“Distiktos,” said they, playfully turning the name of the humourist

into the argot of the street, “we find you charming just at the turn of

the tide, but when the flood comes in, _ne Dia!_ you are certainly _de

trop_. And in your own private interest, Distiktos, unless you really

want to lead a life totally anexetastic and forlorn, how can you go on

in that manner?”

FRANK MOORE COLBY

_American Civilization from the Foreign Point of View_

I. ENGLISH

II. IRISH

III. ITALIAN

I. AS AN ENGLISHMAN SEES IT

A little less than two years ago--on the 14 July, 1919, to be exact--it

fell to my lot, as an officer attached to one of the many military

missions in Paris, to “assist,” from a reserved seat in a balcony of

the Hotel Astoria, at the _défilé_, or triumphal entry of the Allied

troops into Paris.

The march _à Berlin_ not having eventuated owing to the upset in

schedule brought about by the entry of dispassionate allies at the

eleventh hour, it was felt that the French must be offered something

in exchange, and this took the happy form of a sort of community march

along the route once desecrated by Prussian hoof-beats--a vast military

_corbeille_ of the allied contingents, with flags, drums, trumpets, and

all the rest of the paraphernalia that had been kept in cold storage

during four years of gas, shell, and barbed wire. Such a _défilé_, it

was calculated, would be something more than a frugal gratification

to the French army and people. It would offer to the world at large,

through the medium of a now unmuzzled press, a striking object lesson

in allied good feeling and similarity of aims.

My purpose in referring to the _défilé_ is merely to record one

unrehearsed incident in it but I would say in passing that the

affair, “for an affair,” as the French say, was extraordinarily well

stage-managed. A particularly happy thought was the marshalling of the

allied contingents by alphabetical order. This not only obviated any

international pique on what we all wanted to be France’s day, but left

the lead of the procession where everybody, in the rapture of delivery,

was well content it should remain. Handled with a little tact, the

alphabet had once more justified itself as an impartial guide:

B is for Britain, Great.

A is for America, United States of.

* * * * *

For impressiveness I frankly and freely allot the palm to what it was

the fashion then to term the American effort. Different contingents

were impressive in different ways. The Republican Guard, jack-booted,

with buckskin breeches, gleaming helmets, flowing _crinières_, and

sabres _au clair_, lent just the right subtle touch of the _épopée_ of

Austerlitz and Jena to make us feel 1871 had been an evil dream; the

Highlanders, the voice of the hydra squalling and clanging from their

immemorial pipes, stirred all sorts of atavistic impulses and memories.

Nevertheless, had I been present that day in Paris as a newspaper man

instead of as the humblest and most obscure of soldiers, neither one

nor the other would have misled my journalistic instinct. I should have

put the lead of my “story” where alphabetical skill had put the lead of

the procession--in the American infantry.

In front the generalissimo, martial and urbane, on a bright coated

horse that pranced, curvetted, “passaged” from side to side under

a practised hand. At his back the band, its monster uncurved horns

of brass blaring out the Broadway air before which “over there”

the walls of pacifism had toppled into dust in a day. Behind them,

platoon by platoon, the clean shaved, physically perfect fighting

youth of the great republic. All six feet high--there was not one,

it was whispered, but had earned his place in the contingent by a

rigorous physical selection: moving with the alignment of pistons in

some deadly machine--they had been drilled, we were told, intensively

for a month back. In spotless khaki, varnished trench helmets, spick

and span, scarcely touched by the withering breath of war. Whenever

the procession was checked, platoon after platoon moved on to the

regulation distance and marked time. When it resumed, they opened out

link by link with the same almost inhuman precision, and resumed their

portentous progress. How others saw them you shall hear, but to me they

were no mere thousand fighting men; rather the head of a vast battering

ram, the simple threat of which, aimed at the over-taxed heart of the

German Empire, had ended war. A French _planton_ of the Astoria staff,

who had edged his way into the ticketed group was at my back. “Les

voilà qui les attendaient,” he almost whispered. “Look what was waiting

for _them_.”

The next balcony to mine had been reserved for the civil employés

of British missions, and here was gathered a little knot of average

English men and women--stenographers, typists, clerks, cogs of

commercialism pressed into the mechanical work of post-war settlement.

As the Americans moved on after one of the impressive checks of which

I have just spoken, something caught my ears that made me turn my head

quickly, even from a spectacle every lost moment of which I grudged. It

was, of all sounds that come from the human heart, the lowest and the

most ominous--the sound that makes the unwary walker through tropical

long grass look swiftly round his feet and take a firmer grasp on the

stick he has been wise enough to carry.

It is impossible--it is inconceivable--and it’s true. On this great

day of international congratulation, one of the two branches of the

Anglo-Saxon race was hissing the other.

* * * * *

I spoke about the matter later to a friend and former chief, whom I

liked but whose position and character were no guarantee of tact or

good judgment. I said I thought it rather an ominous incident, but

he refused to be “rattled.” With that British imperturbability which

Americans have noted and filed on the card index of their impressions

he dismissed the whole thing as of slight import.

“Very natural, I dare say. Fine show all the same. Perhaps your friends

on the other balcony thought they were slopping over in front.”

“‘Slopping over...?’”

“Well--going a little too far. Efficiency and all that. Bit out of step

with the rest of the procession.”

I have often wondered since whether this homely phrase, uttered by a

simple soldier man, did not come nearer to the root of the divergence

between British and American character than all the mystifying and

laborious estimates which nine out of ten of our great or near-great

writers seem to think is due at a certain period in their popularity.

To achieve discord, you see, it is not necessary that two instruments

should play different tunes. It is quite sufficient that the tempo of

one should differ from the tempo of the other. All I want to indicate

in the brief space which the scope of this work, leaves at my disposal

are just a few of the conjunctures at which I think the beat of the

national heart, here and across the Atlantic, is likely to find itself

out of accord.

* * * * *

Englishmen do not emigrate to the United States in any large numbers,

and it is many years since their arrival contributed anything but an

insignificant racial element to the “melting pot.” They do not come

partly because their own Colonies offer a superior attraction, and

partly because British labour is now aware that the economic stress is

fiercer in the larger country and the material rewards proportionately

no greater. Those who still come, come as a rule prepared to take

executive positions, or as specialists in their several lines. Their

unwillingness to assume American citizenship is notorious, and I think

significant; but it is only within quite recent years that it has been

made any ground of accusation--and among the class with which their

activities bring them into closest contact it is, or was until a year

or two ago, tacitly and tactfully ignored. During a review of the

“foreign element” in Boston to which I was assigned two years before

the war, I found business men of British birth not only reluctant to

yield “copy” but resentful of the publicity to which the enterprise of

my journal was subjecting them.

There are many reasons why eminent English writers and publicists are

of little value in arriving at an estimate of “how Americans strike an

Englishman.” While not asserting anything so crude as that commercial

motives are felt as a restraining force when the temptation arises to

pass adverse judgment on the things they see and hear, it is evident

that the conditions under which they come--men of achievement in their

own country accredited to men of achievement here--keep them isolated

from much that is restless, unstable, but vitally significant in

American life. None of them, so far as I know, have had the courage or

the enterprise to come to America, unheralded and anonymous, and to pay

with a few months of economic struggle for an estimate that might have

real value.

To this lack of real contact between the masses in America and Great

Britain is due the intrinsic falsity of the language in which the

racial bond is celebrated on the occasions when some political crisis

calls for its reiteration. It is felt easier and safer to utter it

in consecrated _clichés_--to refer to the specific gravity of blood

and water, or the philological roots of the medium used by Milton

and Arthur Brisbane. The banality, the insincerity, of the public

utterances at the time that America’s entry into the European struggle

first loomed as a possible solution of the agony on the Western Front

was almost unbelievable. Any one who cares to turn up the files of the

great dailies between September, 1916, and March, 1918, may find them

for himself.

To a mind not clouded by the will to believe, this constant invocation

of common aims, this perpetual tug at the bond to ensure that it has

not parted overnight, would be strong corroboration of a suspicion

that the two vessels were drifting apart, borne on currents that flow

in different directions. It is not upon the after-dinner banalities of

wealthy and class-conscious “pilgrims” nor the sonorous platitudes of

discredited laggards on the political scene, still less is it upon the

sporting proclivities of titled hoydens and hawbucks to whom American

sweat and dollars have arrived in a revivifying stream, that we shall

have to rely should the cable really part and the two great vessels of

State grope for one another on a dark and uncharted sea. It is upon

the sheer and unassisted fact of how American and Englishman like or

dislike one another.

It is a truism almost too stale to restate that we are standing to-day

on the threshold of great changes. What is not so well realized is

that many of these changes have already taken place. The passing of

gold in shipment after shipment from the Eastern to the Western side

of the Atlantic and the feverish hunt for new and untapped sources

of exploitation are only the outward signs of a profound European

impoverishment in which Britain for the first time in her history has

been called upon to bear her full share. The strikes and lock-outs that

have followed the peace in such rapid succession might possibly be

written off as inevitable _sequelæ_ of a great war. The feeble response

to the call for production as a means of salvation, the general change

in the English temper faced with its heavy task are far more vital and

significant matters. They seem to mark a shift in moral values--a

change in the faith by which nations, each in the sphere that character

and circumstance allot, wax and flourish.

Confronted with inevitable competition by a nation more populous,

more cohesive, and richer than itself, it seems to me that there are

three courses which the older section of the English race may elect

to follow. One is war, before the forces grow too disparate, and on

the day that war is declared one phase of our civilization will end.

It will really not matter much, to the world at large, who wins an

Anglo-American world conflict. The second, which is being preached

in and out of season by our politicians and publicists, who seldom,

however, dare to speak their full thought, is a girding up of the

national loins, a renewed consecration to the gospel of effort, a

curtailment, if necessary--though this is up to now only vaguely

hinted--of political liberties bestowed in easier and less strenuous

days. The third course may easily be guessed. It is a persistence in

proclivities, always latent as I believe in the English temperament,

but which have only revealed themselves openly since the great war,

a clearer questioning of values till now held as unimpeachable, a

readier ear to the muttering and murmuring of the masses in Continental

Europe, internationalism--revolution. No thoughtful man in England

to-day denies the danger. Even references to that saving factor, the

“common sense of the British workman,” no longer allays the spectre of

a problem the issues of which have only to be stated to stand forth in

all their hopeless irreconcilability. Years ago, long before the shadow

fell on the world, in a moment of depression or inspiration, I wrote

that cravings were stirring in the human heart on the very eve of the

day when the call would be to sacrifice. That is the riddle, nakedly

stated, to which workers and rulers alike are asked to find an answer

to-day.

In this choice that lies before the British worker a great deal may

depend upon how American experiments and American achievements strike

him. In England now there is no escaping from the big transatlantic

sister. Politicians use her example as a justification; employers hold

up her achievements as a reproach. A British premier dare not face the

House of Commons on an “Irish night” unequipped with artful analogies

culled from the history of the war of secession. The number of bricks

per hour America’s bricklayers will lay or the tons of coal per week

her stolid colliers will hew are the despair of the contractor face

to face with the loafing and pleasure-loving native born. You will

hear no more jokes to-day in high coalition places over her political

machine replacing regularly and without the litter and disorder of a

general election tweedledum Democrat by a tweedledee Republican. She is

recognized--and this, I think, is the final value placed upon her by

the entire ruling and possessing classes in my own country--as better

equipped in her institutions, her character, and her population for the

big economic struggle that is ahead of us.

This is the secret of the unceasing court paid to Washington by all

countries, but pre-eminently by Britain. It is not fear of her power,

nor hunger for her money bags and harvests, nor desire to be “on the

band-wagon,” as light-hearted cartoonists see it, that prompts the

nervous susceptibility and the instantaneous response to anything that

will offend those in high places on the banks of the Potomac. It is the

sense, among all men with a strong interest in maintaining the present

economic order, that the support in their own countries is crumbling

under their hands, and that that fresh support, stronger and surer, is

to be found in a new country with a simpler faith and a cleaner, or

at any rate a shorter, record. To fight proletarianism with democracy

is a method so obvious and safe that one only wonders its discovery

had to wait upon to-day. Its salient characteristic is a newly aroused

interest and enthusiasm in one country for the political forces that

seem to make stability their watchword in the other. The coalition has

become the hero of the New York _Times_ and _Tribune_--the triumph

of the Republican party was hailed almost as a national victory in

the London _Times_ and Birmingham _Post_. Intransigeance in foreign

policies finds ready forgiveness in London; in return, a blind eye is

turned to schemes of territorial aggrandisement at Washington.

If a flaw is to be discerned in what at first sight seems a perfectly

adjusted instrument for international comity, it is that this new

Anglo-American understanding seems to be founded on class rather

than on national sympathy. Even offhand some inherent inconsistency

would seem to be sensed from the fact that the appeal of the great

republic comes most home, in the parent country, to the class that is

least attached to democratic forms and the most fearful of change.

References to America arouse no enthusiasm at meetings of the labour

element in England, and it is still felt unwise to expose the Union

Jack to possible humiliation in parades on a large scale in New York or

Chicago. A sympathy that flowers into rhetoric at commercial banquets

or at meetings of the archæologically inclined may have its roots in

the soundest political wisdom. But to infer from such demonstrations

of class solidarity any national community of thought or aim is both

unwarranted and unsafe. This much is evident, that should a class

subversion, always possible in a country the political fluidity of

which is great, leave the destinies of Great Britain in the hands of

the class that is silent or hostile to-day when the name of America is

mentioned, an entire re-statement of Anglo-American unity would become

necessary, in terms palatable to the average Englishman.

* * * * *

This average Englishman is a highly complicated being. Through the

overlay which industrialism has imposed on him, he has preserved to

quite an extraordinary extent the asperities, the generosities, the

occasional eccentricities of the days when he was a free man in a free

land. No melting process has ever subdued the sharp bright hues of

his individuality into the universal, all-pervading drab that is the

result of blending primary colours. No man who has employed him to

useful purpose has ever succeeded in reducing his personality to the

proportions of a number on a brass tag. The pirate and rover who looked

upon Roman villadom and found it not good, the archer who brought the

steel-clad hierarchy of France toppling from their blooded horses at

Crécy and Agincourt, the churl who struck off the heads of lawyers in

Westminster Palace yard survive in him.

If I am stressing this kink in the British character it is because one

of its results has been to make the Englishman of all men the least

impressed by scale, and the one to whom appeals made on the size of an

experiment or the vastness of a vision will evoke the least response,

and especially because I think I perceive a tendency to approach him

in the interests of Anglo-American unity precisely from the angle that

will awake antagonism where co-operation is sought. The attachment of

the Englishman to little things and to hidden things, which no one

except Chesterton has had the insight to perceive, or at all events

which Chesterton was the first to place in its full relation to his

inconsistencies, explains his strangely detached attitude to that

British Empire of which his country is the core. Its discovery as

an entity calling for a special quality in thought and action dates

no further back than that strange interlude in history, when the

personality of Roosevelt and the vision of Kipling held the imagination

of the world.

This refusal to be impressed by greatness, whether his own or others’,

has its disadvantages, but at least it has one saving element. It

leaves an Englishman quite capable of perceiving that it is possible

for a thing to be grandiose in scale and mean in quality. It leaves

intact his frank and childlike confidence that the little things of

the world confound the strong; his implicit conviction that David

will always floor Goliath, and that Jack’s is the destined sword to

smite off the giant’s head. The grotesqueness of the Kaiser’s upturned

moustaches, the inadequacy of a mythical “William the Weed” to achieve

results that would count, were his guiding lights to victory, the

touchstones by which he tested in advance the vast machine that finally

cracked and broke under its own weight. It was the “contemptible”

little army of shopmen and colliers which seized his imagination and

held his affection throughout, not the efficient mechanical naval

machine that fought one great sea battle, which was a revelation of

the risks inherent in its own monstrousness and complexity, and made

its headquarters in Scapa Flow. I recall the comments heard at the

time of Jutland in the artillery camp where fate had throwm me. They

served to confirm a dawning conviction that the navy, while it still

awes and impresses, lost its hold on the British heart the day wooden

walls were exchanged for iron and steel. It is perhaps the “silent

service” to-day because its appeal awakes so little response. It has

been specialized and magnified out of the average Englishman’s power to

love it.

In America the contrary seems the case. The American heart appears to

go out to bulk, to scale, and to efficiency. The American has neither

the time nor the temperament to test and weigh. His affections, even

his loyalties, seem to be at the mercy of aspects that impose and

impress. I know no other country where the word “big” is used so

constantly as a token of affection. Every community has its “Big Tims,”

“Big Bills,” “Big Jacks,” great hearty fellows who gambol and spout on

public occasions with the abandonment of a school of whales. Gargantuan

“Babe Ruth,” mountainous Jack Dempsey are the idols of its sport-loving

crowds. “Mammoth in character,” the qualification which on the lips of

the late Mr. Morgan Richards stirred laughter throughout England, is to

the American no inconsequential or slipshod phrase. He does perceive a

character and justification in bigness. It was perhaps to this trait

in his mental make-up that the puzzling shift of allegiance to the

beginning of the great war was due. The scale and completeness of the

German effort laid hold of his imagination to an extent that only

those who spent the first few months of agonizing doubt in the West

and the Middle West can appreciate. Something that was obscurely akin,

something that transcended racial affinities and antipathies, awoke

in him at the steady ordered flow of the field-grey legions Westward,

so adequately pictured for him by Richard Harding Davis. He is quite

merciless to defeat.

Nothing conceived on such a scale can indulge complexities. Its ideals

must be ample, rugged, and primitive, adequate to the vast task. Hence

the velocity, the thoroughness, the apparent ruthlessness with which

American enterprises are put through. It is the fashion among a certain

school of thought to call America the country of inhibitions. But there

is little inhibition to be perceived on that side of his temperament,

which the American has chosen to cultivate, leaving all else to those

who find perverse attraction in weed and ruin. His language--and he is

amazingly vocal--is as simple and direct as his thought. The appeals

and admonitions of his leaders reverberate from vast and resonant

lungs. They are calculated rather to carry far than to penetrate

deeply. They are statements and re-statements rather than arguments. If

their verbiage often aims at and sometimes seems to attain the sublime,

if the American leader is forever dedicating, consecrating, inspiring

something, the altitude is like the elevation given a shell in order

that it may travel further. The nimble presentation of antithesis

of a Lloyd George, the dagger-play of sarcasm of an Asquith, are

conspicuously absent from the speeches of American leaders. There is

something arrogant and ominous, like the clenching of a fist before

the arm is raised, in this sonorous presentation of a faith already

securely rooted in the hearts of all its hearers.

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