BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM.
Bloodiest Single Day of the War--Comparison of Casualties--Hooker
opens the Fight against Jackson's Centre--Many Officers among the
Fallen early in the Day--McLaws and Walker in time to meet Sumner's
Advance under Sedgwick--Around Dunker Chapel--Richardson's splendid
Advance against the Confederate Centre the Signal of the bursting of
another Storm--Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's Troops stood before
it--Fall of General G. B. Anderson--General Richardson mortally
wounded--Aggressive Spirit of his Command broken--Wonderful
Cannon-shot--General D. H. Hill's Third Horse killed under him.
The field that I have described--the field lying along the Antietam and
including in its scope the little town of Sharpsburg--was destined to pass
into history as the scene of the bloodiest single day of fighting of the
war, and that 17th of September was to become memorable as the day of
greatest carnage in the campaigns between the North and South.
Gettysburg was the greatest battle of the war, but it was for three days,
and its total of casualties on either side, terrible as it was, should be
one-third larger to make the average per diem equal to the losses at
Sharpsburg. Viewed by the measure of losses, Antietam was the fourth
battle of the war, Spottsylvania and the Wilderness, as well as
Gettysburg, exceeding it in number of killed and wounded, but each of
these dragged its tragedy through several days.
Taking Confederate losses in killed and wounded as the criterion of
magnitude in battles, the Seven Days' Battle (following McClellan's
retreat), Gettysburg, and Chickamauga exceeded Sharpsburg, but each of
these occupied several days, and on no single day in any one of them was
there such carnage as in this fierce struggle.
The Confederates lost in killed and wounded in the Seven Days' Battle
19,739,--more, it will be observed, than at Gettysburg (15,298), though
the total loss, including 5150 captured or missing, at the latter, brought
the figures up to those of the former (20,614), in which the captured or
missing were only 875. Our killed and wounded at Chickamauga were 16,986,
but that was in two days' battle, while at Chancellorsville in three days
the killed and wounded were 10,746. It is impossible to make the
comparison with absolute exactness for the Confederate side, for the
reason that our losses are given for the entire campaign in Maryland,
instead of separately for the single great battle and several minor
engagements. Thus computed they were 12,187.[64] But nearly all of these
are known to have been losses at Sharpsburg, and, making proper deductions
for the casualties in other actions of the campaign, the Confederate loss
in this single day's fighting was still in excess of that at the _three
days' fight_ at Chancellorsville (10,746), and for the single day far
larger proportionally than in the two days at Chickamauga, three days at
Gettysburg, or seven days on the bloody Chickahominy.
But the sanguinary character of this battle is most strikingly exhibited
by a comparison of the accurate figures of the Federal losses, returned
specifically for the day. These show a total killed and wounded of 11,657
(or, including the captured and missing, 12,410), as contrasted with
17,567 killed and wounded in _three_ days at Gettysburg, 16,141 in _eight_
days at Spottsylvania, and 14,283 in the _three_ days at the Wilderness,
while the _three_ and _two_ days' fighting respectively at
Chancellorsville and Chickamauga were actually productive of less loss
than this battle of _one_ day. The exceeding losses of this battle are
further shown by the fact that of the 11,657 Federals stricken on the
field, the great number of 2108 were actually slain,--more than two-thirds
of the number killed in three days at Gettysburg (3070). And this
tremendous tumult of carnage was entirely compassed in the brief hours
from dawn to four o'clock in the afternoon.
At three o'clock in the morning of the 17th firing along the picket lines
of the confronting and expectant armies became quite frequent, and before
daylight the batteries began to plough the fields in front of them,
feeling, as it were, for the ranks of men whose destruction was better
suited to their ugly purpose.
As the dawn came, the fire spread along both lines from left to right,
across the Antietam and back again, and the thunder of the big guns became
continuous and increased to mighty volume. To this was presently added the
sharper rattling of musketry, and the surge of mingling sound sweeping up
and down the field was multiplied and confused by the reverberations from
the rocks and hills. And in this great tumult of sound, which shook the
air and seemed to shatter the cliffs and ledges above the Antietam, bodies
of the facing foes were pushed forward to closer work, and soon added the
clash of steel to the thunderous crash of cannon-shots.
The first impact came from Hooker's right division under Doubleday, led by
the choice brigade under Gibbon. It was deployed across the turnpike and
struck the centre of Jackson's division, when close engagement was
strengthened by the brigades of Patrick, Phelps, and part of Hofmann's,
Ricketts's division, engaged in close connection along Lawton's front.
Hooker supported his battle by his division under Meade, which called into
action three of D. H. Hill's brigades,--Ripley's, Colquitt's, and McRae's.
Hartsuff, the leading spirit of Ricketts's division, was the first general
officer to fall severely hurt, and later fell the commander of the corps,
wounded also. General Starke, commanding Jackson's division, was killed.
At six o'clock the Twelfth Corps came in, when General Lawton called for
Hood's brigades, "and all the help he could bring." Hood's and G. T.
Anderson's brigades were put in, and the brigades from my right, under J.
G. Walker, marched promptly in response to this call.
The weight of Mansfield's fight forced Jackson back into the middle wood
at the Dunker chapel, and D. H. Hill's brigades to closer lines. Hood was
in season to brace them, and hold the line as he found it. In this fight
the corps commander, General Mansfield, fell, mortally wounded, which took
from that corps some of its aggressive power.
Jackson, worn down and exhausted of ammunition, withdrew his divisions at
seven A.M., except Early's brigade, that was with the cavalry. This he
called back to vacant ground on Hood's left. Two detachments, one under
Colonel Grigsby, of Virginia, the other under Colonel Stafford, of
Louisiana, remained on the wooded ground off from the left of Jackson's
position. One of the regiments of Early's brigade was left with the
cavalry. Stuart retired to position corresponding to the line of Jackson's
broken front. The brigade under G. T. Anderson joined on Hood's right, and
the brigades under J. G. Walker coming up took place on Hood's left,
Walker leaving two regiments to fill a vacant place between Anderson's
brigade and Hood's right. Walker, Hood, and D. H. Hill attacked against
the Twelfth Corps; worn by its fight against Jackson, it was driven back
as far as the post-and-rail fence in the east open, where they were
checked. They were outside of the line, their left in the air and exposed
to the fire of a thirty-gun battery posted at long range on the Hagerstown
road by General Doubleday. Their left was withdrawn, and the line
rectified, when Greene's brigade of the Twelfth resumed position in the
northeast angle of the wood, which it held until Sedgwick's division came
in bold march.
In these fights offensive and defensive the artillery battalions under
Lieutenant-Colonel S. D. Lee and Major Frobel were in active combat, the
former from the first shot made before daylight. They had been severely
worked, and were nearly exhausted of ammunition. The Washington Artillery
was called on for a battery to assist them, and some of the guns of that
battalion were sent for ammunition. Miller's battery of four Napoleon guns
came.
As Jackson withdrew, General Hooker's corps retired to a point on the
Hagerstown road about three-quarters of a mile north of the battle-ground,
where General Doubleday established his thirty-gun battery. Jackson's and
Hooker's men had fought to exhaustion, and the battle of the Twelfth
Corps, taken up and continued by Mansfield, had taken defensive relations,
its chief mortally wounded.
Generals Lawton, Ripley, and J. R. Jones were severely wounded, and
Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, killed. A third of the men
of Lawton's, Hays's, and Trimble's brigades were reported killed or
wounded. Four of the field officers of Colquitt's brigade were killed,
five were wounded, the tenth and last contused by a shell. All of
Jackson's and D. H. Hill's troops engaged suffered proportionally. Hood's,
Walker's, and G. T. Anderson's, though longer engaged, did not lose so
severely.
General Hooker's aggregate of loss was 2590; General Mansfield's, 1746.
The Federal batteries, of position, on the east side were more or less
busy during the engagement, having occasional opportunities for a raking
fire on the troops along Jackson's line and my left. The horse artillery
under Stuart was strengthening to the Confederate left, and had
occasional opportunities for destructive fire across the Union right when
coming into action.
Although the battle along the line of contention had become defensive,
there were threatening movements on the Boonsborough pike by Sykes's
division and the horse artillery under Pleasonton, and Burnside was busy
at his bridge, working to find his way across.
At the close of the Walker-Hood-Hill affair, Hood found his line making a
large angle with the line of the latter, which was rectified, drawing in
the angle. Early's regiments were in the wood between Walker and the
cavalry, and the detachments under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford in the
wood some distance in advance of Early's left.
The line thus organized was thin and worn by severe attrition. The men
were losing strength and the ammunition getting low. Some gathered
cartridges from their fallen comrades and distributed them as far as they
would go, others went for fresh supplies.
McLaws's column came up at nine o'clock. He reported at General Lee's
head-quarters, where he was ordered at rest, and afterwards reported to
me, with General Lee's orders for his own division, and asked the
disposition to be made of R. H. Anderson's. He was ordered to send the
latter to report to General D. H. Hill.
Coincident with these arrivals, heavy columns of Federal infantry and
artillery were seen crossing the Antietam. Morell's division of the Fifth
Corps was up and relieved Richardson's of the Second, which had been in
our front since its arrival on the 15th. Richardson's following the march
of the troops by the upper crossing advised us that the next engagement
would be by the Second Corps, under General Sumner; Sedgwick's division
was in the lead as they marched. Our left centre was almost exhausted of
men and ammunition. The divisions of French and Richardson followed in
left echelon to Sedgwick. Hood's brigades had retired for fresh supply of
ammunition, leaving the guard to Walker's two brigades, G. T. Anderson's
brigade on Walker's right, part of Early's brigade on Walker's left, and
the regiments under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford off the left front.
McLaws's division was called for, and on the march under conduct of Major
Taylor of general head-quarters staff.
At sight of Sumner's march, General Early rode from the field in search,
as he reported, of reinforcements. His regiments naturally waited on the
directions of the leader.
General Sumner rode with his leading division under General Sedgwick, to
find the battle. Sedgwick marched in column of brigades, Gorman, Dana, and
Howard. There was no officer on the Union side in charge of the field, the
other corps commanders having been killed or wounded. General Sumner
testified,--
"On going upon the field I found that General Hooker's corps had been
dispersed and routed. I passed him some distance in the rear, where he
had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all, as I
was advancing with my command on the field. There were some troops
lying down on the left which I took to belong to Mansfield's command.
In the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of
his corps (formerly Banks's) had also been thrown into confusion."[65]
He passed Greene's brigade of the Twelfth, and marched through the wood,
leaving the Dunker chapel on his left.
As McLaws approached, General Hood was sent to give him careful
instructions of the posture, of the grounds, and the impending crisis. He
marched with his brigades,--Cobb's, Kershaw's, Semmes's, and Barksdale's.
The leading brigade filed to the right, before the approaching march.
Kershaw's leading regiment filed into line as Sedgwick's column approached
the south side of the Dunker chapel wood,--the latter on a diagonal
march,--while Kershaw's regiment was in fair front against it. The
regiment opened prompt fire, and the other regiments came into line in
double time, opening fire by company as they came to the front. The other
brigades came into line by companies, and forward into line by regiments.
Armistead's brigade had been drawn from R. H. Anderson's column to
reinforce McLaws.
[Illustration: Relative positions of McLaws and other Confederates and
Sedgwick at their opening.]
Sedgwick's diagonal march exposed his left to a scattering fire from
Walker's left brigade under M. Ransom, but he kept his steady march while
Walker increased his fire. McLaws increasing his fire staggered the march
of Sedgwick, and presently arrested it. The regiments under Colonels
Stafford and Grigsby, coming from their lurking-places, opened fire on
Sedgwick's right rear. At McLaws's opening Sedgwick essayed to form line
of battle; the increasing fire on his right and left rear, with the
terrible fire in front, was confusing, but the troops were eager to return
the fire they found pouring into their lines from three-quarters of a
circle. To counter the rear fire of Walker, General Sumner ordered the
rear brigade to face about. The troops, taking this to mean a rearward
march, proceeded to execute it without awaiting further orders, which was
soon followed by the other brigades.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG]
McLaws and Walker, pushing their success, were joined by G. T. Anderson's,
the brigades of D. H. Hill's left, and those of R. H. Anderson's division,
making strong battle through the woodland and open to the post-and-rail
fence and to the Roulette House, where they encountered Sumner's division
under French, and parts of the Twelfth Corps rallied on that part of the
field. This contention was firm and wasting on both sides, but held with
persevering courage until Richardson's reserve, under Brooke, was put
against Hill's right and broke the Confederate line back to the woodlands
south of the chapel, where Early's regiments had formed a rallying line.
When Hill's right was struck and pressed so severely, Rodes's brigade, the
reserve of his division, was ordered out to support his right. The brigade
advanced in good strong battle, but General Rodes reported that he could
not move his Sixth Alabama Regiment in time, notwithstanding his personal
efforts; that with the support of that regiment the battle line of the
Confederates could have waited other supports.
General Sumner was eager in riding with his leading division. He was
always anxious to get in in time to use all of his power, and thought
others like himself. Had he formed the corps into lines of divisions, in
close echelon, and moved as a corps, he would have marched through and
opened the way for Porter's command at bridge No. 2, and Pleasonton's
cavalry, and for Burnside at the third bridge, and forced the battle back
to the river bank.
He was criticised for his opposition to Franklin's proposed attack, but
the chances are even that he was right. The stir among Franklin's troops
was observed from a dead angle of our lines, and preparations were made to
meet it. General Jackson was marching back to us, and it is possible that
the attack might have resulted in mingling our troops with Franklin's down
on the banks of the Antietam.
After this fight the artillery battalions of S. D. Lee and Frobel, quite
out of ammunition, retired to replenish. The battery of Napoleons was
reduced to one section, that short of ammunition and working hands.
General Hill rallied the greater part of G. B. Anderson's and Rodes's
brigades in the sunken road. Some of Ripley's men came together near
Miller's guns at the Hagerstown pike. General R. H. Anderson and his next
in rank, General Wright, were wounded. The next officer, General Pryor,
not advised of his new authority, the brigades assembled at points most
suited to their convenience, in rear of D. H. Hill's brigades.
But time was up. Confederate affairs were not encouraging. Our men were
all leg-weary and heavy to handle, while McClellan, with his tens of
thousands, whom he had marched in healthful exercise the past two weeks,
was finding and pounding us from left to right under converging fire of
his batteries east and west of the Antietam.
The signal of the approaching storm was the bursting of Richardson's
command, augmented by parts of French's division, through the field of
corn, hardly ruffled by the affair at the Roulette House, spreading its
grand march against our centre. They came in brave style, in full
appreciation of the work in hand, marched better than on drill, unfolded
banners making gay their gallant step.
The Fifth Corps and Pleasonton's cavalry were in active preparation to
cross at the second bridge and join on Richardson's left, and Burnside at
the third bridge was pressing his claim for a passage against our right.
I had posted G. T. Anderson's brigade behind a stone fence near the
Hagerstown pike, about the safest spot to be found on the field of
Sharpsburg,--a dead angle, so to speak. The batteries on the field north
and the long-range thirty-gun battery of General Doubleday were playing
their fire down the pike, taking their aim by the direction of the road,
where they stood. This brought their fire into the field about one hundred
yards in rear of Anderson's line. As the fire came from an enfilade
direction, the troops assumed that they were under enfilade fire, and
General Anderson changed position without reporting. General D. H. Hill
got hold of him and moved him to the Boonsborough pike to defend against
Sykes's and Pleasonton's forces, advancing in that quarter. Thus, when
Richardson's march approached its objective, the Confederates had Boyce's
battery, well out in the corn-field, facing the march; Miller's section of
Napoleons in the centre, and a single battery at McLaws's rear, with
fragments of scattered brigades along the pike, and the Twenty-seventh
North Carolina Regiment to hold the left centre, besides the brigades in
the sunken road, and the brigades of R. H. Anderson's division awaiting
the bloody struggle. They received the severe attack in firm holding for a
long half-hour, the enemy pressing closer at intervals, until an order of
General Rodes's was misconstrued and part of his brigade under
Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama Regiment, was forced to
the rear, and marched off, informing others that that was the order.
General G. B. Anderson fell mortally wounded. The enemy pressed in on his
outer flank and called for surrender of the forces cut off and outflanked.
Meagher's brigade was retired to replenish ammunition, and Barlow swung to
his right and came against our fragments about Miller's guns, standing
near his flank. Miller had two guns, the others off for a supply of
ammunition. Cooke's Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment was well
organized, but short of ammunition; fragments of Ripley's brigade and some
others were on the turnpike; Miller was short of hands and ammunition,
even for two guns; McLaws's division and the other part of Walker's were
in front of threatenings of parts of French's division and of troops
rallying on their front, and the Sixth Corps was up and coming against
them, so that it seemed hazardous to call them off and leave an open way.
Our line was throbbing at every point, so that I dared not call on General
Lee for help. Sergeant Ellis thought that he could bring up ammunition if
he was authorized to order it. He was authorized, and rode for and brought
it. I held the horses of some of my staff who helped to man the guns as
cannoneers.
As the attacking forces drew nearer, Colonel Cooke reported his ammunition
exhausted. He was ordered to hold on with the bayonet, and sent in return
that he would "hold till ice forms in regions where it was never known,"
or words to that effect. As Richardson advanced through the corn he cut
off the battery under Boyce, so that it was obliged to retire to save
itself, and as Barlow came upon our centre, the battery on our left was
for a time thrown out of fire lest they might injure friend as much as
foe. Barlow marched in steady good ranks, and the remnants before him rose
to the emergency. They seemed to forget that they had known fatigue; the
guns were played with life, and the brave spirits manning them claimed
that they were there to hold or to go down with the guns.
As our shots rattled against the armored ranks, Colonel Fairfax clapped
his hands and ran for other charges. The mood of the gunners to a man was
one of quiet but unflinching resolve to stand to the last gun. Captain
Miller charged and double-charged with spherical case and canister until
his guns at the discharge leaped in the air from ten to twelve inches.
[Illustration: John W. Fairfax. Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General,
First Corps.]
When the crest was reached, the rush that was expected to sweep us away
paused,--the Confederates became hopeful. Soon the advancing ranks lay
behind the crest, and presently drew nearer Richardson's part of the line,
then mounting the crest over the Piper House. This latter point, once
established, must cut and break the Confederate position as effectually as
our centre just saved. He occupied the Piper House with two regiments
under Colonel Brooke in advance of his line along the crest, and called up
some of his batteries.
The Confederates meanwhile were collecting other batteries and infantry in
defence, when a shot from one of our batteries brought Richardson down,
mortally wounded. His taking-off broke the aggressive spirit of the
division and reduced its fight to the defensive. The regiments at the
Piper House found their position thus advanced too much exposed, and
withdrew to the stronger line of the crest. General Meagher's brigade came
up with ammunition replenished. General Hancock was despatched to take
command of the division. In the midst of the tragedy, as Richardson
approached the east crest, there was a moment of amusement when General
Hill, with about fifty men and a battle-flag, ran to gain a vantage-point
for flank fire against Richardson's left. Colonel Ross, observing the move
and appreciating the opportunity, charged with two regiments for the same
and secured it. General Hill claimed (and rightly) that it had effect in
giving the impression that there were other forces coming to support him.
Another regiment came to the relief of the Twenty-seventh, under Cooke.
The movement of troops in that quarter was construed by the enemy as a
threatened flank move against Richardson, which caused some little delay
in his march. Though the Confederates had but fragments here and there,
the enemy were kept busy and watchful lest they should come upon another
surprise move.
The Confederates were surprised but much relieved when they found this
affair reduced to the defensive, and assumed that every missile they sent
must have found one or more victims. But accounts of the other side make
clear that the result was due to accidental artillery shots that cut down
Colonel Barlow, the aggressive spirit of Richardson's right column, and
General Richardson himself at his culminating moment. Barlow fell from a
case- or canister-shot, as did Richardson. All the Union accounts refer to
a battery on their right throwing shell, and the "two brass guns in front
throwing case and canister," and this latter was the only artillery at
work against them at the time of Barlow's fall. When Barlow's command drew
nearer the division the brass guns were turned upon Richardson, but at the
moment of his taking-off another battery was in action on his left.
General D. H. Hill thought that Carter's battery was in time to divide the
honor of the last shot with the section of Napoleons under Miller.
Orders were given General Pleasonton, at the second bridge, to be ready to
enter the battle as soon as the attack by Richardson should open the way.
To meet these orders skirmishers were advanced, and Tidball's battery, by
piece, using canister, to drive back the Confederate sharp-shooters. The
Fifth Corps (General Porter's) was ordered to be ready for like service.
When Richardson swung his line up along the crest at the Piper House,
Pleasonton advanced troopers and batteries, crossed the bridge at a gallop
by the Fifth Regular Cavalry, Farnsworth's brigade, Rush's brigade, two
regiments of the Fifth Brigade under B. F. Davis, and the batteries of
Tidball, Robertson, Hains, and Gibson. The batteries were put into action
under the line of skirmishers, that were reinforced by Sykes's division of
the Fifth and Tenth Infantry under Lieutenant Poland.
General Hill seized a musket and by example speedily collected a number of
men, who joined him in reinforcing the line threatened by this heavy
display. The parts of brigades under General Pryor, Colonels Cummings,
Posey, and G. T. Anderson afterwards got up to help the brigade of Evans
already there. By these, with the batteries of Squires, Gardner, and
Richardson, this threatening demonstration was checked. Then it was
reinforced by the batteries of Randol, Kusserow, and Van Reed, and the
Fourth United States Infantry, Captain Dryer; the first battalion of the
Twelfth, Captain Blount; second battalion of the Twelfth, Captain
Anderson; first battalion of the Fourteenth, Captain Brown, and second
battalion of the Fourteenth, Captain McKibbin, of Sykes's division; the
batteries posted to command the field, right and left, to cover Sumner's
and Burnside's fronts, as soon as they could rise to the plateau. S. D.
Lee's batteries were back on the crest, replenished of ammunition, while
the Union batteries were on low ground, near the river. A very clever
well-organized advance was made, but their advantages of position and the
tenacious hold of the Confederates, even after the attack reached the
crest, enabled them to drive back the assaulting forces. The horse
batteries went back to positions on the west side after replenishing with
ammunition, except Gibson's, which was put in defensive attitude on the
east. Pleasonton, with a comprehensive view of the opportunity, called for
additional force, but two of Morell's brigades had been ordered by the
upper crossing to Sumner's relief, and a detachment had been sent to
assist Burnside, which reduced the Fifth Corps to the minimum of force
necessary to the service to which it was assigned; not equal to the
aggressive fight to which it was invited. But for the breaking up of
Richardson's aggression, this last advance could have gained the field.
The Third Brigade of the Second Division, Sixth Corps, made an erratic
march across part of the field, the Seventh Maine Regiment leading, and
retired like a meteor that loses its own fire.
A little after one o'clock this and other parts of the line, except at the
Burnside Bridge, settled down to defensive. Burnside was still hard at
work in search of a practical line of advance, Toombs standing manfully
against him.
During the lull, after the rencounter of Walker's, Hill's, and Hood's
divisions against Mansfield's last fight, General Lee and myself, riding
together under the crest of General D. H. Hill's part of the line, were
joined by the latter. We were presently called to the crest to observe
movements going on in the Union lines. The two former dismounted and
walked to the crest; General Hill, a little out of strength and thinking a
single horseman not likely to draw the enemy's fire, rode. As we reached
the crest I asked him to ride a little apart, as he would likely draw fire
upon the group. While viewing the field a puff of white smoke was seen to
burst from a cannon's mouth about a mile off. I remarked, "There is a shot
for General Hill," and, looking towards him, saw his horse drop on his
knees. Both forelegs were cut off just below the knees. The dropping
forward of the poor animal so elevated his croup that it was not an easy
matter for one not an expert horseman to dismount _a la militaire_. To add
to the dilemma, there was a rubber coat with other wraps strapped to the
cantle of the saddle. Failing in his attempt to dismount, I suggested that
he throw his leg forward over the pommel. This gave him easy and graceful
dismount. This was the third horse shot under him during the day, and the
shot was one of the best I ever witnessed. An equally good one was made by
a Confederate at Yorktown. An officer of the Topographical Engineers
walked into the open, in front of our lines, fixed his plane table and
seated himself to make a map of the Confederate works. A non-commissioned
officer, without orders, adjusted his gun, carefully aimed it, and fired.
At the report of the gun all eyes were turned to see the occasion of it,
and then to observe the object, when the shell was seen to explode as if
in the hands of the officer. It had been dropped squarely upon the
drawing-table, and Lieutenant Wagner was mortally wounded.[66] Of the
first shot, Major Alfred A. Woodhull, under date of June 8, 1886, wrote,--
"On the 17th of September, 1862, I was standing in Weed's battery,
whose position is correctly given in the map, when a man on, I think,
a gray horse, appeared about a mile in front of us, and footmen were
recognized near. Captain Weed, who was a remarkable artillerist,
himself sighted and fired the gun at the horse, which was struck."