Whitehall, Feb. 13th, 1789.
MY DEAR BROTHER,
We have no news here, except of the favourable accounts of the
King's situation, which are every hour more and more confirmed. All
our present anxiety is, to keep down the too sanguine expectations
of our friends, in order to prevent their being too much damped by
any check, which Willis considers as an event by no means unlikely,
and not such as in any degree to diminish his confidence in the
King's recovery. From the general turn of people's conversation
here, it seems by no means certain that the Prince will take any
step for dismissing the present Government, if the King continues
to mend. It would, indeed, be a measure so grossly indecent to turn
out the King's servants at the eve of his recovery, that it would
be too strong even for those counsels by which His Royal Highness
has hitherto been actuated. But there is another consideration
which will possibly have still more weight, namely, that the
acceptance of office under such circumstances would put his friends
to considerable inconvenience and expense, such as to be by no
means worth incurring, if they are to hold them for so very short
a period as the King's present situation appears to indicate. This
mode of reasoning is of itself sufficiently obvious, and I
understand that the Prince has held a language which corresponds
with it, since so great an alteration has taken place.
Under these circumstances, you must see that the letter which you
sent me is clearly inapplicable to the present situation. If,
contrary to our present expectation, the Prince should dismiss us
all immediately, I will lose no time in sending that letter; but if
not, it seems to be the wish of all your friends that you should
remain where you are for some little time, in order that you may
not have the appearance of being driven away either by the event
which has happened, or by the violence of the abuse thrown out
against you. I see and acknowledge the difficulties of such a
situation, and lament that you should in any case be subject to
them, but you must, on the other hand, consider that these
difficulties do not of themselves, unaccompanied by other
circumstances, afford a reason for withdrawing yourself from them.
I am far from being desirous, for many, very many reasons, that
your stay should be prolonged to the usual period of a
Lord-Lieutenant's reign; but I cannot help most earnestly wishing
that you could, in some mode or other, struggle through the present
session, in order to cover your retreat, which will otherwise by
your enemies be represented as a flight.
You see that all this refers to an event which may possibly not
happen; but I felt it indispensably due to you that I should beg
you to consider this case very seriously, and that with a view not
to present difficulties only, but taking into the account your
future situation. I have told you what I believe is the unanimous
wish of your friends on such lights as we possess here. It is
possible that circumstances with which we are unacquainted might
alter our opinion, but they must be very strong before they could
produce that effect.
I know no other point which is worth writing to you about:
certainly none which is worth your bestowing a moment, thought
upon, in comparison with that which I have mentioned. I enclose my
last account from Aylesbury. I need not say how much I feel for the
unpleasant circumstances of your present situation. But I know that
you have the best resource against them, in the sense of your own
conduct, and in the consciousness of the sincere and invariable
affection of those whose friendship you value.
Ever most affectionately yours,
W. W. G.
Two days afterwards, the report of the King's health was so encouraging
that his recovery was considered by the Cabinet as little less than
absolutely certain. Under these circumstances, it became a matter of
speculation whether the Prince would dismiss the Ministers, or, if he
did not, whether he would treat them in such a manner as to make it
impossible for them to stay in office. In any case, whether they were
dismissed or driven to resign, Mr. Grenville judged it prudent to
withhold Lord Buckingham's letter of resignation, till the solution,
either way, should have been ascertained. The conflicting difficulties
of the situation, looking at it from all sides, are ably stated in a
letter of the 15th of February.
You cannot come away, without appearing to desert your trust, while
the King's servants here abide by theirs; nor without giving the
Regent an opportunity to object to the nomination of any person who
may be proposed to him by Pitt to succeed you. You cannot remain
without the means of carrying on some appearance, at least, of
government in the House of Commons. You cannot employ those who
have now deserted you; nor can we expect that the Prince will
allow you to dismiss those whom he considers as having stood by
him. On the whole, I cannot imagine a more puzzling or distressing
case.
Nothing short of the implicit confidence and cordial support of the
Ministers, seconded by the highest courage and firmness on his own part,
could have enabled Lord Buckingham to sustain his authority in this
trying emergency. That he possessed the confidence and support of
Government to the fullest extent, is attested by the following letter
from Mr. Pitt; and that he displayed the qualities of resolution and
self-reliance demanded by the occasion, is sufficiently shown in the
sequel.