(Private.) St. James's Square, Aug. 29th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
The despatch which you will receive by this messenger, and the
letter which Wyndham has promised to write to you from the British
head-quarters, will explain to you the whole of the system which we
have adopted, as affording the only hope of vigorous or successful
exertion. The Austrian Government is already prepared for your
proposal, respecting the giving to Lord Cornwallis the command of
the whole combined force, as Count Starhemberg is apprized of it,
having, indeed, himself in a great degree suggested the measure, on
some general hints which I threw out to him, in order to try the
ground. For the moment, the great point seems to be to bring them
to acquiesce in the virtual command which his rank of Field-Marshal
will give him over Clairfayt, and to send positive orders to the
latter to that effect; and if there should be any difficulty in
Clairfayt's submitting to this, then to let Clairfayt absent
himself for the moment, and leave the Austrian troops under the
command of some officer whose standing will occasion no difficulty
in this respect. You will observe that, by virtual command, we mean
precisely the same deference as the Duke of York has shown to the
Prince of Coburg, not extending to any of the points of military
etiquette by which command is usually rendered ostensible, but
going to the effect of complying with his suggestions respecting
the mode of executing the operations agreed upon in concert, when
the instructions of his Court do not interfere with such
suggestions. Before you receive this letter, Lord Cornwallis will
probably be on the spot; and it is therefore urgent, to prevent the
first beginnings of dissension, that no time should be lost in
making the Austrians give their orders to Clairfayt. Knowing the
delay of that Government, and the difficulty of getting them to
adopt any decided line of conduct, we have thought it best to do
the thing first, and afterwards to try to obtain their consent to
it. If you succeed, or, indeed, in any case, it will be useful that
you should write directly to Lord C. upon the subject, as that may
save a week, at a time when a week's delay might be of the utmost
importance.
With respect to the Duke of York, Wyndham will probably tell you in
confidence how he succeeds in his negotiation. It certainly is a
pretty strong instance of zeal and desire to facilitate whatever
can promote the cause, when he undertakes a task of no less
difficulty than the reconciling the mind of a young Prince to a
supercession in his military command, and that too at the precise
moment of moving forwards, after so mortifying a retreat. I am,
however, not without hopes of his success; and, at all events, the
moment was too critical to suffer any consideration to interfere
with the only means of salvation that appeared practicable.
With respect to the languor of the Austrian Government, and the
doubt whether even money will obtain from them decisive efforts, we
have strongly felt the force of all that you have stated on that
head. But we are inclined to flatter ourselves, that if we once
obtain so large a force as is mentioned in my despatch, and can put
that force, in addition to our own, under the absolute and supreme
direction of such a man as Lord Cornwallis, we shall at least be
able to say to ourselves, whatever be the result, that we have done
everything that it was possible to do; and without trying this
measure, I confess for one that I should not have that sentiment in
my mind. I lament that we have thought ourselves obliged to bring
forward the discussion of a precise barrier, and yet I do not see
how it could be avoided. But the impression may be very bad on
their minds, if we appear to be narrowing the benefits which they
are to derive from exertion, instead of animating them by the hope
of increased advantage. I have not dwelt on this point in my
despatch, as you mention that you intended to write further upon
it.
When the idea of transferring the subsidy was opened to me by
Starhemberg, from Merey's instructions it was expressly stated, as
a part of the plan, that the empire could be made to subsidize the
Prussian troops; and this agrees with every information we receive
on the subject, all which concur in stating the efforts of the
empire, particularly in money, as being very far below what they
could be brought to make by the joint exertions of Austria and
Prussia. But on my pressing Starhemberg for further detail on this
point, he has always avoided it, assuring me, whether truly or not,
that he found no particulars respecting it among Merey's papers.
You will see that in the despatch we make the whole dependent on a
complete and _bona fide_ execution of this point, and my language
to him has always been of the same nature. But I confess that it is
on this point that I feel the strongest apprehensions, and I much
fear that Austria will both be disposed to evade it, and, in truth,
unable to accomplish it. Should this be the case, the whole plan
must be abandoned; and we should, I believe, in that event, be
disposed to turn our subsidy to the object of raising other force,
of whatever nature, so as, if possible, to form a separate British
and Dutch army, destined to act under Lord Cornwallis, without the
pretence or show of concert with either of the German Powers.
With respect to your remaining at Vienna, you will easily conceive,
that having a project of this nature to propose, none of us thought
we should give it its fair chance if we put it into other hands
than those in which the business now is. We allow for your natural
desire of quitting a scene which, God knows, must be mortifying
enough to men who feel how much of the safety of Europe depends on
the conduct of the Austrian Government, and who see how unfit that
Government is to be trusted with the interests of the smallest
corporation. But we are confident that as long as there may remain
the hope of doing so much good as would, we trust, be done by the
complete success of the present plan, you will not be unwilling to
give your assistance to it.
With respect to what you mention about yourself, you know my wishes
on the subject, but I certainly will not urge them beyond what you
are disposed to do. The proposal Lord Fitzwilliam makes to you is,
I fairly own, in my apprehension, one less eligible than that of
Vienna; but I fear a nearer view of that Court has rather
strengthened than diminished your indisposition to that situation.
You know, as well as I do, all the _desagremens_ belonging to the
post of Irish Secretary; but it is certainly an important and
honourable one, and such as to afford you ample room for showing
yourself such as you are: more, perhaps, than many others which
commonly rank higher in public estimation. My objection to it is
the banishment, which obtains as much as in the foreign missions,
and certainly to the most disagreeable of all countries. I do not
know well how to make myself quite a disinterested adviser; but if
I was to give you fairly the result of my thoughts upon it, I
should still beg you to look at the foreign line, and if that must
not be, I should then say _yes_ to the question of Ireland.
Supposing that _yes_ were decided, let me ask you whether your
remaining some time longer at Vienna, so as finally to conclude,
not the leading points only, but all the details of the arrangement
now in question, and of the preparations for the active scene of
next year, is wholly out of the question? It seems very clear that
no arrangement will happen before that time which can change the
Irish Government, and in the meanwhile you would be honourably and
_most usefully_ employed. I have, however, not hinted this idea to
any individual, nor will I. If all this is wholly out of the
question, I conclude that my reply to your answer to these
despatches, will bring to Lord Spencer and you the King's
permission to return to England.
It would be very satisfactory to you to see how well things are
going on here, and how completely our hopes have been realized on
the subject which employed so much of our time and thoughts this
summer.
God bless you, my dearest brother.
At this time, the new changes in the Administration, already alluded to,
were under discussion in the Cabinet; and, amongst the rest, it was
proposed that the government of Ireland should be offered to Lord
Fitzwilliam. As soon as this appointment was suggested, his Lordship
wrote to Mr. Thomas Grenville to offer him the office of Secretary.