We have made no attempt in this article to take up the subject of

out-door advertising. There is nothing to say about this branch of

the profession save that it is bad beyond expression, and should be

removed from sight with all possible haste. In revolting against the

sign-board, direct action assumes the dignity of conservatism, and

although I do not recommend an immediate assault on all sign-boards,

I should be delighted if such an assault took place. Were I a judge

sitting on the case of a man apprehended in the act of destroying one

of these eyesores, I should give him the key to my private stock, and

adjourn the court for a week.

J. THORNE SMITH

BUSINESS

Modern business derives from three passions in this order, namely: The

passion for things, the passion for personal grandeur and the passion

for power. Things are multiplied in use and possession when people

exchange with each other the products of specialized labour. Personal

grandeur may be realized in wealth. Gratification of the third passion

in this way is new. Only in recent times has business become a means to

great power, a kind of substitute for kingship, wherein man may sate

his love of conquest, practise private vengeance, and gain dominion

over people.

These passions are feeble on the Oriental side of the world, strong

in parts of Europe, powerful in America. Hence the character of

American business. It is unique, wherein it is so, not in principle

but in degree of phenomena. For natural reasons the large objects of

business are most attainable in this country. Yet this is not the

essential difference. In the pursuit of them there is a characteristic

American manner, as to which one may not unreasonably prefer a romantic

explanation. No white man lives on this continent who has not himself

or in his ancestry the will that makes desire overt and dynamic, the

solitary strength to push his dream across seas. Islands had been

peopled before by this kind of selection, notably England; never a

continent. A reckless, egoistic, experimental spirit governs, betrays,

and preserves us still.

The elemental hunger for food, warmth, and refuge gives no direct

motive to business. People may live and reproduce without business.

Civilization of a sort may exist without its offices. The settler who

disappears into the wilderness with a wife, a gun, a few tools, and

some pairs of domestic beasts, may create him an idyllic habitation,

amid orchards and fields, self-contained in rude plenty; but he is lost

to business until he produces a money crop, that is, a surplus of the

fruits of husbandry to exchange for fancy hardware, tea, window glass,

muslin, china, and luxuries.

The American wilderness swallowed up hundreds of thousands of such

hearth-bearers. Business was slow to touch them. What they had to sell

was bulky. The cost of transportation was prohibitive. There were no

highways, only rivers, for traffic to go upon. Food was cheap, because

the earth in a simple way was bounteous; but the things for which food

could be exchanged were dear. This would naturally be true in a new

country, where craft industry must develop slowly. It was true also

for another reason, which was that the Mother Country regarded the New

World as a plantation to be exploited for the benefit of its own trade

and manufactures.

Great Britain’s claim to proprietary interest in America having been

established against European rivals by the end of the 17th century, her

struggle with the colonists began. The English wanted (1) raw materials

upon which to bestow their high craft labour, (2) an exclusive market

for the output of their mills and factories, and (3) a monopoly of

the carrying trade. The colonists wanted industrial freedom. As long

as they held themselves to chimney-corner industries, making nails,

shoes, hats, and coarse cloth for their own use, there was no quarrel.

But when labour even in a small way began to devote itself exclusively

to handicraft, so that domestic manufactures were offered for sale in

competition with imported English goods, that was business--and the

British Parliament voted measures to crush it. The weaving of cloth for

sale was forbidden, lest the colonists become independent of English

fabrics. So was the making of beaver hats; the English were hatters.

It was forbidden to set up an iron rolling-mill in America, because

the English required pig iron and wished to work it themselves. To all

these acts of Parliament the colonists opposed subterfuge until they

were strong enough to be defiant. That impatience of legal restraints

which is one of the most obstinate traits of American business was then

a patriotic virtue.

Meanwhile the New England trader had appeared--that adorable, hymning,

unconscious pirate who bought molasses in the French West Indies,

swapped it for rum at Salem, Mass., traded the rum for Negroes on the

African coast, exchanged the Negroes for tobacco in Virginia, and sold

the tobacco for money in Europe, at a profit to be settled with God.

This trade brought a great deal of money to the colonies; and they

needed money almost more than anything else. Then the British laid a

ban on trade with the French West Indies, put a tax upon coastwise

traffic between the colonies; and decreed that American tobacco should

be exported nowhere but to English ports, although--or because--tobacco

prices were higher everywhere else in Europe. The natural consequence

of this restrictive British legislation was to make American business

utterly lawless. As much as a third of it was notoriously conducted in

defiance of law. Smuggling both in domestic and foreign trade became

a folk custom. John Hancock, the first signer of the Declaration of

Independence, was a celebrated smuggler.

During the War of Independence domestic craft industry was stimulated

by necessity. But the means were crude and the products imperfect; and

when, after peace, British merchants with an accumulation of goods

on their hands began to offer them for sale in the United States at

low prices, hoping to recover their new-world trade in competitive

terms, the infant industries cried out for protection. They got

it. One of the first acts of the American Congress was to erect a

tariff against foreign-made goods in order that the country might

become self-sufficing in manufactures. This was the beginning of our

protectionist policy.

Fewer than four million unbusiness-like people coming into free

possession of that part of the North American continent which is

named America was a fabulous business event. We cannot even now

comprehend it. They had not the dimmest notion of what it was they were

possessed of, nor what it meant economically. Geography ran out at the

Mississippi. The tide of Westward immigration was just beginning to

break over the crest of the Alleghany mountains.

Over-seas trade grew rapidly, as there was always a surplus of food and

raw materials to be exchanged abroad for things which American industry

was unable to provide. Foreign commerce was an important source of

group-wealth and public interest was much concerned with it. Besides,

it was easier to trade across seas than inland. Philadelphia until

about 1835 was nearer London than Pittsburgh, not as the crow flies

but as freight moves. Domestic business, arising from the internal

exchange of goods, developed slowly, owing partly to the wretched state

of transportation and partly to the self-contained nature of families

and communities. The population was more than nine-tenths rural; rural

habits survived even in the towns, where people kept cows and pigs,

cured their own meats, preserved their own fruits and vegetables, and

thought ready-made garments a shocking extravagance. Business under

these conditions performed a subservient function. People’s relations

with it were in large measure voluntary. Its uses were more luxurious

than vital. There was not then, nor could any one at this time have

imagined, that interdependence of individuals, groups, communities,

and geographical sections which it is the blind aim of business

increasingly to promote, so that at length the case is reversed and

people are subservient to business.

In Southern New Jersey you may see a farm, now prosperously devoted to

berry and fruit crops, on which, still in good repair, are the cedar

rail fences built by a farmer whose contacts with business were six or

eight trips a year over a sand road to Trenton with surplus food to

exchange for some new tools, tea, coffee, and store luxuries. That old

sand road has become a cement pavement--a motor highway. Each morning

a New York baking corporation’s motor stops at the farm-house and the

driver hands in some fresh loaves. Presently a butcher’s motor stops

with fresh meat, then another one with dry groceries, and yet another

from a New York department store with parcels containing ready-made

garments, stockings and shoes.

Consider what these four motors symbolize.

First is an automobile industry and a system for producing, refining

and distributing oil which together are worth as much as the whole

estimated wealth of America three generations ago.

Back of the bakery wagon what a vista! An incorporated baking industry,

mixing, kneading, roasting, and wrapping the loaf in paraffine paper

without touch of human hands, all by automatic machinery. Beyond the

Mississippi, in a country undiscovered until 1804, the wheat fields

that are ploughed, sown, reaped by power-driven machinery. In Minnesota

a milling industry in which the miller has become an impersonal flour

trust. A railroad system that transports first the grain and then the

flour over vast distances at rates so low that the cost of two or three

thousand miles of transportation in the loaf of bread delivered to the

New Jersey farm-house is inexpressible.... Back of the butcher’s motor

is a meat-packing industry concentrated at Chicago. It sends fresh meat

a thousand miles in iced cars and sells it to a New Jersey farmer for

a price at which he can better afford to buy it than to bother about

producing it for himself.... Back of the grocer’s motor are the food

products and canning industries. By means of machinery they shred,

peel, hull, macerate, roll, cook, cool, and pack fruits, cereals, and

vegetables in cartons and containers which are made, labelled, and

sealed by other automatic machinery.... And back of the department

store motor are the garment-making, shoe-making, textile, and knitting

industries.

If one link in all this ramified scheme of business breaks there is

chaos. If the State of New Jersey were suddenly cut off from the

offices of business for six months, a third of her population might

perish; not that the State is unable potentially to sustain her own,

but that the people have formed habits of dependence upon others, as

others depend upon them, for the vital products of specialized labour.

All this has happened in the life of one cedar rail fence. You say

that is only fifty or sixty years. Nevertheless it is literally so.

The system under which we live has been evolved since 1860. The

transformation was sudden. Never in the world were the physical

conditions of a nation’s life altered so fast by economic means. Yet

it did not happen for many years. The work of unconscious preparation

occupied three-quarters of a century.

Man acts upon his environment with hands, tools, and imagination; and

business requires above everything else the means of cheap and rapid

transportation. In all the major particulars save one the founders

were ill-equipped for their independent attack upon the American

environment. At the beginning of the 19th century there were no

roads, merely a few trails fit only for horseback travel. There were

no canals yet. And the labour wherewith to perform heavy, monotonous

tasks was dear and scarce and largely self-employed. Though the hands

of the pioneer are restless they are not patiently industrious. There

was need of machinery such as had already begun to revolutionize

British industry, but the English jealously protected their mechanical

knowledge.

There is a tradition that the Americans were marvellously inventive

with labour-saving devices. That is to be qualified. Their special

genius lay rather in the adaptation and enthusiastic use of such

devices. The introduction of them was not resisted as in the older

countries by labour unwilling to change its habits and fearful of

unemployment. This was an important advantage.

The American textile industry was founded by British artisans who

came to this country carrying contraband in their heads, that is, the

plans of weaving, spinning, and knitting machines which the English

guarded as carefully as military secrets.... The pre-eminence of this

country in the manufacture and use of agricultural implements is set

out in elementary school-books as proof of American inventiveness; yet

the essential principles of the reaper were evolved in Great Britain

forty years before the appearance of the historic McCormick reaper

(1831) in this country, and threshing-machines were in general use in

England while primitive methods of flailing, trampling, and dragging

prevailed in America. As recently as 1850 the scythe and cradle reaped

the American harvest and there still existed the superstition that

an iron plough poisoned the soil and stimulated weeds. Of all the

tools invented or adopted the one which Americans were to make the

most prodigious use of was the railroad; yet the first locomotive was

brought from England in 1829, the embargo on machinery having by this

time been lifted--and it failed because it was too heavy!

Twenty years passed and still the possibilities of rail transportation

were unperceived, which is perhaps somewhat explained by the fact

that the one largest vested interest of that time existed in canals.

On the map of 1850 the railroads resemble earthworms afraid to leave

water and go inland. The notion of a railroad was that it supplemented

water transportation, connecting lake, canal, and river routes, helping

traffic over the high places.

But in the next ten years--1850 to 1860--destiny surrendered. There

was that rare coincidence of seed, weather, deep ploughing, and

mysterious sanction which the miracle requires. The essential power of

the American was suddenly liberated. There was the discovery of gold

in California. There was the Crimean War, which created a high demand

abroad for our commodities. The telegraph put its indignities upon

time and space. The idea of a railroad as a tool of empire seized the

imagination. Railroads were deliriously constructed. The map of 1860

shows a glistening steel web from the seaboard to the Mississippi.

The gigantesque was enthroned as the national fetich. Votive offerings

were mass, velocity, quantity. True cities began. The spirit of Chicago

was born. Bigness and be-damnedness. In this decade the outlines of our

economic development were cast for good.

In the exclusive perspective of business the Civil War is an indistinct

episode. It stimulated industry in the North, shattered it in the

South. The net result in a purely economic sense is a matter of free

opinion. The Morse telegraph code probably created more wealth than the

war directly destroyed. Or the bitter sectional row over the route of

the first transcontinental railroad which postponed that project for

ten years possibly cost the country more than the struggle to preserve

the Union. But that is all forgotten.

After 1860 the momentum of growth, notwithstanding the war and two

terrible panics, was cumulative. In the next fifty years, down to

1910, we built half as much railroad mileage as all the rest of

the world. Population trebled. This fact stands alone in the data

of vital statistics. Yet even more remarkable were the alterations

of human activity. The number of city dwellers increased 3½ times

faster than the population; the number of wage-earners, 2 times

faster; clerks, salesmen, and typists, 6½ times faster; banks, 7

times faster; corporations, 6½ times faster; miners, 3 times faster;

transportation-workers, 20 times faster, and the number of independent

farmers decreased. Wealth in this time increased from about $500 to

more than $1,500 _per capita_.

If America in its present state of being had been revealed to the

imagination of any hard-headed economist in, say, 1850, as a mirage or

dream, he would have said: “There is in all the world not enough labour

and capital to do it.” He could not have guessed how the power of both

would be multiplied.

First there was the enormous simple addition to the labour supply

in the form of immigration. Then the evolution of machinery and

time-saving methods incredibly increased the productivity of labour

per human unit. Thirdly, the application of power to agriculture and

the opening of all that virgin country west of the Mississippi to

bonanza-farming so greatly increased the production of food per unit

of rural labour that at length it required only half the population to

feed the whole. The other half was free. Business and industry absorbed

it.

Of what happened at the same time to capital, in which term we include

also credit, there could have been no prescience at all. Even now when

we think of building a railroad, a telephone system, or an automobile

factory the thought is that it will take capital, as of course it will

at first, but one should consider also how anything that increases the

velocity with which goods are exchanged, or reduces the time in which

a given amount of business may be transacted, adds to the functioning

power of capital. To illustrate this: the merchant of 1850 did business

very largely with his own capital unaided. He was obliged to invest

heavily in merchandise stocks. The turn-over was slow. His margin

of profit necessarily had to be large. But with the development of

transportation and means of communication--the railroad, telegraph,

and telephone--and with the parallel growth of banking facilities,

the conditions of doing business were fundamentally changed. All the

time-factors were foreshortened.

A merchant now has to lock up much less capital in merchandise, since

his stocks are easily and swiftly replenished. The turn-over is

much faster because people using suburban railways and street-cars

go oftener to shop. And not only is it possible for these reasons to

do a larger volume of business with a given amount of capital, but

the merchant now borrows two-thirds, maybe three-quarters, of his

capital at the bank in the form of credit. The same is true of the

manufacturer. Formerly he locked up his capital, first in raw materials

and then in finished products to be sold in season as the demand was;

and there was great risk of loss in this way of matching supply to

an estimated demand. Now he sells his goods before he makes them,

borrows credit at the bank to buy his raw materials, even to pay his

labour through the processes of manufacture, and when the customer

pays on delivery of the goods with credit which he also has borrowed

at the bank, the manufacturer settles with _his_ bank and keeps the

difference. An exporter was formerly one who bought commodities with

his own money, loaded them on ship, sent them on chance to a foreign

market, and waited for his capital to come back with a profit. Now he

first sells the goods to a foreign customer by cable, then buys them on

credit, loads them on ship, sells the bill of lading to a bank, uses

the proceeds to pay for the goods, and counts his profit. All large

business now is transacted in this way with phantom capital, called

credit; money is employed to settle differences only.

The effect of this revolution of methods upon the morals and manners

of business was tremendous. It destroyed the aristocracy of business

by throwing the field open to men without capital. Traders and brokers

over-ran it. The man doing business on borrowed capital could out-trade

one doing business on his own. The more he borrowed, the harder he

could trade. Salesmanship became a specialized, conscienceless art.

There was no rule but to take all the traffic would bear: let the

buyer look out. Dishonesty in business became so gross that it had

to be sublimated in the national sense of humour. There are many

still living who remember what shopping was like even in the largest

city stores when nobody dreamed of paying the price first asked and

counter-higgling was a universal custom. Indeed, so ingrained it

was that when A. T. Stewart in New York announced the experiment of

treating all buyers alike on a one-price basis his ruin was predicted

by the whole merchant community.

As credit both increases competition and enables a larger business

to be done on a small base of invested capital, the margin of profit

in business tends to fall. Under conditions of intense rivalry among

merchants and manufacturers operating more and more with phantom

capital the margin of profit did fall until it was very thin indeed.

This led to the abasement of goods by adulteration and tricks of

manufacture, which became at length so great an evil that the

government had to interfere with pure-food acts and laws forbidding

wilful misrepresentation.

There was a limit beyond which the cost of production could not be

reduced by degradation of quality. It was impossible to control prices

with competition so wild and spontaneous and with cheapness the

touchword of success. Therefore the wages of business were low, and

things apparently had come to an impasse. Yet out of this chaos arose

what now we know as big business. The idea was simple--mass production

of standardized foods. The small, fierce units of business began to be

amalgamated. As society is integrated by steps--clan, tribe, nation,

State--so big business passed through mergers, combines, and trusts

toward the goal of monopoly.

When a number of competing manufacturers unite to produce standard

commodities in quantity, much duplication of effort is eliminated,

time-saving methods are possible as not before, the cost of production

is reduced. There are other advantages. They are stronger than they

were separately, not only as buyers of labour, raw materials, and

transportation, but as borrowers of capital. The individual or firm

is the customer of a bank. The corporation makes a partnership with

finance.

Now a curious thing happens. The corporation with its mass production

restores the quality of goods. It is responsible for its products and

guarantees them by brands, labels and trade-marks. Sugar and oatmeal

come out of the anonymous barrel behind the grocer’s counter and go

into attractive cartons on his shelf, bearing the name of the producer.

Gloves, shirts, stockings, cutlery, furniture, meat products, jams,

watches, fabrics, everything in fact becomes standardized by name

and price and is advertised by the producer directly to the public

over the retailer’s head, so that the small retailer is no longer a

merchant in the old sense but a grumbling commission-man. Big business

has delivered itself from the impasse; it has recovered control of

its profits; but now the retailer’s margin of profit tends to become

fixed. What does the retailer do? He applies the same principle to the

last act of selling. Enter the chain-store. Obviously a corporation

owning a chain of several hundred stores and working, like the

manufacturer, with borrowed capital, is stronger than any one retailer

to bargain with the powerful producers, and as the chain-store tends

to displace the little retailer a balance is restored between the

business of production and the business of retailing. Mass production

is met by mass selling. The consumer as the last subject may resort to

legislation for his protection.

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