THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.
General Lee continues Aggressive Work--From Foraged Fields of Virginia
into a Bounteous Land--Longstreet objected to the Movement on Harper's
Ferry--Lee thinks the Occasion Timely for Proposal of Peace and
Independence--Confederates singing through the Streets of
Fredericktown--McClellan's Movements--Cautious Marches--Lee's Lost
Order handed to the Federal Chief at Frederick.
"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows, and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat."
As our columns approached Leesburg, "Maryland, my Maryland" was in the
air, and on the lips of every man from General Lee down to the youngest
drummer. Our chief could have safely ordered the ranks to break in
Virginia and assemble in Fredericktown. All that they would ask was a
thirty minutes' plunge in the Potomac to remove some of the surplus dust,
before they encountered the smiles of the winsome lasses of Maryland. Yet
he expressed doubt of trusting so far from home solely to untried and
unknown resources for food-supplies. Receiving his anxious expressions
really as appeals for reinforcement of his unexpressed wish, but warm to
brave the venture, I related my Mexican War experiences with Worth's
division, marching around the city of Monterey on two days' rations of
roasting-ears and green oranges, and said that it seemed to me that we
could trust the fields of Maryland, laden with ripening corn and fruit, to
do as much as those of Mexico; that we could in fact subsist on the
bounty of the fields until we could open communication with our organized
base of supplies.
As factors in the problem, important as Lee's masterly science and
Jackson's great skill, stood the fortitude and prowess of the Confederate
soldiers, and their faith in the friendship and generosity of their
countrymen. Hungry, sparsely clad, worn with continuous bivouac and battle
since the 26th of June, proud of their record from the First to the honors
of the Second Manassas, their cheery smiles and elastic step told better
than words of anticipations of welcome from friends in Maryland, and of
new fields of honor for their solid ranks,--of the day when they should be
masters of the field and of a new-born republic.
Though a losing battle, the Union armies had made a splendid fight at
Second Manassas. The stand at Ox Hill was severe; severe till the march of
retreat, so that the Army of Northern Virginia should have held in
profound respect its formidable adversary, seasoned by many bloody fields.
The policy of the Richmond government was defensive rather than aggressive
warfare, but the situation called for action, and there was but one
opening,--across the Potomac. General Lee decided to follow his success in
its natural leading, and so reported to the Richmond authorities.
He was not so well equipped as an army of invasion should be, but the many
friends in Maryland and the fields on the north side of the Potomac were
more inviting than those of Virginia, so freely foraged. He knew from
events of the past that his army was equal to the service to which he
thought to call it, and ripe for the adventure; that he could march into
Maryland and remain until the season for the enemy's return into Virginia
for autumn or winter work had passed, improve his transportation supplies,
and the clothing of his army, and do that, if not more, for relief of our
Southern fields and limited means, besides giving his army and cause a
moral influence of great effect at home and abroad. He decided to make his
march by the most direct route from Chantilly, where he had last fought,
to the Potomac, and so crossed by the fords near Leesburg. Marching by
this route, he thought to cut off a formidable force of Union troops at
Winchester, at Martinsburg, and a strong garrison occupying the fortified
position at Harper's Ferry.
To summarize the situation, we were obliged to go into Maryland or retreat
to points more convenient to supplies and the protection of Richmond.
At Leesburg Lee learned that the Union troops in the Valley had left
Winchester, and sent back orders to have the crippled and feeble soldiers
wending their way to the army march through the Valley to join us in
Maryland. Trains of supplies were ordered to move by the same route.
On the 5th and 6th the columns crossed the Potomac by the fords near
Leesburg. Stuart's cavalry, coming up from the line near Alexandria and
the Long Bridge, passed to front and right flank of the army. General
McLaws's division, General J. G. Walker, with two brigades of his
division, and General Hampton's cavalry brigade, including Colonel Baker's
North Carolina regiment, joined us on the march. On the 7th our infantry
and artillery commands came together near Frederick City.
Riding together before we reached Frederick, the sound of artillery fire
came from the direction of Point of Rocks and Harper's Ferry, from which
General Lee inferred that the enemy was concentrating his forces from the
Valley, for defence at Harper's Ferry, and proposed to me to organize
forces to surround and capture the works and the garrison.
I thought it a venture not worth the game, and suggested, as we were in
the enemy's country and presence, that he would be advised of any move
that we made in a few hours after it was set on foot; that the Union army,
though beaten, was not disorganized; that we knew a number of their
officers who could put it in order and march against us, if they found us
exposed, and make serious trouble before the capture could be
accomplished; that our men were worn by very severe and protracted
service, and in need of repose; that as long as we had them in hand we
were masters of the situation, but dispersed into many fragments, our
strength must be greatly reduced. As the subject was not continued, I
supposed that it was a mere expression of passing thought, until, the day
after we reached Frederick, upon going over to head-quarters, I found the
front of the general's tent closed and tied. Upon inquiring of a member of
the staff, I was told that he was inside with General Jackson. As I had
not been called, I turned to go away, when General Lee, recognizing my
voice, called me in. The plan had been arranged. Jackson, with his three
divisions, was to recross the Potomac by the fords above Harper's Ferry,
march _via_ Martinsburg to Bolivar Heights; McLaws's division by
Crampton's Gap to Maryland Heights; J. G. Walker's division to recross at
Cheek's Ford and occupy Loudoun Heights, these heights overlooking the
positions of the garrison of Harper's Ferry; D. H. Hill's division to
march by the National road over South Mountain at Turner's Gap, and halt
at the western base, to guard trains, intercept fugitives from Harper's
Ferry, and support the cavalry, if needed; the cavalry to face the enemy
and embarrass his movements. I was to march over the mountain by Turner's
Gap to Hagerstown.
As their minds were settled firmly upon the enterprise, I offered no
opposition further than to ask that the order be so modified as to allow
me to send R. H. Anderson's division with McLaws and to halt my own column
near the point designated for bivouac of General D. H. Hill's command.
These suggestions were accepted, and the order[55] so framed was issued.
It may be well to digress from my narrative for a moment just here to
remark that General Lee's confidence in the strength of his army, the
situation of affairs, and the value of the moral effect upon the country,
North and South, was made fully manifest by the nature of the campaign he
had just entered upon, especially that portion of it directed against
Harper's Ferry, which, as events were soon to prove, weakened the
effectiveness of his army in the main issue, which happened to be
Antietam.
In another and a very different way, and with even greater plainness, his
high estimate of opportunity and favoring condition of circumstances
existing at the time was indicated to the authorities, though of course
not at that time made public. This was his deliberate and urgent advice to
President Davis to join him and be prepared to make a proposal for peace
and independence from the head of a conquering army. Fresh from the Second
Manassas, and already entered upon the fateful Maryland campaign, he wrote
the President this important letter:
"HEAD-QUARTERS NEAR FREDERICKTOWN, MD.,
"September 8, 1862.
"HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS,
"_President of the Confederate States, Richmond, Va._:
"MR. PRESIDENT,--The present position of affairs, in my opinion,
places it in the power of the government of the Confederate States to
propose with propriety to that of the United States the recognition of
our independence. For more than a year both sections of the country
have been devastated by hostilities which have brought sorrow and
suffering upon thousands of homes, without advancing the objects which
our enemies proposed to themselves in beginning the contest. Such a
proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded
as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict
injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that
our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the
attainment of an honorable peace. The rejection of this offer would
prove to the country that the responsibility of the continuance of the
war does not rest upon us, but that the party in power in the United
States elect to prosecute it for purposes of their own. The proposal
of peace would enable the people of the United States to determine at
their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a
prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to a
termination, which can but be productive of good to both parties
without affecting the honor of either.
"I have the honor to be, with great respect,
"Your obedient servant,
"R. E. LEE,
"_General_."[56]
And now I return to my narrative.
General Walker's division was on detached service at the time of the
order, trying to cut the canal. He marched, however, at the appointed
time, found Cheek's Ford under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries,
and marched on up the left bank as far as the Point of Rocks, where he
crossed and rested on the 11th. On the 12th he marched to and bivouacked
at Hillsboro'; on the 13th, to the foot of the Blue Ridge and occupied
Loudoun Heights by a detachment under Colonel Cooke.
Not satisfied with the organization of McLaws's column, I asked and
obtained permission on the 10th to strengthen it by three other
brigades,--Wilcox's, under Colonel Alfred Cumming; Featherston's, and
Pryor's, which were attached to R. H. Anderson's division.
The different columns from Frederick marched as ordered, except in the
change authorized for Anderson's division. It was a rollicking march, the
Confederates playing and singing, as they marched through the streets of
Frederick, "The Girl I left behind me."
Jackson recrossed the Potomac on the 11th, at Light's Ford, ordered A. P.
Hill's division by the turnpike to Martinsburg, his own and Ewell's
northwest to North Mountain Depot to intercept troops that might retreat
in that direction from Martinsburg. General White, commanding the Union
troops, abandoned Martinsburg the night of the 11th, having timely advice
of Jackson's movements, and retreated to Harper's Ferry. On the 12th,
Jackson's troops came together at Martinsburg, found some stores of bacon
and bread rations, and marched on the 13th for Harper's Ferry, where he
found the Union troops in battle array along Bolivar Heights.
I marched across South Mountain at Turner's Pass, and bivouacked near its
western base. General Lee ordered my move continued to Hagerstown. The
plans of the Confederates, as blocked out, anticipated the surrender of
Harper's Ferry on Friday, the 12th, or Saturday, the 13th, at latest. The
change of my position from Boonsborough to Hagerstown further misled our
cavalry commander and the commanders of the divisions at Boonsborough and
Harper's Ferry into a feeling of security that there could be no
threatening by the army from Washington.
D. H. Hill's division crossed by Turner's Gap and halted near
Boonsborough. McLaws took the left-hand road, marched through
Burkittsville, and halted for the night at the east base of the mountain,
near Crampton's and Brownsville Passes.
Near Crampton's Pass on the west the mountain unfolds into two parallel
ridges, the eastern, the general range of South Mountain, the western, Elk
Ridge, opening out Pleasant Valley, about three miles from crest to crest.
Crampton's is the northern of the two passes, and about eight miles south
of Turner's. One mile south of Crampton is the Brownsville Pass, and four
miles from that the river pass, which cuts in between the Blue Ridge of
Virginia and South Mountain of Maryland. Through the river pass the
Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the canal, and the Fredericktown turnpike
reach out to the west, and at the pass is the little town of Riverton.
Between Riverton and Harper's Ferry was the hamlet Sandy Hook, occupied by
about fifteen hundred Federal troops. Two roads wind through Pleasant
Valley, one close under South Mountain, the other hugging the foot-hills
of Elk Ridge,--the latter rugged, little used.
Harper's Ferry, against which Lee's new movement was directed, nestles at
the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers, on the Virginia side,
under the towering cliffs of Maryland or Cumberland Heights. At Harper's
Ferry the river cuts in so close under Maryland Heights that they stand
almost perpendicularly over it. The crowded space between the heights and
the river, filled by the railway, canal, and turnpike, was made by
blastings from the southern extremities of Maryland Heights. Under the
precipice the railroad bridge crosses the Potomac, and a pontoon bridge
was laid a few yards above it.
McLaws marched over into Pleasant Valley on the 11th, through Brownsville
Pass, near which and over Elk Ridge a road passes through Solomon's Gap of
Elk Ridge. From the top of this gap is a rugged way along the ridge
leading down to its southern projections and limits, by which infantry
only could find foothold. That southern point is called Maryland Heights.
Two brigades--Kershaw's and Barksdale's--under General Kershaw were
ordered to ascend Elk Ridge, march along its summit, driving off
opposition, and capture the enemy's position on the heights. General
Semmes was left near the pass, over which the troops had marched with his
own and Mahone's brigades, the latter under Colonel Parham with orders to
send a brigade to the top of Solomon's Gap to cover Kershaw's rear.
General Wright, of Anderson's division, was ordered with his brigade and
two pieces of artillery along the crest ridge of South Mountain to its
projection over Riverton. General Cobb was ordered with his brigade along
the base of Elk Ridge, to be abreast of Kershaw's column. With the balance
of his command, General McLaws moved down the Valley by the South Mountain
road, connecting his march, by signal, with General Kershaw's. Kershaw
soon met a strong force of skirmishers, which was steadily pushed back
till night. General Wright, without serious opposition, reached the end of
the mountain, when R. H. Anderson sent another brigade--Pryor's--to occupy
Weverton. On the 13th, Kershaw renewed his fight against very strong
positions, forced his way across two abatis, along a rugged plateau,
dropping off on both sides, in rocky cliffs of forty or fifty feet,
encountered breastworks of logs and boulders, struggled in a severe fight,
captured the position, the enemy's signal station, and at four P.M. gained
possession of the entire hold. Cobb's brigade was advanced, and took
possession of Sandy Hook without serious opposition. The column near South
Mountain was advanced to complete the grasp against the enemy at Harper's
Ferry. Up to this hour General McLaws had heard nothing direct from
Generals Jackson and Walker, though from the direction of the former
sounds of artillery reached him, and later a courier told that Jackson
thought his leading division would approach at two o'clock that afternoon.
During the day heavy cannonading was heard towards the east and northeast,
and rumors reached McLaws of the advance of the enemy from Frederick, but
the signal-parties and cavalry failed to discover movements, so the firing
was not credited as of significance. The morning of the 14th was occupied
in cutting a road for his artillery up to the point overlooking Harper's
Ferry, and at two P.M. Captains Read and Carlton had their best guns in
position over the town. But during these progressions the Confederates on
other fields had been called to more serious work.
General McClellan, moving his columns out from the vicinity of Washington
City on the 5th, made slow and very cautious marches to save fatigue of
his men and at the same time cover the capital against unforeseen
contingency; so slow and cautious was the march that he only covered forty
or fifty miles in seven days. On the 12th his head-quarters were at
Urbana, where he received the following telegram from President Lincoln:
"Governor Curtin telegraphs me, 'I have advices that Jackson is
crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel
army will be drawn from Maryland.'"
The President added,--
"Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and
positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates
the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let
him get off without being hurt."[57]
Elsewhere General McClellan has written of the 12th:
"During these movements I had not imposed long marches on the columns.
The absolute necessity of refitting and giving some little rest to the
troops worn down by previous long-continued marches and severe
fighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position,
strength, and intentions of the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon me
to move slowly and cautiously until the head-quarters reached Urbana,
where I first obtained reliable information that the enemy's object
was to move upon Harper's Ferry and the Cumberland Valley, and not
upon Washington and Baltimore."
His army was organized: Right wing, under General Burnside: First and
Ninth Corps; the Kanawha Division, under General J. D. Cox, was assigned
with the Ninth Corps about the 8th instant.
Centre column: Second and Twelfth Corps, under General Sumner.
Left wing: Sixth Corps and Couch's division of the Fourth under General
Franklin; Sykes's division, Fifth Corps, independent.[58]
Besides the despatches of the 11th and 12th, his cavalry under General
Pleasonton, which was vigilant and pushing, sent frequent reports of his
steady progress. In the afternoon Pleasonton and the Ninth Corps under
General Reno entered Fredericktown. This advance, by the National road,
threatened to cut off two of Stuart's cavalry regiments left at the
Monocacy Bridge. To detain the enemy till these were withdrawn, the
outpost on that road was reinforced. Hampton retired his cavalry beyond
Frederick and posted his artillery to cover the line of march, where he
was soon attacked by a formidable force. To make safe the retreat of the
brigade, a cavalry charge was ordered, under Colonel Butler, Lieutenant
Meaghan's squadron leading. Colonel Moore, of the Twenty-eighth Ohio
Cavalry, and a number of other prisoners were captured. This so detained
the enemy as to give safe withdrawal for the brigade to Middletown,
leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Martin's cavalry and two guns on guard at the
gap of the Catoctin range of mountains.
Before withdrawing from Frederick on the 12th, General Stuart sent orders
for the brigade under General Fitzhugh Lee to move around the right of the
Union army and ascertain the meaning and strength of its march.
Following his orders of the 12th, General Pleasonton detached a cavalry
brigade on the 13th and section of artillery under Colonel McReynolds to
follow Fitzhugh Lee, and Rush's Lancers were sent to Jefferson for General
Franklin's column. With his main force he pursued the Confederates towards
Turner's Pass of South Mountain. Midway between Frederick and South
Mountain, running parallel, is a lesser range, Catoctin, where he
encountered Stuart's rear-guard. After a severe affair he secured the
pass, moved on, and encountered a second force near Middletown. Reinforced
by Gibson's battery, he attacked and forced the way to a third stand. This
in turn was forced back and into the mountain at Turner's Pass.
On that day McClellan's columns marched: Ninth Corps, to and near
Middletown, eight miles; First Corps, to the Monocacy, eight miles;
Twelfth Corps, to Frederick, nine miles; Second Corps, to Frederick, eight
miles; Sixth Corps, to Buckeystown, seven miles; Couch's division, to
Licksville, six miles; Sykes's division, to Frederick, eight miles.
At Frederick, General Lee's special order No. 191 was handed to General
McClellan at his head-quarters with his centre (Sumner's) column.
How lost and how found we shall presently see, and see that by the
mischance and accident the Federal commander came in possession of
information that gave a spur, and great advantage, to his somewhat
demoralized army.