Congress is sometimes complained of for wasting time in discussion, and

for not having, after a four months' session, arrived at any definite

plan of settlement. There has been, perhaps, a little eagerness on the

part of honorable members to associate their names with the particular

nostrum that is to build up our national system again. In a country

where, unhappily, any man may be President, it is natural that a means

of advertising so efficacious as this should not be neglected. But

really, we do not see how Congress can be blamed for not being ready

with a plan definite and precise upon every point of possible

application, when it is not yet in possession of the facts according to

whose varying complexion the plan must be good or bad. The question

with us is much more whether another branch of the government,--to

which, from its position and its opportunity for a wider view, the

country naturally looks for initiative suggestion, and in which a few

months ago even decisive action would have been pardoned,--whether this

did not let the lucky moment go by without using it. That moment was

immediately after Mr. Lincoln's murder, when the victorious nation was

ready to apply, and the conquered faction would have submitted without

a murmur to that bold and comprehensive policy which is the only wise

as it is the only safe one for great occasions. To let that moment slip

was to descend irrecoverably from the vantage ground where

statesmanship is an exact science to the experimental level of

tentative politics. We cannot often venture to set our own house on

fire with civil war, in order to heat our iron up to that point of easy

forging at which it glowed, longing for the hammer of the master-smith,

less than a year ago. That Occasion is swift we learned long ago from

the adage; but this volatility is meant only of moments where force of

personal character is decisive, where the fame or fortune of a single

man is at stake. The life of nations can afford to take less strict

account of time, and in their affairs there may always be a hope that

the slow old tortoise, Prudence, may overtake again the opportunity

that seemed flown by so irrecoverably. Our people have shown so much of

this hard-shelled virtue during the last five years, that we look with

more confidence than apprehension to the result of our present

difficulties. Never was the common-sense of a nation more often and

directly appealed to, never was it readier in coming to its conclusion

and making it operative in public affairs, than during the war whose

wounds we are now endeavoring to stanch. It is the duty of patriotic

men to keep this great popular faculty always in view, to satisfy its

natural demand for clearness and practicality in the measures proposed,

and not to distract it and render it nugatory by the insubstantial

metaphysics of abstract policy. From the splitting of heads to the

splitting of hairs would seem to be a long journey, and yet some are

already well on their way to the end of it, who should be the leaders

of public opinion and not the skirmishing harassers of its march. It

would be well if some of our public men would consider that Providence

has saved their modesty the trial of an experiment in cosmogony, and

that their task is the difficult, no doubt, but much simpler and less

ambitious one, of bringing back the confused material which lies ready

to their hand, always with a divinely implanted instinct of order in

it, to as near an agreement with the providential intention as their

best wisdom can discern. The aggregate opinion of a nation moves

slowly. Like those old migrations of entire tribes, it is encumbered

with much household stuff; a thousand unforeseen things may divert or

impede it; a hostile check or the temptation of present convenience may

lead it to settle far short of its original aim; the want of some

guiding intellect and central will may disperse it; but experience

shows one constant element of its progress, which those who aspire to

be its leaders should keep in mind, namely, that the place of a wise

general should be oftener in the rear or the centre than the extreme

front. The secret of permanent leadership is to know how to be

moderate. The rashness of conception that makes opportunity, the

gallantry that heads the advance, may win admiration, may possibly

achieve a desultory and indecisive exploit; but it is the slow

steadiness of temper, bent always on the main design and the general

movement, that gains by degrees a confidence as unshakable as its own,

the only basis for permanent power over the minds of men. It was the

surest proof of Mr. Lincoln's sagacity and the deliberate reach of his

understanding, that he never thought time wasted while he waited for

the wagon that brought his supplies. The very immovability of his

purpose, fixed always on what was attainable, laid him open to the

shallow criticism of having none,--for a shooting star draws more eyes,

and seems for the moment to have a more definite aim, than a

planet,--but it gained him at last such a following as made him

irresistible. It lays a much lighter tax on the intellect, and proves

its resources less, to suggest a number of plans, than to devise and

carry through a single one.

Mr. Johnson has an undoubted constitutional right to choose any, or to

reject all, of the schemes of settlement proposed by Congress, though

the wisdom of his action in any case is a perfectly proper subject of

discussion among those who put him where he is, who are therefore

responsible for his power of good or evil, and to whom the consequences

of his decision must come home at last. He has an undoubted personal

right to propose any scheme of settlement himself, and to advocate it

with whatever energy of reason or argument he possesses, but is liable,

in our judgment, to very grave reprehension if he appeal to the body of

the people against those who are more immediately its representatives

than himself in any case of doubtful expediency, before discussion is

exhausted, and where the difference may well seem one of personal pique

rather than of considerate judgment. This is to degrade us from a

republic, in whose fore-ordered periodicity of submission to popular

judgment democracy has guarded itself against its own passions, to a

mass meeting, where momentary interest, panic, or persuasive

sophistry--all of them gregarious influences, and all of them

contagious--may decide by a shout what years of afterthought may find

it hard, or even impossible, to undo. There have been some things in

the deportment of the President of late that have suggested to

thoughtful men rather the pettish foible of wilfulness than the

strength of well-trained and conscientious will. It is by the objects

for whose sake the force of volition is called into play that we decide

whether it is childish or manly, whether we are to call it obstinacy or

firmness. Our own judgment can draw no favorable augury from meetings

gathered "to sustain the President," as it is called, especially if we

consider the previous character of those who are prominent in them, nor

from the ill-considered gossip about a "President's party;" and they

would excite our apprehension of evil to come, did we not believe that

the experience of the last five years had settled into convictions in

the mind of the people. The practical result to which all benevolent

men finally come is that it is idle to try to sustain any man who has

not force of character enough to sustain himself without their help,

and the only party which has any chance now before the people is that

of resolute good sense. What is now demanded of Congress is unanimity

in the best course that is feasible. They should recollect that Wisdom

is more likely to be wounded in the division of those who should be her

friends, than either of the parties to the quarrel. Our difficulties

are by no means so great as timid or interested people would represent

them to be. We are to decide, it is true, for posterity; but the

question presented to us is precisely that which every man has to

decide in making his will,--neither greater nor less than that, nor

demanding a wisdom above what that demands. The power is in our own

hands, so long as it is prudent for us to keep it there; and we are

justified, not in doing simply what we will with our own, but what is

best to be done. The great danger in the present posture of affairs

seems to be lest the influence which in Mr. Lincoln's case was inherent

in the occasion and the man should have held over in the popular mind

as if it were entailed upon the office. To our minds more is to be

apprehended in such a conjuncture from the weakness than from the

strength of the President's character.

There is another topic which we feel obliged to comment on, regretting

deeply, as we do, that the President has given us occasion for it, and

believing, as we would fain do, that his own better judgment will lead

him to abstain from it in the future. He has most unfortunately

permitted himself to assume a sectional ground. Geography is learned to

little purpose in Tennessee, if it does not teach that the Northeast as

well as the Southwest is an integral and necessary part of the United

States. By the very necessity of his high office, a President becomes

an American, whose concern is with the outward boundaries of his

country, and not its internal subdivisions. One great object of the

war, we had supposed, was to abolish all fallacies of sectional

distinction in a patriotism that could embrace something wider than a

township, a county, or even a State. But Mr. Johnson has chosen to

revive the paltry party-cries from before that deluge which we hoped

had washed everything clean, and to talk of treason at both ends of the

Union, as if there were no difference between men who attempted the

life of their country, and those who differ from him in their judgment

of what is best for her future safety and greatness. We have heard

enough of New England radicalism, as if that part of the country where

there is the most education and the greatest accumulation of property

in the hands of the most holders were the most likely to be carried

away by what are called agrarian theories. All that New England and the

West demand is that America should be American; that every relic of a

barbarism more archaic than any institution of the Old World should be

absolutely and irrecoverably destroyed; that there should be no longer

two peoples here, but one, homogeneous and powerful by a sympathy in

idea. Does Mr. Johnson desire anything more? Does he, alas! desire

anything less? If so, it may be the worse for his future fame, but it

will not and cannot hinder the irresistible march of that national

instinct which forced us into war, brought us out of it victorious, and

will not now be cheated of its fruits. If we may trust those who have

studied the matter, it is moderate to say that more than half the

entire population of the Free States is of New England descent, much

more than half the native population. It is by the votes of these men

that Mr. Johnson holds his office; it was as the exponent of their

convictions of duty and policy that he was chosen to it. Not a vote did

he or could he get in a single one of the States in rebellion. If they

were the American people when they elected him to execute their will,

are they less the American people now? It seems to us the idlest of all

possible abstractions now to discuss the question whether the

rebellious States were ever out of the Union or not, as if that settled

the right of secession. The victory of superior strength settled it,

and nothing else. For four years they were practically as much out of

the Union as Japan; had they been strong enough, they would have

continued out of it; and what matters it where they were theoretically?

Why, until Queen Victoria, every English sovereign assumed the style of

King of France. The King of Sardinia was, and the King of Italy, we

suppose, is still titular King of Jerusalem. Did either monarch ever

exercise sovereignty or levy taxes in those imaginary dominions? What

the war accomplished for us was the reduction of an insurgent

population; and what it settled was, not the right of secession, for

that must always depend on will and strength, but that every inhabitant

of every State was a subject as well as a citizen of the United

States,--in short, that the theory of freedom was limited by the

equally necessary theory of authority. We hoped to hear less in future

of the possible interpretations by which the Constitution may be made

to mean this or that, and more of what will help the present need and

conduce to the future strength and greatness of the whole country. It

was by precisely such constitutional quibbles, educating men to believe

they had a right to claim whatever they could sophistically demonstrate

to their own satisfaction,--and self-interest is the most cunning of

sophists,--that we were interpreted, in spite of ourselves, into civil

war. It was by just such a misunderstanding of one part of the country

by another as that to which Mr. Johnson has lent the weight of his name

and the authority of his place, that rendered a hearty national

sympathy, and may render a lasting reorganization, impossible.

If history were still written as it was till within two centuries, and

the author put into the mouth of his speakers such words as his

conception of the character and the situation made probable and

fitting, we could conceive an historian writing a hundred years hence

to imagine some such speech as this for Mr. Johnson in an interview

with a Southern delegation.

"Gentlemen, I am glad to meet you once more as friends, I wish I might

say as fellow-citizens. How soon we may again stand in that relation to

each other depends wholly upon yourselves. You have been pleased to say

that my birth and lifelong associations gave you confidence that I

would be friendly to the South. In so saying, you do no more than

justice to my heart and my intentions; but you must allow me to tell

you frankly, that, if you use the word South in any other than a purely

geographical sense, the sooner you convince yourselves of its

impropriety as addressed to an American President, the better. The

South as a political entity was Slavery, and went out of existence with

it. And let me also, as naturally connected with this topic, entreat

you to disabuse your minds of the fatally mistaken theory that you have

been conquered by the North. It is the American people who are victors

in this conflict, and who intend to inflict no worse penalty on you

than that of admitting you to an entire equality with themselves. They

are resolved, by God's grace, to Americanize you, and America means

education, equality before the law, and every upward avenue of life

made as free to one man as another. You urge upon me, with great force

and variety of argument, the manifold evils of the present unsettled

state of things, the propriety and advantage of your being represented

in both houses of Congress, the injustice of taxation without

representation. I admit the importance of every one of these

considerations, but I think you are laboring under some misapprehension

of the actual state of affairs. I know not if any of you have been in

America since the spring of 1861, or whether (as I rather suspect) you

have all been busy in Europe endeavoring to--but I beg pardon, I did

not intend to say anything that should recall old animosities. But

intelligence is slow to arrive in any part of the world, and

intelligence from America painfully so in reaching Europe. You do not

seem to be aware that _something has happened here during the last

four years_, something that has made a very painful and lasting

impression on the memory of the American people, whose voice on this

occasion I have the honor to be. They feel constrained to demand that

you shall enter into bonds to keep the peace. They do not, I regret to

say, agree with you in looking upon what has happened here of late as

only a more emphatic way of settling a Presidential election, the

result of which leaves both parties entirely free to try again. They

seem to take the matter much more seriously. Nor do they, so far as I

can see, agree with you in your estimate of the importance of

conserving your several state sovereignties, as you continue to call

them, insisting much rather on the conservation of America and of

American ideas. They say that the only thing which can individualize or

perpetuate a commonwealth is to have a history; and they ask which of

the States lately in rebellion, except Virginia and South Carolina, had

anything of the kind? In spite of my natural sympathies, gentlemen, my

reason compels me to agree with them. Your strength, such as it was,

was due less to the fertility of your brains than to that of your soil

and to the invention of the Yankee Whitney which you used and never

paid for. You tell me it is hard to put you on a level with your

negroes. As a believer in the superiority of the white race, I cannot

admit the necessity of enforcing that superiority by law. A Roman

emperor once said that gold never retained the unpleasant odor of its

source, and I must say to you that loyalty is sweet to me, whether it

throb under a black skin or a white. The American people has learned of

late to set a greater value on the color of ideas than on shades of

complexion. As to the injustice of taxation without representation,

that is an idea derived from our English ancestors, and is liable, like

all rules, to the exceptions of necessity. I see no reason why a State

may not as well be disfranchised as a borough for an illegal abuse of

its privileges; nor do I quite feel the parity of the reason which

should enable you to do that with a loyal black which we may not do

with a disloyal white. Remember that this government is bound by every

obligation, ethical and political, to protect these people because they

are weak, and to reward them (if the common privilege of manhood may be

called a reward) because they are faithful. We are not fanatics, but a

nation that has neither faith in itself nor faith toward others must

soon crumble to pieces by moral dry-rot. If we may conquer you,

gentlemen, (and you forced the necessity upon us,) we may surely impose

terms upon you; for it is an old principle of law that _cui liceat

majus, ei licet etiam minus_.

"In your part of the country, gentlemen, that which we should naturally

appeal to as the friend of order and stability--property--is blindly

against us; prejudice is also against us; and we have nothing left to

which we can appeal but human nature and the common privilege of

manhood. You seem to have entertained some hope that I would gather

about myself a 'President's party,' which should be more friendly to

you and those animosities which you mistake for interests. But you

grossly deceive yourselves; I have nor sympathy but with my whole

country, and there is nothing out of which such a party as you dream of

could be constructed, except the broken remnant of those who deserted

you when for the first time you needed their help and not their

subserviency, and those feathery characters who are drawn hither and

thither by the chances of office. I need not say to you that I am and

can be nothing in this matter but the voice of the nation's deliberate

resolve. The recent past is too painful, the immediate future too

momentous, to tolerate any personal considerations. You throw

yourselves upon our magnanimity, and I must be frank with you. My

predecessor, Mr. Buchanan, taught us the impolicy of weakness and

concession. The people are magnanimous, but they understand by

magnanimity a courageous steadiness in principle. They do not think it

possible that a large heart should consist with a narrow brain; and

they would consider it pusillanimous in them to consent to the weakness

of their country by admitting you to a share in its government before

you have given evidence of sincere loyalty to its principles, or, at

least, of wholesome fear of its power. They believe, and I heartily

agree with them, that a strong nation begets strong citizens, and a

weak one weak,--that the powers of the private man are invigorated and

enlarged by his confidence in the power of the body politic; and they

see no possible means of attaining or securing this needed strength but

in that homogeneousness of laws and institutions which breeds unanimity

of ideas and sentiments, no way of arriving at that homogeneousness but

the straightforward path of perfect confidence in freedom. All nations

have a right to security, ours to greatness; and must have the one as

an essential preliminary to the other. If your prejudices stand in the

way, and you are too weak to rid yourselves of them, it will be for the

American people to consider whether the plain duty of conquering them

for you will be, after all, so difficult a conquest as some they have

already achieved. By yourselves or us they must be conquered.

Gentlemen, in bidding you farewell, I ask you to consider whether you

have not forgotten that, in order to men's living peacefully together

in communities, the idea of government must precede that of liberty,

and that the one is as much the child of necessity as the other is a

slow concession to civilization, which itself mainly consists in the

habit of obedience to something more refined than force."

THE SEWARD-JOHNSON REACTION

1866

The late Philadelphia experiment at making a party out of nullities

reminds us of nothing so much as of the Irishman's undertaking to

produce a very palatable soup out of no more costly material than a

pebble. Of course he was to be furnished with a kettle as his field of

operations, and after that he asked only for just the least bit of beef

in the world to give his culinary miracle a flavor, and a pinch of salt

by way of relish. As nothing could be more hollow and empty than the

pretence on which the new movement was founded, nothing more coppery

than the material out of which it was mainly composed, we need look no

further for the likeness of a kettle wherewith to justify our

comparison; as for the stone, nothing could be more like that than the

Northern disunion faction, which was to be the chief ingredient in the

newfangled pottage, and whose leading characteristic for the last five

years has been a uniform alacrity in going under; the offices in the

gift of the President might very well be reckoned on to supply the beef

which should lead by their noses the weary expectants whose hunger

might be too strong for their nicety of stomach; and the pinch of

salt,--why could not that be found in the handful of Republicans who

might be drawn over by love of notoriety, private disgusts, or that

mixture of motives which has none of the substance of opinion, much

less of the tenacity of principle, but which is largely operative in

the action of illogical minds? But the people? Would they be likely to

have their appetite aroused by the fumes of this thin decoction? Where

a Chinaman is cook, one is apt to be a little suspicious; and if the

Address in which the Convention advertised their ingenious mess had not

a little in its verbiage to remind one of the flowery kingdom, there

was something in that part of the assemblage which could claim any

bygone merit of Republicanism calculated to stimulate rather than to

allay any dreadful surmise of the sagacious rodent which our antipodes

are said to find savory. And as for the people, it is a curious fact,

that the party which has always been loudest to profess its faith in

their capacity of self-government has been the last to conceive it

possible that they should apprehend a principle, arrive at a logical

conclusion, or be influenced by any other than a mean motive. The

_cordons bleus_ of the political cooks at Philadelphia were men

admirably adapted for the petty intrigues of a local caucus, but by

defect of nature profoundly unconscious of that simple process of

generalization from a few plain premises by which the popular mind is

guided in times like these, and upon questions which appeal to the

moral instincts of men.

The Writings of James Russell Lowell in Prose and Poetry, Volume V Political Essays · 第 17 / 20 段