There are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in
certain military operations. Secrecy is usually the aim of all movement,
and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the Air
Service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements
being made during the hours of darkness. In all Night Operations (except
marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the
main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps
must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to
prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of
subordinates. Orders will be communicated beforehand only to those
officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the
position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is
absolutely necessary. It may even be advisable, in order to deceive
spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. Secrecy of
intention as well as of preparation is essential. Frederick the Great is
reported to have said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans I would burn
it!"
NIGHT MARCHES.--Night Marches are the movement of columns in march
formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day;
but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit,
deceive, and surprise the enemy--the principal aim of the strategist--by
outflanking his position, by anticipating him in the occupation of a
locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which
appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. {145} Forces may
also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is
imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. Long marches of
this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are
made with such an object in view, the "March" may be said to terminate
when the Position of Assembly is reached, and from that point to become
an "Advance" or an "Assault." There are certain essentials to success:--
I. _Direction_ towards the objective must always be maintained. The
route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the
Advanced Guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the
route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should
be secured. Across open country a general direction can be maintained by
means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compass. (See
Chapter VIII., "Manual of Map Reading.")
II. _Protection_ against surprise attacks must be provided by Advanced,
Flank, and Rear Guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of
mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service.
The Advanced Guard will be small, and will usually consist of Patrols
within 100 yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the
rest of the Advanced Guard in collective formation. The Rear Guard will
also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. Flanks will
usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted
by the Advanced Guard, and withdrawn by the Rear Guard.
III. _Secrecy_ must be maintained, and orders issued as late as
possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. The march
{146} itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of
any kind. Care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds, and horses
likely to neigh must be left with the train. In the case of a march to
elude the enemy, Outposts will remain in position until daylight and will
be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and
bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning.
IV. _Connection_.--Every commander must have and must maintain a fixed
place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each
unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such
commanders at all times. Units must be closed up, and the usual
distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained
between units and their sub-divisions. The pace should be uniform, but
not more than 2 miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including
halts. The time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting,
and units must regain any distance lost before halting. After crossing
or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then
be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should
be detailed to superintend these matters. In addition to these general
principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb"
with all concerned:--
An officer must march in rear of each unit.
All ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack.
Fire will not be opened without orders.
Magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber.
There must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights.
{147}
When halted, men may lie down in their places, but must not quit the
ranks.
NIGHT ADVANCES.--Night advances are the movement of deployed troops to
gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an
assault at dawn. They may take place as a preliminary to an engagement,
or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success. In
the first case they are usually the sequel to a Night March, and in
either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn. Surprise
is the main object, even when they are undertaken for the purpose of
gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight, from which to renew an
engagement, as frequently happens during a campaign in a War of
Manoeuvre, while such advances are common features of Position Warfare.
In any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately, as a
counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected, and if the
ground offers difficulties for entrenching, the necessary materials must
be carried by the troops. Successive advances of this nature may enable
the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault, and such
advances may be made on successive nights, the ground won being defended
meanwhile against counter-attacks. Unless troops are already deployed
for the advance, a Position of Assembly will need to be selected, with a
further Position of Deployment; but these positions sometimes coincide.
The deployment will be, as a rule, into shallow columns on a narrow
frontage at deploying intervals, in order that the final deployment of
the leading columns into the Forward Troops of the Attack may take place
without delay when the moment for the assault arrives. On reaching the
objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line, and each
unit would entrench itself on the new position. As it is essential for
success that _direction_ should be maintained and _connection_ preserved,
the ground over which the advance is to be made must be {148} examined
beforehand and landmarks noted, and touch must be kept by means of ropes
or any available device. Care must also be taken in consolidating the
position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the
enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire.
Night Assaults.--Night Assaults are delivered by troops already deployed
into attack formation. It is an established tactical principle that
"when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is
probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from
a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of
a night assault." These conditions are frequently so unfavourable in
Position Warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to
the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are
made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of
daylight. During the _Battle of the Somme_ (July 1-17, 1916) a night
advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about 4 miles. The
troops moved out in the early hours of July 14, for a distance of about
1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some 300 to 500
yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong
patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid
out on the ground earlier in the night of July 13-14. The whole movement
was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The
assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m., when there was just sufficient light
to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the
whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery
barrage. They swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and
consolidated their position in the defences beyond.
On the night of February 10-11, 1917, the 32nd Division attacked and
captured 1,500 yards of trench {149} line at the foot of the _Serre
Hill_. The division formed up after dark and the attack began at 8.30
p.m., the objective was captured, and at 5 a.m. a determined
counter-attack was repulsed. The capture of the _Vimy Ridge_ by Canadian
troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on April 9,
1917: and the British victory of Messines (June 7, 1917) to an assault
launched at 3.10 a.m. In the latter case the Wytschaete-Messines
position, "one of the Germans' most important strongholds on the Western
Front, consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate
system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt
over a mile in depth, and the Germans had omitted no precautions to make
the position impregnable" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). Nineteen deep
mines under this position were fired at 3.10 a.m., and this was the
signal for the assault, which was immediately successful and was carried
out under intense artillery protecting fire. By nightfall of June 7 the
whole position had been recaptured, heavy losses inflicted, and over
7,000 prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost, by the II. Army,
under General Sir H. C. O. Plumer. During the German offensive in 1918 a
counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the
village of _Villers Brétonneux_. The attack was launched at 10 p.m. on
the night of April 24-25. By daybreak the village was surrounded, and by
the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of 1,000 prisoners.
Among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the
Allies in July, 1918, was a highly successful night attack by the 2nd
Australian Division, on a front of about 2 miles, south of _Morlancourt_
(June 10, 1918). At 4.35 a.m. on May 12, 1864, one of General Ulysses
Grant's Corps, under General Hancock, assaulted "the Salient," part of
General Robert Lee's entrenchments in The Wilderness of Virginia
(_Spottsylvania_). 20,000 men were assembled and a night advance was
made, {150} directed by compass, on an unusually dark and stormy night,
with part of the line of the advance densely wooded. The assault was
ordered for 4 a.m., but a dense fog delayed the signal until 4.35 a.m.
When the order was given, one of the divisions had some difficulty in
making its way through a wood and marsh, but contrived to keep up with
the others, and reached the abattis at the same time. The assault
resulted in the capture of 4,000 prisoners and inflicted losses with the
bayonet of over 2,000, with a total loss to the assailants of about
2,000. This manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole
corps to a Position of Assembly within 1,200 yards of the hostile
outposts, of an advance before dawn, and of a final assault of 20,000
troops. The captured salient was afterwards retaken by the Confederates
by a decisive counter-attack, rendered possible by the provision, in rear
of the salient, of a second line of entrenchments (see _Battle of
Spottsylvania_).
Owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the
attacking movement, Night Assaults do not now carry the same comparative
advantages over Daylight Attacks as was the case before the introduction
of _Smoke_. Hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited
objective, as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special
tactical localities. But by employing Smoke only two elements of
Surprise can be achieved. The _direction_ and _weight_ of the blow are
concealed, but the appearance of Smoke will warn the enemy to expect an
attack, and the _time_ of the blow is thus revealed. Smoke will probably
be employed extensively in modern warfare and, except against an
ill-trained and undisciplined enemy, assaults by night will generally be
undertaken to gain tactical points, to drive in advanced troops and
Outposts, to capture advanced and detached posts, to rush an isolated
force guarding a bridge or defile, and in carrying out enterprises of a
similar nature, in order to gain advantages {151} for further operations
in daylight. When more important assaults are made, a larger force than
a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective, although a
series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a
wide front. A Night Assault was delivered by two Federal brigades on the
Confederate bridgehead at _Rappahannock Station_ (November 7, 1863). One
of the brigades was ultimately repulsed, but the other penetrated the
Confederate position and cut off the retreat. Upwards of 1,500 of the
defenders were captured or killed, and the small remnant evacuated the
bridgehead. In the Second Afghan War, General Sir F. Roberts marched up
to the high passes leading out of the Kurram into the interior of
Afghanistan, with a column of 3,200 all ranks and 13 guns. He was
opposed by the Amir's force of about 18,000 men with 11 guns at _Peiwar
Kotal_ (December 2, 1878). Sir F. Roberts detached the greater part of
his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the Afghan position and
attacked at daylight. The Night March and subsequent attack were
completely successful. The enemy was defeated with great loss and all
his guns captured, the British losses being 20 killed and 78 wounded.
_Tel-el-Kebir_ was an example of a Night March in battle formation of a
force of 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns, to attack an
entrenched position at dawn, the object being to surprise the enemy and
to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a
prolonged fire action. It resulted in a victory which decided the
Egyptian campaign, and added the Nile Valley to the British Empire. Sir
Garnet Wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast, with
its left resting on the railway, and was successfully carried out, the
troops reaching a position, varying from 300 to 900 yards distance from
the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the
march. The Egyptian Army, under Arabi Pasha, fought steadily, and again
and again renewed the fight, after falling back {152} within their
entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position
captured. The British loss was only 459 all ranks, and the Egyptians
lost upwards of 2,500 killed and wounded, the remaining 23,000 being
dispersed or captured. A daylight advance and assault of so strong a
position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a
cost to the attacking troops. In the South African War there were two
examples of the unsuccessful Night Attack. Major-General Gatacre essayed
a Night March followed by a Night Attack upon the Boers' position at
_Stormberg_ (December 10, 1899), but he was misled by his guides in
unknown ground and was himself surprised by the Boers and forced to
retire with a loss of over 700 officers and other ranks. On the
following day Lord Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position
between the Upper Modder River and the Kimberley road. In a Night Attack
on _Magersfontein Hill_ (December 11, 1899) the Highland Brigade came
under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its Brigadier
(A. G. Wauchope) and 750 officers and other ranks. In the later stages
of the South African War, however, Night Marches followed by Raids were
employed with marked success, particularly in the Eastern Transvaal in
November and December, 1901.
Except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be
necessary to choose Positions of Assembly and of Deployment, and to
precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead
and on the flanks, within 100 yards of the following troops. On arrival
at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of
the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for
the various units. A scout from each Forward Platoon can thus mark the
inner flank on which his Platoon will rest, and the direction of the
whole line will be assured.
The troops will usually advance, during the earlier {153} stages, in
shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may
maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached.
Owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and
the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations, no
greater rate than 1 mile an hour can be counted on. When several
objectives are in view a corresponding series of Positions of Assembly
and Deployment will be required, and care must be taken that the various
advancing forces do not converge.
Owing to the difficulty of recognition, a distinguishing mark will
usually be worn by the troops engaged, a watchword will usually be
adopted and made known to all ranks, and the commander and staff should
wear easily distinguishable badges. If hostile patrols are encountered
it is essential that they should be silenced, and any one encountered who
is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be
similarly treated.
The risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be
provided against, and Engineers or Pioneer Infantry should be present for
removing such obstacles. If fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that
all hope of surprise has vanished, and the troops must then press on at
all costs; for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a
reasonable prospect of achieving their object, whereas a halt will
increase the enemy's power of resistance, and withdrawal will almost
certainly end in disaster.
In order that secrecy may be observed, details of the assault will
usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action
is required, until the Position of Assembly is reached; but before the
troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the
objective in general, the particular task of the unit, and the formation
to be adopted at the Position of Deployment. In addition to this
information, and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles
involved, {154} there are certain axioms which must become "rules of
thumb" with all ranks:--
Fire must not be opened without orders.
Magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber.
Until daylight the bayonet only to be used.
Absolute silence to be maintained until the signal for the assault is
given.
No smoking; no lights.
If obstacles are encountered each man will lie down in his place until
they are removed.
If hostile fire is opened, all ranks must press on at once with the
utmost spirit and determination and overpower the enemy with the bayonet.
{155}