell you
they are trying so hard to avoid). Thus the Editor of _The Spectator_
tells us that mankind cannot yet dispense with the discipline of war;
and Lord Roberts, that to make war when you are really ready for it (or
that in any case for Germany to do it) is "an excellent policy and one
to be pursued by every nation prepared to play a great part in history."
The truth is, of course, that we are not likely to get peace from those
who believe it to be an evil thing and war and aggression a good thing,
or, at least, are very mixed in their views as to this. Before men can
secure peace they must at least make up their minds whether it is peace
or war they want. If you do not know what you want, you are not likely
to get it--or you are likely to get it, whichever way you prefer to put
it.
And that is another thing which divides us from the military Pacifists:
we really do want peace. As between war and peace we have made our
choice, and having made it, stick to it. There may be something to be
said for war--for settling a thing by fighting about it instead of by
understanding it,--just as there may be something to be said for the
ordeal, or the duel, as against trial by evidence, for the rack as a
corrective of religious error, for judicial torture as a substitute for
cross-examination, for religious wars, for all these things--but the
balance of advantage is against them and we have discarded them.
But there is a still further difference which divides us: We have
realised that we discarded those things only when we really understood
their imperfections and that we arrived at that understanding by
studying them, by discussing them,--because one man in London or another
in Paris raised plainly and boldly the whole question of their wisdom
and because the intellectual ferment created by those interrogations,
either in the juridical or religious field, re-acted on the minds of men
in Geneva or Wurtenburg or Rome or Madrid. It was by this means, not by
improving the rapiers or improving the instruments of the inquisition,
that we got rid of the duel and that Catholics ceased to torture
Protestants or _vice versa_. We gave these things up because we realised
the futility of physical force in these conflicts. We shall give up war
for the same reason.
But the Bellicist says that discussions of this sort, these attempts to
find out the truth, are but the encouragement of pernicious theories:
there is, according to him, but one way--better rapiers, more and better
racks, more and better inquisitions.
Mr. Bonar Law, in one of the very wisest phrases ever pronounced by a
statesman, has declared that "war is the failure of human wisdom."
That is the whole case of Pacifism: we shall not improve except at the
price of using our reason in these matters; of understanding them
better. Surely it is a truism that that is the price of all progress;
saner conceptions--man's recognition of his mistakes, whether those
mistakes take the form of cannibalism, slavery, torture, superstition,
tyranny, false laws, or what you will. The veriest savage, or for that
matter the ape, can blindly fight, but whether the animal develops into
a man, or the savage into civilized man, depends upon whether the
element of reason enters in an increasing degree into the solution of
his problems.
The Militarist argues otherwise. He admits the difficulty comes from
man's small disposition to think; therefore don't think--fight. We
fight, he says, because we have insufficient wisdom in these matters;
therefore do not let us trouble to get more wisdom or understanding; all
we need do is to get better weapons. I am not misrepresenting him; that
is quite fairly the popular line: it is no use talking about these
things or trying to explain them, all that is logic and theories; what
you want to do is to get a bigger army or more battleships. And, of
course, the Bellicist on the other side of the frontier says exactly the
same thing, and I am still waiting to have explained to me how,
therefore, if this matter depends upon understanding, we can ever solve
it by neglecting understanding, which the Militarist urges us to do. Not
only does he admit, but pleads, that these things are complex, and
supposes that that is an argument why they should not be studied.
And a third distinction will, I think, make the difference between us
still clearer. Like the Bellicist, I am in favour of defence. If in a
duelling society a duellist attacked me, or, as a Huguenot in the Paris
of the sixteenth century a Catholic had attacked me, I should certainly
have defended myself, and if needs be have killed my aggressor. But that
attitude would not have prevented my doing my small part in the creation
of a public opinion which should make duelling or such things as the
massacre of St. Bartholomew impossible by showing how unsatisfactory and
futile they were; and I should know perfectly well that neither would
stop until public opinion had, as the result of education of one kind or
another, realised their futility. But it is as certain as anything can
be that the Churchills of that society or of that day would have been
vociferous in declaring (as in the case of the duel they still to-day
declare in Prussia) that this attempt to prove the futility of duelling
was not only a bad and pernicious campaign, but was in reality a subtle
attempt to get people killed in the street by bullies, and that those
who valued their security would do their best to discredit all
anti-duelling propaganda--by misrepresentation, if needs be.
Let this matter be quite clear. No one who need be considered in this
discussion would think of criticising Lord Roberts for wanting the army,
and Mr. Churchill for wanting the navy, to be as good and efficient as
possible and as large as necessary. Personally--and I speak, I know, for
many of my colleagues in the anti-war movement--I would be prepared to
support British conscription if it be demonstrably wise or necessary.
But what we criticise is the persistent effort to discredit honest
attempts at a better understanding of the facts of international
relationship, the everlasting gibe which it is thought necessary to
fling at any constructive effort, apart from armament, to make peace
secure. These men profess to be friends of peace, they profess to
regret the growth of armament, to deplore the unwisdom, ignorance,
prejudice and misunderstanding out of which the whole thing grows, but
immediately there is any definite effort to correct this unwisdom, to
examine the grounds of the prejudice and misunderstanding, there is a
volte face and such efforts are sneered at as "sentimental" or "sordid,"
according as the plea for peace is put upon moral or material grounds.
It is not that they disagree in detail with any given proposition
looking towards a basis of international co-operation, but that in reality
they deprecate raising the matter at all.[9] It must be armaments and
nothing but armaments with them. If there had been any possibility of
success in that we should not now be entering upon the 8,000th or
9,000th war of written history. Armaments may be necessary, but they are
not enough. Our plan is armaments plus education; theirs is armament
versus education. And by education, of course, we do not mean school
books, or an extension of the School Board curriculum, but a recognition
of the fact that the character of human society is determined by the
extent to which its units attempt to arrive at an _understanding_ of
their relationship, instead of merely subduing one another by force,
which does not lead to understanding at all: in Turkey, or Venezuela, or
San Domingo, there is no particular effort made to adjust differences by
understanding; in societies of that type they only believe in settling
differences by armaments. That is why there are very few books, very
little thought or discussion, very little intellectual ferment but a
great many guns and soldiers and battles. And throughout the world the
conflict is going on between these rival schools. On the whole the
Western world, inside the respective frontiers, almost entirely now
tends to the Pacifist type. But not so in the international field, for
where the Powers are concerned, where it is a question of the attitude
of one nation in relation to another, you get a degree of understanding
rather less than more than that which obtains in the internal politics
of Venezuela, or Turkey, or Morocco, or any other "warlike" state.
And the difficulty of creating a better European opinion and temper is
due largely to just this idea that obsesses the Militarist, that unless
they misrepresent facts in a sensational direction the nations will be
too apathetic to arm; that education will abolish funk, and that
presumably funk is a necessary element in self-defence.
For the most creditable explanation that we can give of the Militarist's
objection to having this matter discussed at all, is the evident
impression that such discussion will discourage measures for
self-defence; the Militarist does not believe that a people desiring to
understand these things and interested in the development of a better
European society, can at the same time be determined to resist the use
of force. They believe that unless the people are kept in a blue funk,
they will not arm, and that is why it is that the Militarist of the
respective countries are for ever talking about our degeneration and the
rest. And the German Militarist is just as angry with the unwarlike
qualities of his people as the English Militarist is with ours.
Just note this parallel:
BRITISH OPINION ON BRITISH APATHY AND GERMAN VIGOUR.
"There is a way in which Britain is certain to have war and its
horrors and calamities; it is this--by persisting in her present
course of unpreparedness, her apathy, unintelligence, and blindness,
and in her disregard of the warnings of the most ordinary political
insight, as well as of the example of history.
"Now in the year 1912, just as in 1866, and just as in 1870, war
will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are,
by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as
anything in human calculation can be made certain. 'Germany strikes
when Germany's hour has struck.' That is the time-honoured policy of
her Foreign Office. It is her policy at the present hour, and it is
an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation
prepared to play a great part in history."--LORD ROBERTS, at
Manchester.
"Britain is disunited; Germany is homogeneous. We are quarrelling
about the Lords' Veto, Home Rule, and a dozen other questions of
domestic politics. We have a Little Navy Party, an Anti-Militarist
Party; Germany is unanimous upon the question of naval
expansion."--MR. BLATCHFORD.
GERMAN OPINION ON GERMAN APATHY AND BRITISH VIGOUR.
"Whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm
which constituted the greatness of its history. With the increase of
wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing
the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and
close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the
pressing problems of international life which await a solution at
the present time."--GENERAL VON BERNHARDI in "Germany and the Next
War."
"There is no one German people, no single Germany.... There are more
abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than between Germans
and Indians."
"One must admire the consistent fidelity and patriotism of the
English race, as compared with the uncertain and erratic methods of
the German people, their mistrust, and suspicion.... In spite of
numerous wars, bloodshed, and disaster, England always emerges
smoothly and easily from her military crises and settles down to new
conditions and surroundings in her usual cool and deliberate manner,
so different from the German."--_Berliner Tageblatt_, March 14, 1911.
Presumably each doughty warrior knows his own country better than that
of the other, which would carry a conclusion directly contrary to that
which he draws.
But note also where this idea that it is necessary artificially to
stimulate the defensive zeal of each country by resisting any tendency
to agreement and understanding leads. It leads even so good a man as
Lord Roberts into the trap of dogmatic prophesy concerning the
intentions of a very complex heterogeneous nation of 65 million people.
Lord Roberts could not possibly tell you what his own country will do
five, ten, or fifteen years hence in such matters as Home Rule or the
Suffragists, or even the payment of doctors, but he knows exactly what a
foreign country will do in a much more serious matter. The simple truth
is, of course, that no man knows what "Germany" will do ten years hence,
any more than we can know what "England" will do. We don't even know
what England will _be_, whether Unionist or Liberal or Labour,
Socialist, Free Trade or Protectionist. All these things, like the
question of Peace and War depends upon all sorts of tendencies, drifts
and developments. At bottom, of course, since war, in Mr. Bonar Law's
fine phrase, is "never inevitable--only the failure of human wisdom," it
depends upon whether we become a little less or a little more wise. If
the former, we shall have it; if the latter, we shall not. But this
dogmatism concerning the other man's evil intentions is the very thing that
leads away from wisdom.[10] The sort of temper and ideas which it
provokes on both sides of the frontier may be gathered from just such
average gems as these plucked recently from the English press:--
Yes, we may as well face it. _War with Germany is inevitable_, and
the only question is--Shall we consult her convenience as to its
date? Shall we wait till Germany's present naval programme, which
is every year reducing our advantage, is complete? Shall we wait
till the smouldering industrial revolution, of which all these
strikes are warnings, has broken into flame? Shall we wait till
Consols are 65 and our national credit is gone? Shall we wait till
the Income Tax is 1s. 6d. in the pound? OR SHALL WE STRIKE
NOW--_finding every out-of-work a job in connection with the
guardianship of our shores_, and, with our mighty fleet, either
sinking every German ship or towing it in triumph into a British
port? _Why_ should we do it? _Because the command of the seas is
ever ours_; because our island position, our international trade
and our world-wide dominions _demand that no other nation shall
dare to challenge our supremacy_. That is why. Oh, yes, the cost
would be great, but we could raise it to-day all right, _and we
should get it back_.
If the struggle comes to-day, we shall win--and after it is over,
there will be abounding prosperity in the land, and no more labour
unrest.
Yes, we have no fear of Germany to-day. The only enemy we fear is
the crack-brained fanatics who prate about peace and goodwill
whilst foreign _Dreadnoughts_ are gradually closing in upon us. As
Mr. Balfour said at the Eugenic Conference the other day, man is a
wild animal; and there is no room, in present circumstances, for
any tame ones.--_John Bull_, Aug. 24, 1912.
The italics and large type are those of the original, not mine. This
paper explains, by the way, in this connection that "In the
Chancelleries of Europe _John Bull_ is regarded as a negligible
journalistic quantity. But _John Bull_ is read by a million people every
week, and that million not the least thoughtful and intelligent section
of the community, they _think_ about what they read."
One of the million seems to have thought to some purpose, for the next
week there was the following letter from him. It was given the place of
honour in a series and runs as follows:--
I would have extended your "Down with the German Fleet!" to "Down
with Germany and the Germans!" For, unless the whole ---- lot are
swept off the surface of the earth, there will be no peace. If the
people in England could only realise the quarrelsome, deceitful,
underhanded, egotistic any tyrannical character of the Germans,
there would not be so much balderdash about a friendly
understanding, etc., between England and Germany. The German is a
born tyrant. The desire to remain with Britain on good terms will
only last so long until Germany feels herself strong enough to beat
England both on sea and on land: afterwards it'll simply be "_la
bourse ou la vie_," as the French proverb goes. Provided they do not
know that there are any English listeners about, phrases like the
following can be heard every day in German restaurants and other
public places: "I hate England and the English!" "Never mind, they
won't be standing in our way much longer. We shall soon be ready."
And _John Bull_, with its million readers, is not alone. This is how the
_Daily Express_, in a double-leaded leader, teaches history to its
readers:--
When, one day, Englishmen are not allowed to walk the pavements of
their cities, and their women are for the pleasure of the invaders,
and the offices of the Tiny England newspapers are incinerated by a
furious mob; when foreign military officers proclaim martial law
from the Royal Exchange steps, and when some billions of pounds
have to be raised by taxation--by taxation of the "toiling
millions" as well as others--to pay the invaders out, and the
British Empire consists of England--less Dover, required for a
foreign strategic tunnel--and the Channel Islands--then the ghosts
of certain politicians and publicists will probably call a meeting
for the discussion of the Fourth Dimension.--Leading Article,
_Daily Express_, 8/7/12.
And not merely shall our women fill the harems of the German pashas,
and Englishmen not be allowed to walk upon the pavement (it would be the
German way of solving the traffic problem--near the Bank), but a
"well-known Diplomat" in another paper tells us what else will happen.
If England be vanquished it means the end of all things as far as
she is concerned, and will ring in a new and somewhat terrible era.
Bankrupt, shorn of all power, deserted, as must clearly follow, as
a commercial state, and groaning under a huge indemnity that she
cannot pay and is not intended to be able to pay, what will be the
melancholy end of this great country and her teeming population of
forty-five millions?
... Her shipping trade will be transferred as far as possible from
the English to the German flag. Her banking will be lost, as London
will no longer be the centre of commerce, and efforts will be made
to enable Berlin to take London's place. Her manufactures will
gradually desert her. Failing to obtain payments in due time,
estates will be sequestered and become the property of wealthy
Germans. The indemnity to be demanded is said to be one thousand
millions sterling.
The immediate result of defeat would mean, of course, that
insolvency would take place in a very large number of commercial
businesses, and others would speedily follow. Those who cannot get
away will starve unless large relief funds are forthcoming from,
say, Canada and the United States, for this country, bereft of its
manufactures, will not be able to sustain a population of more than
a very few millions.--From an Article by "A Well-known
Diplomatist" in _The Throne_, June 12, 1912.
These are but samples; and this sort of thing is going on in England and
Germany alike. And when one protests that it is wicked rubbish born of
funk and ignorance, that whatever happens in war this does not happen,
and that it is based on false economics and grows into utterly false
conceptions of international relationship, one is shouted down as an
anti-armament man and an enemy of his country.
Well, if that view is persisted in, if in reality it is necessary for a
people to have lies and nonsense told to them in order to induce them to
defend themselves, some will be apt to decide that they are not worth
defending. Or rather will they decide that this phase of the
pro-armament campaign--which is not so much a campaign in favour of
armament as one against education and understanding--will end in turning
us into a nation either of poltroons or of bullies and aggressors, and
that since life is a matter of the choice of risks it is wiser and more
courageous to choose the less evil. A nation may be defeated and still
live in the esteem of men--and in its own. No civilized man esteems a
nation of Bashi-Bazouks or Prussian Junkers. Of the two risks
involved--the risk of attack arising from a possible superiority of
armament on the part of a rival, and the risk of drifting into conflict
because, concentrating all our energies on the mere instrument of
combat, we have taken no adequate trouble to understand the facts of
this case--it is at least an arguable proposition that the second risk
is the greater. And I am prompted to this expression of opinion without
surrendering one iota of a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation
attacked should defend itself to the last penny and to the last man.
And you think that this idea that the nations--ours amongst them--may
drift into futile war from sheer panic and funk arising out of the
terror inspired by phantoms born of ignorance, is merely the idea of
Pacifist cranks?
The following, referring to the "precautionary measures" (_i.e._,
mobilization of armies) taken by the various Powers, is from a leading
article of the _Times_:--
"Precautions" are understandable, but the remark of our Berlin
Correspondent that they may produce an untenable position from
which retreat must be humiliating is applicable in more than one
direction. Our Vienna Correspondent truly says that "there is no
valid reason to believe war between Austria-Hungary and Russia to
be inevitable, or even immediately probable." We entirely agree,
but wish we could add that the absence of any valid reason was
placing strict limitations upon the scope of "precautions." The
same correspondent says he is constantly being asked:--"Is there no
means of avoiding war?" The same question is now being asked, with
some bewilderment, by millions of men in this country, who want to
know what difficulties there are in the present situation which
should threaten Europe with a general war, or even a collision
larger than that already witnessed.... There is no great nation in
Europe which to-day has the least desire that millions of men
should be torn from their homes and flung headlong to destruction
at the bidding of vain ambitions. The Balkan peoples fought for a
cause which was peculiarly their own. They were inspired by the
memories of centuries of wrong which they were burning to avenge.
The larger nations have no such quarrel, unless it is wilfully
manufactured for them. The common sense of the peoples of Europe is
well aware that no issue has been presented which could not be
settled by amicable discussion. In England men will learn with
amazement and incredulity that war is possible over the question of
a Servian port, or even over the larger issues which are said to
lie behind it. Yet that is whither the nations are blindly drifting
Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the
Chancelleries of Europe, among the men who have too long played
with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so
enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have
ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they
trifle. And thus will war continue to be made, until the great
masses who are the sport of professional schemers and dreamers say
the word which, shall bring, not eternal peace, for that is
impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a
just and righteous and vital cause. If that word is ever to be
spoken, there never was a more appropriate occasion than the
present; and we trust it will be spoken while there is yet time.
And the very next day there appeared in the _Daily Mail_ an article by
Mr. Lovat Fraser ending thus:--
The real answer rests, or ought to rest, with the man in the train.
Does he want to join in Armageddon? It is time that he began to
think about it, for his answer may soon be sought.
Now we have here, stated in the first case by the most authoritative of
English newspapers, and in the second by an habitual contributor of the
most popular, the whole case of Pacifism as I have attempted to expound
it, namely: (1) That our current statecraft--its fundamental
conceptions, its "axioms," its terminology--has become obsolete by
virtue of the changed conditions of European society; that the causes of
conflict which it creates are half the time based on illusions, upon
meaningless and empty formulas; (2) that its survival is at bottom due
to popular ignorance and indifference--the survival on the part of the
great mass of just those conceptions born of the old and now obsolete
conditions--since diplomacy, like all functions of government, is a
reflection of average opinion; (3) that this public opinion is not
something which descends upon us from the skies but is the sum of the
opinions of each one of us and is the outcome of our daily contacts, our
writing and talking and discussion, and that the road to safety lies in
having that general public opinion better informed not in directly
discouraging such better information; (4) that the mere multiplication
of "precautions" in the shape of increased armaments and a readiness for
war, in the absence of a corresponding and parallel improvement of
opinion, will merely increase and not exorcise the danger, and,
finally, (5) that the problem of war is necessarily a problem of at
least two parties, and that if we are to solve it, to understand it
even, we must consider it in terms of two parties, not one; it is not a
question of what shall be the policy of each without reference to the
other, but what the final upshot of the two policies taken in
conjunction will be.
Now in all this the _Times_, especially in one outstanding central idea,
is embodying a conception which is the antithesis of that expressed by
Militarists of the type of Mr. Churchill, and, I am sorry to say, of
Lord Roberts. To these latter war is not something that we, the peoples
of Europe, create by our ignorance and temper, by the nursing of old and
vicious theories, by the poorness and defects of the ideas our
intellectual activities have developed during the last generation or
two, but something that "comes upon us" like the rain or the earthquake,
and against which we can only protect ourselves by one thing: more arms,
a greater readiness to fight.
In effect the anti-Educationalists say this: "What, as practical men, we
have to do, is to be stronger than our enemy; the rest is theory and
does not matter."
Well the inevitable outcome of such an attitude is catastrophe.
I have said elsewhere that in this matter it seems fatally easy to
secure either one of two kinds of action: that of the "practical man"
who limits his energies to securing a policy which will perfect the
machinery of war and disregard anything else; or that of the idealist,
who, persuaded of the brutality or immorality of war, is apt to show a
certain indifference concerning self-defence. What is needed is the type
of activity which will include both halves of the problem: provision for
education, for a Political Reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such
means of defence as will meantime counterbalance the existing impulse
to aggression. To concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the
other half is to render the whole problem insoluble.
What must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the
"practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up
armaments?
A critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "Do you urge
that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?"
To which I replied: "The last time that question was asked me was in
Berlin, by Germans. What would you have had me reply to those
Germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: In attempting to find
the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting
the impossible. The outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. It
would all have to be begun over again.
The Navy League catechism says: "Defence consists in being so strong
that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[11] Mr.
Churchill, however, goes farther than the Navy League, and says: "The
way to make war impossible is to make victory certain."
The Navy League definition is at least possible of application to
practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make
attack by either dangerous. Mr. Churchill's principle is impossible of
application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by
one party, and would, in the terms of the Navy League principle, deprive
the other party of the right of defence. As a matter of simple fact,
both the Navy League, by its demand for two ships to one, and Mr.
Churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter
Germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part
of a people animated by like motives to ourselves, to provoke a
challenge. When the Navy League says, as it does, that a self-respecting
nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners for its safety,
but upon its own strength, it recommends Germany to maintain her efforts
to arrive at some sort of equality with ourselves. When Mr. Churchill
goes further and says that a nation should be so strong as to make
victory over its rivals certain, he knows that if Germany were to adopt
his own doctrine its inevitable outcome would be war.
The issue is plain: We get a better understanding of certain political
facts in Europe, or we have war. And the Bellicist at present is
resolutely opposed to such political education. And it is for that
reason, not because he is asking for adequate armament, that some of the
best of this country look with the deepest misgiving upon his work, and
will continue to do so in increasing degree unless his policy be
changed.
Now a word as to the peace Pacifist--the Pacifist sans phrases--as
distinct from the military Pacifist. It is not because I am in favour of
defence that I have at times with some emphasis disassociated myself
from certain features and methods of the peace movement, for
non-resistance is no necessary part of that movement, and, indeed, so
far as I know, it is no appreciable part. It is the methods not the
object or the ideals of the peace movement which I have ventured to
criticize, without, I hope, offence to men whom I respect in the very
highest and sincerest degree. The methods of Pacifism have in the past,
to some extent at least, implied a disposition to allow easy emotion to
take the place of hard thinking, good intention to stand for
intellectual justification; and it is as plain as anything well can be
that some of the best emotion of the world has been expended upon some
of the very worst objects, and that in no field of human
effort--medicine, commerce, engineering, legislation--has good intention
ever been able to dispense with the necessity of knowing the how and the
why.
It is not that the somewhat question-begging and emotional terminology
of some Pacifists--the appeal to brotherly love and humanity--connotes
things which are in themselves poor or mean (as the average Militarist
would imply), but because so much of Pacifism in the past has failed to
reconcile intellectually the claims of these things with what are the
fundamental needs of men and to show their relation and practical
application to actual problems and conditions.
[Footnote 8: As a matter of fact, of course, the work of these two men
has not been fruitless. As Lord Morley truly says: "They were routed on
the question of the Crimean War, but it was the rapid spread of their
principles which within the next twenty years made intervention
impossible in the Franco-Austrian War, in the American War, in the
Danish War, in the Franco-German War, and above all, in the war between
Russia and Turkey, which broke out only the other day."]
[Footnote 9: Thus the Editor of the _Spectator_:--
"For ourselves, as far as the main economic proposition goes, he
preaches to the converted.... If nations were perfectly wise and held
perfectly sound economic theories, they would recognize that exchange is
the union of forces, and that it is very foolish to hate or be jealous
of your co-operators.... Men are savage, bloodthirsty creatures ... and
when their blood is up will fight for a word or a sign, or, as Mr.
Angell would put it, for an illusion."
Therefore, argues the _Spectator_, let the illusion continue--for there
is no other conclusion to be drawn from the argument.]
[Footnote 10: Need it be said that this criticism does not imply the
faintest want of respect for Lord Roberts, his qualities and his
services. He has ventured into the field of foreign politics and
prophecy. A public man of great eminence, he has expressed an English
view of German "intentions." For the man in the street (I write in that
capacity) to receive that expression in silence is to endorse it, to
make it national. And I have stated here the reasons which make such an
attitude disastrous. We all greatly respect Lord Roberts, but, even
before that, must come respect for our country, the determination that
it shall be in the right and not in the wrong, which it certainly will
be if this easy dogmatism concerning the evil intentions of other
nations becomes national.]
[Footnote 11: The German Navy Law in its preamble might have filched
this from the British Navy League catechism.]