CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLE

OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection,

taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my

personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving

to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at

Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by

the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached

the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the

opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within

easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our

presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.

But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as

prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would

be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--a

cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been so

long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a

line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs

nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or six

miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east of

the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet

above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more

before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout

Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. Just below the town

the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout

Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The

Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain

stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South

Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west

of that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end,

rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a

gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a

palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground,

between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse,

which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of

Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south,

thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain

was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in

Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending

down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it

useless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line in

Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout

Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications

on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with

occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy's

pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the

pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were

separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley

and town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were

shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to

the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically,

the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his

cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition

and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having

ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered

parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals

Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the

Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send them

to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were

consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to

them. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at

Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move

which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the

manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should

have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he

was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following

details were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was

ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by

Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a

division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move

down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite

Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had

passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under

General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under

General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of

night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,

down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive

away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder

of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river

to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge

as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his

eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen

moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave

and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the

river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of

hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road

parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.

It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at

Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By

seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in

possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily

fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock

the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was

fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over

the Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at

Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the

fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker

found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th

emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's

Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped

three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now

cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.

Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a

narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to

increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem

it. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled

up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating

the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only

eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,

which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side

of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river

opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and

abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good

supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so

long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full

supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to

hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In

five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport

and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops

were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witness

to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and

also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a

cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither

officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak

and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at

once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume

it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited

Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to

be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These

dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's

speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed

of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements

must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a

question of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfully

sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to

"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during

the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was

more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The latter had the

people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and

prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution

abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which

degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.

With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have

extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor

allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming

degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." The

system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people

poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small

slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the

slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy

with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The

war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood

and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of

supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover

the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to

Hooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to

march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach

Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made

on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battle

commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three

miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel

troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road

was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and

captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many

prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to

reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about

three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that

the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of

the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's

teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules also

became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded

directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a

charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the

battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward

disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and

four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,

captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416

killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops

buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a

hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our

supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation

of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek

comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of

the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,

and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This

creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two

lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from

the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an open

country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed

some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left.

When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the

call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied,

"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their

tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,

were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their post

called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commanding

general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant." Their line in a

moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I

returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the

two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the

stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing

water for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed there

at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.

Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced

conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very

polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General

Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions--but not with a view of

gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode

off.

Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2 · 第 2 / 33 章