PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE.
Confederates retreat from South Mountain--Federals follow and harass
them--Franklin and Cobb at Crampton's Pass--A spirited
Action--Fighting around Harper's Ferry--Its Capitulation--The
Confederates take Eleven Thousand Prisoners--Jackson rejoins
Lee--Description of the Field of Antietam--McClellan posts his
Corps--Lee's Lines advantageously placed--Hooker's Advance on the Eve
of Battle should have been resisted.
At first sight of the situation, as I rode up the mountain-side, it became
evident that we were not in time nor in sufficient force to secure our
holding at Turner's Gap, and a note was sent General Lee to prepare his
mind for disappointment, and give time for arrangements for retreat.
After nightfall General Hill and I rode down to head-quarters to make
report. General Lee inquired of the prospects for continuing the fight. I
called upon General Hill to demonstrate the situation, positions and
forces. He explained that the enemy was in great force with commanding
positions on both flanks, which would give a cross-fire for his batteries,
in good range on our front, making the cramped position of the
Confederates at the Mountain House untenable. His explanation was too
forcible to admit of further deliberation. General Lee ordered withdrawal
of the commands to Keedysville, and on the march changed the order, making
Sharpsburg the point of assembly. General Hill's troops were first
withdrawn, and when under way, the other brigades followed and were
relieved by General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the mountain at three
o'clock in the morning, Hood's two brigades, with G. T. Anderson's, as
rear-guard.
General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was ordered to cover our march, but
Pleasonton pushed upon him so severely with part of the Eighth Illinois
Cavalry and Tidball's battery that he was forced off from our line through
Boonsborough and found his way to the Potomac off the rear of General
Lee's left, leaving his killed and wounded and losing two pieces of
artillery. Otherwise our march was not disturbed. In addition to his
regular complement of artillery, General D. H. Hill had the battalion
under Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cutts. The batteries were assigned
positions near the ridge under the crest, where they could best cover the
fields on the farther side of the stream. A few minutes after our lines
were manned, information came of the capitulation of Harper's Ferry, and
of the withdrawal of the troops to the Virginia side of the Potomac.
General Toombs's brigade joined us early on the 15th, and was posted over
the Burnside Bridge. He was subsequently ordered to detach two regiments,
as guard for trains near Williamsport.
As long as the armies were linked to Harper's Ferry, the heights in front
of Sharpsburg offered a formidable defensive line, and in view of possible
operations from Harper's Ferry, through the river pass, east of South
Mountain, formed a beautiful point of strategic diversion. But when it
transpired that Harper's Ferry was surrendered and the position was not to
be utilized, that the troops there were to join us by a march on the south
side, its charms were changed to perplexities. The threatening attitude
towards the enemy's rear vanished, his line of communication was open and
free of further care, and his army, relieved of entanglements, was at
liberty to cross the Antietam by the upper fords and bridges, and approach
from vantage-ground General Lee's left. At the same time the Federal left
was reasonably secured from aggression by cramped and rugged ground along
the Confederate right. Thus the altered circumstances changed all of the
features of the position in favor of the Federals.
Approaching Crampton's Gap on the morning of the 14th, Hampton's cavalry
encountered the enemy's and made a dashing charge, which opened his way to
Munford's, both parties losing valuable officers and men. When General
Stuart rode up, he saw nothing seriously threatening, and ordered Hampton
south to the river pass; thinking that there might be something more
important at that point, he rode himself to Maryland Heights to see
General McLaws, and to witness the operations at Harper's Ferry, posting
Colonel Munford with two regiments of cavalry, two regiments of Mahone's
brigade under Colonel Parham, part of the Tenth Georgia Infantry, Chew's
battery of four guns, and a section of navy howitzers, to guard the pass.
The infantry regiments were posted behind stone walls at the base of the
mountain, the cavalry dismounted on the flanks acting as sharp-shooters.
At noon General Franklin marched through Burkittsville with his leading
division under General Slocum, holding the division under General W. F.
Smith in reserve. His orders were to wait until Couch's division joined
him, but he judged that the wait might be more favorable to the other
side. Slocum deployed his brigades, Bartlett's, Newton's, and Torbert's,
from right to left, posted Wolcott's battery of six guns on his left and
rear, and followed the advance of his skirmish line, the right brigade
leading. When the Confederate position was well developed, the skirmishers
were retired, and the order to assault followed,--the right regiments of
Newton's brigade supporting Bartlett's assault, the regiments on the left
supporting Torbert's. The Confederates made a bold effort to hold, but the
attack was too well organized and too cleverly pushed to leave the matter
long in doubt. Their flanks, being severely crowded upon, soon began to
drop off, when a sweeping charge of Slocum's line gained the position.
The brigades of General Brooks and Colonel Irwin of General Smith's
division were advanced to Slocum's left and joined in pursuit, which was
so rapid that the Confederates were not able to rally a good line; the
entire mountain was abandoned to the Federals, and the pursuit ended. Some
four hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, and one gun were
their trophies in this affair. General Franklin's total loss was five
hundred and thirty-three.[61]
General McLaws had ordered General Cobb's brigade and the other regiments
of Mahone's to reinforce the troops at the gap, but they only came up as
the Federals were making their sweeping charge, and were driven back with
their discomfited comrades. General Semmes's brigade at the Brownsville
Pass, a mile south, with five or six guns, attempted to relieve their
comrades, but the range was too great for effective work. That McLaws was
not prepared for the sudden onslaught is evident from the assurances made
him by the cavalry commander. His orders for Cobb were severe enough, but
Franklin was too prompt to allow Cobb to get to work. Upon hearing the
noise of battle, he followed his orders, riding with General Stuart, but
the game was played before he could take part in it. Night came and gave
him time to organize his forces for the next day. Had the defenders been
posted at the crest of the mountain it is probable they could have delayed
the assaulting forces until reinforced. But cavalry commanders do not
always post artillery and infantry to greatest advantage.
General Cobb made worthy effort to arrest the retreat and reorganize the
forces, but was not able to fix a rallying-point till after the pass was
lost and the troops were well out of fire of the pursuers. General Semmes
came to his aid, with his staff, but could accomplish nothing until he
drew two of his regiments from Brownsville Pass and established them with
a battery as a rallying-point. General McLaws reformed his line about a
mile and a half south of the lost gap, and drew all of his force not
necessary to the bombardment at Harper's Ferry to that line during the
night.
[Illustration: Lafayette McLaws. Commanding First Division, First Army
Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.]
Under cover of the night, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Davis, at the head of the
Union cavalry, left Harper's Ferry, crossed the Potomac, marched up the
left bank, through Sharpsburg, and made good his escape, capturing some
forty or fifty Confederate wagons as they were moving south from
Hagerstown.
We left McLaws in possession of Maryland Heights, on the 14th, with his
best guns planted against the garrison at Harper's Ferry. The Potomac
River was between his and Jackson's and Walker's forces, and the
Shenandoah divided Jackson's and Walker's commands. Walker posted his
division to defend against the escape from Harper's Ferry, and planted
three Parrott guns of Captain French's battery and two rifle pieces of
Captain Branch's on Loudoun Heights, having effective fire along Bolivar
Heights. General Jackson sent word to McLaws and Walker that the batteries
were not to open till all were ready, but the latter, hearing the
engagement along South Mountain drawing nearer, and becoming impatient
lest delay should prove fatal, ordered his guns to open against the
batteries along Bolivar Heights, and silenced those under range.
General Jackson ordered A. P. Hill's division along the left bank of the
Shenandoah to turn the enemy's left, the division under Lawton down the
turnpike in support of Hill, and his own division to threaten against the
enemy's right. Hill's division did its work in good style, securing
eligible positions on the enemy's left and left rear of Bolivar Heights,
and planted a number of batteries upon them during the night; and Jackson
had some of his best guns passed over the Shenandoah to commanding points
near the base of Loudoun Heights. At daylight Lawton's command moved up
close to the enemy. At the same time the batteries of Hill's division
opened fire, and a little later all the batteries, including those of
McLaws and Walker. The signal ordered for the storming columns was to be
the cessation of artillery fire. In about one hour the enemy's fire
ceased, when Jackson commanded silence upon his side. Pender's brigade
started, when the enemy opened again with his artillery. The batteries of
Pegram and Crenshaw dashed forward and renewed rapid fire, when the signal
of distress was raised.
Colonel D. H. Miles, the Federal commander at Harper's Ferry, was mortally
wounded, and the actual surrender was made by General White, who gave up
eleven thousand prisoners, thirteen thousand small-arms, seventy-two
cannon, quantities of quartermaster's stores and of subsistence.[62]
General Franklin had posted his division under General Couch at
Rohrersville on the morning of the 15th, and proceeded to examine McLaws's
line established the night before across Pleasant Valley. He found the
Confederates strongly posted covering the valley, their flanks against the
mountain-side. Before he could organize for attack the firing at Harper's
Ferry ceased, indicating surrender of that garrison and leaving the troops
operating there free to march against him. He prepared, therefore, for
that eventuality.
The "lost order" directed the commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and
Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they had been detached,
to join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. Under the
order and the changed condition of affairs, they were expected, in case of
early capitulation at Harper's Ferry, to march up the
Rohrersville-Boonsborough road against McClellan's left. There were in
those columns twenty-six of General Lee's forty brigades, equipped with a
fair apportionment of artillery and cavalry. So it seemed to be possible
that Jackson would order McLaws and Walker up the Rohrersville road, and
move with his own corps through the river pass east of South Mountain,
against McClellan's rear, as the speedier means of relief to General Lee's
forces. But prudence would have gone with the bolder move of his entire
command east of the mountain against McClellan's rear, with a fair field
for strategy and tactics. This move would have disturbed McClellan's plans
on the afternoon of the 15th, while there seemed little hope that
McClellan would delay his attack until Jackson could join us, marching by
the south side.
The field, and extreme of conditions, were more encouraging of results
than was Napoleon's work at Arcola.
General Jackson judged it better to join us by the south side, marched
promptly with two of his divisions (leaving A. P. Hill with six brigades
to receive the surrender and captured property), then ordered Walker's and
McLaws's troops to follow his march. With his report of surrender of the
garrison he sent advice of his march by the south side to join us.
At daylight on the 15th the head of General Lee's column reached the
Antietam. General D. H. Hill, in advance, crossed and filed into position
to the left of the Boonsborough turnpike, G. B. Anderson on his right,
Garland's brigade under Colonel McRae, Ripley, and Colquitt, Rodes in rear
near Sharpsburg, my command on his right. The two brigades under Hood were
on my right, Kemper, Drayton, Jenkins (under Colonel Walker), Washington
Artillery, on the ridge near the turnpike, and S. D. Lee's artillery.
Pickett's brigade (under Garnett) was in a second line, G. T. Anderson's
brigade in rear of the battalions, Evans's brigade on the north side of
the turnpike; Toombs's brigade joined and was posted at bridge No. 3
(Burnside Bridge). As the battalions of artillery attached to the
divisions were all that could find places, General Lee sent the reserve
artillery under General Pendleton across the Potomac.
As soon as advised of the surrender and Jackson's march by the south side,
my brigades under Hood were moved to the extreme left of the line, taking
the division of General D. H. Hill within my limits, while three of S. D.
Lee's batteries were sent in support of Hood's brigades. The pursuit
ordered by General McClellan was the First, Second, and Twelfth Corps by
the Boonsborough turnpike, the Ninth Corps and Sykes's division of the
Fifth by the old Sharpsburg road;[63] the Ninth and Fifth to reinforce
Franklin by the Rohrersville road, or move to Sharpsburg.
About two o'clock in the afternoon the advance of the Union army came in
sight. General Porter had passed the Ninth Corps with his division under
Sykes and joined Richardson's division of the Second. These divisions
deployed on the right and left of the turnpike and posted their batteries,
which drew on a desultory fire of artillery, continuing until night. The
morning of the 16th opened as the evening of the previous day closed,
except for the arrival of the remainder of the Union troops. The Ninth
Corps took post at the lower bridge opposite the Confederate right, the
First, the other divisions of the Second, and the Twelfth Corps resting
nearer Keedysville. The display of their finely appointed batteries was
imposing, as seen from Sharpsburg Heights.
Before maturing his plans, General McClellan had to make a careful
reconnoissance, and to know of the disposition to be made of the
Confederate forces from Harper's Ferry.
Of the latter point he was informed, if not assured, before he posted the
Ninth Corps. Four batteries of twenty-pound Parrotts were planted on the
height overlooking the Antietam on their right; on the crest near the
Burnside Bridge, Weed's three-inch guns and Benjamin's twenty-pound
Parrotts. At intervals between those were posted some ten or more
batteries, and the practice became more lively as the day wore on, till,
observing the unequal combat, I ordered the Confederates to hold their
ammunition, and the batteries of the other side, seeming to approve the
order, slackened their fire.
The Antietam, hardly worthy the name river, is a sluggish stream coming
down from Pennsylvania heights in a flow a little west of south till it
nears the Potomac, when it bends westward to its confluence. It is spanned
by four stone bridges,--at the Williamsport turnpike, the
Boonsborough-Sharpsburg turnpike, the Rohrersville turnpike, and another
near its mouth. The third was afterwards known as the Burnside Bridge.
From the north suburbs of Sharpsburg the Hagerstown turnpike leads north a
little west two miles, when it turns east of north to the vanishing point
of operations. A mile and a half from Sharpsburg on the west of this road
is the Dunker chapel, near the southern border of a woodland, which
spreads northward half a mile, then a quarter or more westward. East of
the pike were open fields of corn and fruit, with occasional woodlands of
ten or twenty acres, as far as the stream, where some heavier forests
cumbered the river banks. General Lee's line stood on the Sharpsburg
Heights, his right a mile southeast of the village, the line extending
parallel with the Hagerstown turnpike, three miles from his right, the
left curved backward towards the rear, and towards the great eastern bend
of the Potomac, near which were the cavalry and horse artillery. Along the
broken line were occasional ridges of limestone cropping out in such shape
as to give partial cover to infantry lying under them. Single batteries
were posted along the line, or under the crest of the heights, and the
battalions of the Washington Artillery, Cutts's, and S. D. Lee's.
In forming his forces for the battle, General McClellan divided his right
wing, posted the Ninth Corps on his left, at the Burnside Bridge, under
General Cox, and assigned the First Corps, under General Hooker, for his
right flank. General Burnside was retained on his left. The plan was to
make the main attack against the Confederate left, or to make that a
diversion in favor of the main attack, and to follow success by his
reserve.
At two P.M. of the 16th, Hooker's First Corps crossed the Antietam at the
bridge near Keedysville and a nearby ford, and marched against my left
brigades, Generals Meade, Ricketts, and Doubleday commanding the
divisions, battalions, and batteries of field artillery. The sharp
skirmish that ensued was one of the marked preliminaries of the great
battle; but the Federals gained nothing by it except an advanced position,
which was of little benefit and disclosed their purpose.
General Jackson was up from Harper's Ferry with Ewell's division and his
own, under Generals Lawton and Jones. They were ordered out to General
Lee's left, and took post west of the Hagerstown turnpike, the right of
his line resting on my left, under Hood, Winder's and Jones's brigades on
the front, Starke's and Taliaferro's on the second line, Early's brigade
of Ewell's division on the left of Jackson's division, with Hays's brigade
for a second; Lawton's and Trimble's brigades were left at rest near the
chapel; Poague's battery on Jackson's front; five other batteries prepared
for action. Following Jackson's march to the left, General J. G. Walker
came up with his two brigades, and was posted on my extreme right in the
position left vacant by the change of Hood's brigades.
General Hooker was joined, as he marched that afternoon, by his chief, who
rode with him some little distance conversing of pending affairs. It
subsequently transpired that Hooker thought the afternoon's work ordered
for his corps (thirteen thousand) so far from support extremely
venturesome, and he was right. Jackson was up and in position with two
divisions well on the flank of the attack to be made by Hooker. Hood with
S. D. Lee's batteries received Hooker's attack, and arrested its progress
for the day. If Jackson could have been put into this fight, and also the
brigades under J. G. Walker, Hooker's command could have been fought out,
if not crushed, before the afternoon went out. He was beyond support for
the day, and the posting along the Antietam was such--we will soon see--as
to prevent effective diversion in his favor. Events that followed
authorize the claim for this combination, that it would have so disturbed
the plans of General McClellan as to give us one or two days more for
concentration, and under that preparation we could have given him more
serious trouble.
Hood's skirmish line was out to be driven, or drawn in, but throughout the
severe engagement his line of battle was not seriously disturbed. After
night General Jackson sent the brigades of Trimble and Lawton, under
General Lawton, to replace Hood's men, who were ordered to replenish
ammunition, and, after getting food, to resume their places on my right.
Preparing for battle, General Jackson sent the brigade under General Early
to support Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery, and Lawton drew his
brigade, under General Hays, to support his others on the right of
Jackson's division.
General Mansfield crossed during the night with the Twelfth Corps and took
position supporting General Hooker's command, with the divisions of
Generals A. S. Williams and George S. Greene, and field batteries.
A light rain began to fall at nine o'clock. The troops along either line
were near enough to hear voices from the other side, and several spats
occurred during the night between the pickets, increasing in one instance
to exchange of many shots; but for the most part there was silence or only
the soft, smothered sound of the summer rain over all that field on which
was to break in the morning the storm of lead and iron.