Close country has a marked influence on Tactics owing to the
restrictions it imposes on view and on movement. Forest, jungle, and
bush, mountains and ravines, rivers and streams are natural obstacles,
while cultivation adds woods and plantations, fences and hedges, high
growing crops, farm houses, villages and towns, with sunken roads below
the surface of the adjoining land, and civilisation brings in its train
a network of railways and canals with embankments and bridges, and the
natural difficulties of close country are thereby increased. The
obstruction to movement is more or less constant, except in
"continental" climates, where frost and snow render movement possible
in winter over the deepest rivers or marshes, and over roads and tracks
which are scarcely practicable in the summer season. The obstruction
to view is greater when trees and hedges are in leaf than when the
leaves have fallen.
When the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in close country are
weighed in the balance there appears to be a distinct tendency in
favour of the Attack over the Defence.
An Attacking force can usually obtain cover in the early stages of the
action and loss can therefore be avoided in approaching the objective,
while the screening of its movements and dispositions generally enables
the Attacking force to surprise the Defence as to the direction and
weight of the blow to be delivered. Troops fighting in close country
are often unable to see what is going on around them, and the "sense of
security" is lessened by the knowledge that a flank may be successfully
assailed without warning. This favours the {156} Attack more than the
Defence, as the counter-attack, which is the soul of all defensive
operations, requires previous organisation to be thoroughly effective.
SAVAGE WARFARE.--In Savage Warfare the inherent difficulties of
fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of
numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical
courage of the savages. Discipline, self-reliance, vigilance, and
judgment in the application of the Principles of War, are required to
overcome these added difficulties. A vigorous offensive, Strategical
as well as Tactical, is _always_ the best method of conducting
operations in Savage Warfare, and for the purpose of Protection
vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other
form of warfare. At _Isandhlwana_ (January 22, 1879) the British camp
at the foot of Isandhlwana Hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a Zulu
Army, 10,000 strong, and almost the whole of the garrison killed; and
yet in the evening of the same day 120 all ranks (40 sick being
included in that number) beat off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus
at _Rorke's Drift_. In the operations after the fall of Khartoum a
desert column under Major-General Sir J. McNeill was surprised in dense
bush while constructing a zeriba at _Tofrik_ (March 22, 1885), but
after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the Mahdist Arabs were driven off
with more than 1,000 killed. In the operations in Upper Egypt against
the invading Mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led
to the _Battle of Toski_ (August 3, 1889) and resulted in the defeat
and complete destruction of the invaders, with but slight loss to the
Anglo-Egyptian force under General Sir F. W. Grenfell. At the
beginning of the Christian Era three well-disciplined Roman legions
were decoyed into the fastnesses of the _Teutoberger Wald_ (A.D. 9) and
there attacked and annihilated by the Cherusci, a Saxon tribe, under
their king Arminius, and this defeat of Quintilius Varus is included by
Sir Edward Creasey among the {157} "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the
World." Fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes
is frequently the task of British troops in East and West Africa, while
the Indian Frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions
against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts. In "Field
Service Regulations" (Part II.), 1921, the peculiarities of various
savage races by whom the Outposts of the British Empire are liable to
be assailed are carefully noted.
IN CIVILIZED WARFARE.--The military history of Europe and America
abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country. In all ages
woods and villages play an important part in war. They form natural
magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood. The fact of their
being easily visible, and named on maps, causes them to be adopted as
objectives in the Attack or as boundaries in the Defence, and in all
operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of
cover, or to obtain water, supplies, and shelter. Their situation is
also likely to make them of tactical importance, as woods are
frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive
scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main
position, while villages are naturally situated on roads, which must be
guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops. In
Position Warfare the wood and the village are of the highest
importance, and whenever they are situated along the alignment, or near
the front, of a defensive position, they may always be assumed to be
occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually
supporting tactical points. The names of woods, large and small, and
of the most insignificant villages, were of everyday occurrence in
reports on the fighting on the Western Front in the Great War as the
scene of furious encounters, of attacks and counter-attacks, and there
are 67 references to copses, woods, and forests in Marshal Haig's
Dispatches. It {158} appears, however, to be generally admitted that
close country in general, and woods and villages in particular, favour
Delaying Action rather than a protracted Defence, and in Position
Warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the Attack on account
of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of
movement.
There are many instances of successful Delaying Action in woods and
villages. Some of the characteristics of such fighting were
exemplified in the Franco-Prussian War. At the _Battle of Gravelotte_
(August 18, 1870) the Bois de Vaux, on the left of the French position,
induced Marshal Bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank, as it
appeared to invite attack; whereas he was defeated by a turning
movement on the _other_ flank. During an attack through the Bois de
Vaux a Prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all
cohesion was lost, a common danger in wood fighting. At the earlier
_Battle of Spicheren_ (August 6, 1870), however, two battalions
maintained their order and cohesion in Pfaffen Wood, and by moving
through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order. A
tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified
at the same battle. Other Prussian troops had captured Gifert Wood and
the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position
through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood.
At the _Battle of Worth_ (August 6, 1870) two French battalions held up
the attack of 18,000 Prussians for over an hour in the Niederwald,
although no fortifications were employed; the difficulty of debouching
from a captured wood was then experienced by the Prussians, as the
farther edge was kept under heavy fire by French troops in the
neighbouring Elsasshausen Copse. A decisive counter-attack cannot
usually be organised in such warfare, although Lee managed to employ
17,000 troops for that purpose with complete success at the _Battle of
the Wilderness_ (May 5-6, 1864). Local {159} counter-attacks, however,
are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods, and in the
Niederwald, at the _Battle of Worth_, several spirited counter-attacks
were made by the 96th French Regiment.
Villages are even more attractive to troops than woods, and they figure
in all battles as local centres of resistance. One of the most
spirited defences of a village took place at the _Battle of Sedan_
(September 1, 1870) when a heroic struggle was maintained by French
marine infantry in the village of _Bazeilles_, and after the white flag
had been hoisted over the Fortress of Sedan the fight was stubbornly
maintained at the village of Balan, the second line of defence of the
Bazeilles position. Visitors to the battlefield of Sedan are shown a
little inn with the title, _A La Dernière Cartouche_, in commemoration
of the struggle. A highly successful Night Attack was made by the
French on the village of _Noisseville_ (August 31, 1870), the normal
difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise
and the darkness.
THE ATTACK ON WOODS.--The opening stages of the attack on a wood
resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer
fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field
of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak
points must be achieved. Flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under
these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending
troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is
necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while
advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close
range. Supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops
in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. Machine
guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support,
the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on {160}
stockaded defenders. Small woods should usually be attacked from the
flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards,
while machine guns and Lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements
reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. During
the German counter-attacks at Cambrai (November 30-December 4, 1917)
_Tanks_ were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and
were in a great measure responsible for the capture of _Gauche Wood_,
acting in co-operation with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th
Cavalry Division and with the Guards' Division; but although they
reached the outskirts of _Villers Guislain_ they were forced to
withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to
the fire of the enemy's machine guns. At the _Battle of Messines_
(June 7, 1917) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance
by overcoming the machine guns posted in Fanny's Farm. Generally
speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the
many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is
limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of
approach. During the fighting for the interior of the wood
"reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the
flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on
account of the liability to counter-attack. Touch must also be kept,
to avoid loss of direction. In the _advance from the captured
position_ great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have
established a fire position within close range it may only be possible
to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or
neutralised that position. It may even be necessary to hold the rear
edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from
both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against
the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in
the further edge. If the fire position is to be carried by direct
assault, or if {161} it can be got under control and the advance is to
be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood
(care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy
before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood.
DEFENCE OF A WOOD.--The outer edge of a wood is particularly
vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for
purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while
the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to
enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and Lewis guns being
particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and
strengthened emplacements. The perimeter should be divided into
sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. Lines
of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral
communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished
marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be
saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. The second
line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from
which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and Lewis guns,
and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to
counter-attack. If the wood is too far from the Outpost Zone of the
defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to
neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed
avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a
fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer
heavy loss or annihilation. In most cases, an attacking force will be
harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by
_fighting patrols_, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with
entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to
collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns.
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THE ATTACK ON VILLAGES.--There are three phases in the attack on a
village as in the attack on a wood. In the fight for the outer edge,
the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both
flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover
of fire from machine guns and Lewis guns.
The second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the
village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and
dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. All captured
points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be
prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Troops must be trained to enter
buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads,
close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult
without undue exposure. Light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be
fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street
barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and
machine guns and Lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting
or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from
a commanding position at the end of a street. _The Tank_ is at its
best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any
street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but
it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as
a principal.
In the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the
supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the
capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as
essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the
struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be
expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. In issuing
from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions
in rear can be brought under control will also be required.
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DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE.--It is difficult to avoid the inclusion of
villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded
for water, cover, and shelter, but while villages assist in the
Delaying Action they are liable to become "shell traps" in a prolonged
defence, unless there is good cellarage accommodation, while the local
effect of a bursting shell is also increased.
There are certain principles common to all defensive action in village
fighting:--
(1) The garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a
definite commander.
(2) The forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the
village, partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to
artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing
itself in the forward buildings. In the case of a small village it
will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding
the edge by fire, with a view to enticing the attack into the "funnel"
thus provided.
(3) Supports and Reserves must be centralised in order that they may be
readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks, by which
means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy.
(4) Houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged, while
house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the
defenders' power of manoeuvre.
(5) The interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of
machine guns and Lewis guns, but while churches and halls, and the
inner edge of village greens and of squares, should be prepared for
determined resistance, such places should not be occupied as billets,
owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment.
(6) The natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting
require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the
part of all leaders, and special arrangements must be made for
collecting information in report centres, the position of which must be
made known to all ranks in the defending force.
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