Dropmore, Sept. 9th, 1799.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
I hope, from your account, that the worst is over, and that Lady B.
will continue to mend, but we shall be very anxious to hear that it
is so. If nothing new arise, and if we shall not be troublesome to
you, we think of being with you on Wednesday in next week; but pray
let us know if you would wish us to delay our visit.
If the project holds respecting Holland, it is likely, I think,
that I shall not be much longer before I am called upon to begin my
preparations. I have as yet no answer from Tom, but I shall have
one to-day or to-morrow; for we know that the wind changed to the
eastward on the other side the water on Friday, and we have three
mails due.
Our first division of Russians, five thousand two hundred men, are
arrived, and are under sailing orders for the Texel. Popham left
the second division at Elsineur on Sunday last; and calculates that
both this and the rear division, amounting together to above eleven
thousand men, will be here by Tuesday or Wednesday next. Our own
transports were also beginning to arrive, so that we shall have to
send them in the course of a week or ten days a reinforcement of
twenty-six thousand men, besides cavalry. I have no doubt that this
is more than sufficient, with tolerable activity and enterprise, to
do our work completely, and in a very few weeks--I might almost say
days--for we have the command of the Zuyder Zee, by which we can
turn the enemy on their right, and of the North Sea, which equally
turns their left; and they have, I am confident, no means of
assembling an army of half the force of ours, to oppose it in
front. All this, however, is a question of time; for if that is
allowed them, one can answer for nothing.
We have not heard of Abercromby (nor indeed could we) since the
31st. He was then preparing to march forward to Alkmaar. Have you
got Wiebeking's map of Holland and Utrecht? If not, let anybody
write for it for you from Hamburgh. You will see, indeed, in any
map, a little promontory that runs forward opposite to Amsterdam,
on the north bank of the Y., between Buyksloot and Newdam. The
opinion of persons of the country is, that if we can make ourselves
masters of that point, Amsterdam is open to be bombarded, and must
capitulate on the first summons. All the other advantages of the
country we have to act in, upon our line of march, are obvious by
looking at the map. The disadvantages are, the facility of
retarding our march by defending the dykes and narrow causeways
along which we must pass; but a great superiority of force will
enable us to surmount many of these. The French papers talk of
having marched against us the garrisons of the Generality. So much
the better if it is so, for then we shall not find them there, and
the fact itself proves (if even our intelligence were defective)
how little other force they have in the country.
I am greatly obliged to you for what you have written on the
subject of the Militia. It seems to me that allowing the Militia to
volunteer by companies for a fixed time is the best suggestion I
have yet heard. But it would be necessary to consider, on a
statement of numbers, how many could be so procured from all the
Militias--English, Scotch, and Irish--though, with respect to these
last, there is, I fear, an insurmountable difficulty, from the
necessity of assembling Parliament, which could not be done in
Ireland without broaching the question of Union before we are
prepared for it.
Less than twenty thousand men would not, on the most sanguine
calculations, answer our object, and the issue of the war so much
depends upon it that we should be unpardonable to omit any possible
effort that we could make for it. What we want is to be able to
garrison Holland with twenty thousand men so as to have as soon as
possible after the conquest of it the means of disposing of our
whole army now there. It is a very doubtful question, I think,
whether our Militia volunteering would be more or less promoted if
we confined our proposal to that particular service, and sent our
Militia battalions into the Dutch garrisons, employing the army now
there in the active service, or if we took the offer generally for
foreign service, and made such distribution between the two as
might best suit our convenience.
There would be no difficulty as to Parliament; we can call them
together at a fortnight's notice. We would do so for this object
alone. The King would speak of nothing else, and ask no supply; and
we could easily, in a moment of triumph like the present, exclude
all other discussions, so that the execution, were the plan once
arranged to the satisfaction of the Militia officers, would take up
not more than ten days or a fortnight at most.
If anything new occurs to you upon it, let me hear it. If not, we
will talk it over when we meet; but as that is always precarious,
write if you have anything to suggest upon it.
Ever yours,
G.
A year, memorable in the annals of the war for the European confederacy
which was formed by the energies of England to resist the aggressions of
France, and for the successes by which it was crowned, was now drawing
to a close. How much of that vast machinery of diplomacy, of that
activity in council and promptitude in action, by which the happy
results were obtained, may be justly attributed to the genius and
firmness of the distinguished statesmen whose correspondence forms the
substance of these volumes, need scarcely be pointed out; nor would it
be becoming in this work to pronounce the eulogy which their virtues and
patriotism deserve. That grateful duty may be securely left to history.
The last letter of the year appropriately terminates the record of its
events, by a general outline of the projects that were contemplated and
in preparation for the arduous and important period that marked the
opening of the nineteenth century.