RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

My object, then, is to show how a system which embodies a large amount

of private enterprise can be made tolerable and acceptable to modern

ideas of equity. For this purpose we need to consider (1) what have we

done in that direction in the past? (2) what is the setting of the

economic problem to-day, and (3) what is to be our policy for the

future?

Dealing first with wealth and wages, the whole field of social

legislation has a bearing upon them, including particularly education,

elementary and technical, the Factory Acts, and a great mass of

legislation which has affected the earning powers of the worker and the

conditions under which he labours. Just before the war we had come to

the point of fixing a minimum wage in the mines, but an even more

important factor was that we had introduced the Trade Board system,

which had begun to impose a minimum wage in certain trades where wages

were particularly low. But the most important direct attack upon the

unequal distribution of wealth was by taxation in accordance with the

Liberal policy of a graduated and differential income-tax, and still

more important by taxes upon inheritance; for it has long been

recognised that though it may be desirable to allow men to accumulate

great wealth during their lifetime, it by no means follows that they

should be entitled to control the distribution of wealth in the next

generation and launch their children on the world with a great advantage

over their fellows of which they may be quite unworthy. On the question

of insecurity it cannot be said that any serious attack has been made on

the problem of how to diminish fluctuations of trade, but again the

Liberal solution for dealing with that difficulty was to remedy not the

cause but its effects by insurance.

On the question of monopolies and exploitation, though we hear a great

deal of the growth of capitalistic organisation, in fact we find that,

of the three greatest industrial countries in the world, Great Britain

is the least trust-ridden, mainly because of its free trade system. In

the case of enterprises not subject to foreign competition, we had begun

to develop a fairly satisfactory system of control of public utility

services which were of a monopolistic character.

Finally, there had been growing up a complete system of collective

bargaining and conciliation, and though we always heard of it whenever

there was dispute and strife, the ordinary public did not know that this

machinery was working and developing in many great and important

industries a feeling of co-operation or at all events of conciliation

between the two sides. I only mention these points very briefly in

passing in order to show that with the evolution of modern industry we

were already feeling our way, haltingly and far too slowly, it is true,

towards a solution of its most serious defects.

Turning to the present situation, we have to face the fact that Great

Britain is to-day faced with one of the most serious positions in its

economic history. We must make allowances for the readily understood

pessimism of a miners' leader, but it should arrest attention that Mr.

Frank Hodges has recently described the present situation as the coming

of the great famine in England. For nearly two decades before the war

there was occurring a slight fall in the real wages of British

workpeople. Food was becoming dearer, as the world's food supply was not

increasing as fast as the world's industrial population, and the

industrial workers of the world had, therefore, to offer more of their

product to secure the food they needed. Hence the cost of living was

rising faster than wages, except in trades where great technical

advances were being made. There is some reason to fear that the war may

have accentuated this tendency.

For some years the distant countries of the world have had to do without

European manufactured goods. You are all aware of the tendency, for

example, of India, Australia, and Canada to develop their own steel

resources and to create manufacturing industries of all kinds. Moreover,

we have lost part of our hold on the food-producing countries of the

world by the sale of our capital investments in those countries to pay

for the war. These and other considerations all suggest that we may find

it increasingly difficult to maintain our position as one of the main

suppliers of the manufactured goods of the world. In such circumstances

we shall be hard put to it to maintain, far less raise, the pre-war

standard of living.

How then are we to cope with this problem of retaining our economic

position? We can only hope to do it if the present financial

difficulties and obstructions working through the exchanges, by which

international commerce is restricted and constrained, are removed. We

can only do it if and so long as the conception of international

division of labour is maintained. And we can only do it if--granted that

we can induce the world to accept this principle of international

division of labour--we can prove ourselves, by our economic and

productive efficiency, to be the best and cheapest producer of those

classes of goods in which our skilled labour and fixed capital is

invested.

Assuming the financial difficulty is overcome, and that the old régime

of international specialisation revives, can we still show to the world

that it is more profitable for them to buy goods and services from us

than from other people? Can we compete with other industrial countries

of the world? The actual output of our labour in most cases is far less

than its potential capacity, partly because of technical conservatism,

and partly for reasons connected with the labour situation. How are we

to mobilise these reserve resources. I have only space to deal with the

second of these problems. In Germany labour is well disciplined, and has

the military virtues of persistence and obedience to orders in the

factory. But we cannot hope to call forth the utmost product of our

labouring population by drill-sergeant methods.

In America this problem is a different one, because the American

employer is often able to take full advantage of his economic position.

For he has a labouring population of mixed nationality, which does not

readily combine, and he can play off one section against the other.

British employers cannot, if they would, deal with British labour on the

principle of Divide and Rule. There is only one method by which we can

hope to call forth this great reserve capacity of British labour, and

that is by securing its confidence. If Free Trade is one of the legs on

which British prosperity rests, the other is goodwill and active

co-operation between the workman and his employer. How is that goodwill

to be gained?

The solution of that problem is only partly in the hands of the

politician; that is one of the reasons why it is extremely difficult to

suggest an industrial policy which is going to hold out the hope of

reaching Utopia in a short time. But it is obviously essential somehow

or another to develop, particularly among employers, the sense of

trusteeship--the sense that a man who controls a large amount of capital

is in fact not merely an individual pursuing his own fortune, but is

taking the very great responsibility of controlling a fragment of the

nation's industrial resources. And we have also to develop a conception

of partnership and joint enterprise between employer and employed.

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