Camp, Weymouth, Aug. 31st, 1794.
MY DEAR BROTHER,
I have just received your letter of the 16th from Vienna, and am
glad to find from it that you are as well as I wish you to be, and
as sanguine as any one could wish who is less desponding than
myself. I fear that very much of your difficulty is insuperable,
for I have no idea that it is possible to induce the Imperial
Government to exert themselves more for the _recovery_ of Brabant
than they did for the _preservation_ of it. Various circumstances
(some of which you have stated) co-operated to the scandalous
dereliction of a country, which all former history proves to us
might have been defended (even for a losing campaign) with one half
of the allied force; and it is no part of my creed that the zeal or
activity of the Austrian Ministry (even if they act with good
faith) can replace us by the end of November where we were last
year. But if it is to be proposed to us to add Austria to the list
of powers subsidized, and to call upon Great Britain, the _ally_ of
the war, to consider herself as the only principal in it, I fear
that the proposition will meet with every difficulty, and (if
acceded to) with as little success as the subsidy paid to Prussia.
You will then ask me for my solution of this difficulty; and I will
fairly own that I see none, but in endeavouring to stimulate
Austria, by showing them clearly that we will not take the whole
upon our back; and that we can better keep the wolf out of our
house, than they can out of theirs, if the war is to be defensive.
As to the military operations of the Prince of Saxe Coburg, I make
no doubt that he has done very ill; indeed, it seems difficult to
conceive that his groom could have done worse. But I fear that the
ignorance or treachery of the German Generals goes much deeper than
you imagine, for I do not recollect one instance in the course of
this campaign--and perhaps not one in the last--in which they
answered the expectation formed of them. Again, if we imagined that
by protracting the war we might exhaust the enemy, though I might
not agree as to the prospect of success, I could understand it as a
system; but in that case, the war would have been defensive, and
co-operation settled to that object, instead of abandoning the Duke
of York to certain ruin, if the winds and the circumstances of this
country had not permitted Lord Moira's army to arrive just (and
only just) in time to cover their retreat, and communication. These
points are all mysterious to us lookers-on, and perhaps not much
more clear to you at Vienna. The only point clear and indisputable
is, that we begun the campaign offensively in the south-west point
without securing West Flanders; that we undertook by defensive
positions to cover it; and notwithstanding the very slow progress
of the French, which gave us full and ample time, it was lost for
want of sufficient force on the western flank of our combined
force, and for want of co-operation, either of defensive retreat,
or of mutual support in a systematic evacuation of a country so
very tenable. Now, if all this is proposed to be cured by changing
the Commander, and by taking the Austrians into British pay, I fear
that I shall be one of the first to cry out against such a measure,
which cannot in the least tend to remove those difficulties, and
will superinduce many others on the continent, and others more
serious at home, to which you cannot be a stranger. If the object
be to add to our force, we do not accomplish it by changing the
Paymaster or Commander of the troops; but we may obtain a very
considerable force under our immediate and actual command, by
adding to the levies of French troops; or, in plain terms, by
raising an immense French army in British pay, who would not be
liable to be called off _a la Prussienne_ to schemes of plunder, or
possibly of home defence, in the moment in which they are the most
wanted by us. I have taken some pains to get information on this
subject; and I verily believe, that if we take the small remnant of
the Prince of Conde's army into our pay, with him at the head of it
as a foundation, we may in a very short time increase it to
twenty-five, or perhaps thirty thousand men, which, added to our
British, Hessian and Hanoverian army, would effectually support the
Dutch in covering Holland, and would enable us to make a very
serious diversion either in Normandy or in Poitou.
I have written upon this subject more at large than I at first
intended, but it is very difficult to compress it; and having found
it difficult to reconcile the conduct of Ministry in the
management of this campaign to my own feelings, or the plan (so far
as I understand it from common report) of reconquering Brabant for
the Emperor by an Austrian army in British pay, or of assisting
Holland by a force of the same nature on which the experience of
two campaigns shows how little we can depend, I have not thought it
fair to withhold these opinions from you, having stated them to my
other brother as soon as I heard of your mission (and from public
report of the objects of it) to Vienna. But be assured, my dear
brother, that I do not feel the less warmly for your credit, and
for the success of your negotiation (whatever it may be) as far as
the question is personal to yourself. I have always seen, with very
sincere regret, your talents useless to the public; and I am happy,
on every account, that you have found an opportunity of showing
them in co-operation with my brother William, who seemed so happy
in this proof of your confidence and affection.
I feel, as I ought, your anxiety about the yeomanry. I have the
satisfaction of hearing that they go on very well, but of course
meeting very seldom, because of the harvest. Their numbers,
however, increase; and are, as near as can be, as follows:
Captains. Lieutenants. 2nd ditto. Qr. Masters. Numbers.
Lt.-Col. Grenville Fremantle Grubb ---- 47
Praed Mansell Higgins Cooch 60
Sir J. Dashwood W. Hicks T. Mason Clarke 43
Drake K. Mason Clerk ---- 37
Sir W. Young Ch. Clowes L. Way Quanne 29
Most of them have got their swords, and have returned their
pistols, which were most scandalously bad; they have got their
appointments, and (except Young's troop) they come on very well. I
am, however, tied by the leg to Weymouth, while the King is here,
and cannot stir. He is in wonderful health; but very unruly as to
the common precautions which ought to be taken, and which keep me
in constant hot water, notwithstanding our incessant rains. Lord
Howe passed Portland yesterday with thirty-three sail of the line,
and three Portuguese ships; of which one ran foul of the
'Barfleur,' and stove in her bows so as to force her to return to
Portsmouth. All the sea prisoners lately taken, say, that Barrere
is determined to force the Brest fleet of thirty-five sail to sea.
Sir J. B. Warren's last prisoners say, that they were brought from
the interior to Brest, and embarked _handcuffed_; another account
states, that sixteen thousand men have been sent to Brest _en
requisition_, since Lord Howe's action. Our line of battle is
thirty-seven sail, including what is to join at Plymouth; from
which deduct two ships not ready, and the 'Barfleur,' his number
will be thirty-four. He will probably fall in with your friend,
Lord Macartney, who is coming back with "_the Emperor's copy of
verses_," and left St. Helena on the 6th of July with nineteen East
India ships.
Adieu, my dear brother,
Ever most affectionately yours,
N. B.
Sept. 5th, 1794.
P.S.--This letter was begun five days ago, but I have been for the
last four days confined, and very ill from an epidemic, which is
running all over England. It is not confined to the army, and it
has not been fatal, but very painful. I have got clear of it, but I
have above forty men ill of it at this moment. Adieu.
The difficulties of the negotiation in which Lord Spencer and Mr. Thomas
Grenville were engaged, are very clearly stated in the following letter.
It is perfectly evident from these curious revelations, that Austria and
Prussia were pursuing a crooked and evasive policy in their diplomacy
with England, that the vacillations and infirmity of purpose they
betrayed left them open to the suspicion of insincerity, and that the
affairs of both Courts were conducted by Ministers utterly deficient in
all qualities of firmness and judgment, which the occasion imperatively
demanded.