to do the deed. On that evening, it was known, the spy was to arrive
at the Shenandoah railway station, whence a long stretch of lonely
roadway led to the townlet of that name. Mack arrived, the sole
passenger, and, to his surprise, was met by none of the Brotherhood.
This was a bad omen; but he decided to go on, and made his way to the
hotel of one M'Andrew, whom he still considered to be his friend.
Affecting the usual cordiality, he entered the house and parlour;
but conversation becoming at once strained, he realised that serious
business was in contemplation; two sentinels were placed outside the
house, one Sweeny remaining in the room; he too got up dreamily and
left, telling the landlord he was going home. Presently, however, he
returned with a piece of snow which he carelessly threw at M'Andrew's
feet, where it melted. This meant that time was short and nothing was
being done—an established sign. M'Andrew looked at the spy, gave a
groan and said: "My feet are sore, I must take off my boots," another
sign which conveyed that as men were not coming in sufficient numbers,
the business of murdering Mack would have to be postponed. Mack,
who, like all Mollies, was well armed, accordingly left the place,
making for his lodgings by the highway. Once at home he spent the
night in self-defensive vigil and on the morrow, early, two Mollies
from a local camp called upon him. With true Irish trust to chance and
the possible ignorance of the other man, they declared they had come
from Scranton by rail and Mack was well aware that no train arrived
at such an hour from that town. These were, however, the men who had
been chosen overnight, and after the last failure, to remove him. The
spy, always on his guard, told the men boldly he was going straight to
Kehoe's house to ask why they had placed him under suspicion. Marching
from the house, he made for the hotel of M'Andrew, whom he induced to
accompany him to Kehoe's by sleigh. The other two men decided also that
they would accompany Mack to Kehoe's and hired a second sleigh. On the
journey several stops were made at intervening pot-houses, where the
victim-to-be treated his would-be murderers to all they desired in the
way of drink—and then some. At Kehoe's the master of the house was
preparing to celebrate the slaying of Mack with a dinner to a score
of Mollies, and when the man who was already supposed to be a "corp"
walked up to the house with a front of brass, followed by his appointed
murderers, both sorely besotted, Kehoe began to pinch himself to see if
he might be dreaming. In the front parlour, where the spy knew they
would not dare to murder him, were a dozen Mollies all celebrating his
slaughter in Old Crow, most of them already on the blink. Mack entered
the room after Kehoe and did a bold thing: "Boys," he said, "you are a
band of foul murderers to seek to take the life of the truest Molly in
the whole bunch. Give me the whisky." They handed him a glass filled to
the brim and the spy drained it. "Kehoe," he demanded, "what is it you
have against me and why do you want my life?" "Father O'Connor knows
all about you," retorted Kehoe. "He knows you for a spy." Mack looked
at his watch and brazened it out. "Well then," says he, "'tis Father
O'Connor himself I will have here, and by God I'll go and fetch him."
Passing from the house he met Mrs Kehoe, with whom he was a favourite,
and telling her how her husband and his friends had put him on the
mortuary list, Mack reached his sleigh, M'Andrew following him. At
the priest's house, he was informed that Father O'Connor had gone to
a neighbouring town. Under pretext of sending him a wire the spy then
drove to the station, reflecting wisely at this somewhat overdrawn
point that his mission was now really at an end. He had timed his
arrival well but still had a few minutes to wait for the noon train.
In the short interval Mack feigned to be busy drawing up his telegram
to the priest. The train arrived to the minute, and Mack, waiting till
the moment of its departure, threw down the prepared message as the
cars were drawing clear of the platform, boarded the last carriage and
vanished for good from the coal regions. His next appearance was made
in the witness-box at Philadelphia, where his evidence incriminated
the leading spirits of the Conspiracy, who were sentenced to long
imprisonment, the Molly Maguires passing thereafter into the history of
evils that had been.
VII
MAJOR ANDRÉ
When the psychology of the Spy comes to be expounded by some master
thinker, one wonders if he will emphasise the fact that, more often
than not, there is that in the pedigree and antecedents of the
agent of stealth which clearly suggests a mongrel breed. Was it not
Tacitus who wrote of the half-caste races who swarmed the Roman
Suburra, describing them in the memorable words: "Despectissima pars
servientium"—the most despicable of the slave tribe? It was among this
class that Marcus Crassus was wont to go in quest of recruits for that
grand army of touts, quidnuncs and informers who, by bringing him
first-hand intelligence of fires, burglaries, murders and kindred daily
occurrences in Rome, most of which were pregnant with the possibilities
of profit of some sort, helped to build up the monster fortune that
made him one of the most important men of antiquity. Your Stiebers and
Schulmeisters, too, all in some vague way convey an impression that
they are beings who are not quite human, although not wholly brute;
living things which seem to come from an unracial stock without stamp
or tradition. To a man who has been accorded the honour of a monument
in Westminster Abbey these reflections do not, of course, apply.
Nevertheless they suggest themselves, and when one reads in the life
of John André that "it was not known whether the place of his birth
was London or elsewhere in England," one feels disposed not to care
particularly whether or not he ever had a father, or if his mother
ever changed her name. André, too, was by origin a Swiss, and there
is invariably lacking in the inhabitants of Switzerland a specific
national cachet or clear racial type. His sire had been born in Geneva,
while his mother was a Frenchwoman called Girardot, who in 1751 gave
birth to the unfortunate British spy.
To add to the complexities of André's particular case, no one seems
to be very certain where he passed the early years of his education,
though it seems correct that the best part of his academic training
was obtained in that always very cosmopolitan University of Geneva. We
are assured that there he mastered several European tongues, that he
became an adept in the social arts and possessed an acquaintance with
the best classical literatures. It is only, however, in 1769, the year
of his father's death, that we really begin to locate him, and then we
find him living at Clapton, where his father, a merchant, resided in
the local manor-house. At the time of this gentleman's death, André was
eighteen years of age and his precociousness seems to be established
by the fact that in those days he was paying his addresses to the
daughter of a clergyman named Seward, the lady being several years
older than himself. Not only that, but Anna Seward was, it appears,
a poet and the leader of a _salon_ of sorts at Lichfield, where many
well-known literary lights of the day were wont to assemble and discuss
the trends of literary and artistic thought and action. Evidently Miss
Seward did not take her gallant too seriously, for we hear of him
shortly afterwards as a worshipper at the shrine of Honoria Sneyd, who
was afterwards to become the mother of Maria Edgeworth. Romance, it is
certain, entered generously into the youth of André.
It is clear also that the counting-house of a London merchant's
establishment was not at all to the taste of the young man. He had
always thirsted for military adventure, and it is not surprising
to hear that in his twentieth year, he purchased a commission as
under-lieutenant in the Royal English Fusiliers. It may be noted in
passing that this was a period in which commissions in the Army—since
become an easy enough achievement—were practically the monopoly of men
who were far superior by birth and social position to the sons of even
the most princely merchants, and there is nothing to indicate that
André's father was at all a man of more than moderate means. The point
is interesting, however, inasmuch as it points to the psychological
tendencies of the young man's mind. His commission duly obtained, André
repaired at once to Berlin, where he received considerable insight
into the military arts. Berlin, it may be parenthetically observed,
was in those days probably the best-organised centre of a vast system
of spies, for had not the collector of the famous giant-regiment
of Potsdam Guards passed that way a generation before, and was not
Frederick the Great still boasting that he had only one cook and a
hundred spies? Some authorities incline to the belief that young André,
while in Berlin, was already an active spy of the British Government.
It is clear at any rate that when after a few years' residence in
Germany he returned to England, he became known to prominent officers
as a man not only more than usually well informed on all matters of a
military kind, but also as a soldier who had fitted himself by very
special study for the business of probing the military secrets and
plans of other countries.
To the man's personality justice must, however, be done, for it is
agreed on all hands that a more captivating or picturesque officer
had never worn King George's uniform. Unlike Wolfe, also a man of
literary parts, though a somewhat dark and silent person, André was a
conversationalist of such fascination and sparkle that his presence
in a drawing-room proved sufficient to attract the larger portion of
both sexes to its immediate vicinity. Even his male contemporaries
all declare that a more lovable being had rarely crossed the social
stage, while the number of women of note and fashion with whom the
young officer was said to be on that footing which the French so
expressively describe by the term _au mieux_, can hardly have been
inferior to that which favoured handsome John Churchill in a former
age. Great facial beauty, a splendid presence, romantic courage,
a reputation for brilliancy in an age which was far from being a
superficial one—all these were qualities which we expect in the pages
of fiction, but which are only occasionally to be met with in actual
experience. They are qualities, nevertheless, which have been the
possession of most of the distinguished adventurers of history and it
is obviously the consciousness of possessing such gifts that turns your
born adventurer towards a life to which he has no definite social or
traditional right.
It is often pointed out in the way of evidence of André's particular
mission as a spy having been officially forecast for him, that on
leaving England for Quebec, where his regiment was stationed, the
young officer travelled thither by the very roundabout route via
Philadelphia. Here he arrived in September 1774. His experience as a
man who had seen much of the military spy system of Frederick and who
was in any case an acute observer of all things were facts of which
General Carleton, the Governor-General of Canada, was well aware. That
officer, coincidently enough, left England about the same time as
André, the twain travelling however by different ways. It is assumed,
by Americans generally, that Carleton, who foresaw the imminence of
the Revolutionary conflict, had directed his subordinate to visit
Philadelphia in the capacity of a commissioned spy, in order to learn
all he might regarding the condition of public affairs, the temper
of the people and, above all, to obtain some clear idea as to the
intentions of the leaders of the American forces. Halting a short while
and for the accomplishment of his purpose in the old Quaker City,
André subsequently passed to New York and Boston, ever observant,
everywhere transcribing, always on the alert. At Quebec he arrived
early in November 1774. On the outbreak of the war André was one of the
first British officers to be captured by the enemy and for over a year
remained a prisoner in several Pennsylvania cities, where his charming
personality and accomplishments gave him among the enemy the footing of
a privileged guest rather than a captive. He was exchanged at the close
of 1776 and rejoined the Army at New York, then commanded by Howe. To
that officer André came like some visitor from Fortune herself, for
during his late captivity, in the course of which he held practically
_carte blanche_ to move about the outlying country, the young soldier
had always done so with his professional instincts set and with the
result that he was able immediately to present Howe with more accurate
information as to the military effective, disposition and plans of
Washington than the regular Intelligence service could have procured
him in three years. A vacancy falling due on the staff of General Grey,
Howe procured its reversion to André, giving him the rank of Captain.
At this time the British Army was moving on Philadelphia.
Literature dealing with the story of Philadelphia in that age presents
us with the picture of a city of perennial pageant. The British Army
was in occupation in the winter and spring of 1778 and revelry ran
long and high in every phase of the social life of Quaker City. Our
André was here in his very element and among the acquaintances he
formed was that of Margaret Shippen, who afterwards became the wife
of Benedict Arnold. "No one," wrote Mr Winthropp Sergeant in 1861,
"seems to have created such a pleasing impression or to have been so
long admiringly remembered as André. His name in our own days lingers
on the lips of every aged woman whose youth had seen her a belle in
the royal lines.... He is described as of five feet nine inches in
height and of singularly handsome person—well made, slender, graceful
and very active, a dark complexion with a serious and somewhat tender
expression; his manners easy and insinuating.... If the serious
business of life was a part of his lot, there was yet ample scope
for the exercise of those elegant arts in which he excelled. His
infirmities, if any there were, sprang like Charles Townshend's from
a noble cause—that lust of fame which is the instinct of all great
souls; and his comely person, his winning speech, his graceful manners
procured him universal acceptance, while his freedom from the grosser
passions of his fellows was especially observed." The universal gaiety
which prevailed throughout Philadelphia was not without its effect on
the Army as a whole and the inevitable demoralisation of all classes of
society followed. It remains a lasting tribute to the attractions of
the fair maids of Philadelphia that the number of irregular marriages
which took place among the lower ranks of the Army alone was so large
as to necessitate the organisation of special pickets with the object
of preventing the wholesale depletion of regiments through long absence
or desertion. As Benjamin Franklin declared at the time: "Howe has not
taken Philadelphia, Philadelphia has taken Howe," and it is written
that on the evacuation of the city by the British forces, 18,000
strong, at least 1000 privates deserted, returning to their sweethearts
and lately married wives in Quaker Town. General Howe himself proved
far from a shining example to his subordinates or soldiery, indolence
and sensuality being his chief characteristics, while there were not
wanting those who accused him of malversation of military funds. "He
returned to England richer in money than laurels," while Americans are
wont to thank him for having given them America, as they put it. His
relations with André hardly seem consistent with what we know of that
officer's usual discernment. In his honour, André, now a major, had
composed and stage-managed a kind of allegorical tourney entitled the
_Mischianza_, which was enacted to honour a general who was already
under sentence of recall to England. Howe was in due course succeeded
by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom André, on the departure of General Grey
in 1778, became chief aide and secretary, a position in which he
so clearly proved his ability that in 1779 he was appointed deputy
adjutant-general to the British forces in America with headquarters in
New York.
We have seen that during his earlier stay in Philadelphia the young
officer had formed a close friendship with Margaret Shippen, daughter
of a wealthy resident. By 1779 this lady had become the wife of
Benedict Arnold, one of the leading Revolutionary generals who was
appointed military governor of Philadelphia on its evacuation by the
British. Arnold, it was well known, maintained a sumptuous style of
living which was wholly out of keeping with his means or position.
A princely retinue, a lavish table, extravagance in all things were
sufficient, once the British ascendancy had given way to the staid
Quaker rule and custom of Philadelphia, to make him an object of
distrust among a naturally suspicious community. Nor was Arnold at all
a man of high character, whether domestic or public. Already in 1780 he
was formally accused of peculation and, though exonerated on inquiry,
was reprimanded by Washington for "imprudent and improper conduct."
Arnold, who fully expected a complete vindication by his superiors,
never forgave them the last implied stigma on his character. He was
suspected even then of disloyal conversation with the enemy under
adopted names, and his present wrath was not calculated to weaken
any predisposition he may have felt towards the commission of an act
of supreme treachery. It seems clear that André, an unusually astute
judge of character, had fully taken the measure of Arnold and perhaps
had already learned something when, on 16th August 1779, he wrote to
the General's wife at Philadelphia a rather whimsical letter offering
to do some "shopping" for her in New York—a somewhat inconsequent kind
of offer if its object was not to discover the condition of the lady's
purse. Shortly afterwards a communication was addressed from the Tory
side—the Whigs were the Revolutionaries—sounding Arnold and his general
disposition, and it is now well established that the correspondence,
which ensued thereafter between Clinton and himself, partook of a
treasonable character on the part of the American General, who wrote
in a disguised hand and assumed the name of "Gustavus" for the purpose
of his communications, Clinton not then being aware of the identity
or the importance of his correspondent. It seems clear, however, that
André, as Clinton's secretary, was well aware of that identity and we
may suppose the Major to have suggested the transference to himself of
the duty of keeping up communication with the traitor, a transference
which accordingly took place. Major André continued therefore to keep
in touch with Arnold, himself writing under the name "John Anderson" in
a slightly disguised hand. It is not implausibly maintained by some
that in the "shopping" letter which André had addressed to Mrs Arnold
in August 1779 he had used a disguised handwriting with the object of
making clear to her husband—reasonably certain to see the letter—the
identity of John Anderson. Shortly after André had taken a hand in
the intrigue, Arnold began to importune his superiors to give him the
command of West Point near New York, urging the costliness of keeping
up his position in Philadelphia. The request seemed reasonable and
was granted by Washington, Arnold assuming the command at West Point,
already, it is certain, resolved to surrender that strong fort to the
British who were lying some fifty miles below in New York, and for whom
the possession of the Point meant a free communication with Canada.
Up till the contemplated treachery of Arnold, the ascendancy of the
British had been well maintained on the American Continent. Charleston
had fallen and here André had twice risked his life disguised as a
spy; the South was in British possession; Gates had been beaten at
Camden and Manhattan was in their army's occupation. Arnold astutely
chose the proper moment for his act of treachery, certain in that dark
hour to produce a strong moral reaction upon the Revolutionaries. In
September 1780 the American General forwarded to André a letter asking
for a personal interview within the American lines, the Major to
disguise himself as John Anderson. André refused to enter the danger
zone and the meeting was arranged to take place at Haverstraw—neutral
ground—on 21st September. Thereafter it became a matter of somewhat
dangerous rumour that André, whose daring men well knew, was about
to undertake a perilous enterprise, a successful execution of which
must swiftly end the war. A baronetcy, a brigadiership, a large sum
of money—these were the rewards Clinton is said to have promised his
young Adjutant. It is generally agreed that André faced his present
mission with anything but that imperturbability which had marked his
departure on similar expeditions. He was saddened, it was said, by an
indefinable presentiment of death and impending disaster, and left
New York to keep his appointment with Arnold, sailing up the Hudson
in the British sloop _Vulture_. Arnold had agreed to send a boat to
the sloop at midnight, 21st September, in order to take off the Major,
who, on his landing, was led by a friend of the former to the secret
tryst on neutral ground. The interview was long, Arnold haggling
desperately over the terms of settlement; dawn had already begun to
shadow the eastern hill-tops and still the bargain was not square.
By five o'clock, however, the men had come to terms, and Arnold, who
had horses in waiting, suggested the completion of the details in
documentary form at the house of a local farmer, Smith his name. André
consented reluctantly, well knowing the house in question to be within
the American lines. By ten o'clock the deeds were drawn up and signed;
André was in possession of all necessary information concerning the
post to be surrendered. Arnold was to make a show of resistance on the
arrival of the British on 25th September, while Washington himself was
to be delivered into the hands of the enemy on his return that way on
September 27th. Benedict Arnold was to receive some £6500 as a reward
for his treachery, a sum which was eventually paid though the surrender
of West Point never took place.
On leaving Smith's residence and bidding adieu to Arnold, the Major
discovered to his surprise that the _Vulture_ had disappeared. The
sloop had been cannonaded during the night and compelled to drop down
the river. As the Major considered his difficult position, the vessel
returned to its previous moorings and André requested Smith to convey
him aboard. Smith refused, pleading reasonably enough that he was
afraid of the consequences to himself of rendering such a service.
No bribe being sufficient apparently to move the farmer, André found
himself forced to remain where he was and to his undoubted peril,
until nightfall. Smith offered to provide the Major with an American
uniform, but finding it impossible to procure one, gave him instead
an old-fashioned coat of the cavalier style, purple in colour, with
faded gold lace. A melancholy beaver hat completed the strange attire
of the British officer who covered the whole with an ordinary surtout.
Contrary to express instructions from Clinton, André took away the
papers which Arnold had given him at the farmhouse, concealing them in
his top-boots—an entirely senseless as well as purposeless proceeding,
which eventually led to his undoing. Accompanied by Smith and a negro,
André crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry on 22nd September, rode boldly
into the American lines, spending, indeed, a night at another farmhouse
in the midst of the enemy. On the 23rd, bidding his companions adieu,
the Major, following directions given him by Smith, made for so-called
neutral ground which swarmed with Tories and where he might feel
reasonably safe. Mistaking a turn, however, in the old Tarrytown Road,
along which he rode his horse slowly and with some hesitation, he came
suddenly upon a group of farmers who were ranging the countryside in
quest of suspicious persons. One of them, Paulding by name, wore a
Hessian surtout given him by a friend. When André came in sight the
company was playing cards, and on the Major's approach, Paulding,
the master spirit of the gang, stepped to the front, musket in hand,
commanding the traveller to halt and account for himself. Seeing the
Hessian coat—a garment peculiar to King George's troops—André stopped
his horse.
"My lads," he said, "you belong to our side, I see."
"What side?" asked Paulding.
"The British side," André replied.
"We do," answered Paulding.
André was momentarily taken off his guard. "Thank God!" he exclaimed.
"I am a British officer out on particular business. I am glad to be
among friends once more and I hope you will not detain me."
"We are Americans," cried Paulding, "and you are our prisoner."
Assuming as much composure as he could, André drew Arnold's passports
from his pocket permitting "Mr John Anderson to pass the guards to
the White Plains," only, of course, to confirm the suspicions of the
farmers, who thereupon dragged him from his horse, searching him from
head to foot, duly to find the incriminating documents which clearly
proved their captive a first-class spy. The Major began by offering
them in turn, cash, his gold watch, one hundred guineas, and finally
made a promise of one thousand guineas, saying he would remain a
hostage in their hands till one of the party should return with the
money. "We would not let you go for ten thousand guineas," shouted
Paulding, and André's doom was spoken. He was taken to the nearest
American post and delivered to the commandant, Colonel Jameson, under
his name John Anderson. André at once requested that General Arnold
should be notified that his friend "Anderson" was in custody, and the
Colonel, an unsuspicious soul, concluded that he could best serve his
superior officer by returning the captive to Arnold, under a guard of
four troopers in charge of Lieutenant Allen, who was also entrusted
with a letter in which the Colonel mentioned that he was "forwarding
certain documents found on Anderson forthwith to Washington," and this
was accordingly done. André, to his joy, set out with his escort on
the return journey to Arnold's lines. Before the party had progressed
many miles towards West Point, a messenger arrived with orders for
their return, and André found himself a captive once more in Jameson's
lines, the Colonel, on a subordinate's advice, having decided to refer
the whole matter to General Washington. In the meanwhile Allen, of his
own initiative, had proceeded to Arnold's headquarters with the private
letter and report from Jameson to the commander at West Point. For this
blunder your true American has never forgiven the simple-minded Colonel.
On 24th September, the day following his capture, Major André, of
whose real name and rank the American officers were still ignorant,
indited his famous letter to Washington, full of rhetoric and
self-justification, in which he advanced several considerations for
his release from captivity. Mentioning his name and military rank,
he only wrote, he said, to vindicate his good fame, not to solicit
security. He was not, he vowed with a strange distortion of actuality,
accustomed to duplicity. He justified his negotiations with "a person"
(Arnold, unnamed) who was to give him intelligence which should
prove serviceable to British arms, a fair ruse of war, he thought.
Having concluded these negotiations, he proceeded, he was conducted
without his knowledge into the American lines. He had thus become a
prisoner and was justified in his endeavour to escape by all means
available, and having reached neutral ground, through a disguise, he
had been arrested by irregulars. There were gentlemen at Charleston,
he concluded, in a half-menacing and highly impolitic phrase, whose
rank might be set in exchange for his; in any case they were persons
whom the treatment he received could not fail to affect. Washington
received this communication after the flight of Arnold who, learning
from Jameson's letter, duly delivered by Allen, how perilously matters
stood for him, had taken refuge on board the British vessel _Vulture_.
The American commander-in-chief gave immediate orders for the transfer
of André to West Point, where he arrived on 26th September, under the
care of a strong escort commanded by Major Tallmadge, the officer who
had advised Jameson to countermand the first order sending the prisoner
to Arnold. It was to Tallmadge that André made the memorable confession
that he had engaged in the adventure "for military glory, the applause
of his King and country and perhaps a brigadiership." The Major asked
the American in what light General Washington was likely to regard him.
"He will regard you," replied Tallmadge simply, "just as the British
regarded my old comrade and schoolfellow, Nathan Hale. Your fate will
be the same as Hale's."
It is not difficult to understand the fierce indignation of the
Americans at this critical time, when the black treachery of a
commander on their own side is considered, and it was, from the very
first, written in the stars that André should receive no mercy,
although, indeed, a strong effort was made to exchange him for Arnold
whom, in all probability, the Americans would have preferred. In
General Washington, above all, there was an elemental severity of the
early Roman type which would leave nothing to chance, although the plot
had, happily for his own arms, totally miscarried. Nevertheless, with
that ideal sense of justice which was found later in his illustrious
successor, Lincoln, he convened a military board with the object of
making careful inquiries and reporting their "opinion of the light in
which the prisoner ought to be considered and what punishment ought
to be inflicted." The court consisted of six major-generals and eight
brigadier-generals. It was held at Tappan, where Washington had his
headquarters. Inevitably André was held to be "a spy from the enemy and
only death could satisfy his crime." Washington stood by the verdict
and sentenced Major André to be hanged as a spy on the second day of
October at four in the afternoon.
At four accordingly on the second day of October 1780, Major André
was executed upon an eminence near Tappan village, in the presence of
a vast concourse of people. He was dressed in full military costume
and white top-boots. A large procession of officers preceded him to
the gallows—a cross-piece between two trees. The prisoner's step was
firm nor did he falter until he saw the gallows, realising then that,
despite his appeal to Washington, he was to die as a felon and not as a
soldier. His hesitation was only momentary, however. A baggage-wagon,
in which was laid a plain pine coffin, had been driven under the
gallows, a grave being dug near by. Into this wagon the prisoner
stepped, and taking the rope from the hangman adjusted it to his neck,
tying also a white silk handkerchief over his eyes. The Major was then
told that he might speak if he wished. Lifting the fold lightly from
his eyes and bowing courteously, André replied in a firm voice: "All I
request of you, gentlemen, is that while I acknowledge the propriety of
my sentence, you will bear me witness that I die like a brave man." And
taking his last look at the sky, he replaced the bandage on his eyes.
The wagon was driven swiftly from under him, and in a few minutes he
was no more.
VIII
BRITISH SECRET SERVICE
Under the euphemism Secret Service, we describe in England our system
of espionage. In common with other countries, espionage has always
prevailed in England as essential in some degree to most conditions of
our political, social, diplomatic and commercial life, all of which are
conducted on the most comprehensive and complex lines. The story of
England has, however, revealed but little of the spy in any class and,
indeed, next to nothing at all when considered in proportion to the
vastness of its national and international relations and commitments,
a happy state of affairs which is attributable to the fact that our
constitutional liberties represent the nearest approach to the ideal in
respect of the completeness of their guarantees. Going back to early
periods, it is only in the case of prominent figures like Alfred—who
did his own spying, it will be remembered—or the seventh Henry, or
Wolsey, that we find there was anything like the beginnings of an
organised secret service system. The father of King Harry, through the
agency of his lawyers Empson and Dudley, undoubtedly spied out the
financial conditions of the territorial nobles as well as the monastic
properties, and by doing so, certainly facilitated the seizure of the
Abbey possessions when the Reformation took place in the next reign.
The agents employed in the case of the wealthy landowners were usually
chaplains who also exercised secretarial functions for their patrons,
while in the monasteries renegade monks were always to be found willing
at a price to put Henry's financial sleuths in the way of obtaining
correct information. The Lord Cardinal, there is no doubt, spied on
the goings and comings of Campeggio when that legate was in England,
and neither is there any doubt of his having spied successfully, and
much to the irritation of the monarch, on King Henry himself who
retaliated, however, more than once by informing the Chancellor as
to certain romantic but very unpriestly trysts of the Cardinal which
had come within the royal cognisance. In royal circles, of course, we
may be sure that spying has always been the custom, all the more so
since household officers justify their persistent attentions on the
ground that the safety of the royal person requires that it should
be perennially shadowed. Did not Fouché once surprise Napoleon, who
was boasting of the superiority of service rendered by his own _corps
d'espions_, when he informed the Emperor regarding every detail of a
nocturnal outing which Majesty had made through Paris in company with
Murat, and in the course of which visits were paid, in turn, to a low
music-hall, a lower night-house and a cheap restaurant?
To find the first definite shapings of organised secret service we
must come to the time of Elizabeth when the Intelligencer and the
Spy were well-known characters in the society of the period. The
Intelligencer proves highly interesting as a study of the purely
parasitical life. In general, he started in life as a man who made it
his business to learn what was going on at all the main centres of
public and private life, trading off the items to men of business,
politicians and diplomatists for the best price he could obtain. He
corresponded very closely to the Roman quidnunc with whom the Satires
of Horace made us all familiar in our schooldays. Who can forget
the picture of that oily Nasidienus—what a nose for news the name
holds!—whose chief title to dine with Mæcenas depended on the fact that
he constituted in his own person a kind of central news agency upon
which all the gossip and intelligence of Rome was sure to converge.
For indeed, the famous quidnunc had his own corps of reporters whom he
employed to scour the City in quest of tittle-tattle for his patron.
The Intelligencer or private newsmonger of Elizabeth's age was, it is
recorded, looked upon as a highly respectable member of the workaday
classes until, to use a journalistic Americanism, he began to "put
it over" on his patrons—meaning to say, when he began to supply them
with the news that was not, drawing good money in exchange for false
intelligence. Like the free-lance of our own day, the Intelligencer
had first of all to build up a connection, as the phrase goes, the
same being remunerative, or the reverse, in proportion to the man's
energy and reliability. Since in those days he invariably dealt with
principals, it happened not so seldom that he effected a permanent
way into the good graces of a wealthy patron, rising afterwards to
positions of honourable importance. It is, nevertheless, a fact that
the majority of these men deteriorated, and for the simple reason that,
deeply versed as they became in the sordid architectonics of life of
all kinds, social, political and commercial, they quickly shed their
ideals. Their previous experience and knowledge of ways and means had,
however, fitted them in a peculiar manner for the business of watching
other men and they were invariably sought out by personages of wealth
and position to exercise the trade of spy, or common informer. And,
accordingly, when Burleigh and his congeners were looking around for
plausible excuses for killing off Mary of Scotland, they fell back on
the services of an informer who had originally made his bow before the
public as an Intelligencer. It is not necessary to go into the story
of the mysterious "J. B.," whom one Delbena, an Italian adventurer,
had introduced to the English Ambassador in Paris, Poulet, as a man of
good birth, but desperate in all enterprises and a traitor to the last
fibre of his spinal column. The records of Elizabethan days would seem
to indicate either that Burleigh and Walsingham were not very astute
judges of the common spy, or else that "J. B." was devilishly apt in
extracting large sums out of credulous statesmen and diplomats, for
it is written that having raised many thousands from Poulet on his
simple promise to capture an agent of Mary Stuart, whose papers were
certain to incriminate that Queen—why, the rascal failed to deliver
goods, to use another expressive newspaper Americanism. Then there was
the informer Gifford whose early training as a priest enabled him, in
his clerical capacity and with forged credentials, to spy on the great
Catholic families of his time, in all cases transmitting false yet
incriminating information to Burleigh. His nefarious activities brought
at least a dozen men to the execution block in those days. In two years
another of the species, one Thomas Phillips, also an ex-Intelligencer,
had contracted to the Crown a debt equal to the large sum of £60,000
of our own money on account of infamous work done for its ministers,
mostly political, be it said. Indeed, the record of the Elizabethan spy
constitutes one long chronicle of the bloodiest treachery in the whole
history of secret service, since the Tower, if not Tyburn, invariably
figured as the last scene in the life of the unfortunate who fell into
the hands of the Queen's sleuths. Treachery seems, for all the halo
which surrounds our notion of the "good old days," to have played a
part in the whole social fabric as universal as it was sinister, nor
can the fact be wondered at, seeing that the promiscuous distribution
of the confiscated estates of murdered men, which often in a day
rewarded poor men with vast lands, was an ever-present incentive to the
cupidity of the adventurer.
Cromwell, if we may judge by diaries and records of his day, was the
best-informed man in England. He had an undoubted faith in the value
of secret service and was ably served by the many agents he employed,
not only at home, but also abroad, where their activities helped to lay
the broad foundations of that foreign policy which is based upon the
principle known as the Balance of Power. It was the Protector's custom
to invite to his table men whom he well knew to be what the current
vernacular of the time termed "trimmers" and what the American calls a
"mugwump"; these men he invariably surprised with the correctness of
his information regarding the variety of their political friends and
relations, as well as of the dangerous company which they frequented,
advising them always in a friendly way to beware. The Protector was
one of the few statesmen in Europe who remained a perennial puzzle
to Mazarin, during whose large ascendancy on the Continent, Cromwell
strengthened the foundations of that naval power which has given
England for so long a paramount voice in Europe's councils. His
successor Charles II. distinguished himself above all other English
monarchs by receiving into his intimate court circle a paid spy of
Louis XIV. in the person of Louise de Kérouaille, on whom he conferred
the title of Duchess of Portsmouth. This lady, as Duchesse d'Aubigny
in France, was at the same time drawing a ducal revenue from the
coffers of Louis XIV., while it remains a matter of statistical record
that in the year 1681 she took in perquisite from the English Exchequer
the sum of £136,000—equal to more than half-a-million sterling of
our time. There can be little doubt that the capacity for political
intrigue of the Duchess, as well as her complete ascendancy over
Charles and her own greed of money, contributed at a later stage to
swell the indictment which ultimately led to the banishment of the
Stuarts. In her Life of the Duchess, Mrs Colquhoun Grant takes a view
generally accepted by historical writers, to wit, that the favourite's
character was neither vicious nor depraved, that her conduct was not
immoral according to the notions of the age, that she was a woman of
immense political capacity, while of a tender and affectionate heart.
Her political correspondence, in which she exercised her specific
rôle as informer to the French court, was carried on with Madame de
Montespan, who is memorable as one of the splendid favourites of Louis.
[Illustration: The Duchess of Portsmouth]
Passing over to Georgian times we find that the employment of spies was
common in all departments of life, and there can be little doubt that
the Hanoverians brought to England many men and women who had learned
the arts of espionage at the best of all possible schools—namely,
Berlin. The history of England of those days shows us nothing in the
way of pre-eminent exponents of the business, nor can espionage be
said, in its political aspects, to have reached to that excellence of
organisation which it attained later in the times of Pitt, whom the
ever-present activities of Bonaparte compelled in the interests of our
security to develop a secret-service system the operations of which
were inferior to none in Europe. It remains a matter of record that in
the days of the French Revolution certain political leaders in England
were in the pay of the Committee of Public Safety presided over by
Robespierre. This fact was communicated to Pitt through his own spy, a
professedly violent Jacobin, who by means of cipher and anagrammatic
correspondence, carried on with a relative in Italy, was transmitting
by that roundabout route the most minute and accurate accounts of the
Committee's proceedings to the English Premier. The sums paid for such
dangerous work, while never, of course, disclosed, were undoubtedly
very large, seeing that the all-observant Saint-Just was moving at
the time through Revolutionary circles. The failure of the French
invasion of Ireland in December 1796 is also set down to an act of paid
treachery on the part of the captain of one of the French vessels,
the story being that he took advantage of prevailing foul weather to
decline approaching the Irish coast for several days, and since the
general commanding the expedition was on board, the brave venture
became a foregone failure. Charles Lever, who, it will be remembered,
acted as British Consul at Spezzia and Trieste, introduces us on
more than one occasion to a kind of consular or ambassadorial spy, an
individual who in those days was as regular a member of a chancellery
as its archivist is in our own.
In the time of Napoleon, Charles James Fox, an admirer and friend
of the First Consul, found himself, all unconsciously, caught in
the vast woof of the Fouché-Talleyrand system of intelligence, thus
becoming an unwitting agent in communicating to the French Government
certain of the designs of the British Government for the destruction
of Bonaparte's Continental policy. The fact that Fox was a desperate
gambler, and ever in debt, was not of course allowed to escape
the notice of his few, but bitter, enemies, who in this case were
obviously moved by malice rather than by anything they really knew. The
cleverness of Canning in procuring private information regarding the
secret clauses of the Treaty of Tilsit between Alexander of Russia and
Napoleon is commonly regarded as among the greatest achievements of
diplomacy in all time. How the British foreign minister obtained this
information will probably remain a secret for ever; but the momentous
results of his cleverness are indisputable, since they led to the
seizure of the Danish fleet and broke up the northern confederation
of powers by which Napoleon still hoped to invade England, and some
analogy to which is found at our own time in the occupation of
Belgium by the Germans, England having been the main objective in
both cases. Conjecture is, of course, not wanting as to the means
which placed this intelligence in the hands of Canning. According to
one writer, a certain Lady Sarah Spencer, in a letter addressed to
her father at Althorp, declared at the time that "Lord G. L. Gower
had got possession, for £20,000, of the original treaty of Tilsit
and that one of the secret articles stipulated that the Danish fleet
should be employed against us, which induced Ministers to adopt such
measures." It is declared by a member of the Mackenzie clan that one
Colin Mackenzie, who perfectly understood and spoke French, disguised
himself as a Cossack and was one of the attendants chosen to accompany
the Russian Emperor to the raft on which the interview with Napoleon
was held—a story which does not, it must be said, meet with very
cordial acceptance. Again it is asserted that the famous Launay, Count
d'Antraigues, obtained the treaty from a friend in Russia, a version
which seems disproved by the fact that the Count was at that time in
disgrace in England. On Sir Robert Wilson has also been conferred
the distinction of discovering the secret understandings of Tilsit,
while the tradition of the Foreign Office is that the information came
indirectly from the Emperor Alexander and was given publicity through
some blunder on the part of the Russian Ambassador in London—most
probably the correct facts.
The enactment of the Union between England and Ireland led in its
time to the commission of untold treacheries. Until within a score
of years ago there stood in the private offices of Dublin Castle two
iron-clamped chests filled to the top with papers relating to pre-Union
days. These chests bore the Government seal and on them was inscribed
the legend: "Secret and confidential—not to be opened." For close upon
a century, these chests remained unexplored until, leave having been
given for their examination, hundreds of betrayals and treacheries
leapt to light. Men of the highest names, says Dr Fitzpatrick, in
effect, were found to have been spies of the Government and practically
_agents provocateurs_, although to the outer world they bore themselves
as high-souled patriots of unimpeachable honour. The various causes
in which these men served were not less filled with the foulness of
secret crime than outwardly they proved to be fraught with deliberately
constructed outrage and injustice to a whole nation. Coming down
to more modern days, we seize upon the story of Major Le Caron.
This man's adventure among the open and admitted enemies of England
shows us the meagre extent to which our Government is prepared to
subsidise its agents abroad. Le Caron is not singular in his criticism
of the British authorities who, by a consistent policy of paying
starvation pay, have reduced the secret service to the proportions of
a vanishing quantity. Le Caron warned the authorities of their fatal
and improvident parsimony in his time. "Some day," he said, "a big
thing will happen about which there will be no leakage beforehand
and then the affrighted and indignant British citizen will turn on
his band of thirty secret-service men and rant and rave at them for
their want of capacity and performance. The fault will be the want of
a perfect system of secret service, properly financed. If plots are to
be discovered in time, they can only be discovered through information
coming from men associated with them. If it is to be made worth their
while to speak, then the price offered by the British Government must
be higher than that of the other paymasters." Le Caron's words are
clearly based on the assumption that men enter into revolutionary
movements rather for what there is in them, than from any spiritual or
ethical motives. Until far more evidence than we possess is afforded
us, we fear that the spy must be held to be right, for the tortuous
path of political agitation is a path which is ever crowded with
self-seekers and one on which the altruist is always the loneliest of
pilgrims.
In the course of the trials of Captains Trench and Brandon at Leipsic
in 1910, the public prosecutor emphasised his view that British gold
had bought up the services of hundreds of agents scattered throughout
Germany, all of them engaged in the business of transmitting important
information to the British Admiralty and War Office. Visitors to what
is known as the Black Country of Westphalia will recollect, too, how
ordinary English tourists who arrive at towns in the neighbourhood
of Essen, the home of Krupp, such as Bochum, or Wesel, or Elberfeld
invariably become the objects of police attention from the moment of
their arrival at local hotels. It is certain that espionage on the
part of the foreigner excites more real concern in Germany than is
the case in England, a fact that we must put down to her geographical
position which leaves her, despite vast armaments and preparations, an
ever-possible object of attack to heavily armed nations which surround
her on all sides. Even, however, if it be the fact that England has
held her spies within Germany itself, few will be found to argue that
it is not a legitimate use of secret service funds, as well as a
matter altogether apart from the infamy which attaches to the person
who accepts money in return for the betrayal of fatherland. It is,
nevertheless, very questionable if any information really worth having,
in the military sense, ever escapes the record of duly appointed
military attachés, whose official existence dates from 1864 and whose
admitted business it is to keep themselves professionally posted as
to the resources of a possible enemy. In regard to Germany, it may be
said that in the business of spying, she occupies a class by herself,
since professional espionage is not looked upon by the people as in
any way degrading or underhand. An easy tolerance of this kind towards
a trade which is in itself intrinsically base cannot, it must follow,
be without a corresponding reaction on the common mind in regard to
spying for the benefit of foreign powers, and we may reasonably assume
it to be the fact that in such cases the British authorities go far
less frequently in quest of native spies, than the native spies come
in quest of British gold. A sum of less than £40,000 is annually set
aside for the purposes of the British Secret Service, according to
official books. The smallness of the sum must clearly be some index of
the limits of our secret-service operations, although no one is asked
to suppose that the amount in question covers the entire expenditure
made on account of useful information given up. Germany, it is known,
makes a public appropriation of, roughly, £1,000,000 sterling for the
secret-service system. Russia's budget for the same object amounts to
£500,000, while that of France is less than £200,000, as far, in all
cases, as public figures are available. The public appropriations do
not, of course, reveal anything like the entire sums expended, the
facts as to which could be realised only by a survey of the various
accounts of consular offices and embassies throughout Europe.
Much ink has been spilt and many public utterances have been made
with the object of showing that the British Government had taken
but perfunctory measures in order to fight the system of espionage
which was preparing England for invasion, even as France had been
prepared for invasion in 1870. Writers in the daily Press and
members of Parliament had declared, by the end of August 1914, that
anything more inadequate than the British system of what is known as
counter-espionage—that is to say, the organising of spies to watch
and report on Germans who were obviously overrunning the country in
quest of information of military value—was inconceivable. After all,
results afford the best test of the precautions taken, and it is on
record that the ease and rapidity with which the authorities rounded up
over 14,000 German and Austrian potential spies, within a few weeks of
the outbreak of the war, came as an illuminating shock to the German
Secret Service authorities themselves who had based their warlike
decisions largely upon the hypothesis that England was still asleep.
A well-known authority on such matters at the Home Office informed
the writer in September 1914 that even the so-called "incendiary
points"—that is to say, localities which had been marked out as
suitable for the setting fire to houses, in the event of aerial raids
on London—were being gradually and completely scheduled by vigilant
officers of our Secret Service, and in such a way that nothing was
left to assist the operations of possible spies who have succeeded
in eluding enumeration by our somewhat silent and unofficious, but
nevertheless eternally wakeful police. As we have said in another
place, the German organisation of spies, internal and external, had
been raised to a point under Stieber, beyond which, given the present
conditions of the world and mankind, it was practically impossible
to go, and since for the past twenty years and more, we have been in
possession of the technical details of Stieberism, we may rely on it
that the authorities, on their side, have not read in vain. Shortly
after the outbreak of the Great War, and in order to allay the anxiety
created by critics of such departments as are charged with the duty of
watching the enemy in our midst, the Home Office issued the following
statement dealing with measures which had been undertaken with a view
to counteracting the operations of foreign spies scattered throughout
the Islands:—
"In view of the anxiety naturally felt by the public with regard to
the system of espionage on which Germany has placed so much reliance,
and to which attention has been directed by recent reports from the
seat of war, it may be well to state briefly the steps which the Home
Office, acting on behalf of the Admiralty and War Office, has taken
to deal with the matter in this country. The secrecy which it has
hitherto been desirable in the public interest to observe on certain
points cannot any longer be maintained, owing to the evidence which it
is necessary to produce in cases against spies that are now pending.
"It was clearly ascertained five or six years ago that the Germans
were making great efforts to establish a system of espionage in this
country, and in order to trace and thwart these efforts a Special
Intelligence Department was established by the Admiralty and the War
Office which has ever since acted in the closest co-operation with
the Home Office and Metropolitan Police and the principal provincial
Police Forces. In 1911, by the passing of the Official Secrets Act,
1911, the law with regard to espionage, which had hitherto been
confused and defective, was put on a clear basis and extended so as to
embrace every possible mode of obtaining and conveying to the enemy
information which might be useful in war.
"The Special Intelligence Department, supported by all the means which
could be placed at its disposal by the Home Secretary, was able in
three years, from 1911 to 1914, to discover the ramifications of the
German secret service in England. In spite of enormous efforts and
lavish expenditure of money by the enemy, little valuable information
passed into their hands. The agents, of whose identity knowledge was
obtained by the Special Intelligence Department, were watched and
shadowed without in general taking any hostile action or allowing
them to know that their movements were watched. When, however, any
actual step was taken to convey plans or documents of importance
from this country to Germany the spy was arrested, and in such case
evidence sufficient to secure his conviction was usually found in his
possession. Proceedings under the Official Secrets Acts were taken by
the Director of Public Prosecutions, and in six cases sentences were
passed varying from eighteen months to six years' penal servitude.
At the same time steps were taken to mark down and keep under
observation all the agents known to be engaged in this traffic, so
that when any necessity arose the Police might lay hands on them at
once, and accordingly on August 4, before the declaration of war,
instructions were given by the Home Secretary for the arrest of twenty
known spies, and all were arrested. This figure does not cover a large
number (upwards of two hundred) who were noted as under suspicion or
to be kept under special observation. The great majority of these were
interned at or soon after the declaration of war.
"None of the men arrested in pursuance of the orders issued on August
4 has yet been brought to trial, partly because the officers whose
evidence would have been required were engaged in urgent duties in
the early days of the war, but mainly because the prosecution, by
disclosing the means adopted to track out the spies and prove their
guilt, would have hampered the Intelligence Department in its further
efforts. They were, and still are, held as prisoners under the powers
given to the Secretary of State by the Aliens Restriction Act. One of
them, however, who established a claim to British nationality, has now
been formally charged, and, the reasons for delay no longer existing,
it is a matter for consideration whether the same course should now be
taken with regard to some of the other known spies.
"Although this action taken on August 4 is believed to have broken
up the spy organisation which had been established before the
war, it is still necessary to take the most rigorous measures to
prevent the establishment of any fresh organisation and to deal with
individual spies who might previously have been working in this
country outside the organisation, or who might be sent here under
the guise of neutrals after the declaration of war. In carrying
this out the Home Office and War Office have now the assistance of
the Cable Censorship, and also of the Postal Censorship, which,
established originally to deal with correspondence with Germany
and Austria, has been gradually extended (as the necessary staff
could be obtained) so as to cover communications with those neutral
countries through which correspondence might readily pass to Germany
or Austria. The censorship has been extremely effective in stopping
secret communications by cable or letter with the enemy; but, as its
existence was necessarily known to them, it has not, except in a few
instances, produced materials for the detection of espionage.
"On August 5 the Aliens Restriction Act was passed, and within an
hour of its passing an Order-in-Council was made which gave the
Home Office and the Police stringent powers to deal with aliens,
and especially enemy aliens, who under this Act could be stopped
from entering or leaving the United Kingdom, and were prohibited
while residing in this country from having in their possession any
wireless or signalling apparatus of any kind, or any carrier or homing
pigeons. Under this Order all those districts where the Admiralty
or War Office considered it undesirable that enemy aliens should
reside have been cleared by the Police of Germans and Austrians, with
the exception of a few persons, chiefly women and children, whose
character and antecedents are such that the local Chief Constable, in
whose discretion the matter is vested by the Order, considered that
all ground for suspicion was precluded. At the same time the Post
Office, acting under the powers given them by the Wireless Telegraphy
Acts, dismantled all private wireless stations; and they established
a special system of wireless detection by which any station actually
used for the transmission of messages from this country could be
discovered. The Police have co-operated successfully in this matter
with the Post Office.
"New and still more stringent powers for dealing with espionage were
given by the Defence of the Realm Act, which was passed by the Home
Secretary through the House of Commons and received the Royal Assent
on August 8. Orders-in-Council have been made under this Act which
prohibit, in the widest terms, any attempt on the part either of
aliens or of British subjects to communicate any information which
'is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to an
enemy'; and any person offending against this prohibition is liable to
be tried by court martial and sentenced to penal servitude for life.
The effect of these Orders is to make espionage a military offence.
Power is given both to the police and to the military authorities to
arrest without a warrant any person whose behaviour is such as to give
rise to suspicion, and any person so arrested by the police would be
handed over to the military authorities for trial by court martial.
Only in the event of the military authorities holding that there is no
prima facie case of espionage or any other offence triable by military
law is a prisoner handed back to the civil authorities to consider
whether he should be charged with failing to register or with any
other offence under the Aliens Restriction Act.
"The present position is, therefore, that espionage has been made
by statute a military offence triable by court martial. If tried
under the Defence of the Realm Act, the maximum punishment is penal
servitude for life; but if dealt with outside that Act as a war crime
the punishment of death can be inflicted.
"At the present moment one case is pending in which a person charged
with attempting to convey information to the enemy is now awaiting
his trial by court martial, but in no other case has any clear trace
been discovered of any attempt to convey information to the enemy, and
there is good reason to believe that the spy organisation crushed at
the outbreak of the war has not been re-established.
"How completely that system had been suppressed in the early days of
the war is clear from the fact—disclosed in a German Army Order—that
on August 21 the German Military Commanders were still ignorant
of the despatch and movements of the British Expeditionary Force,
although these had been known for many days to a large number of
people in this country.
"The fact, however, of this initial success does not prevent the
possibility of fresh attempts at espionage being made, and there is no
relaxation in the efforts of the Intelligence Department and of the
Police to watch and detect any attempts in this direction. In carrying
out their duties, the military and police authorities would expect
that persons having information of cases of suspected espionage would
communicate the grounds of the suspicion to local military authority
or to the local police, who are in direct communication with the
Special Intelligence Department, instead of causing unnecessary public
alarm, and possibly giving warning to the spies by public speeches
and letters to the Press. In cases in which the Director of Public
Prosecutions has appealed to the authors of such letters and speeches
to supply him with the evidence upon which their statements were
founded in order that he might consider the question of prosecuting
the offender, no evidence of any value has as yet been forthcoming.
"Among other measures which have been taken has been the registration,
by Order of the Secretary of State, made under the Defence of the
Realm Act, of all persons keeping carrier or homing pigeons. The
importation and the conveyance by rail of these birds have been
prohibited; and, with the valuable assistance of the National Homing
Union, a system of registration has been extended to the whole of the
United Kingdom, and measures have been taken which it is believed will
be effective to prevent the possibility of any birds being kept in
this country which would fly to the Continent.
"Another matter which has engaged the closest attention of the police
has been the possibility of conspiracies to commit outrage. No trace
whatever has been discovered of any such conspiracy, and no outrage of
any sort has yet been committed by any alien—not even telegraph-wires
having been maliciously cut since the beginning of the war.
Nevertheless, it has been necessary to bear in mind the possibility
that such a secret conspiracy might exist or might be formed among
alien enemies resident in this country.
"Accordingly, immediately after the commencement of hostilities,
rigorous search was made by the police in the houses of Germans and
Austrians, in their clubs and in all places where they were likely to
resort. In a few cases individuals were found who were in possession
of a gun or pistol which they had not declared, and in one or two
cases there were small collections of ancient firearms, and in such
cases the offenders have been prosecuted and punished; but no store of
effective arms—still less any bombs or instruments of destruction—have
so far been discovered.
"From the beginning, any Germans or Austrians who were deemed by the
police to be likely to be dangerous were apprehended, handed over
to the military authorities, and detained as prisoners of war; and,
as soon as the military authorities desired it, general action was
taken to arrest and hand over to military custody Germans of military
age, subject to exceptions which have properly been made on grounds
of policy. About 9000 Germans and Austrians of military age have been
so arrested, and are held as prisoners of war in detention camps, and
among them are included those who are regarded by the police as likely
in any possible event to take part in any outbreak of disorder or
incendiarism."
IX
FRENCH SECRET SERVICE
Napoleon it was who once expressed the view that if not impossible,
it was rare to find a Frenchman who could really put his heart into
the business of spying, whether military or civil, and it was his
custom, as far as possible, to employ in either capacity men of that
cosmopolitan or unnational type of which we have spoken. The Emperor's
view would hardly seem, however, to fit in with the preconceived
notion entertained by most of us. Regaled as we have long been with
the fantasies and fictions of modern French writers and their inspired
master detectives, we find ourselves almost invariably crediting
the French system of secret service with being, in respect of its
excellence, an exemplar to all other kindred bodies. No satire, so
far as we know, of the stolen-white-elephant type has ever yet been
written with the object of pointing out the futility of its processes
or the imbecility of its methods, and in any case, it is a matter of
statistical record that the amount of undiscovered crime in France is
twenty per cent. lower than that of any other country in the world.
Here, it must be admitted, we seem to be confusing the business of
the detector of crime with that of the secret-service agent; in
most countries, nevertheless, the two departments work largely in
conjunction, and it may be, in general, fairly presumed that a service
which is likely to provide a good corps of detectives is also capable
of producing an able body of spies. It would seem that in no age in
French history was the system of organised spying so complete as during
the ascendancy of Richelieu, when clerical influences, supported
by a vast network of espionage, were everywhere overwhelming, and
again during the times of Napoleon's military empire, a contrast in
conditions which suggests the idea that governments which are based
on autocratic or non-representative principles invariably require the
help of intrinsically corrupt and vicious influences to enable them to
maintain their existence. For all the lauded excellence of the imperial
German organisation of spies, that of France may be said, when we take
into consideration the lighter political and social machinery of a
Republican country, to be hardly less comprehensive, as well as quite
as effective in its results.
Paris is, of course, the centre of the French organisation. Here it
works craftily and silently and though rarely coming into contact with
the work of the President or his Cabinet, is permanently in touch with
departmental officials in all the great public offices. It is declared
on the authority of a now-retired divisional chief of the French secret
service, Saint-Just, that even the Prefect of Police in Paris only
rarely hears of the business details of his own department, though it
is very doubtful if such a statement could be made about M. Méline,
whose omnivorous activities and private information during his tenure
of that office are said on more than one occasion to have extricated
the Republic from a difficult international impasse. As a rule the
divisional chiefs of the system only invite the attention of the
titular head of the service in the event of a _cause célèbre_ in which
great names are mentioned, or else in cases in which international
complications, as in the Dreyfus drama, are to be feared. The French
Secretary for Foreign Affairs can alone be said, in regard to the work
and the results of the French spy system, to be in close touch with it;
and in all certainty this was true about M. Delcassé in the perilous
period of the Moroccan imbroglio of 1906. Other Ministers, all of whom,
like the Prefect of Police himself, hold office by virtue of their
being party men, know as a rule less about what is taking place in the
underground of political movements than much humbler civil servants.
The divisional chiefs without doubt are the real controllers of the
police organisation; these men are practically irremovable and they are
invariably so well acquainted with inside working of state affairs that
no Government dares dismiss one of them without grave reason. Colonel
Henry, whose momentous knowledge of the real motives which underlay
the Dreyfus affair made his own removal by suicide or murder—who can
tell which?—an insistent necessity, had acted as a go-between from
a divisional chief to an important political personage in France and
consequently learned, in the course of his dealings with them both,
that formidable secret which eventually cost the Colonel his life.
The spy system of France is largely based nowadays, as in the time
of Fouché, on the _Dossier_. In France any person who has had, or
even who is likely to have, anything like a career which is of a
public nature is duly taken cognisance of by the police, and all and
everything in the way of private information or gossip or documentary
evidence and the like is collated against all possible eventuality
and upshot, the result being forthwith archived in the offices of the
chief of police. The merest novice who enters in any capacity into the
limelight of publicity, even artists, literary men, frail queans of
the _demi-monde_, financiers, politicians, social fancy-men, jockeys,
actors, clerics, opulent mistresses, editors—all these in point of
personal "pedigree," to cull an expression from the American police
vocabulary, are better known to the secret service than to their own
parents. And so it happens, when a man attains to high political power
and is courted by ministers, he invariably makes it his business to
become as intimate as possible with the Chief of the Police, his object
being to recover and destroy all incriminating documents concerning
his past life. In former times, we have all read, kings were wont on
occasion to ask useful retainers if they had anything to solicit in
the way of favours. If a French President were nowadays to invite a
rising or, better still, a risen politician who had served the party
well, to make his particular request, it is certain that first, and
before all things, the politician would ask to be put in possession
of his _dossier_, since no man, great or small, cares that the world
should know by what arts he taught himself to rise, as Pope puts it.
It is an undoubted fact that the _dossier_ is frequently asked for by
arrivals at high political position, and the police, of course, make
a pretence at surrendering it. But do not think for a moment that
they actually surrender each and all of the documentary proofs and
tit-bits of private intelligence which have come into their possession
regarding the person most concerned. The great man is, of course, given
a _dossier_ of sorts. Yet a year or so later, when the politician has
fallen from his high office, the "pedigree" is replaced in the police
archives, often fatter and more succulent than ever. Since the days
of Fouché, who was the inventor of the _dossier secret_, this has
been a fixed official custom of the French Police and the cost of its
maintenance is charged on the municipal rates. It is also certain that
no constant visitor to Paris, no matter whence he comes or what his
nationality, provided he possesses high political or social importance,
or even notoriety, in his own country, all unconsciously goes through
the ordeal of having his pedigree taken, as they say in New York. And
again, since the art of police photography has become common, as
often as not, and unknown to himself, the visitor has to submit to the
official process of having his portrait taken, or being "mugged," as
the American police so expressively describe it.
Years back, in the time of Napoleon the Third, there existed a system
of spying throughout France, known as that of the "White Blouses,"
these being a ubiquitous band of _agents provocateurs_ who were paid to
incite the people to riots and so furnish the police with pretexts for
incarcerating leading popular spirits who were likely, if allowed their
freedom, to become dangerous to the stability of the Empire. The fall
of that fabric in 1870 led to the partial break-up of this monstrous
organisation, and many who were known to be its paid agents were very
deservedly shot in the days of the Commune. After the establishment of
the Republic the spy police was reorganised and a special brigade of
secret-service agents was formed whose object was—and still is—to spy
upon all those political sects at the head of which stand pretenders
like the Duke of Orleans, or Prince Napoleon, or the late General
Boulanger. At any grave political crisis in France these political
sects display more than their usual energies, trusting more or less, as
they do, in the star of their particular candidate, and at such times
the corps of spies become correspondingly active. This especial body is
said to have constituted far more than any other force to the permanent
stability of the present Republican regime. Most of its special spies
are recruited, it is known, among the newspaper reporters and writers
of Paris and the larger towns of France, and for the reason that their
business affords them better opportunities than are given to most men
of coming in touch with people who are anxious to "move the public
mind" in regard to pet principles, or in simpler words, who have an axe
to grind. This service was the invention of the celebrated Prefect of
Police Andrieux, who also organised a system of fractional divisions
of his police which still exists, and which is also associated with
the body that spies upon the movements of anarchist societies in
France, Spain, England, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Holland
and the United States, with all the chief bureaux of which countries
it continues to remain in permanent affiliation. Its magnificent work
undoubtedly accounts for the chronic failure of the militant anarchists
to do serious damage or outrage in anything like proportion to the
fiery sentiments which they profess to entertain towards all reasoned
systems of government, or even in proportion to their numbers.
The real chief of the French Secret Service is, as we have told,
not the Prefect of Police, who is a politician and a party man. The
traditions of a generation will it that the active headship of that
service be taken over generally by the chief of what is officially
known as the Third Division of the Police. Under this functionary's
control are the head of the First Bureau in which the _dossiers_ are
kept, and the head of the Second Bureau which deals with the reports
of political agents and which also directs the notorious Black Cabinet
having charge of the opening of all private letters passing between
suspected persons; when read these letters are photographed and
archived. The Third Bureau has been made famous in recent times by
the Panama, Dreyfus and Humbert scandals in which its large corps of
handwriting experts and interpreters came on the scene. In the First
Division the various bureaux are made up as follows: (_A_) Spies upon
persons of note; thus Esterhazy during the Dreyfus case had seventeen
members of this division following him in all places and at all hours.
(_B_) The corps of men who are detailed to watch women frequently
visited by prominent politicians, and who are, when it is found
necessary, instructed to "engage the sentiments" of the ladies at their
dwelling places, cash-expenses being allowed the spies in proportion
to the cubicular tariff of any given lady who may be suspected of
knowing anything. (_C_) The body of spies who are detailed to spy upon
the actions and movements of notable foreigners. This body includes
those spies who are available for hire by great bankers, the heads of
large business houses, the chiefs of great newspapers, or any other
private individuals of great wealth and position who for reasons of
their own, wish to have their employees, their acquaintances, or their
mistresses followed and their movements reported upon. Foreigners
and others whose presence is not considered desirable in France are
invariably tracked down by the spies of this department. (_D_) The
service of spies whose qualifications enable them to look out for
traits of insanity or eccentricity, especially in persons of wealth
and "in the interests of public health and security," it is officially
stated. There is then the Second Division, which is composed mainly of
a bureau the agents of which are stationed at the different ports of
France and who watch all suspicious characters landing in or leaving
France, or who, as occasion requires, visit foreign ports in quest of
criminal evidence; a subsidiary body of its spies are detailed to watch
malefactors and politicians of the municipal order. Finally there is
the "laboratory" to which the late M. Bertillon, the anthropometrician,
has given celebrity as chief of its Identification department, in
which criminals are measured or identified. In this department, should
the police be very anxious to possess the "identification dossier" of
any person who is suspected of criminal relations, the chiefs have
the suspect arrested on some pretext or other. He is at once haled to
the Identification bureau, where the officials go through the mock
process of recording his measures. Subsequently it is discovered that,
after all, he is not the person required, and he is released with much
apology. The bureau authorities nevertheless retain his card and when,
if ever, the suspect is caught in the act, he is sure to be confronted
with his record in measurements even though he have never so many
aliases.
As in Germany, so in France, that type of inferior spy who is known
by the term _mouchard_ is generally to be found among the municipal
inspectors of lodging-houses, the supervisors of night-houses, those
detectives whose business is the watching of the street-police, all of
which individuals have opportunities for picking up clues to more or
less important crime. There is also an inferior corps of _mouchards_
who are known by the expressive term _remueurs de casseroles_—that is
to say, persons whose business it is to stir up the social saucepan
in any district in order to bring minor details to light. As may be
supposed from their name, they move in the very lowest circles of the
unchosen races of evil and are generally to be hired, for a franc or
two the job, among waiters, money-lenders' touts, race-course "narks"
and such gentry. Spies are also, it is well known, sent in the guise
of convicted offenders among those already undergoing imprisonment,
with the object of bringing to the knowledge of the police further
details as to crimes already committed. Such a person is usually known
among French professional criminals by the name "_mouton_." All these
classes of spies may be said to come under the supervision of the chief
of the Third Division, who also takes charge of that portion of the
system which is detailed to watch the mining, the manufacturing and the
wine districts for the purposes of reporting on anything in the way
of "syndicalist" disaffection. The political _corps d'espionnage_ in
France numbers, it may be said, some 1000 paid agents of all grades of
society, men and women. They are expected to earn their living among
the class of people upon whom they report to the police, so that being
in regular employment their movements shall not be open to suspicion.
When the chief-of-division requires the service of a particular spy
at an established point, the individual chosen is requested formally
to present himself at district headquarters. Here he is informed by
the presiding chief that some details have been gathered concerning
his relations with a dishonest and punishable piece of business
which had taken place perhaps ten years before in, perhaps, another
neighbourhood, or even a different town. The visitor admits the fact,
but pleads that the occurrence is really statute-barred. The police
official declares himself ready to forget the matter provided his
visitor will consent to work on his behalf among the people of his
factory, or store, or municipality, as the case may be. There will be
a little money in it—according to the man's standing, and all he is
required to do is to forward once or twice weekly a letter detailing
conversations, opinions expressed by others, various acts, trysts and
so on of any or all of those with whom he works and consorts. The
prospective spy does not know, nor will he ever know, what object the
police have ultimately in view, or how important it is, or for what
stakes they are playing. He is in reality on the outside rim of some
gigantic movement the penetration of the inmost workings of which is
being sought. Naturally he consents and enters the public service as an
"agent of record."
In France, it is well established, each great newspaper has a spy who
is in receipt of occasional tips from the proprietor. His duty is to
watch editors, writers and reporters, their movements, the quality
of the people they visit and how they spend their spare hours. These
newspapers also employ their agents in other offices in order that
items of special interest in the way of news shall not be omitted by
their own papers. In the great banking-houses of Paris there are spies
paid from inside to spy upon employees and spies paid from outside
to spy on the especial details of the business, its investments, its
intentions and plans, and even these men are spied upon in their turn
to prevent their abusing their information on the Bourse. Politicians,
senators—all these are watched by colleagues who draw salaries from
the secret-service funds. Going back many years, it will be recalled
that at a critical moment in his political career, General Boulanger
fled from Paris because, as he explained to the reporters in Brussels,
his enemies had decided upon his seizure and imprisonment. It was
afterwards shown that the General's valet, one Georget, was a paid spy
in the service of the police, and Boulanger had taken him to Brussels.
Furthermore, the maid who waited upon Madame de Bonnemain, Boulanger's
mistress, was the sweetheart of Georget, and she also was a paid police
spy, the result being that the movements of both were perfectly well
known to the secret-service agents, who could have arrested the General
at any one of the twenty stations between Paris and Brussels. The
police were fully aware, indeed, as Boulanger himself was, that, his
cause being discredited, he no longer counted in politics or society.
The French War Office is now as well informed as any war office in
Europe and the war of 1914 may be held to have disproved the opposite
view. Into its secret intelligence bureau flows information from
every part of Europe. The military attaché of the present day is
responsible for much that is pigeon-holed in its offices—services
of transportation, war material, armaments, railroads, mobilisation
plans, finances—and there is little of moment in any other country
upon which French emissaries cannot throw all necessary light in the
way of special information. From the General Staff down every military
official collects his quota. He is trained what to observe, what to ask
about, what to look for and what to expect—plans of fortifications, new
guns, or parts of guns and so forth. Accordingly it is not surprising
to hear that France, which had neglected to watch, or who more probably
despised the internal enemy in 1870, had by 1914 perfected a system
of counter-espionage which totally neutralised that of Germany in
all directions. Since 1895 the French Code has been increased by
practically only one item of importance in regard to spies. The clause
in question states that "all dealings with the enemy, by private French
citizens, which shall have the effect of conveying knowledge that
hostile armies can make use of in war shall entail penal servitude
for life. In the case of officers or officials who are found to be
transmitting information to the enemy the penalty shall be death."
Renan has declared that, to the honour of France, it has ever been
found impossible to discover a traitor in her hour of trial. On the
whole this statement may be taken as representing the truth, and in
flagrant cases in which French citizens have been proved to have
betrayed their country, it has almost invariably been proved that the
offenders were of German origin.
X
GERMAN SECRET SERVICE
In order properly and fully to understand the nature of the German
system of spying, it is essential that we go down to fundamentals. The
principles on which it is based may be said to have their roots in the
character of the Germans themselves and that character has been largely
developed by a special type of ethical education, the lines of which
were to a great extent conceived by Frederick the Great as especially
applicable to the qualities of his people, and subsequently elaborated
into a kind of national philosophy by writers like Nietzsche,
Treitschke, Bernhardi and others, all of whom were the leaders of that
extreme pragmatical school of which we have spoken. Frederick, it may
be said, was like his descendant[1] of to-day, William the Second, a
man who outwardly professed religious principles and held the view
that Religion is absolutely necessary in a State government. In the
famous _Matinées du Roi de Prusse_, published in 1784, the Prussian
monarch is made, however, to say that the value of religion for the
people consists mainly in the fact that it enables their rulers to
hold them more completely in subjection. For a King to have any
religion whatsoever is, he is also said to have declared, a very unwise
policy, and for the reason, he adds, that "if a King fears God, or
more exactly, if he fears a future punishment, he becomes a greater
bigot than any monk. If a favourable opportunity presents itself of
taking forcible possession of a neighbouring province, immediately
an army of demons seems to him ready to defend it; he is weak-minded
enough to think he is going to commit an injustice and he proportions
the punishment of his crime to the extent of his evil designs. When he
is about to conclude a treaty with some foreign power, all is lost if
he stops to remember that he is a Christian, for by doing so, he will
always suffer himself to be duped and imposed upon."
It is only right to state here that the _Matinées_ have been disavowed
as the work of Frederick himself, and in the British Museum catalogue
are placed among the "doubtful and spurious" works relating to the
King of Prussia. It may be pointed out, however, that the "Testament
of Peter the Great" was also in its time disavowed, although the
policies it lays down for the Russianisation of the Near East have
always been followed to the letter by successive Tsars. It is certain,
too, that the successors of Frederick the Great on the Prussian
throne have followed in every sense the spirit of their ancestor's
alleged teachings and counsels, as far as indicated by the work under
consideration, and since the policies in regard to the conduct of war
and government, which were counselled as far back as 1784, are
to-day being followed and improved upon by German commanders, we make
no apology for assuming that the _Matinées_ fully represent the mind of
the monarch to whom they are attributed. As regards war, for example,
here is the alleged opinion of Frederick:
[Illustration: Frederick the Great
The founder of modern organised espionage]
"War is a business in which the slightest scruple is detrimental to
one's arms and policies. It may be said that no sovereign can seriously
enter into the business of war, if he feels he has not the right to
justify pillage, incendiarism and carnage," a declaration which allows
us to assume that at least _one_ Hohenzollern heart would never have
bled for the fate of Louvain, or Arras, or Rheims, in 1914.
Continuing to voice his opinions on religion, the King is made to say:
"Whatever we may think inwardly, impiety is never to be displayed at
any time, although we must adapt our sentiments and opinions to our
rank and standing in the world. It would be the height of folly, if a
monarch's attention was diverted by trifles of religion which are fit
only for the common people. Besides, the most complete indifference
for religious matters is the best means which a King can hold to
prevent his subjects from becoming fanatics. My ancestors acted in a
most sensible manner in dealing with religion, undertaking a religious
Reformation which, while it gave them a glorious apostolic halo, at
the same time filled their treasuries with money. The Hohenzollerns
began by being pagans, of course, but became Christians in the ninth
century in order to please the Emperors; in the fifteenth century they
became Lutherans in order to have an excuse to rob the Church, and
Reformers again in the sixteenth, in order to placate the Dutch over
the succession of Cleves."
In regard to Justice, Frederick declared that justice is due to the
subjects of a State, although it is especially necessary that rulers
should not be brought so far within the scope of justice that they
become themselves subject to it. "I am too ambitious and autocratic by
nature to suffer willingly the existence of another order within my
States which should restrict my action. It was for this reason that
I drew up a new code of laws. I am fully aware that I did away with
the real spirit of justice, but the truth was, I had become rather
afraid of the influence such notions exert among the common people.
A King must not allow himself to be dazzled by the word Justice: it
is only a relative term, and one which is susceptible of application
and explanation in different ways. Everyone likes to be just in his
own fashion, and as I early realised this, I decided to undermine the
foundations of that great power Justice. And so it has only been by
simplifying it as much as possible that I have been able to reduce it
to the point where I wanted it to be—that is, to a minimum. I could
never have accomplished anything had I been restrained by legal ideals.
I might have passed for a just monarch, but I should never have won the
title of a hero."
Of the value of a set policy in the world and as the only means of
achieving any success, Frederick had very decided notions: "As it has
been agreed among men that to cheat our fellow-creatures is a base and
criminal act, it has been necessary to find a word which should modify
the conception, and accordingly the term _policy_ was adopted. By the
word policy, I mean that we must always try to dupe other people. This
is the only sure means of getting, not necessarily an advantage, but
a fair chance of remaining on an equal footing. I am, therefore, not
ashamed of making alliances from which only myself can derive entire
advantage; but I am never so foolish as not to break faith when my
interests require it, since I uphold the rectitude of the maxim that to
despoil one's neighbours is to deprive them of the means of injuring
one. Statesmanship can be reduced to three principles or maxims: the
first is to maintain your power and, according to circumstances, to
increase and extend it, just as I doubled my army on reaching the
throne for the sole purposes of conquest. Make sure of your army; have
plenty of money and bide a favourable time; you can then be certain,
not only of preserving your States, but of adding to them. The term
'balance of power' is one which has subjugated the whole world; in
reality, however, it is nothing but a mere phrase. Europe is a family
in which there are too many bad brothers and relatives, and it is only
by despising the whole system that vast projects can be formed. The
second principle is to make your allies serve you, and to throw them
off when they have ceased to be useful. The third principle is to make
yourself feared—this is the height of great statesmanship. All your
neighbours must be led to believe that you are a dangerous monarch who
is moved by no principle except martial glory. If they are convinced
that you would rather lose two kingdoms than not occupy a prominent
place in history, you are certain to succeed. Above all, let no one
within your kingdom write anything except to extol your actions and
efforts."
Given a political philosophy of this kind as the inspiration of the
Prussian idea—"Kultur," they call it—it is not hard to realise that the
essentially evil qualities of the government of Prussia were certain
ultimately to react upon the character of the people themselves. If
anyone should doubt the correctness of our view that non-constitutional
systems of government invariably require the support of vicious
subsidiary systems in order to assure their stability, as in the
militaristic regime of Napoleon, or the quasi-ecclesiastical rule of
Richelieu, a study of Prussian autocracy will soon put him in the way
of settled conviction. Since the day of Frederick, some one hundred
and twenty-eight years ago, the people of Prussia have only known such
liberty as is consistent with a bureaucracy the underlying conditions
of which are conceived on entirely military ideas—that is to say, the
type of individual freedom which we are accustomed to associate with a
feudalistic regime or rule by martial law. People who travelled much
on the Continent before the outbreak of the Great War may recollect how
on crossing the frontier of Belgium into Germany—at Herbesthal, if we
remember—one invariably seemed to experience much the same sensation
as that of exchanging the atmosphere of some warm and comfortable
sitting-room for the cold and formal conditions of a public office.
Once across the border, the military spirit seemed to predominate
everywhere, while among the friendly enough natives of the unofficial
classes there was a subdued not to say cowed demeanour which was in
saddening contrast with the free-and-easy cheeriness of the people just
left behind. Everywhere was there evidence of set discipline and on all
hands the spectre of officialism appeared to darken the daily lives of
men with some sort of unexpressed threat. Even fair and open dealings
seemed among the townsmen to be undertaken with the consciousness
that at any moment some furtive official might come upon the scene
and utter the irrevocable _verboten_—forbidden. Later in the noisy
gaieties of the beer-garden or music-hall, one ever seemed to note
that fear of the boisterous schoolboy who under the watchful eye of a
forbidding master never ceases even in the fullness of his frolic to
wonder just how far he is allowed to go. "Germany," says the admirable
Price Collier, "has shown us that the short-cut to the government of a
people by suppression and strangulation results in a dreary development
of mediocrity." In our opinion the American might have added that a
nation which is ruled as if it were a country of convicts, actual or
potential, cannot fail inevitably to develop in a pronounced degree
those symptoms of character and predisposition which land your convict
in the correctional institutions where he is most commonly to be found.
"Prussia and Germany," again says Collier, "are still ruled socially
and politically by a small group of, roughly, fifty thousand men, eight
thousand of them in the frock-coat of the civilian official and the
rest in military uniforms."
It is the fashion to say that Doctor Stieber was the organiser of the
modern spy system of Germany, for the conduct of which some million
pounds sterling are annually appropriated. The truth is, however,
that the organisation goes much farther back, a well-known statesman
of the Napoleonic period, Baron Stein, having been responsible for
the practical application of the theories which lie implicit in the
philosophy of Frederick the Great. In his turn, Stieber assumed control
of the lines and developed them to a point at which improvement became
almost impossible. Stieber was a typical adventurer of the middle
class, a man who, it is clear enough, had in him all those elements
of character which we associate with the criminal who operates along
the higher lines. It is said that he qualified as a barrister, not so
much with the object of practising law, as to discover its limitations,
or in other words, to know for a certainty how far scheming and
the exploitation of simpler natures can be made a lawful trade. He
was born in Prussia in 1818, and having been called to the Prussian
Bar, sought to apply his knowledge of legal matters as a kind of
counsellor in a Silesian factory, Silesia being in those days, 1847,
the nursery of that vast school of Socialism which has since gained
over twenty millions of adherents throughout Germany—indeed, one-third
of the empire's entire population. By far the larger percentage of
the workmen attached to the factory at which he was employed were
Socialists, and Stieber realised that if he could only penetrate the
secrets and methods of this important socialistic nucleus, he might
prove undoubtedly serviceable to the central government in Berlin.
Accordingly he joined the Socialist brotherhood, professing to be
entirely in sympathy with their aims and aspirations, and in a short
while became an acknowledged leader of the Silesian movement. As a man
of superior education, Stieber gained admittance to the family of the
firm which employed him, won the heart of his employer's daughter and
married her.
It is certain that by 1848 he was already in touch with officials at
the chief police bureau in Berlin, and traitor that he was, in order
further to ingratiate himself with the Berlin authorities, Stieber
persuaded his wife's uncle to enter into the Socialistic movement,
the new recruit compromising himself so deeply by the violence of his
radical opinions and utterances that, with Stieber's complicity,
he was denounced, arrested and imprisoned on the ground that he was
inciting the Silesians to revolt against the government. To have been
a Socialist about 1850 was, it may be said, as bad as to have been
an Anarchist in the last years of the nineteenth century, when that
movement was at its height. The arrest of a relative through Stieber's
instrumentality was accordingly a real earnest of his good disposition
towards existing authority, and it was readily realised that in this
recruit there was all the baseness and treachery which Berlin looked
for in its officials. Stieber was summoned to Berlin, where he was
given a commission in the secret police, with the duty of allying
himself to the Socialist movement and reporting as to its progress,
designs and machinations to headquarters in Berlin. Parenthetically,
it may be observed, the German word _stieber_ is equivalent to our own
term sleuth-hound, so that the spy was happy in his patronymic as well
as mentally adapted for his traitorous trade. A writer has described
him in the following terms:—"Herr Stieber is a man whose head, nose and
ears suggest a Hebrew strain, although it is known that his father was
a Gentile. There is in the general aspect of the face, and especially
in the drawn lines of the mouth, much of that self-justifying hardness
which is associated with the ideas given us of the Inquisition Fathers;
his eyes are almost white in their colourlessness. With subordinates
he adopts the loud airs of a master towards his slaves, and when in
the presence of high authorities he is self-abasing and quiet of voice,
wearing a smile of perennial oiliness and acquiescence, with much
rubbing of the hands, a Jewish characteristic."
His work in Silesia was so ably performed and so many arrests and
imprisonments followed as the result of his services, that the Berlin
authorities decided to employ their sleuth in the capital, where
already the Socialists were becoming an important enough body. Armed
with letters of introduction from his committees in Silesia, Stieber
arrived in Berlin and forthwith became a member of the principal
revolutionary clubs in the metropolis. The spy himself describes his
presentation to King Frederick William: "My duties required me as a
Socialist leader to head a procession of revolutionaries through the
capital. At a point in the progress of our bands, the King appeared
on the scene, and naturally felt but little at his ease, seeing
that the Socialists were the avowed enemies of all existing forms
of government and their representatives. Noting his trepidation, I
approached his majesty near enough to say: 'Sire, have no fear. I am of
your majesty's side and have taken every precaution for your safety.
In the meanwhile I must proceed with my rôle of leading these poor
deluded people.'" Notwithstanding that Stieber from this day became an
object of suspicion to men of the Socialist clubs who had known him in
Silesia, the influence of the King protected him and eventually took
him into the monarch's service with the title of "police-counsellor,"
a position which allowed him virtually to act on his own initiative and
independently of the minister of police. Stieber's real business in his
new post was to keep a close watch upon the ministerial or official
police, and that he did so with particular satisfaction to the Prussian
monarch, the latter one day admitted to the official chief of police
who was complaining of the officious activities and energies of the
police-counsellor, and suggested his removal on the ground that since
the man was a traitor to those with whom he professed to adhere, he
must necessarily be suspect in any cause in which he engaged. The King
replied:
"Stieber is more devoted to his King than to any cause and I reward
him well. He used to come to me from time to time and tell me what the
Socialists were doing, what their plans and intentions were and how on
one occasion they had debated the question of seizing the royal family
and establishing a Commune."
The minister of police was accordingly forced to realise that Stieber
had for several years been engaged in the double game of working for
the secret service as an agent and at the same time of spying upon
them at the instance of the King. A few days later he was appointed by
his royal patron chief of the Prussian secret service with a salary
of £1200 per annum. In his new capacity, as the confidential man of
the sovereign and the head of a system which operated almost as much
against the official police as against revolutionary bodies, the spy
had not only to organise the nucleus of that army corps of espionage
which by 1912 was said to number 45,000 active agents, but had also to
fight strong and influential enemies who saw with dismay the promotion
of this unknown intruder. In order to effect the complete independence
of his own body from all others which exercised kindred functions,
Stieber suggested the entire modernisation and specialisation of
his service with proper subsidies and adequate appropriations from
parliament, the department to enjoy autonomy under its presiding chief.
He undertook himself to organise an "internal" and an "external"
service, and here it may be said that the Russian dual system of
espionage has been based entirely on Stieber's ideas and, in so far,
differs not at all from the secret service of Prussia, except possibly
in that the almost entire absence of ideas of personal liberty renders
illegal acts and outrages far more frequent in Russia than in Germany.
It was Stieber also who inaugurated the well-established system of
court-spying which is known to exist at all the German capitals; he was
responsible for the corps of spies within government offices who spy
upon departmental bureaux, while a highly efficient body of clerks who
were employed in banking and commercial houses and all institutions
which possessed large internal and foreign relations were also paid in
proportion to tit-bits of information which they were able to place at
the disposal of his cabinet. To the King—clearly a worthy descendant
of Frederick II.—Stieber, by virtue of his office, had free access and
presented a daily report in person in which all and everything of any
import concerning the public and private life of men and women was made
known to the sovereign. On one occasion the King jokingly reproved his
spy, saying: "You give me all the information I require regarding the
private lives of my courtiers; but what about my brothers? They are
certainly not angels."
"Your Majesty had not authorised me to spy upon the Princes," replied
Stieber, "but in the meantime I had prepared myself against the
possibilities of your Majesty doing so. Here are three sealed documents
containing all there is to be known about their Royal Highnesses since
I have had the honour of serving."
By 1854 the chief agent had become a personage in Berlin, and although
the nobility of the higher rank would not receive him, Stieber found
many valuable acquaintances among the wealthy "climbers" of the capital
who were eager to be associated with the powerful chief confidant of
the King. When the special-service department was in full running,
Stieber was given orders to apply its methods to foreign countries and
accordingly by 1860 Austria, Bohemia, Saxony, Luxembourg and France
were under the observation of his employees. In 1855 the Reichstag
voted an appropriation of about £15,000 in order to "secure for the
State the benefits of useful intelligence," the secret-service agent
himself drawing some £1800 yearly from the fund. At this time, says a
writer of the period, Stieber was the most prominent official in the
kingdom. All were conscious of being closely watched by himself and
his agents and everyone was aware that ruin and dismissal could be
brought about at the nod of the chief, and accordingly Stieber effected
the entrance of himself and his wife into some of the best houses in
Berlin under veiled threats of disclosing secrets of moment unless his
advances were respectfully received. About this time, too, Stieber
began that collection of decorations which were to testify to the high
honour and esteem in which his King and country held him. He had no
proper military uniform and that which on official occasions he was
wont to wear resembled not a little the quasi-regimental garb of the
commissionaire. By 1860 it had become heavily covered with medals and
decorations.
Stieber's activities had enabled him to learn so much as to the inner
workings of the whole political and social fabric of Prussia and the
Germanic nations that an attempt to abolish the private police system,
undertaken by the Reichstag in 1855, had no practical result, although
Stieber disappeared for a short while from official life in that
year. It was certain, however, that the very extent of his private
information had made him a man who was no less dangerous than important
and who, in any case, was an individual who had to be calculated
with. Bismarck, an already-established figure in national politics,
was the first to realise this in 1864, when he was president of the
council of ministers and when Stieber was reinstated in active public
life. In the previous couple of years he had occupied his comparative
leisure by organising the Russian secret police, by discovering the
manœuvres and designs of a certain French _intrigante_ whose services
were being used by diplomats, the Tsar conferring on him the order of
Stanislaus and making him a large grant of money. Bismarck was well
aware of the splendid services Stieber had rendered to Russia and it
was with a view to making use of the chief's universal information
that he attached him to the foreign office as a secret-mission agent,
with instructions to proceed into Bohemia. It was already Bismarck's
intention to strike down Austria, even as he had struck down Denmark
in 1864 and as again he was to strike down France in 1870. Stieber's
mission was to prepare the invasion of Bohemia by supplying Bismarck
with all kinds of topographical information which must prove of the
first importance to German military commanders. It was information
which could only be acquired by a most minute inspection of the various
military routes available into Austria, and Stieber felt that this
could best be accomplished by disguising himself as a pedlar. His
stock-in-trade consisted of religious statues and indecent pictures.
During 1864, 1865 and 1866, the supposed pedlar, travelling with a
small wagon, mapped out in the completest detail the country through
which the Prussian armies marched in the last-named year to the victory
of Sadowa by which Austria finally surrendered any possible claim
she may still have entertained to hold the headship of the Germanic
States in Europe. Even Moltke, the Prussian organiser of victory, was
astonished at the vast amount of valuable military information by which
the spy had facilitated the rapid advance of his armies. "A man with a
genius for military combinations could not have done better for his own
purposes," declared the old Field-Marshal to Bismarck. King William,
too, while occupying Brunn as his headquarters after Sadowa, requested
the ex-pedlar to administer the town, explaining to both Bismarck and
the commander-in-chief his reasons in the following words:—
"One must not confine oneself to giving money to spies. One must also
know how to show them honour when they deserve it."
Stieber was Governor of Brunn, the capital of Moravia, for several
months, a position which Napoleon had also allowed his spy Schulmeister
to hold at several towns in his time. It has to be remembered,
however, that in both cases the spies were in districts about which
they were far better acquainted than any members of the military or
political _personnels_. Expediency also counted for something in each
appointment. At the close of the war he was appointed a Prussian
privy-councillor and minister of the national police. Asked afterwards
how much he had expended on his network of strategic spies and
traitors who practically sold Austria to Prussia in 1866, Stieber
replied:
"One cannot set down in dollars the value of bloodshed which has been
avoided, nor of victories which have been secured."
XI
GERMAN SECRET SERVICE—_continued_
That Stieber was admitted to the more intimate confidences of Bismarck
would seem indicated by the fact that in the year after Sadowa, the
chief of police suggested, he tells in his Memoirs, that he should be
entrusted with the task of doing in France what he had done in Bohemia.
This was in June 1867, when he asked Bismarck for eighteen months' time
in which to supply the Chancellor with all the military and regional
intelligence of the French frontiers and invasion zones, which it was
necessary to possess for a successful campaign. Prussia was then paying
some £52,000 a year for the secret-intelligence service, and Bismarck
was not slow to perceive that Stieber in his own way was making the
path of victory more smooth for von Moltke's commanders. In the month
of June the Chancellor had induced King William to confer on his
police-minister the order of the Red Eagle, and in the course of the
evening which followed the conferring of that decoration Bismarck and
Stieber were for long engaged in conversation, the momentous nature of
which was soon shown by the departure of Stieber, accompanied by his
aides, Zernicki and Kaltenbach, into France with the object of laying
down base-lines, as the surveyors put it. Among the various results of
that journey was the appointment of over 1000 spies within the invasion
zones with "head-centres" at Brussels, Lausanne and Geneva. Another
result of this journey, he himself tells, was his handing over to
Bismarck some 1650 reports of fixed local spies, in the pay of Prussia,
90 per cent. of them Prussians, which called for (_a_) the drafting of
large bodies of German agriculturists into districts which lay along
the possible routes of advancing German armies, and (_b_) the sending
of several thousands of female employees for service in public places
as barmaids or cashiers. It was emphasised that these women should
be "as pretty as possible." Several hundred retired non-commissioned
officers were to be sent to France, where local "fixed spies"
guaranteed them employment of a commercial kind. Furthermore in the
garrison towns in the eastern departments some fifty young and pretty
girls to act as servants in canteens were requisitioned by Stieber,
who laid stress on the fact that women of a "high type of morality"
would hardly serve his purpose, which was to extract information from
drinking soldiers. Several hundred more domestic servants were to be
placed among the homes of middle-class people such as doctors, lawyers,
merchants. From the year 1867, and in pursuance of Stieber's plans,
some 13,000 German spies of the minor order were asked for, itself a
sufficiently large body of immigrants, one would imagine, to awaken
the suspicions of alert French people. Between that year and 1870,
Stieber had added at least 20,000 more, all of them scattered in
various kinds of capacities along the routes of intended invasion from
Berlin and Belgium to Paris. There was one important interlude, however.
In 1867 an attempt was made on the life of Alexander II. of Russia by
a Pole, when that Emperor was paying an important political visit to
Napoleon III. Stieber was then in Paris with Bismarck, also attached
to the staff of the King of Prussia, who was a participator in this
meeting of sovereigns. Information had come to the Prussian minister
of police that an attempt was to be made on the life of Alexander.
Accordingly Stieber called on Bismarck, imparting to him this important
information. Bismarck assured his police-minister that he was already
acquainted with the plot to assassinate the Tsar.
"But," added the Chancellor, "we must allow this act to be attempted
and for political reasons. Nevertheless, we can assure the safety of
the Emperor by having the conspirators shadowed and arrested once
they have fired their revolvers. You, Stieber, must have your men on
the spot, and when the attempt is made, the assailant's aim must be
deflected. The very fact that an attack is made upon the Tsar while in
Paris will prevent the arranging of a Franco-Russian alliance which is
not just now to the interests of Prussia, and if the would-be assassin
is not condemned to death, a period of estrangement must follow
between France and Russia and this is just as I would have things to
be."
As it fell out, a young Pole actually made the attempt on the next day.
Stieber's men had shadowed him all through the night, till the very
moment in which he fired at the Tsar, the outrage taking place, but
without harmful results to the object of the attack. All had fallen
out as Bismarck had foretold, and with the subsequent failure of a
Paris jury to convict the youthful Pole, France was prevented, by the
estrangement which succeeded, from assuring herself the friendship
of an ally whose support might have changed the history of the
Franco-German War of 1870. The story is told in detail in Stieber's own
Memoirs, and we confess that, having read it several times with care,
we are ourselves forced to the conclusion that Bismarck's supposition
that a French jury would fail to convict the Pole was based upon
something much more tangible than the arts and processes of divination.
In other words, the impression left upon the mind is that Bismarck's
gold had subsidised the conspirators in the plot as well as the Paris
jurymen, in order to bring about a political situation which should not
interfere with his plans. Bismarck had already more than once proved
himself an expert in preparing his schemes far in advance, as the
Danish and Austrian wars had already proved, and as the Franco-German
War was even more fully to demonstrate.
When, in due course, and as a result of Bismarck's plan of forcing
a fight on the French at the psychological moment, war was declared
against France in July 1870, Stieber and his two lieutenants, Zernicki
and Kaltenbach, left for the Front with the headquarters staff. His
title was Chief of the Active-Service Police and his duties, drawn up
by himself, were as follows:—
1. To provide information to the Staff regarding the situation,
strength and movements of each of the French armies in the field.