cases were stated to be pending, a history of which will fitly conclude
this discussion. In 1818 three American schooners sailed from the United
States to Havana; on June 2 they started back with cargoes aggregating
one hundred and seven slaves. The schooner "Constitution" was captured
by one of Andrew Jackson's officers under the guns of Fort Barancas. The
"Louisa" and "Marino" were captured by Lieutenant McKeever of the United
States Navy. The three vessels were duly proceeded against at Mobile,
and the case began slowly to drag along. The slaves, instead of being
put under the care of the zealous marshal of the district, were placed
in the hands of three bondsmen, friends of the judge. The marshal
notified the government of this irregularity, but apparently received no
answer. In 1822 the three vessels were condemned as forfeited, but the
court "reserved" for future order the distribution of the slaves.
Nothing whatever either then or later was done to the slave-traders
themselves. The owners of the ships promptly appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and that tribunal, in 1824, condemned the
three vessels and the slaves on two of them.[104] These slaves,
considerably reduced in number "from various causes," were sold at
auction for the benefit of the State, in spite of the Act of 1819.
Meantime, before the decision of the Supreme Court, the judge of the
Supreme Court of West Florida had awarded to certain alleged Spanish
claimants of the slaves indemnity for nearly the whole number seized, at
the price of $650 per head, and the Secretary of the Treasury had
actually paid the claim.[105] In 1826 Lieutenant McKeever urgently
petitions Congress for his prize-money of $4,415.15, which he has not
yet received.[106] The "Constitution" was for some inexplicable reason
released from bond, and the whole case fades in a very thick cloud of
official mist. In 1831 Congress sought to inquire into the final
disposition of the slaves. The information given was never printed; but
as late as 1836 a certain Calvin Mickle petitions Congress for
reimbursement for the slaves sold, for their hire, for their natural
increase, for expenses incurred, and for damages.[107]
64. ~The Supplementary Acts, 1818-1820.~ To remedy the obvious defects
of the Act of 1807 two courses were possible: one, to minimize the crime
of transportation, and, by encouraging informers, to concentrate efforts
against the buying of smuggled slaves; the other, to make the crime of
transportation so great that no slaves would be imported. The Act of
1818 tried the first method; that of 1819, the second.[108] The latter
was obviously the more upright and logical, and the only method
deserving thought even in 1807; but the Act of 1818 was the natural
descendant of that series of compromises which began in the
Constitutional Convention, and which, instead of postponing the
settlement of critical questions to more favorable times, rather
aggravated and complicated them.
The immediate cause of the Act of 1818 was the Amelia Island
scandal.[109] Committees in both Houses reported bills, but that of the
Senate finally passed. There does not appear to have been very much
debate.[110] The sale of Africans for the benefit of the informer and of
the United States was strongly urged "as the only means of executing the
laws against the slave trade as experience had fully demonstrated since
the origin of the prohibition."[111] This proposition was naturally
opposed as "inconsistent with the principles of our Government, and
calculated to throw as wide open the door to the importation of slaves
as it was before the existing prohibition."[112] The act, which became a
law April 20, 1818,[113] was a poorly constructed compromise, which
virtually acknowledged the failure of efforts to control the trade, and
sought to remedy defects by pitting cupidity against cupidity, informer
against thief. One-half of all forfeitures and fines were to go to the
informer, and penalties for violation were changed as follows:--
For equipping a slaver, instead of a fine of $20,000, a fine of
$1000 to $5000 and imprisonment from 3 to 7 years.
For transporting Negroes, instead of a fine of $5000 and
forfeiture of ship and Negroes, a fine of $1000 to $5000 and
imprisonment from 3 to 7 years.
For actual importation, instead of a fine of $1000 to $10,000
and imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, a fine of $1000 to
$10,000, and imprisonment from 3 to 7 years.
For knowingly buying illegally imported Negroes, instead of a
fine of $800 for each Negro and forfeiture, a fine of $1000 for
each Negro.
The burden of proof was laid on the defendant, to the extent that he
must prove that the slave in question had been imported at least five
years before the prosecution. The slaves were still left to the disposal
of the States.
This statute was, of course, a failure from the start,[114] and at the
very next session Congress took steps to revise it. A bill was reported
in the House, January 13, 1819, but it was not discussed till
March.[115] It finally passed, after "much debate."[116] The Senate
dropped its own bill, and, after striking out the provision for the
death penalty, passed the bill as it came from the House.[117] The House
acquiesced, and the bill became a law, March 3, 1819,[118] in the midst
of the Missouri trouble. This act directed the President to use armed
cruisers on the coasts of the United States and Africa to suppress the
slave-trade; one-half the proceeds of the condemned ship were to go to
the captors as bounty, provided the Africans were safely lodged with a
United States marshal and the crew with the civil authorities. These
provisions were seriously marred by a proviso which Butler of Louisiana,
had inserted, with a "due regard for the interests of the State which he
represented," viz., that a captured slaver must always be returned to
the port whence she sailed.[119] This, of course, secured decided
advantages to Southern slave-traders. The most radical provision of the
act was that which directed the President to "make such regulations and
arrangements as he may deem expedient for the safe keeping, support, and
removal beyond the limits of the United States, of all such negroes,
mulattoes, or persons of colour, as may be so delivered and brought
within their jurisdiction;" and to appoint an agent in Africa to receive
such Negroes.[120] Finally, an appropriation of $100,000 was made to
enforce the act.[121] This act was in some measure due to the new
colonization movement; and the return of Africans recaptured was a
distinct recognition of its efforts, and the real foundation of Liberia.
To render this straightforward act effective, it was necessary to add
but one measure, and that was a penalty commensurate with the crime of
slave stealing. This was accomplished by the Act of May 15, 1820,[122] a
law which may be regarded as the last of the Missouri Compromise
measures. The act originated from the various bills on piracy which were
introduced early in the sixteenth Congress. The House bill, in spite of
opposition, was amended so as to include slave-trading under piracy,
and passed. The Senate agreed without a division. This law provided that
direct participation in the slave-trade should be piracy, punishable
with death.[123]
----------------------+----------------------+-----------------------
STATUTES AT LARGE. | DATE. | AMOUNT APPROPRIATED.
----------------------+----------------------+-----------------------
VOL. PAGE | |
III. 533-4 | March 3, 1819 | $100,000
" 764 | " 3, 1823 | 50,000
IV. 141 | " 14, 1826 | 32,000
" 208 | March 2, 1827 | / 36,710
| | \ 20,000
" 302 | May 24, 1828 | 30,000
" 354 | March 2, 1829 | 16,000
" 462 | " 2, 1831 | 16,000
" 615 | Feb. 20, 1833 | 5,000
" 671 | Jan. 24, 1834 | 5,000
V. 157-8 | March 3, 1837 | 11,413.57
" 501 | Aug. 4, 1842 | 10,543.42
" 615 | March 3, 1843 | 5,000
IX. 96 | Aug. 10, 1846 | 25,000
XI. 90 | " 18, 1856 | 8,000
" 227 | March 3, 1857 | 8,000
" 404 | " 3, 1859 | 75,000
XII. 21 | May 26, 1860 | 40,000
" 132 | Feb. 19, 1861 | 900,000
" 219 | March 2, 1861 | 900,000
" 639 | Feb. 4, 1863 | 17,000
XIII. 424 | Jan. 24, 1865 | 17,000
XIV. 226 | July 25, 1866 | 17,000
" 415 | Feb. 28, 1867 | 17,000
XV. 58 | March 30, 1868 | 12,500
" 321 | March 3, 1869 | 12,500
----------------------+----------------------+-----------------------
Total, 50 years $2,386,666.99
Minus surpluses re-appropriated (approximate) 48,666.99?
--------------
$2,338,000
Cost of squadron, 1843-58, @ $384,500 per year
(_House Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong. 1 sess. IX. No. 73) 5,767,500
Returning slaves on "Wildfire" (_Statutes at Large_,
XII. 41) 250,000
Approximate cost of squadron, 1858-66, probably not
less than $500,000 per year 4,000,000?
---------------
Approximate money cost of suppressing the
slave-trade $12,355,500?
Cf. Kendall's Report: _Senate Doc._, 21 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, pp.
211-8; _Amer. State Papers, Naval_, III. No. 429 E.; also Reports of
the Secretaries of the Navy from 1819 to 1860.
65. ~Enforcement of the Supplementary Acts, 1818-1825.~ A somewhat more
sincere and determined effort to enforce the slave-trade laws now
followed; and yet it is a significant fact that not until Lincoln's
administration did a slave-trader suffer death for violating the laws of
the United States. The participation of Americans in the trade
continued, declining somewhat between 1825 and 1830, and then reviving,
until it reached its highest activity between 1840 and 1860. The
development of a vast internal slave-trade, and the consequent rise in
the South of vested interests strongly opposed to slave smuggling, led
to a falling off in the illicit introduction of Negroes after 1825,
until the fifties; nevertheless, smuggling never entirely ceased, and
large numbers were thus added to the plantations of the Gulf States.
Monroe had various constitutional scruples as to the execution of the
Act of 1819;[124] but, as Congress took no action, he at last put a fair
interpretation on his powers, and appointed Samuel Bacon as an agent in
Africa to form a settlement for recaptured Africans. Gradually the
agency thus formed became merged with that of the Colonization Society
on Cape Mesurado; and from this union Liberia was finally evolved.[125]
Meantime, during the years 1818 to 1820, the activity of the
slave-traders was prodigious. General James Tallmadge declared in the
House, February 15, 1819: "Our laws are already highly penal against
their introduction, and yet, it is a well known fact, that about
fourteen thousand slaves have been brought into our country this last
year."[126] In the same year Middleton of South Carolina and Wright of
Virginia estimated illicit introduction at 13,000 and 15,000
respectively.[127] Judge Story, in charging a jury, took occasion to
say: "We have but too many proofs from unquestionable sources, that it
[the slave-trade] is still carried on with all the implacable rapacity
of former times. Avarice has grown more subtle in its evasions, and
watches and seizes its prey with an appetite quickened rather than
suppressed by its guilty vigils. American citizens are steeped to their
very mouths (I can hardly use too bold a figure) in this stream of
iniquity."[128] The following year, 1820, brought some significant
statements from various members of Congress. Said Smith of South
Carolina: "Pharaoh was, for his temerity, drowned in the Red Sea, in
pursuing them [the Israelites] contrary to God's express will; but our
Northern friends have not been afraid even of that, in their zeal to
furnish the Southern States with Africans. They are better seamen than
Pharaoh, and calculate by that means to elude the vigilance of Heaven;
which they seem to disregard, if they can but elude the violated laws of
their country."[129] As late as May he saw little hope of suppressing
the traffic.[130] Sergeant of Pennsylvania declared: "It is notorious
that, in spite of the utmost vigilance that can be employed, African
negroes are clandestinely brought in and sold as slaves."[131] Plumer of
New Hampshire stated that "of the unhappy beings, thus in violation of
all laws transported to our shores, and thrown by force into the mass of
our black population, scarcely one in a hundred is ever detected by the
officers of the General Government, in a part of the country, where, if
we are to believe the statement of Governor Rabun, 'an officer who would
perform his duty, by attempting to enforce the law [against the slave
trade] is, by many, considered as an officious meddler, and treated with
derision and contempt;' ... I have been told by a gentleman, who has
attended particularly to this subject, that ten thousand slaves were in
one year smuggled into the United States; and that, even for the last
year, we must count the number not by hundreds, but by thousands."[132]
In 1821 a committee of Congress characterized prevailing methods as
those "of the grossest fraud that could be practised to deceive the
officers of government."[133] Another committee, in 1822, after a
careful examination of the subject, declare that they "find it
impossible to measure with precision the effect produced upon the
American branch of the slave trade by the laws above mentioned, and the
seizures under them. They are unable to state, whether those American
merchants, the American capital and seamen which heretofore aided in
this traffic, have abandoned it altogether, or have sought shelter under
the flags of other nations." They then state the suspicious circumstance
that, with the disappearance of the American flag from the traffic, "the
trade, notwithstanding, increases annually, under the flags of other
nations." They complain of the spasmodic efforts of the executive. They
say that the first United States cruiser arrived on the African coast in
March, 1820, and remained a "few weeks;" that since then four others had
in two years made five visits in all; but "since the middle of last
November, the commencement of the healthy season on that coast, no
vessel has been, nor, as your committee is informed, is, under orders
for that service."[134] The United States African agent, Ayres, reported
in 1823: "I was informed by an American officer who had been on the
coast in 1820, that he had boarded 20 American vessels in one morning,
lying in the port of Gallinas, and fitted for the reception of slaves.
It is a lamentable fact, that most of the harbours, between the Senegal
and the line, were visited by an equal number of American vessels, and
for the sole purpose of carrying away slaves. Although for some years
the coast had been occasionally visited by our cruizers, their short
stay and seldom appearance had made but slight impression on those
traders, rendered hardy by repetition of crime, and avaricious by
excessive gain. They were enabled by a regular system to gain
intelligence of any cruizer being on the coast."[135]
Even such spasmodic efforts bore abundant fruit, and indicated what
vigorous measures might have accomplished. Between May, 1818, and
November, 1821, nearly six hundred Africans were recaptured and eleven
American slavers taken.[136] Such measures gradually changed the
character of the trade, and opened the international phase of the
question. American slavers cleared for foreign ports, there took a
foreign flag and papers, and then sailed boldly past American cruisers,
although their real character was often well known. More stringent
clearance laws and consular instructions might have greatly reduced this
practice; but nothing was ever done, and gradually the laws became in
large measure powerless to deal with the bulk of the illicit trade. In
1820, September 16, a British officer, in his official report, declares
that, in spite of United States laws, "American vessels, American
subjects, and American capital, are unquestionably engaged in the trade,
though under other colours and in disguise."[137] The United States ship
"Cyane" at one time reported ten captures within a few days, adding:
"Although they are evidently owned by Americans, they are so completely
covered by Spanish papers that it is impossible to condemn them."[138]
The governor of Sierra Leone reported the rivers Nunez and Pongas full
of renegade European and American slave-traders;[139] the trade was said
to be carried on "to an extent that almost staggers belief."[140] Down
to 1824 or 1825, reports from all quarters prove this activity in
slave-trading.
The execution of the laws within the country exhibits grave defects and
even criminal negligence. Attorney-General Wirt finds it necessary to
assure collectors, in 1819, that "it is against public policy to
dispense with prosecutions for violation of the law to prohibit the
Slave trade."[141] One district attorney writes: "It appears to be
almost impossible to enforce the laws of the United States against
offenders after the negroes have been landed in the state."[142] Again,
it is asserted that "when vessels engaged in the slave trade have been
detained by the American cruizers, and sent into the slave-holding
states, there appears at once a difficulty in securing the freedom to
these captives which the laws of the United States have decreed for
them."[143] In some cases, one man would smuggle in the Africans and
hide them in the woods; then his partner would "rob" him, and so all
trace be lost.[144] Perhaps 350 Africans were officially reported as
brought in contrary to law from 1818 to 1820: the absurdity of this
figure is apparent.[145] A circular letter to the marshals, in 1821,
brought reports of only a few well-known cases, like that of the
"General Ramirez;" the marshal of Louisiana had "no information."[146]
There appears to be little positive evidence of a large illicit
importation into the country for a decade after 1825. It is hardly
possible, however, considering the activity in the trade, that slaves
were not largely imported. Indeed, when we note how the laws were
continually broken in other respects, absence of evidence of petty
smuggling becomes presumptive evidence that collusive or tacit
understanding of officers and citizens allowed the trade to some
extent.[147] Finally, it must be noted that during all this time
scarcely a man suffered for participating in the trade, beyond the loss
of the Africans and, more rarely, of his ship. Red-handed slavers,
caught in the act and convicted, were too often, like La Coste of South
Carolina, the subjects of executive clemency.[148] In certain cases
there were those who even had the effrontery to ask Congress to cancel
their own laws. For instance, in 1819 a Venezuelan privateer, secretly
fitted out and manned by Americans in Baltimore, succeeded in capturing
several American, Portuguese, and Spanish slavers, and appropriating the
slaves; being finally wrecked herself, she transferred her crew and
slaves to one of her prizes, the "Antelope," which was eventually
captured by a United States cruiser and the 280 Africans sent to
Georgia. After much litigation, the United States Supreme Court ordered
those captured from Spaniards to be surrendered, and the others to be
returned to Africa. By some mysterious process, only 139 Africans now
remained, 100 of whom were sent to Africa. The Spanish claimants of the
remaining thirty-nine sold them to a certain Mr. Wilde, who gave bond to
transport them out of the country. Finally, in December, 1827, there
came an innocent petition to Congress to _cancel this bond_.[149] A bill
to that effect passed and was approved, May 2, 1828,[150] and in
consequence these Africans remained as slaves in Georgia.
On the whole, it is plain that, although in the period from 1807 to 1820
Congress laid down broad lines of legislation sufficient, save in some
details, to suppress the African slave trade to America, yet the
execution of these laws was criminally lax. Moreover, by the facility
with which slavers could disguise their identity, it was possible for
them to escape even a vigorous enforcement of our laws. This situation
could properly be met only by energetic and sincere international
co-operation. The next chapter will review efforts directed toward this
end.[151]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 468.
[2] Cf. below, § 59.
[3] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 238.
[4] There were at least twelve distinct propositions as to the
disposal of the Africans imported:--
1. That they be forfeited and sold by the United States at
auction (Early's bill, reported Dec. 15: _Annals of Cong._, 9
Cong. 2 sess. pp. 167-8).
2. That they be forfeited and left to the disposal of the
States (proposed by Bidwell and Early: _Ibid._, pp. 181, 221,
477. This was the final settlement.)
3. That they be forfeited and sold, and that the proceeds go
to charities, education, or internal improvements (Early,
Holland, and Masters: _Ibid._, p. 273).
4. That they be forfeited and indentured for life (Alston and
Bidwell: _Ibid._, pp. 170-1).
5. That they be forfeited and indentured for 7, 8, or 10
years (Pitkin: _Ibid._, p. 186).
6. That they be forfeited and given into the custody of the
President, and by him indentured in free States for a term of
years (bill reported from the Senate Jan. 28: _House Journal_
(repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 575; _Annals of Cong._, 9
Cong. 2 sess. p. 477. Cf. also _Ibid._, p. 272).
7. That the Secretary of the Treasury dispose of them, at his
discretion, in service (Quincy: _Ibid._, p. 183).
8. That those imported into slave States be returned to
Africa or bound out in free States (Sloan: _Ibid._, p. 254).
9. That all be sent back to Africa (Smilie: _Ibid._, p. 176).
10. That those imported into free States be free, those
imported into slave States be returned to Africa or indentured
(Sloan: _Ibid._, p. 226).
11. That they be forfeited but not sold (Sloan and others:
_Ibid._, p. 270).
12. That they be free (Sloan: _Ibid._, p. 168; Bidwell:
_House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 515).
[5] Bidwell, Cook, and others: _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2
sess. p. 201.
[6] Bidwell: _Ibid._, p. 172.
[7] Fisk: _Ibid._, pp. 224-5; Bidwell: _Ibid._, p. 221.
[8] Quincy: _Ibid._, p. 184.
[9] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 478; Bidwell:
_Ibid._, p. 171.
[10] _Ibid._, p. 172.
[11] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 173-4.
[12] Alston: _Ibid._, p. 170.
[13] D.R. Williams: _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 183.
[14] Early: _Ibid._, pp. 184-5.
[15] Lloyd, Early, and others: _Ibid._, p. 203.
[16] Alston: _Ibid._, p. 170.
[17] Quincy: _Ibid._, p. 222; Macon: _Ibid._, p. 225.
[18] Macon: _Ibid._, p. 177.
[19] Barker: _Ibid._, p. 171; Bidwell: _Ibid._, p. 172.
[20] Clay, Alston, and Early: _Ibid._, p. 266.
[21] Clay, Alston, and Early: _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2
sess. p. 266.
[22] Bidwell: _Ibid._, p. 221.
[23] Sloan and others: _Ibid._, p. 271; Early and Alston:
_Ibid._, pp. 168, 171.
[24] Ely, Bidwell, and others: _Ibid._, pp. 179, 181, 271;
Smilie and Findley: _Ibid._, pp. 225, 226.
[25] _Ibid._, p. 240. Cf. Lloyd: _Ibid._, p. 236.
[26] Holland: _Ibid._, p. 241.
[27] _Ibid._, p. 227; Macon: _Ibid._, p. 225.
[28] Bidwell, Cook, and others: _Ibid._, p. 201.
[29] Bidwell: _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 221. Cf.
_Ibid._, p. 202.
[30] Early: _Ibid._, p. 239.
[31] _Ibid._
[32] _Ibid._, p. 1267.
[33] There were about six distinct punishments suggested:--
1. Forfeiture, and fine of $5000 to $10,000 (Early's bill:
_Ibid._, p. 167).
2. Forfeiture and imprisonment (amendment to Senate bill:
_Ibid._, pp. 231, 477, 483).
3. Forfeiture, imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, and fine of
$1000 to $10,000 (amendment to amendment of Senate bill:
_Ibid._, pp. 228, 483).
4. Forfeiture, imprisonment from 5 to 40 years, and fine of
$1000 to $10,000 (Chandler's amendment: _Ibid._, p. 228).
5. Forfeiture of all property, and imprisonment (Pitkin:
_Ibid._, p. 188).
6. Death (Smilie: _Ibid._, pp. 189-90; bill reported to House,
Dec. 19: _Ibid._, p. 190; Senate bill as reported to House,
Jan. 28).
[34] Smilie: _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 189-90.
[35] Tallmadge: _Ibid._, p. 233; Olin: _Ibid._, p. 237.
[36] Ely: _Ibid._, p. 237.
[37] Smilie: _Ibid._, p. 236. Cf. Sloan: _Ibid._, p. 232.
[38] Hastings: _Ibid._, p. 228.
[39] Dwight: _Ibid._, p. 241; Ely: _Ibid._, p. 232.
[40] Mosely: _Ibid._, pp. 234-5.
[41] Tallmadge: _Ibid._, pp. 232, 234. Cf. Dwight: _Ibid._, p. 241.
[42] Varnum: _Ibid._, p. 243.
[43] Elmer: _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 235.
[44] _Ibid._, p. 240.
[45] Holland: _Ibid._, p. 240.
[46] Early: _Ibid._, pp. 238-9; Holland: _Ibid._, p. 239.
[47] _Ibid._, p. 233. Cf. Lloyd: _Ibid._, p. 237; Ely:
_Ibid._, p. 232; Early: _Ibid._, pp. 238-9.
[48] _Ibid._, p. 484.
[49] This was the provision of the Senate bill as reported to
the House. It was over the House amendment to this that the
Houses disagreed. Cf. _Ibid._, p. 484.
[50] Cf. _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 527-8.
[51] _Ibid._, p. 528.
[52] _Ibid._, p. 626.
[53] _Ibid._
[54] _Ibid._
[55] _Ibid._, pp. 636-8; _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong.
2 sess. V. 616, and House Bill No. 219; _Ibid._, 10 Cong. 1
sess. VI. 27, 50; _Annals of Cong._, 10 Cong. 1 sess. pp.
854-5, 961.
[56] On account of the meagre records it is difficult to
follow the course of this bill. I have pieced together
information from various sources, and trust that this account
is approximately correct.
[57] Cf. _Senate Journal_ (repr. 1821), 9 Cong. 2 sess. IV.,
Senate Bill No. 41.
[58] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 438. Cf. above, §
53.
[59] This amendment of the Committee of the Whole was adopted
by a vote of 63 to 53. The New England States stood 3 to 2 for
the death penalty; the Middle States were evenly divided, 3
and 3; and the South stood 5 to 0 against it, with Kentucky
evenly divided. Cf. _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2
sess. V. 504.
[60] _Ibid._, V. 514-5.
[61] The substitution of the Senate bill was a victory for the
anti-slavery party, as all battles had to be fought again. The
Southern party, however, succeeded in carrying all its
amendments.
[62] Messrs. Betton of New Hampshire, Chittenden of Vermont,
Garnett and Trigg of Virginia, and D.R. Williams of South
Carolina voted against the bill: _House Journal_ (repr. 1826),
9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 585-6.
[63] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 626-7.
[64] The unassigned dates refer to debates, etc. The history
of the amendments and debates on the measure may be traced in
the following references:--
_Senate_ (Bill No. 41).
_Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 20-1; 9 Cong. 2 sess.
pp. 16, 19, 23, 33, 36, 45, 47, 68, 69, 70, 71, 79, 87, 93,
etc.
_Senate Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1-2 sess. IV. 11, 112,
123, 124, 132, 133, 150, 158, 164, 165, 167, 168, etc.
* * * * *
_House_ (Bill No. 148).
_Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 438; 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp.
114, 151, 167-8, 173-4, 180, 183, 189, 200, 202-4, 220, 228,
231, 240, 254, 264, 266-7, 270, 273, 373, 427, 477, 481,
484-6, 527, 528, etc.
_House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1-2 sess. V. 470, 482,
488, 490, 491, 496, 500, 504, 510, 513-6, 517, 540, 557, 575,
579, 581, 583-4, 585, 592, 594, 610, 613-5, 623, 638, 640,
etc.
[65] _Statutes at Large_, II. 426. There were some few
attempts to obtain laws of relief from this bill: see, e.g.,
_Annals of Cong._, 10 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1243; 11 Cong. 1 sess.
pp. 34, 36-9, 41, 43, 48, 49, 380, 465, 688, 706, 2209; _House
Journal_ (repr. 1826), II Cong. 1-2 sess. VII. 100, 102, 124,
etc., and Index, Senate Bill No. 8. Cf. _Amer. State Papers,
Miscellaneous_, II. No. 269. There was also one proposed
amendment to make the prohibition perpetual: _Amer. State
Papers, Miscellaneous_, I. No. 244.
[66] Toulmin, _Digest of the Laws of Alabama_, p. 637.
[67] _Laws of North Carolina_ (revision of 1819), II. 1350.
[68] Prince, _Digest_, p. 793.
[69] Fowler, _Historical Status of the Negro in Connecticut_,
in _Local Law_, etc., pp. 122, 126.
[70] _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, p. 32.
[71] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 11 Cong. 3 sess. VII. p.
435.
[72] _House Doc._, 15 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 84, p. 5.
[73] See, e.g., _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 11 Cong. 3 sess.
VII. p. 575.
[74] Drake, _Revelations of a Slave Smuggler_, p. 51. Parts of
this narrative are highly colored and untrustworthy; this
passage, however, has every earmark of truth, and is confirmed
by many incidental allusions.
[75] For accounts of these slavers, see _House Reports_, 17
Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, pp. 30-50. The "Paz" was an armed
slaver flying the American flag.
[76] Said to be owned by an Englishman, but fitted in America
and manned by Americans. It was eventually captured by H.M.S.
"Bann," after a hard fight.
[77] Also called Spanish schooner "Triumvirate," with American
supercargo, Spanish captain, and American, French, Spanish,
and English crew. It was finally captured by a British vessel.
[78] An American slaver of 1814, which was boarded by a
British vessel. All the above cases, and many others, were
proven before British courts.
[79] _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, p. 51.
[80] _House Doc._, 15 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 12, pp. 22, 38.
This slaver was after capture sent to New Orleans,--an
illustration of the irony of the Act of 1807.
[81] _House Journal_, 14 Cong. 2 sess. p. 15.
[82] _House Doc._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 36, p. 5.
[83] _Ibid._, 15 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 12, pp. 8-14. See
Chew's letter of Oct. 17, 1817: _Ibid._, pp. 14-16.
[84] By the secret Joint Resolution and Act of 1811 (_Statutes
at Large_, III. 471), Congress gave the President power to
suppress the Amelia Island establishment, which was then
notorious. The capture was not accomplished until 1817.
[85] _House Doc._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 42, pp. 10-11.
Cf. Report of the House Committee, Jan. 10, 1818: "It is but
too notorious that numerous infractions of the law prohibiting
the importation of slaves into the United States have been
perpetrated with impunity upon our southern frontier." _Amer.
State Papers, Miscellaneous_, II. No. 441.
[86] Special message of Jan. 13, 1818: _House Journal_, 15
Cong. 1 sess. pp. 137-9.
[87] Collector McIntosh, of the District of Brunswick, Ga., to
the Secretary of the Treasury. _House Doc._, 16 Cong. 1 sess.
III. No. 42, pp. 8-9.
[88] _House Doc._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 42, pp. 6-7.
[89] _Ibid._, pp. 11-12.
[90] _Amer. State Papers, Miscellaneous_, II. No. 529.
[91] _House Doc._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 42, p. 7.
[92] _Ibid._, p. 6.
[93] _House Reports_, 21 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 348, p. 82.
[94] They were not general instructions, but were directed to
Commander Campbell. Cf. _House Doc._, 15 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No.
84, pp. 5-6.
[95] _Statutes at Large_, III. 471 ff.
[96] _House Doc._, 15 Cong. 2 sess. VI. No. 107, pp. 8-9.
[97] _Ibid._, IV. No. 84. Cf. Chew's letters in _House
Reports_, 21 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 348.
[98] _House Doc._, 15 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 12, pp. 22, 38; 15
Cong. 2 sess. VI. No. 100, p. 13; 16 Cong. 1 sess. III. No.
42, p. 9, etc.; _House Reports_, 21 Cong. 1 sess. III. No.
348, p. 85.
[99] _House Doc._, 15 Cong. 2 sess. VI. No. 107, pp. 8-9.
[100] _House Reports_, 21 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 348, p. 77.
[101] Cf. _House Doc._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 42, p. 11:
"The Grand Jury found true bills against the owners of the
vessels, masters, and a supercargo--all of whom are
discharged; why or wherefore I cannot say, except that it
could not be for want of proof against them."
[102] E.g., in July, 1818, one informer "will have to leave
that part of the country to save his life": _Ibid._, 15 Cong.
2 sess. VI. No. 100, p. 9.
[103] Joseph Nourse, Register of the Treasury, to Hon. W.H.
Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury: _Ibid._, 15 Cong. 2 sess.
VI. No. 107, p. 5.
[104] The slaves on the "Constitution" were not condemned, for
the technical reason that she was not captured by a
commissioned officer of the United States navy.
[105] These proceedings are very obscure, and little was said
about them. The Spanish claimants were, it was alleged with
much probability, but representatives of Americans. The claim
was paid under the provisions of the Treaty of Florida, and
included slaves whom the court afterward declared forfeited.
[106] An act to relieve him was finally passed, Feb. 8, 1827,
nine years after the capture. See _Statutes at Large_, VI.
357.
[107] It is difficult to get at the exact facts in this
complicated case. The above statement is, I think, much milder
than the real facts would warrant, if thoroughly known. Cf.
_House Reports_, 19 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 231; 21 Cong. 1
sess. III. No. 348, pp. 62-3, etc.; 24 Cong. 1 sess. I. No.
209; _Amer. State Papers, Naval_, II. No. 308.
[108] The first method, represented by the Act of 1818, was
favored by the South, the Senate, and the Democrats; the
second method, represented by the Act of 1819, by the North,
the House, and by the as yet undeveloped but growing Whig
party.
[109] Committees on the slave-trade were appointed by the
House in 1810 and 1813; the committee of 1813 recommended a
revision of the laws, but nothing was done: _Annals of Cong._,
11 Cong. 3 sess. p. 387; 12 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1074, 1090. The
presidential message of 1816 led to committees on the trade in
both Houses. The committee of the House of Representatives
reported a joint resolution on abolishing the traffic and
colonizing the Negroes, also looking toward international
action. This never came to a vote: _Senate Journal_, 14 Cong.
2 sess. pp. 46, 179, 180; _House Journal_, 14 Cong. 2 sess.
pp. 25, 27, 380; _House Doc_, 14 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 77.
Finally, the presidential message of 1817 (_House Journal_, 15
Cong. 1 sess. p. 11), announcing the issuance of orders to
suppress the Amelia Island establishment, led to two other
committees in both Houses. The House committee under Middleton
made a report with a bill (_Amer. State Papers,
Miscellaneous_, II. No. 441), and the Senate committee also
reported a bill.
[110] The Senate debates were entirely unreported, and the
report of the House debates is very meagre. For the
proceedings, see _Senate Journal_, 15 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 243,
304, 315, 333, 338, 340, 348, 377, 386, 388, 391, 403, 406;
_House Journal_, 15 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 19, 20, 29, 51, 92, 131,
362, 410, 450, 452, 456, 468, 479, 484, 492, 505.
[111] Simkins of South Carolina, Edwards of North Carolina,
and Pindall: _Annals of Cong._, 15 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1740.
[112] Hugh Nelson of Virginia: _Annals of Cong._, 15 Cong. 1
sess. p. 1740.
[113] _Statutes at Large_, III. 450. By this act the first six
sections of the Act of 1807 were repealed.
[114] Or, more accurately speaking, every one realized, in
view of the increased activity of the trade, that it would be
a failure.
[115] Nov. 18, 1818, the part of the presidential message
referring to the slave-trade was given to a committee of the
House, and this committee also took in hand the House bill of
the previous session which the Senate bill had replaced:
_House Journal_, 15 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 9-19, 42, 150, 179, 330,
334, 341, 343, 352.
[116] Of which little was reported: _Annals of Cong._, 15
Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1430-31. Strother opposed, "for various
reasons of expediency," the bounties for captors. Nelson of
Virginia advocated the death penalty, and, aided by Pindall,
had it inserted. The vote on the bill was 57 to 45.
[117] The Senate had also had a committee at work on a bill
which was reported Feb. 8, and finally postponed: _Senate
Journal_, 15 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 234, 244, 311-2, 347. The House
bill was taken up March 2: _Annals of Cong._, 15 Cong. 2 sess.
p. 280.
[118] _Statutes at Large_, III. 532.
[119] _Annals of Cong._, 15 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1430. This
insured the trial of slave-traders in a sympathetic slave
State, and resulted in the "disappearance" of many captured
Negroes.
[120] _Statutes at Large_, III. 533.
[121] The first of a long series of appropriations extending
to 1869, of which a list is given on the next page. The totals
are only approximately correct. Some statutes may have escaped
me, and in the reports of moneys the surpluses of previous
years are not always clearly distinguishable.
[122] In the first session of the sixteenth Congress, two
bills on piracy were introduced into the Senate, one of which
passed, April 26. In the House there was a bill on piracy, and
a slave-trade committee reported recommending that the
slave-trade be piracy. The Senate bill and this bill were
considered in Committee of the Whole, May 11, and a bill was
finally passed declaring, among other things, the traffic
piracy. In the Senate there was "some discussion, rather on
the form than the substance of these amendments," and "they
were agreed to without a division": _Senate Journal_, 16 Cong.
1 sess. pp. 238, 241, 268, 287, 314, 331, 346, 350, 409, 412,
417, 420, 422, 424, 425; _House Journal_, 16 Cong. 1 sess. pp.
113, 280, 453, 454, 494, 518, 520, 522, 537; _Annals of
Cong._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 693-4, 2231, 2236-7, etc. The
debates were not reported.
[123] _Statutes at Large_, III. 600-1. This act was in reality
a continuation of the piracy Act of 1819, and was only
temporary. The provision was, however, continued by several
acts, and finally made perpetual by the Act of Jan. 30, 1823:
_Statutes at Large_, III. 510-4, 721. On March 3, 1823, it was
slightly amended so as to give district courts jurisdiction.
[124] Attorney-General Wirt advised him, October, 1819, that
no part of the appropriation could be used to purchase land in
Africa or tools for the Negroes, or as salary for the agent:
_Opinions of Attorneys-General_, I. 314-7. Monroe laid the
case before Congress in a special message Dec. 20, 1819
(_House Journal_, 16 Cong. 1 sess. p. 57); but no action was
taken there.
[125] Cf. Kendall's Report, August, 1830: _Senate Doc._, 21
Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, pp. 211-8; also see below, Chapter X.
[126] Speech in the House of Representatives, Feb. 15, 1819,
p. 18; published in Boston, 1849.
[127] Jay, _Inquiry into American Colonization_ (1838), p. 59,
note.
[128] Quoted in Friends' _Facts and Observations on the Slave
Trade_ (ed. 1841), pp. 7-8.
[129] _Annals of Cong._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 270-1.
[130] _Ibid._, p. 698.
[131] _Ibid._, p. 1207.
[132] _Annals of Cong._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1433.
[133] Referring particularly to the case of the slaver
"Plattsburg." Cf. _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No.
92, p. 10.
[134] _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, p. 2. The
President had in his message spoken in exhilarating tones of
the success of the government in suppressing the trade. The
House Committee appointed in pursuance of this passage made
the above report. Their conclusions are confirmed by British
reports: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1822, Vol. XXII., _Slave
Trade_, Further Papers, III. p. 44. So, too, in 1823, Ashmun,
the African agent, reports that thousands of slaves are being
abducted.
[135] Ayres to the Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 24, 1823;
reprinted in _Friends' View of the African Slave-Trade_
(1824), p. 31.
[136] _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, pp. 5-6.
The slavers were the "Ramirez," "Endymion," "Esperanza,"
"Plattsburg," "Science," "Alexander," "Eugene," "Mathilde,"
"Daphne," "Eliza," and "La Pensée." In these 573 Africans were
taken. The naval officers were greatly handicapped by the size
of the ships, etc. (cf. _Friends' View_, etc., pp. 33-41).
They nevertheless acted with great zeal.
[137] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1821, Vol. XXIII., _Slave
Trade_, Further Papers, A, p. 76. The names and description of
a dozen or more American slavers are given: _Ibid._, pp.
18-21.
[138] _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, pp. 15-20.
[139] _House Doc._, 18 Cong. 1 sess. VI. No. 119, p. 13.
[140] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1823, Vol. XVIII., _Slave
Trade_, Further Papers, A, pp. 10-11.
[141] _Opinions of Attorneys-General_, V. 717.
[142] R.W. Habersham to the Secretary of the Navy, August,
1821; reprinted in _Friends' View_, etc., p. 47.
[143] _Ibid._, p. 42.
[144] _Ibid._, p. 43.
[145] Cf. above, pp. 126-7.
[146] _Friends' View_, etc., p. 42.
[147] A few accounts of captures here and there would make the
matter less suspicious; these, however, do not occur. How
large this suspected illicit traffic was, it is of course
impossible to say; there is no reason why it may not have
reached many hundreds per year.
[148] Cf. editorial in _Niles's Register_, XXII. 114. Cf. also
the following instances of pardons:--
PRESIDENT JEFFERSON: March 1, 1808, Phillip M. Topham,
convicted for "carrying on an illegal slave-trade" (pardoned
twice). _Pardons and Remissions_, I. 146, 148-9.
PRESIDENT MADISON: July 29, 1809, fifteen vessels arrived at
New Orleans from Cuba, with 666 white persons and 683 negroes.
Every penalty incurred under the Act of 1807 was remitted.
(Note: "Several other pardons of this nature were granted.")
_Ibid._, I. 179.
Nov. 8, 1809, John Hopkins and Lewis Le Roy, convicted for
importing a slave. _Ibid._, I. 184-5.
Feb. 12, 1810, William Sewall, convicted for importing slaves.
_Ibid._, I. 194, 235, 240.
May 5, 1812, William Babbit, convicted for importing slaves.
_Ibid._, I. 248.
PRESIDENT MONROE: June 11, 1822, Thomas Shields, convicted for
bringing slaves into New Orleans. _Ibid._, IV. 15.
Aug. 24, 1822, J.F. Smith, sentenced to five years'
imprisonment and $3000 fine; served twenty-five months and was
then pardoned. _Ibid._, IV. 22.
July 23, 1823, certain parties liable to penalties for
introducing slaves into Alabama. _Ibid._, IV. 63.
Aug. 15, 1823, owners of schooner "Mary," convicted of
importing slaves. _Ibid._, IV. 66.
PRESIDENT J.Q. ADAMS: March 4, 1826, Robert Perry; his ship
was forfeited for slave-trading. _Ibid._, IV. 140.
Jan. 17, 1827, Jesse Perry; forfeited ship, and was convicted
for introducing slaves. _Ibid._, IV. 158.
Feb. 13, 1827, Zenas Winston; incurred penalties for
slave-trading. _Ibid._, IV. 161. The four following cases are
similar to that of Winston:--
Feb. 24, 1827, John Tucker and William Morbon. _Ibid._, IV.
162.
March 25, 1828, Joseph Badger. _Ibid._, IV. 192.
Feb. 19, 1829, L.R. Wallace. _Ibid._, IV. 215.
PRESIDENT JACKSON: Five cases. _Ibid._, IV. 225, 270, 301,
393, 440.
The above cases were taken from manuscript copies of the
Washington records, made by Mr. W.C. Endicott, Jr., and kindly
loaned me.
[149] See _Senate Journal_, 20 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 60, 66, 340,
341, 343, 348, 352, 355; _House Journal_, 20 Cong. 1 sess. pp.
59, 76, 123, 134, 156, 169, 173, 279, 634, 641, 646, 647, 688,
692.
[150] _Statutes at Large_, VI. 376.
[151] Among interesting minor proceedings in this period were
two Senate bills to register slaves so as to prevent illegal
importation. They were both dropped in the House; a House
proposition to the same effect also came to nothing: _Senate
Journal_, 15 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 147, 152, 157, 165, 170, 188,
201, 203, 232, 237; 15 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 63, 74, 77, 202, 207,
285, 291, 297; _House Journal_, 15 Cong. 1 sess. p. 332; 15
Cong. 2 sess. pp. 303, 305, 316; 16 Cong. 1 sess. p. 150.
Another proposition was contained in the Meigs resolution
presented to the House, Feb. 5, 1820, which proposed to devote
the public lands to the suppression of the slave-trade. This
was ruled out of order. It was presented again and laid on the
table in 1821: _House Journal_, 16 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 196, 200,
227; 16 Cong. 2 sess. p. 238.
* * * * *
_Chapter IX_
THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE SLAVE-TRADE.
1783-1862.
66. The Rise of the Movement against the Slave-Trade, 1788-1807.
67. Concerted Action of the Powers, 1783-1814.
68. Action of the Powers from 1814 to 1820.
69. The Struggle for an International Right of Search, 1820-1840.
70. Negotiations of 1823-1825.
71. The Attitude of the United States and the State of the Slave-Trade.
72. The Quintuple Treaty, 1839-1842.
73. Final Concerted Measures, 1842-1862.
66. ~The Rise of the Movement against the Slave-Trade, 1788-1807.~ At
the beginning of the nineteenth century England held 800,000 slaves in
her colonies; France, 250,000; Denmark, 27,000; Spain and Portugal,
600,000; Holland, 50,000; Sweden, 600; there were also about 2,000,000
slaves in Brazil, and about 900,000 in the United States.[1] This was
the powerful basis of the demand for the slave-trade; and against the
economic forces which these four and a half millions of enforced
laborers represented, the battle for freedom had to be fought.
Denmark first responded to the denunciatory cries of the eighteenth
century against slavery and the slave-trade. In 1792, by royal order,
this traffic was prohibited in the Danish possessions after 1802. The
principles of the French Revolution logically called for the extinction
of the slave system by France. This was, however, accomplished more
precipitately than the Convention anticipated; and in a whirl of
enthusiasm engendered by the appearance of the Dominican deputies,
slavery and the slave-trade were abolished in all French colonies
February 4, 1794.[2] This abolition was short-lived; for at the command
of the First Consul slavery and the slave-trade was restored in An X
(1799).[3] The trade was finally abolished by Napoleon during the
Hundred Days by a decree, March 29, 1815, which briefly declared: "À
dater de la publication du présent Décret, la Traite des Noirs est
abolie."[4] The Treaty of Paris eventually confirmed this law.[5]
In England, the united efforts of Sharpe, Clarkson, and Wilberforce
early began to arouse public opinion by means of agitation and pamphlet
literature. May 21, 1788, Sir William Dolben moved a bill regulating the
trade, which passed in July and was the last English measure
countenancing the traffic.[6] The report of the Privy Council on the
subject in 1789[7] precipitated the long struggle. On motion of Pitt, in
1788, the House had resolved to take up at the next session the question
of the abolition of the trade.[8] It was, accordingly, called up by
Wilberforce, and a remarkable parliamentary battle ensued, which lasted
continuously until 1805. The Grenville-Fox ministry now espoused the
cause. This ministry first prohibited the trade with such colonies as
England had acquired by conquest during the Napoleonic wars; then, in
1806, they prohibited the foreign slave-trade; and finally, March 25,
1807, enacted the total abolition of the traffic.[9]
67. ~Concerted Action of the Powers, 1783-1814.~ During the peace
negotiations between the United States and Great Britain in 1783, it was
proposed by Jay, in June, that there be a proviso inserted as follows:
"Provided that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall not have any
right or claim under the convention, to carry or import, into the said
States any slaves from any part of the world; it being the intention of
the said States entirely to prohibit the importation thereof."[10] Fox
promptly replied: "If that be their policy, it never can be competent to
us to dispute with them their own regulations."[11] No mention of this
was, however, made in the final treaty, probably because it was thought
unnecessary.
In the proposed treaty of 1806, signed at London December 31, Article 24
provided that "The high contracting parties engage to communicate to
each other, without delay, all such laws as have been or shall be
hereafter enacted by their respective Legislatures, as also all measures
which shall have been taken for the abolition or limitation of the
African slave trade; and they further agree to use their best endeavors
to procure the co-operation of other Powers for the final and complete
abolition of a trade so repugnant to the principles of justice and
humanity."[12]
This marks the beginning of a long series of treaties between England
and other powers looking toward the prohibition of the traffic by
international agreement. During the years 1810-1814 she signed treaties
relating to the subject with Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden.[13] May 30,
1814, an additional article to the Treaty of Paris, between France and
Great Britain, engaged these powers to endeavor to induce the
approaching Congress at Vienna "to decree the abolition of the Slave
Trade, so that the said Trade shall cease universally, as it shall cease
definitively, under any circumstances, on the part of the French
Government, in the course of 5 years; and that during the said period no
Slave Merchant shall import or sell Slaves, except in the Colonies of
the State of which he is a Subject."[14] In addition to this, the next
day a circular letter was despatched by Castlereagh to Austria, Russia,
and Prussia, expressing the hope "that the Powers of Europe, when
restoring Peace to Europe, with one common interest, will crown this
great work by interposing their benign offices in favour of those
Regions of the Globe, which yet continue to be desolated by this
unnatural and inhuman traffic."[15] Meantime additional treaties were
secured: in 1814 by royal decree Netherlands agreed to abolish the
trade;[16] Spain was induced by her necessities to restrain her trade to
her own colonies, and to endeavor to prevent the fraudulent use of her
flag by foreigners;[17] and in 1815 Portugal agreed to abolish the
slave-trade north of the equator.[18]
68. ~Action of the Powers from 1814 to 1820.~ At the Congress of Vienna,
which assembled late in 1814, Castlereagh was indefatigable in his
endeavors to secure the abolition of the trade. France and Spain,
however, refused to yield farther than they had already done, and the
other powers hesitated to go to the lengths he recommended.
Nevertheless, he secured the institution of annual conferences on the
matter, and a declaration by the Congress strongly condemning the trade
and declaring that "the public voice in all civilized countries was
raised to demand its suppression as soon as possible," and that, while
the definitive period of termination would be left to subsequent
negotiation, the sovereigns would not consider their work done until the
trade was entirely suppressed.[19]
In the Treaty of Ghent, between Great Britain and the United States,
ratified February 17, 1815, Article 10, proposed by Great Britain,
declared that, "Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the
principles of humanity and justice," the two countries agreed to use
their best endeavors in abolishing the trade.[20] The final overthrow of
Napoleon was marked by a second declaration of the powers, who,
"desiring to give effect to the measures on which they deliberated at
the Congress of Vienna, relative to the complete and universal
abolition of the Slave Trade, and having, each in their respective
Dominions, prohibited without restriction their Colonies and Subjects
from taking any part whatever in this Traffic, engage to renew
conjointly their efforts, with the view of securing final success to
those principles which they proclaimed in the Declaration of the 4th
February, 1815, and of concerting, without loss of time, through their
Ministers at the Courts of London and of Paris, the most effectual
measures for the entire and definitive abolition of a Commerce so
odious, and so strongly condemned by the laws of religion and of
nature."[21]
Treaties further restricting the trade continued to be made by Great
Britain: Spain abolished the trade north of the equator in 1817,[22] and
promised entire abolition in 1820; Spain, Portugal, and Holland also
granted a mutual limited Right of Search to England, and joined in
establishing mixed courts.[23] The effort, however, to secure a general
declaration of the powers urging, if not compelling, the abolition of
the trade in 1820, as well as the attempt to secure a qualified
international Right of Visit, failed, although both propositions were
strongly urged by England at the Conference of 1818.[24]
69. ~The Struggle for an International Right of Search, 1820-1840.~
Whatever England's motives were, it is certain that only a limited
international Right of Visit on the high seas could suppress or greatly
limit the slave-trade. Her diplomacy was therefore henceforth directed
to this end. On the other hand, the maritime supremacy of England, so
successfully asserted during the Napoleonic wars, would, in case a Right
of Search were granted, virtually make England the policeman of the
seas; and if nations like the United States had already, under present
conditions, had just cause to complain of violations by England of their
rights on the seas, might not any extension of rights by international
agreement be dangerous? It was such considerations that for many years
brought the powers to a dead-lock in their efforts to suppress the
slave-trade.
At first it looked as if England might attempt, by judicial decisions in
her own courts, to seize even foreign slavers.[25] After the war,
however, her courts disavowed such action,[26] and the right was sought
for by treaty stipulation. Castlereagh took early opportunity to
approach the United States on the matter, suggesting to Minister Rush,
June 20, 1818, a mutual but strictly limited Right of Search.[27] Rush
was ordered to give him assurances of the solicitude of the United
States to suppress the traffic, but to state that the concessions asked
for appeared of a character not adaptable to our institutions.
Negotiations were then transferred to Washington; and the new British
minister, Mr. Stratford Canning, approached Adams with full instructions
in December, 1820.[28]
Meantime, it had become clear to many in the United States that the
individual efforts of States could never suppress or even limit the
trade without systematic co-operation. In 1817 a committee of the House
had urged the opening of negotiations looking toward such international
co-operation,[29] and a Senate motion to the same effect had caused long
debate.[30] In 1820 and 1821 two House committee reports, one of which
recommended the granting of a Right of Search, were adopted by the
House, but failed in the Senate.[31] Adams, notwithstanding this, saw
constitutional objections to the plan proposed by Canning, and wrote to
him, December 30: "A Compact, giving the power to the Naval Officers of
one Nation to search the Merchant Vessels of another for Offenders and
offences against the Laws of the latter, backed by a further power to
seize and carry into a Foreign Port, and there subject to the decision
of a Tribunal composed of at least one half Foreigners, irresponsible to
the Supreme Corrective tribunal of this Union, and not amendable to the
controul of impeachment for official misdemeanors, was an investment of
power, over the persons, property and reputation of the Citizens of this
Country, not only unwarranted by any delegation of Sovereign Power to
the National Government, but so adverse to the elementary principles and
indispensable securities of individual rights, ... that not even the
most unqualified approbation of the ends ... could justify the
transgression." He then suggested co-operation of the fleets on the
coast of Africa, a proposal which was promptly accepted.[32]
The slave-trade was again a subject of international consideration at
the Congress of Verona in 1822. Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia,
and Prussia were represented. The English delegates declared that,
although only Portugal and Brazil allowed the trade, yet the traffic was
at that moment carried on to a greater extent than ever before. They
said that in seven months of the year 1821 no less than 21,000 slaves
were abducted, and three hundred and fifty-two vessels entered African
ports north of the equator. "It is obvious," said they, "that this crime
is committed in contravention of the Laws of every Country of Europe,
and of America, excepting only of one, and that it requires something
more than the ordinary operation of Law to prevent it." England
therefore recommended:--
1. That each country denounce the trade as piracy, with a view of
founding upon the aggregate of such separate declarations a general law
to be incorporated in the Law of Nations.
2. A withdrawing of the flags of the Powers from persons not natives of
these States, who engage in the traffic under the flags of these States.
3. A refusal to admit to their domains the produce of the colonies of
States allowing the trade, a measure which would apply to Portugal and
Brazil alone.
These proposals were not accepted. Austria would agree to the first two
only; France refused to denounce the trade as piracy; and Prussia was
non-committal. The utmost that could be gained was another denunciation
of the trade couched in general terms.[33]
70. ~Negotiations of 1823-1825.~ England did not, however, lose hope of
gaining some concession from the United States. Another House committee
had, in 1822, reported that the only method of suppressing the trade was
by granting a Right of Search.[34] The House agreed, February 28, 1823,
to request the President to enter into negotiations with the maritime
powers of Europe to denounce the slave-trade as piracy; an amendment
"that we agree to a qualified right of search" was, however, lost.[35]
Meantime, the English minister was continually pressing the matter upon
Adams, who proposed in turn to denounce the trade as piracy. Canning
agreed to this, but only on condition that it be piracy under the Law of
Nations and not merely by statute law. Such an agreement, he said, would
involve a Right of Search for its enforcement; he proposed strictly to
limit and define this right, to allow captured ships to be tried in
their own courts, and not to commit the United States in any way to the
question of the belligerent Right of Search. Adams finally sent a draft
of a proposed treaty to England, and agreed to recognize the
slave-traffic "as piracy under the law of nations, namely: that,
although seizable by the officers and authorities of every nation, they
should be triable only by the tribunals of the country of the slave
trading vessel."[36]
Rush presented this _project_ to the government in January, 1824.
England agreed to all the points insisted on by the United States; viz.,
that she herself should denounce the trade as piracy; that slavers
should be tried in their own country; that the captor should be laid
under the most effective responsibility for his conduct; and that
vessels under convoy of a ship of war of their own country should be
exempt from search. In addition, England demanded that citizens of
either country captured under the flag of a third power should be sent
home for trial, and that citizens of either country chartering vessels
of a third country should come under these stipulations.[37]
This convention was laid before the Senate April 30, 1824, but was not
acted upon until May 21, when it was so amended as to make it terminable
at six months' notice. The same day, President Monroe, "apprehending,
from the delay in the decision, that some difficulty exists," sent a
special message to the Senate, giving at length the reasons for signing
the treaty, and saying that "should this Convention be adopted, there is
every reason to believe, that it will be the commencement of a system
destined to accomplish the entire Abolition of the Slave Trade." It was,
however, a time of great political pot-boiling, and consequently an
unfortunate occasion to ask senators to settle any great question. A
systematic attack, led by Johnson of Louisiana, was made on all the
vital provisions of the treaty: the waters of America were excepted from
its application, and those of the West Indies barely escaped exception;
the provision which, perhaps, aimed the deadliest blow at American
slave-trade interests was likewise struck out; namely, the application
of the Right of Search to citizens chartering the vessels of a third
nation.[38]
The convention thus mutilated was not signed by England, who demanded as
the least concession the application of the Right of Search to American
waters. Meantime the United States had invited nearly all nations to
denounce the trade as piracy; and the President, the Secretary of the
Navy, and a House committee had urgently favored the granting of the
Right of Search. The bad faith of Congress, however, in the matter of
the Colombian treaty broke off for a time further negotiations with
England.[39]
71. ~The Attitude of the United States and the State of the
Slave-Trade.~ In 1824 the Right of Search was established between
England and Sweden, and in 1826 Brazil promised to abolish the trade in
three years.[40] In 1831 the cause was greatly advanced by the signing
of a treaty between Great Britain and France, granting mutually a
geographically limited Right of Search.[41] This led, in the next few
years, to similar treaties with Denmark, Sardinia,[42] the Hanse
towns,[43] and Naples.[44] Such measures put the trade more and more in
the hands of Americans, and it began greatly to increase. Mercer sought
repeatedly in the House to have negotiations reopened with England, but
without success.[45] Indeed, the chances of success were now for many
years imperilled by the recurrence of deliberate search of American
vessels by the British.[46] In the majority of cases the vessels proved
to be slavers, and some of them fraudulently flew the American flag;
nevertheless, their molestation by British cruisers created much
feeling, and hindered all steps toward an understanding: the United
States was loath to have her criminal negligence in enforcing her own
laws thus exposed by foreigners. Other international questions connected
with the trade also strained the relations of the two countries: three
different vessels engaged in the domestic slave-trade, driven by stress
of weather, or, in the "Creole" case, captured by Negroes on board,
landed slaves in British possessions; England freed them, and refused to
pay for such as were landed after emancipation had been proclaimed in
the West Indies.[47] The case of the slaver "L'Amistad" also raised
difficulties with Spain. This Spanish vessel, after the Negroes on board
had mutinied and killed their owners, was seized by a United States
vessel and brought into port for adjudication. The court, however, freed
the Negroes, on the ground that under Spanish law they were not legally
slaves; and although the Senate repeatedly tried to indemnify the
owners, the project did not succeed.[48]
Such proceedings well illustrate the new tendency of the pro-slavery
party to neglect the enforcement of the slave-trade laws, in a frantic
defence of the remotest ramparts of slave property. Consequently, when,
after the treaty of 1831, France and England joined in urging the
accession of the United States to it, the British minister was at last
compelled to inform Palmerston, December, 1833, that "the Executive at
Washington appears to shrink from bringing forward, in any shape, a
question, upon which depends the completion of their former object--the
utter and universal Abolition of the Slave Trade--from an apprehension
of alarming the Southern States."[49] Great Britain now offered to sign
the proposed treaty of 1824 as amended; but even this Forsyth refused,
and stated that the United States had determined not to become "a party
of any Convention on the subject of the Slave Trade."[50]
Estimates as to the extent of the slave-trade agree that the traffic to
North and South America in 1820 was considerable, certainly not much
less than 40,000 slaves annually. From that time to about 1825 it
declined somewhat, but afterward increased enormously, so that by 1837
the American importation was estimated as high as 200,000 Negroes
annually. The total abolition of the African trade by American countries
then brought the traffic down to perhaps 30,000 in 1842. A large and
rapid increase of illicit traffic followed; so that by 1847 the
importation amounted to nearly 100,000 annually. One province of Brazil
is said to have received 173,000 in the years 1846-1849. In the decade
1850-1860 this activity in slave-trading continued, and reached very
large proportions.
The traffic thus carried on floated under the flags of France, Spain,
and Portugal, until about 1830; from 1830 to 1840 it began gradually to
assume the United States flag; by 1845, a large part of the trade was
under the stars and stripes; by 1850 fully one-half the trade, and in
the decade, 1850-1860 nearly all the traffic, found this flag its best
protection.[51]
72. ~The Quintuple Treaty, 1839-1842.~ In 1839 Pope Gregory XVI.
stigmatized the slave-trade "as utterly unworthy of the Christian name;"
and at the same time, although proscribed by the laws of every civilized
State, the trade was flourishing with pristine vigor. Great advantage
was given the traffic by the fact that the United States, for two
decades after the abortive attempt of 1824, refused to co-operate with
the rest of the civilized world, and allowed her flag to shelter and
protect the slave-trade. If a fully equipped slaver sailed from New
York, Havana, Rio Janeiro, or Liverpool, she had only to hoist the stars
and stripes in order to proceed unmolested on her piratical voyage; for
there was seldom a United States cruiser to be met with, and there were,
on the other hand, diplomats at Washington so jealous of the honor of
the flag that they would prostitute it to crime rather than allow an
English or a French cruiser in any way to interfere. Without doubt, the
contention of the United States as to England's pretensions to a Right
of Visit was technically correct. Nevertheless, it was clear that if the
slave-trade was to be suppressed, each nation must either zealously keep
her flag from fraudulent use, or, as a labor-saving device, depute to
others this duty for limited places and under special circumstances. A
failure of any one nation to do one of these two things meant that the
efforts of all other nations were to be fruitless. The United States had
invited the world to join her in denouncing the slave-trade as piracy;
yet, when such a pirate was waylaid by an English vessel, the United
States complained or demanded reparation. The only answer which this
country for years returned to the long-continued exposures of American
slave-traders and of the fraudulent use of the American flag, was a
recital of cases where Great Britain had gone beyond her legal powers in
her attempt to suppress the slave-trade.[52] In the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, Secretary of State Forsyth declared, in 1840,
that the duty of the United States in the matter of the slave-trade "has
been faithfully performed, and if the traffic still exists as a disgrace
to humanity, it is to be imputed to nations with whom Her Majesty's
Government has formed and maintained the most intimate connexions, and
to whose Governments Great Britain has paid for the right of active
intervention in order to its complete extirpation."[53] So zealous was
Stevenson, our minister to England, in denying the Right of Search, that
he boldly informed Palmerston, in 1841, "that there is no shadow of
pretence for excusing, much less justifying, the exercise of any such
right. That it is wholly immaterial, whether the vessels be equipped
for, or actually engaged in slave traffic or not, and consequently the
right to search or detain even slave vessels, must be confined to the
ships or vessels of those nations with whom it may have treaties on the
subject."[54] Palmerston courteously replied that he could not think
that the United States seriously intended to make its flag a refuge for
slave-traders;[55] and Aberdeen pertinently declared: "Now, it can
scarcely be maintained by Mr. Stevenson that Great Britain should be
bound to permit her own subjects, with British vessels and British
capital, to carry on, before the eyes of British officers, this
detestable traffic in human beings, which the law has declared to be
piracy, merely because they had the audacity to commit an additional
offence by fraudulently usurping the American flag."[56] Thus the
dispute, even after the advent of Webster, went on for a time, involving
itself in metaphysical subtleties, and apparently leading no nearer to
an understanding.[57]
In 1838 a fourth conference of the powers for the consideration of the
slave-trade took place at London. It was attended by representatives of
England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. England laid the _projet_
of a treaty before them, to which all but France assented. This
so-called Quintuple Treaty, signed December 20, 1841, denounced the
slave-trade as piracy, and declared that "the High Contracting Parties
agree by common consent, that those of their ships of war which shall be
provided with special warrants and orders ... may search every
merchant-vessel belonging to any one of the High Contracting Parties
which shall, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the
traffic in slaves." All captured slavers were to be sent to their own
countries for trial.[58]
While the ratification of this treaty was pending, the United States
minister to France, Lewis Cass, addressed an official note to Guizot at
the French foreign office, protesting against the institution of an
international Right of Search, and rather grandiloquently warning the
powers against the use of force to accomplish their ends.[59] This
extraordinary epistle, issued on the minister's own responsibility,
brought a reply denying that the creation of any "new principle of
international law, whereby the vessels even of those powers which have
not participated in the arrangement should be subjected to the right of
search," was ever intended, and affirming that no such extraordinary
interpretation could be deduced from the Convention. Moreover, M. Guizot
hoped that the United States, by agreeing to this treaty, would "aid, by
its most sincere endeavors, in the definitive abolition of the
trade."[60] Cass's theatrical protest was, consciously or unconsciously,
the manifesto of that growing class in the United States who wanted no
further measures taken for the suppression of the slave-trade; toward
that, as toward the institution of slavery, this party favored a policy
of strict _laissez-faire_.
73. ~Final Concerted Measures, 1842-1862.~ The Treaty of Washington, in
1842, made the first effective compromise in the matter and broke the
unpleasant dead-lock, by substituting joint cruising by English and
American squadrons for the proposed grant of a Right of Search. In
submitting this treaty, Tyler said: "The treaty which I now submit to
you proposes no alteration, mitigation, or modification of the rules of
the law of nations. It provides simply that each of the two Governments
shall maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron to enforce
separately and respectively the laws, rights, and obligations of the two
countries for the suppression of the slave trade."[61] This provision
was a part of the treaty to settle the boundary disputes with England.
In the Senate, Benton moved to strike out this article; but the attempt
was defeated by a vote of 37 to 12, and the treaty was ratified.[62]
This stipulation of the treaty of 1842 was never properly carried out by
the United States for any length of time.[63] Consequently the same
difficulties as to search and visit by English vessels continued to
recur. Cases like the following were frequent. The "Illinois," of
Gloucester, Massachusetts, while lying at Whydah, Africa, was boarded by
a British officer, but having American papers was unmolested. Three days
later she hoisted Spanish colors and sailed away with a cargo of slaves.
Next morning she fell in with another British vessel and hoisted
American colors; the British ship had then no right to molest her; but
the captain of the slaver feared that she would, and therefore ran his
vessel aground, slaves and all. The senior English officer reported that
"had Lieutenant Cumberland brought to and boarded the 'Illinois,'
notwithstanding the American colors which she hoisted,... the American
master of the 'Illinois' ... would have complained to his Government of
the detention of his vessel."[64] Again, a vessel which had been boarded
by British officers and found with American flag and papers was, a
little later, captured under the Spanish flag with four hundred and
thirty slaves. She had in the interim complained to the United States
government of the boarding.[65]
Meanwhile, England continued to urge the granting of a Right of Search,
claiming that the stand of the United States really amounted to the
wholesale protection of pirates under her flag.[66] The United States
answered by alleging that even the Treaty of 1842 had been misconstrued
by England,[67] whereupon there was much warm debate in Congress, and
several attempts were made to abrogate the slave-trade article of the
treaty.[68] The pro-slavery party had become more and more suspicious of
England's motives, since they had seen her abolition of the slave-trade
blossom into abolition of the system itself, and they seized every
opportunity to prevent co-operation with her. At the same time, European
interest in the question showed some signs of weakening, and no decided
action was taken. In 1845 France changed her Right of Search
stipulations of 1833 to one for joint cruising,[69] while the Germanic
Federation,[70] Portugal,[71] and Chili[72]enounced the trade as piracy.
In 1844 Texas granted the Right of Search to England,[73] and in 1845
Belgium signed the Quintuple Treaty.[74]
Discussion between England and the United States was revived when Cass
held the State portfolio, and, strange to say, the author of "Cass's
Protest" went farther than any of his predecessors in acknowledging the
justice of England's demands. Said he, in 1859: "If The United States
maintained that, by carrying their flag at her masthead, any vessel
became thereby entitled to the immunity which belongs to American
vessels, they might well be reproached with assuming a position which
would go far towards shielding crimes upon the ocean from punishment;
but they advance no such pretension, while they concede that, if in the
honest examination of a vessel sailing under American colours, but
accompanied by strongly-marked suspicious circumstances, a mistake is
made, and she is found to be entitled to the flag she bears, but no
injury is committed, and the conduct of the boarding party is
irreproachable, no Government would be likely to make a case thus
exceptional in its character a subject of serious reclamation."[75]
While admitting this and expressing a desire to co-operate in the
suppression of the slave-trade, Cass nevertheless steadily refused all
further overtures toward a mutual Right of Search.
The increase of the slave-traffic was so great in the decade 1850-1860
that Lord John Russell proposed to the governments of the United States,
France, Spain, Portugal, and Brazil, that they instruct their ministers
to meet at London in May or June, 1860, to consider measures for the
final abolition of the trade. He stated: "It is ascertained, by
repeated instances, that the practice is for vessels to sail under the
American flag. If the flag is rightly assumed, and the papers correct,
no British cruizer can touch them. If no slaves are on board, even
though the equipment, the fittings, the water-casks, and other
circumstances prove that the ship is on a Slave Trade venture, no
American cruizer can touch them."[76] Continued representations of this
kind were made to the paralyzed United States government; indeed, the
slave-trade of the world seemed now to float securely under her flag.
Nevertheless, Cass refused even to participate in the proposed
conference, and later refused to accede to a proposal for joint cruising
off the coast of Cuba.[77] Great Britain offered to relieve the United
States of any embarrassment by receiving all captured Africans into the
West Indies; but President Buchanan "could not contemplate any such
arrangement," and obstinately refused to increase the suppressing
squadron.[78]
On the outbreak of the Civil War, the Lincoln administration, through
Secretary Seward, immediately expressed a willingness to do all in its
power to suppress the slave-trade.[79] Accordingly, June 7, 1862, a
treaty was signed with Great Britain granting a mutual limited Right of
Search, and establishing mixed courts for the trial of offenders at the
Cape of Good Hope, Sierra Leone, and New York.[80] The efforts of a
half-century of diplomacy were finally crowned; Seward wrote to Adams,
"Had such a treaty been made in 1808, there would now have been no
sedition here."[81]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Cf. Augustine Cochin, in Lalor, _Cyclopedia_, III. 723.
[2] By a law of Aug. 11, 1792, the encouragement formerly
given to the trade was stopped. Cf. _Choix de rapports,
opinions et discours prononcés à la tribune nationale depuis
1789_ (Paris, 1821), XIV. 425; quoted in Cochin, _The Results
of Emancipation_ (Booth's translation, 1863), pp. 33, 35-8.
[3] Cochin, _The Results of Emancipation_ (Booth's
translation, 1863), pp. 42-7.
[4] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1815-6, p. 196.
[5] _Ibid._, pp. 195-9, 292-3; 1816-7, p. 755. It was
eventually confirmed by royal ordinance, and the law of April
15, 1818.
[6] _Statute 28 George III._, ch. 54. Cf. _Statute 29 George
III._, ch. 66.
[7] Various petitions had come in praying for an abolition of
the slave-trade; and by an order in Council, Feb. 11, 1788, a
committee of the Privy Council was ordered to take evidence on
the subject. This committee presented an elaborate report in
1739. See published _Report_, London, 1789.
[8] For the history of the Parliamentary struggle, cf.
Clarkson's and Copley's histories. The movement was checked in
the House of Commons in 1789, 1790, and 1791. In 1792 the
House of Commons resolved to abolish the trade in 1796. The
Lords postponed the matter to take evidence. A bill to
prohibit the foreign slave-trade was lost in 1793, passed the
next session, and was lost in the House of Lords. In 1795,
1796, 1798, and 1799 repeated attempts to abolish the trade
were defeated. The matter then rested until 1804, when the
battle was renewed with more success.
[9] _Statute 46 George III._, ch. 52, 119; _47 George III._,
sess. I. ch. 36.
[10] Sparks, _Diplomatic Correspondence_, X. 154.
[11] Fox to Hartley, June 10, 1783; quoted in Bancroft,
_History of the Constitution of the United States_, I. 61.
[12] _Amer. State Papers, Foreign_, III. No. 214, p. 151.
[13] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1815-6, pp. 886, 937
(quotation).
[14] _Ibid._, pp. 890-1.
[15] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1815-6, p. 887.
Russia, Austria, and Prussia returned favorable replies:
_Ibid._, pp. 887-8.
[16] _Ibid._, p. 889.
[17] She desired a loan, which England made on this condition:
_Ibid._, pp. 921-2.
[18] _Ibid._, pp. 937-9. Certain financial arrangements
secured this concession.
[19] _Ibid._, pp. 939-75
[20] _Amer. State Papers, Foreign_, III. No. 271, pp. 735-48;
_U.S. Treaties and Conventions_ (ed. 1889), p. 405.
[21] This was inserted in the Treaty of Paris, Nov. 20, 1815:
_British and Foreign State Papers_, 1815-6, p. 292.
[22] _Ibid._, 1816-7, pp. 33-74 (English version, 1823-4, p.
702 ff.).
[23] Cf. _Ibid._, 1817-8, p. 125 ff.
[24] This was the first meeting of the London ministers of the
powers according to agreement; they assembled Dec. 4, 1817,
and finally called a meeting of plenipotentiaries on the
question of suppression at Aix-la-Chapelle, beginning Oct. 24,
1818. Among those present were Metternich, Richelieu,
Wellington, Castlereagh, Hardenberg, Bernstorff, Nesselrode,
and Capodistrias. Castlereagh made two propositions: 1. That
the five powers join in urging Portugal and Brazil to abolish
the trade May 20, 1820; 2. That the powers adopt the principle
of a mutual qualified Right of Search. Cf. _British and
Foreign State Papers_, 1818-9, pp. 21-88; _Amer. State Papers,
Foreign_, V. No. 346, pp. 113-122.
[25] For cases, see _1 Acton_, 240, the "Amedie," and _1
Dodson_, 81, the "Fortuna;" quoted in U.S. Reports, _10
Wheaton_, 66.
[26] Cf. the case of the French ship "Le Louis": _2 Dodson_,
238; and also the case of the "San Juan Nepomuceno": _1
Haggard_, 267.
[27] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1819-20, pp. 375-9;
also pp. 220-2.
[28] _Ibid._, 1820-21, pp. 395-6.
[29] _House Doc._, 14 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 77.
[30] _Annals of Cong._, 15 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 71, 73-78,
94-109. The motion was opposed largely by Southern members,
and passed by a vote of 17 to 16.
[31] One was reported, May 9, 1820, by Mercer's committee, and
passed May 12: _House Journal_, 16 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 497, 518,
520, 526; _Annals of Cong._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 697-9. A
similar resolution passed the House next session, and a
committee reported in favor of the Right of Search: _Ibid._,
16 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1064-71. Cf. _Ibid._, pp. 476, 743, 865,
1469.
[32] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1820-21, pp. 397-400.
[33] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1822-3, pp. 94-110.
[34] _House Reports_, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92.
[35] _House Journal_, 17 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 212, 280; _Annals
of Cong._, 17 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 922, 1147-1155.
[36] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1823-4, pp. 409-21;
1824-5, pp. 828-47; _Amer. State Papers, Foreign_, V. No. 371,
pp. 333-7.
[37] _Ibid._
[38] _Ibid._, No. 374, p. 344 ff., No. 379, pp. 360-2.
[39] _House Reports_, 18 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 70; _Amer. State
Papers, Foreign_, V. No. 379, pp. 364-5, No. 414, p. 783, etc.
Among the nations invited by the United States to co-operate
in suppressing the trade was the United States of Colombia.
Mr. Anderson, our minister, expressed "the certain belief that
the Republic of Colombia will not permit herself to be behind
any Government in the civilized world in the adoption of
energetic measures for the suppression of this disgraceful
traffic": _Ibid._, No. 407, p. 729. The little republic
replied courteously; and, as a _projet_ for a treaty, Mr.
Anderson offered the proposed English treaty of 1824,
including the Senate amendments. Nevertheless, the treaty thus
agreed to was summarily rejected by the Senate, March 9, 1825:
_Ibid._, p. 735. Another result of this general invitation of
the United States was a proposal by Colombia that the
slave-trade and the status of Hayti be among the subjects for
discussion at the Panama Congress. As a result of this, a
Senate committee recommended that the United States take no
part in the Congress. This report was finally disagreed to by
a vote of 19 to 24: _Ibid._, No. 423, pp. 837, 860, 876, 882.
[40] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1823-4, and 1826-7.
Brazil abolished the trade in 1830.
[41] This treaty was further defined in 1833: _Ibid._, 1830-1,
p. 641 ff.; 1832-3, p. 286 ff.
[42] _Ibid._, 1833-4, pp. 218 ff., 1059 ff.
[43] _Ibid._, 1837-8, p. 268 ff.
[44] _Ibid._, 1838-9, p. 792 ff.
[45] Viz., Feb. 28, 1825; April 7, 1830; Feb. 16, 1831; March
3, 1831. The last resolution passed the House: _House
Journal_, 21 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 426-8.
[46] Cf. _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115, pp. 35-6,
etc.; _House Reports_, 27 Cong. 3 sess. III. No. 283, pp.
730-55, etc.
[47] These were the celebrated cases of the "Encomium,"
"Enterprize," and "Comet." Cf. _Senate Doc._, 24 Cong. 2 sess.
II. No. 174; 25 Cong. 3 sess. III. No. 216. Cf. also case of
the "Creole": _Ibid._, 27 Cong. 2 sess. II.-III. Nos. 51, 137.
[48] _Ibid._, 26 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 179; _Senate Exec.
Doc._, 31 Cong. 2 sess. III. No. 29; 32 Cong. 2 sess. III. No.
19; _Senate Reports_, 31 Cong. 2 sess. No. 301; 32 Cong. 1
sess. I. No. 158; 35 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 36; _House Doc._, 26
Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 185; 27 Cong. 3 sess. V. No. 191; 28
Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 83; _House Exec. Doc._, 32 Cong. 2 sess.
III. No. 20; _House Reports_, 26 Cong. 2 sess. No. 51; 28
Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 426; 29 Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 753; also
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, _15 Peters_, 518. Cf.
Drake, _Revelations of a Slave Smuggler_, p. 98.
[49] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1834-5, p. 136.
[50] _Ibid._, pp. 135-47. Great Britain made treaties
meanwhile with Hayti, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentine
Confederation, Mexico, Texas, etc. Portugal prohibited the
slave-trade in 1836, except between her African colonies. Cf.
_Ibid._, from 1838 to 1841.
[51] These estimates are from the following sources: _Ibid._,
1822-3, pp. 94-110; _Parliamentary Papers_, 1823, XVIII.,
_Slave Trade_, Further Papers, A., pp. 10-11; 1838-9, XLIX.,
_Slave Trade_, Class A, Further Series, pp. 115, 119, 121;
_House Doc._, 19 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 1, p. 93; 20 Cong. 1
sess. III. No. 99; 26 Cong. 1 sess. VI. No. 211; _House Exec.
Doc._, 31 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, p. 193; _House Reports_, 21
Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 348; _Senate Doc._, 28 Cong. 1 sess.
IV. No. 217; 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV. No. 66; 31 Cong. 2 sess.
II. No. 6; _Amer. State Papers, Naval_, I. No. 249; Buxton,
_The African Slave Trade and its Remedy_, pp. 44-59; Friends'
_Facts and Observations on the Slave Trade_ (ed. 1841);
Friends' _Exposition of the Slave Trade, 1840-50_; _Annual
Reports of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society_.
The annexed table gives the dates of the abolition of the
slave-trade by the various nations:--
-------+-------------------+---------------------------+--------------
| | |Arrangements
| | Right of Search Treaty | for Joint
Date. |Slave-trade | with Great Britain, | Cruising
| Abolished by | made by | with Great
| | | Britain,
| | | made by
-------+-------------------+---------------------------+--------------
1802 | Denmark. | |
1807 | Great Britain; | |
| United States. | |
1813 | Sweden. | |
1814 | Netherlands. | |
1815 | Portugal (north | |
| of the equator).| |
1817 | Spain (north of | Portugal; Spain. |
| the equator). | |
1818 | France. | Netherlands. |
1820 | Spain. | |
1824 | | Sweden. |
1829 | Brazil (?). | |
1830 | Portugal. | |
1831-33| | France. |
1833-39| | Denmark, Hanse Towns, etc.|
1841 | | Quintuple Treaty (Austria,|
1842 | | Russia, Prussia). | United States.
1844 | | Texas. |
1845 | | Belgium. | France.
1862 | | United States. |
-------+-------------------+---------------------------+--------------
[52] Cf. _British and Foreign State Papers_, from 1836 to
1842.
[53] _Ibid._, 1839-40, p. 940.
[54] _House Doc._, 27 Cong. 1 sess. No. 34, pp. 5-6.
[55] _Senate Doc._, 29 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 377, p. 56.
[56] _Ibid._, p. 72.
[57] _Ibid._, pp. 133-40, etc.
[58] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1841-2, p. 269 ff.
[59] See below, Appendix B.
[60] _Senate Doc._, 29 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 377, p. 201.
[61] _Senate Exec. Journal_, VI. 123.
[62] _U.S. Treaties and Conventions_ (ed. 1889), pp. 436-7.
For the debates in the Senate, see _Congressional Globe_, 27
Cong. 3 sess. Appendix. Cass resigned on account of the
acceptance of this treaty without a distinct denial of the
Right of Search, claiming that this compromised his position
in France. Cf. _Senate Doc._, 27 Cong. 3 sess. II., IV. Nos.
52, 223; 29 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 377.
[63] Cf. below, Chapter X.
[64] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 28 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 150, p. 72.
[65] _Ibid._, p. 77.
[66] _House Doc._, 27 Cong. 3 sess. V. No. 192, p. 4. Cf.
_British and Foreign State Papers_, 1842-3, p. 708 ff.
[67] _House Journal_, 27 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 431, 485-8. Cf.
_House Doc._, 27 Cong. 3 sess. V. No. 192.
[68] Cf. below, Chapter X.
[69] With a fleet of 26 vessels, reduced to 12 in 1849:
_British and Foreign State Papers_, 1844-5, p. 4 ff.; 1849-50,
p. 480.
[70] _Ibid._, 1850-1, p. 953.
[71] Portugal renewed her Right of Search treaty in 1842:
_Ibid._, 1841-2, p. 527 ff.; 1842-3, p. 450.
[72] _Ibid._, 1843-4, p. 316.
[73] _Ibid._, 1844-5, p. 592. There already existed some such
privileges between England and Texas.
[74] _Ibid._, 1847-8, p. 397 ff.
[75] _Ibid._, 1858-9, pp. 1121, 1129.
[76] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1859-60, pp. 902-3.
[77] _House Exec. Doc._, 36 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 7.
[78] _Ibid._
[79] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 37 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 57.
[80] _Senate Exec. Journal_, XII. 230-1, 240, 254, 256, 391,
400, 403; _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, pp. 141, 158;
_U.S. Treaties and Conventions_ (ed. 1889), pp. 454-9.
[81] _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, pp. 64-5. This treaty
was revised in 1863. The mixed court in the West Indies had,
by February, 1864, liberated 95,206 Africans: _Senate Exec.
Doc._, 38 Cong. 1 sess. No. 56, p. 24.
* * * * *
_Chapter X_
THE RISE OF THE COTTON KINGDOM. 1820-1850.
74. The Economic Revolution.
75. The Attitude of the South.
76. The Attitude of the North and Congress.
77. Imperfect Application of the Laws.
78. Responsibility of the Government.
79. Activity of the Slave-Trade.
74. ~The Economic Revolution.~ The history of slavery and the
slave-trade after 1820 must be read in the light of the industrial
revolution through which the civilized world passed in the first half of
the nineteenth century. Between the years 1775 and 1825 occurred
economic events and changes of the highest importance and widest
influence. Though all branches of industry felt the impulse of this new
industrial life, yet, "if we consider single industries, cotton
manufacture has, during the nineteenth century, made the most
magnificent and gigantic advances."[1] This fact is easily explained by
the remarkable series of inventions that revolutionized this industry
between 1738 and 1830, including Arkwright's, Watt's, Compton's, and
Cartwright's epoch-making contrivances.[2] The effect which these
inventions had on the manufacture of cotton goods is best illustrated
by the fact that in England, the chief cotton market of the world, the
consumption of raw cotton rose steadily from 13,000 bales in 1781, to
572,000 in 1820, to 871,000 in 1830, and to 3,366,000 in 1860.[3] Very
early, therefore, came the query whence the supply of raw cotton was to
come. Tentative experiments on the rich, broad fields of the Southern
United States, together with the indispensable invention of Whitney's
cotton-gin, soon answered this question: a new economic future was
opened up to this land, and immediately the whole South began to extend
its cotton culture, and more and more to throw its whole energy into
this one staple.
Here it was that the fatal mistake of compromising with slavery in the
beginning, and of the policy of _laissez-faire_ pursued thereafter,
became painfully manifest; for, instead now of a healthy, normal,
economic development along proper industrial lines, we have the abnormal
and fatal rise of a slave-labor large farming system, which, before it
was realized, had so intertwined itself with and braced itself upon the
economic forces of an industrial age, that a vast and terrible civil war
was necessary to displace it. The tendencies to a patriarchal serfdom,
recognizable in the age of Washington and Jefferson, began slowly but
surely to disappear; and in the second quarter of the century Southern
slavery was irresistibly changing from a family institution to an
industrial system.
The development of Southern slavery has heretofore been viewed so
exclusively from the ethical and social standpoint that we are apt to
forget its close and indissoluble connection with the world's cotton
market. Beginning with 1820, a little after the close of the Napoleonic
wars, when the industry of cotton manufacture had begun its modern
development and the South had definitely assumed her position as chief
producer of raw cotton, we find the average price of cotton per pound,
8½_d._ From this time until 1845 the price steadily fell, until in the
latter year it reached 4_d._; the only exception to this fall was in the
years 1832-1839, when, among other things, a strong increase in the
English demand, together with an attempt of the young slave power to
"corner" the market, sent the price up as high as 11_d._ The demand for
cotton goods soon outran a crop which McCullough had pronounced
"prodigious," and after 1845 the price started on a steady rise, which,
except for the checks suffered during the continental revolutions and
the Crimean War, continued until 1860.[4] The steady increase in the
production of cotton explains the fall in price down to 1845. In 1822
the crop was a half-million bales; in 1831, a million; in 1838, a
million and a half; and in 1840-1843, two million. By this time the
world's consumption of cotton goods began to increase so rapidly that,
in spite of the increase in Southern crops, the price kept rising. Three
million bales were gathered in 1852, three and a half million in 1856,
and the remarkable crop of five million bales in 1860.[5]
Here we have data to explain largely the economic development of the
South. By 1822 the large-plantation slave system had gained footing; in
1838-1839 it was able to show its power in the cotton "corner;" by the
end of the next decade it had not only gained a solid economic
foundation, but it had built a closed oligarchy with a political policy.
The changes in price during the next few years drove out of competition
many survivors of the small-farming free-labor system, and put the slave
_régime_ in position to dictate the policy of the nation. The zenith of
the system and the first inevitable signs of decay came in the years
1850-1860, when the rising price of cotton threw the whole economic
energy of the South into its cultivation, leading to a terrible
consumption of soil and slaves, to a great increase in the size of
plantations, and to increasing power and effrontery on the part of the
slave barons. Finally, when a rising moral crusade conjoined with
threatened economic disaster, the oligarchy, encouraged by the state of
the cotton market, risked all on a political _coup-d'état_, which failed
in the war of 1861-1865.[6]
75. ~The Attitude of the South.~ The attitude of the South toward the
slave-trade changed _pari passu_ with this development of the cotton
trade. From 1808 to 1820 the South half wished to get rid of a
troublesome and abnormal institution, and yet saw no way to do so. The
fear of insurrection and of the further spread of the disagreeable
system led her to consent to the partial prohibition of the trade by
severe national enactments. Nevertheless, she had in the matter no
settled policy: she refused to support vigorously the execution of the
laws she had helped to make, and at the same time she acknowledged the
theoretical necessity of these laws. After 1820, however, there came a
gradual change. The South found herself supplied with a body of slave
laborers, whose number had been augmented by large illicit importations,
with an abundance of rich land, and with all other natural facilities
for raising a crop which was in large demand and peculiarly adapted to
slave labor. The increasing crop caused a new demand for slaves, and an
interstate slave-traffic arose between the Border and the Gulf States,
which turned the former into slave-breeding districts, and bound them to
the slave States by ties of strong economic interest.
As the cotton crop continued to increase, this source of supply became
inadequate, especially as the theory of land and slave consumption broke
down former ethical and prudential bounds. It was, for example, found
cheaper to work a slave to death in a few years, and buy a new one, than
to care for him in sickness and old age; so, too, it was easier to
despoil rich, new land in a few years of intensive culture, and move on
to the Southwest, than to fertilize and conserve the soil.[7]
Consequently, there early came a demand for land and slaves greater than
the country could supply. The demand for land showed itself in the
annexation of Texas, the conquest of Mexico, and the movement toward the
acquisition of Cuba. The demand for slaves was manifested in the illicit
traffic that noticeably increased about 1835, and reached large
proportions by 1860. It was also seen in a disposition to attack the
government for stigmatizing the trade as criminal,[8] then in a
disinclination to take any measures which would have rendered our
repressive laws effective; and finally in such articulate declarations
by prominent men as this: "Experience having settled the point, that
this Trade _cannot be abolished by the use of force_, and that
blockading squadrons serve only to make it more profitable and more
cruel, I am surprised that the attempt is persisted in, unless as it
serves as a cloak to some other purposes. It would be far better than it
now is, for the African, if the trade was free from all restrictions,
and left to the mitigation and decay which time and competition would
surely bring about."[9]
76. ~The Attitude of the North and Congress.~ With the North as yet
unawakened to the great changes taking place in the South, and with the
attitude of the South thus in process of development, little or no
constructive legislation could be expected on the subject of the
slave-trade. As the divergence in sentiment became more and more
pronounced, there were various attempts at legislation, all of which
proved abortive. The pro-slavery party attempted, as early as 1826, and
again in 1828, to abolish the African agency and leave the Africans
practically at the mercy of the States;[10] one or two attempts were
made to relax the few provisions which restrained the coastwise
trade;[11] and, after the treaty of 1842, Benton proposed to stop
appropriations for the African squadron until England defined her
position on the Right of Search question.[12] The anti-slavery men
presented several bills to amend and strengthen previous laws;[13] they
sought, for instance, in vain to regulate the Texan trade, through which
numbers of slaves indirectly reached the United States.[14] Presidents
and consuls earnestly recommended legislation to restrict the clearances
of vessels bound on slave-trading voyages, and to hinder the facility
with which slavers obtained fraudulent papers.[15] Only one such bill
succeeded in passing the Senate, and that was dropped in the House.[16]
The only legislation of this period was confined to a few appropriation
bills. Only one of these acts, that of 1823, appropriating $50,000,[17]
was designed materially to aid in the suppression of the trade, all the
others relating to expenses incurred after violations. After 1823 the
appropriations dwindled, being made at intervals of one, two, and three
years, down to 1834, when the amount was $5,000. No further
appropriations were made until 1842, when a few thousands above an
unexpended surplus were appropriated. In 1843 $5,000 were given, and
finally, in 1846, $25,000 were secured; but this was the last sum
obtainable until 1856.[18] Nearly all of these meagre appropriations
went toward reimbursing Southern plantation owners for the care and
support of illegally imported Africans, and the rest to the maintenance
of the African agency. Suspiciously large sums were paid for the first
purpose, considering the fact that such Africans were always worked hard
by those to whom they were farmed out, and often "disappeared" while in
their hands. In the accounts we nevertheless find many items like that
of $20,286.98 for the maintenance of Negroes imported on the
"Ramirez;"[19] in 1827, $5,442.22 for the "bounty, subsistence,
clothing, medicine," etc., of fifteen Africans;[20] in 1835, $3,613 for
the support of thirty-eight slaves for two months (including a bill of
$1,038 for medical attendance).[21]
The African agency suffered many vicissitudes. The first agent, Bacon,
who set out early in 1820, was authorized by President Monroe "to form
an establishment on the island of Sherbro, or elsewhere on the coast of
Africa," and to build barracks for three hundred persons. He was,
however, warned "not to connect your agency with the views or plans of
the Colonization Society, with which, under the law, the Government of
the United States has no concern." Bacon soon died, and was followed
during the next four years by Winn and Ayres; they succeeded in
establishing a government agency on Cape Mesurado, in conjunction with
that of the Colonization Society. The agent of that Society, Jehudi
Ashmun, became after 1822, the virtual head of the colony; he fortified
and enlarged it, and laid the foundations of an independent community.
The succeeding government agents came to be merely official
representatives of the United States, and the distribution of free
rations for liberated Africans ceased in 1827.
Between 1819 and 1830 two hundred and fifty-two recaptured Africans were
sent to the agency, and $264,710 were expended. The property of the
government at the agency was valued at $18,895. From 1830 to 1840,
nearly $20,000 more were expended, chiefly for the agents' salaries.
About 1840 the appointment of an agent ceased, and the colony became
gradually self-supporting and independent. It was proclaimed as the
Republic of Liberia in 1847.[22]
77. ~Imperfect Application of the Laws.~ In reviewing efforts toward the
suppression of the slave-trade from 1820 to 1850, it must be remembered
that nearly every cabinet had a strong, if not a predominating, Southern
element, and that consequently the efforts of the executive were
powerfully influenced by the changing attitude of the South. Naturally,
under such circumstances, the government displayed little activity and
no enthusiasm in the work. In 1824 a single vessel of the Gulf squadron
was occasionally sent to the African coast to return by the route
usually followed by the slavers; no wonder that "none of these or any
other of our public ships have found vessels engaged in the slave trade
under the flag of the United States, ... although it is known that the
trade still exists to a most lamentable extent."[23] Indeed, all that an
American slaver need do was to run up a Spanish or a Portuguese flag, to
be absolutely secure from all attack or inquiry on the part of United
States vessels. Even this desultory method of suppression was not
regular: in 1826 "no vessel has been despatched to the coast of Africa
for several months,"[24] and from that time until 1839 this country
probably had no slave-trade police upon the seas, except in the Gulf of
Mexico. In 1839 increasing violations led to the sending of two
fast-sailing vessels to the African coast, and these were kept there
more or less regularly;[25] but even after the signing of the treaty of
1842 the Secretary of the Navy reports: "On the coast of Africa we have
_no_ squadron. The small appropriation of the present year was believed
to be scarcely sufficient."[26] Between 1843 and 1850 the coast squadron
varied from two to six vessels, with from thirty to ninety-eight
guns;[27] "but the force habitually and actively engaged in cruizing on
the ground frequented by slavers has probably been less by one-fourth,
if we consider the size of the ships employed and their withdrawal for
purposes of recreation and health, and the movement of the reliefs,
whose arrival does not correspond exactly with the departure of the
vessels whose term of service has expired."[28] The reports of the navy
show that in only four of the eight years mentioned was the fleet, at
the time of report, at the stipulated size of eighty guns; and at times
it was much below this, even as late as 1848, when only two vessels are
reported on duty along the African coast.[29] As the commanders
themselves acknowledged, the squadron was too small and the
cruising-ground too large to make joint cruising effective.[30]
The same story comes from the Brazil station: "Nothing effectual can be
done towards stopping the slave trade, as our squadron is at present
organized," wrote the consul at Rio Janeiro in 1847; "when it is
considered that the Brazil station extends from north of the equator to
Cape Horn on this continent, and includes a great part of Africa south
of the equator, on both sides of the Cape of Good Hope, it must be
admitted that one frigate and one brig is a very insufficient force to
protect American commerce, and repress the participation in the slave
trade by our own vessels."[31] In the Gulf of Mexico cruisers were
stationed most of the time, although even here there were at times
urgent representations that the scarcity or the absence of such vessels
gave the illicit trade great license.[32]
Owing to this general negligence of the government, and also to its
anxiety on the subject of the theoretic Right of Search, many officials
were kept in a state of chronic deception in regard to the trade. The
enthusiasm of commanders was dampened by the lack of latitude allowed
and by the repeated insistence in their orders on the non-existence of a
Right of Search.[33] When one commander, realizing that he could not
cover the trading-track with his fleet, requested English commanders to
detain suspicious American vessels until one of his vessels came up, the
government annulled the agreement as soon as it reached their ears,
rebuked him, and the matter was alluded to in Congress long after with
horror.[34] According to the orders of cruisers, only slavers with
slaves actually on board could be seized. Consequently, fully equipped
slavers would sail past the American fleet, deliberately make all
preparations for shipping a cargo, then, when the English were not near,
"sell" the ship to a Spaniard, hoist the Spanish flag, and again sail
gayly past the American fleet with a cargo of slaves. An English
commander reported: "The officers of the United States' navy are
extremely active and zealous in the cause, and no fault can be
attributed to them, but it is greatly to be lamented that this blemish
should in so great a degree nullify our endeavours."[35]
78. ~Responsibility of the Government.~ Not only did the government thus
negatively favor the slave-trade, but also many conscious, positive acts
must be attributed to a spirit hostile to the proper enforcement of the
slave-trade laws. In cases of doubt, when the law needed executive
interpretation, the decision was usually in favor of the looser
construction of the law; the trade from New Orleans to Mobile was, for
instance, declared not to be coastwise trade, and consequently, to the
joy of the Cuban smugglers, was left utterly free and unrestricted.[36]
After the conquest of Mexico, even vessels bound to California, by the
way of Cape Horn, were allowed to clear coastwise, thus giving our flag
to "the slave-pirates of the whole world."[37] Attorney-General Nelson
declared that the selling to a slave-trader of an American vessel, to be
delivered on the coast of Africa, was not aiding or abetting the
slave-trade.[38] So easy was it for slavers to sail that corruption
among officials was hinted at. "There is certainly a want of proper
vigilance at Havana," wrote Commander Perry in 1844, "and perhaps at the
ports of the United States;" and again, in the same year, "I cannot but
think that the custom-house authorities in the United States are not
sufficiently rigid in looking after vessels of suspicious
character."[39]
In the courts it was still next to impossible to secure the punishment
of the most notorious slave-trader. In 1847 a consul writes: "The slave
power in this city [i.e., Rio Janeiro] is extremely great, and a consul
doing his duty needs to be supported kindly and effectually at home. In
the case of the 'Fame,' where the vessel was diverted from the business
intended by her owners and employed in the slave trade--both of which
offences are punishable with death, if I rightly read the laws--I sent
home the two mates charged with these offences, for trial, the first
mate to Norfolk, the second mate to Philadelphia. What was done with the
first mate I know not. In the case of the man sent to Philadelphia, Mr.
Commissioner Kane states that a clear prima facie case is made out, and
then holds him to bail in the sum of _one thousand dollars_, which would
be paid by any slave trader in Rio, on the _presentation of a draft_. In
all this there is little encouragement for exertion."[40] Again, the
"Perry" in 1850 captured a slaver which was about to ship 1,800 slaves.
The captain admitted his guilt, and was condemned in the United States
District Court at New York. Nevertheless, he was admitted to bail of
$5,000; this being afterward reduced to $3,000, he forfeited it and
escaped. The mate was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary.[41]
Also several slavers sent home to the United States by the British, with
clear evidence of guilt, escaped condemnation through
technicalities.[42]
79. ~Activity of the Slave-Trade, 1820-1850.~ The enhanced price of
slaves throughout the American slave market, brought about by the new
industrial development and the laws against the slave-trade, was the
irresistible temptation that drew American capital and enterprise into
that traffic. In the United States, in spite of the large interstate
traffic, the average price of slaves rose from about $325 in 1840, to
$360 in 1850, and to $500 in 1860.[43] Brazil and Cuba offered similar
inducements to smugglers, and the American flag was ready to protect
such pirates. As a result, the American slave-trade finally came to be
carried on principally by United States capital, in United States ships,
officered by United States citizens, and under the United States flag.
Executive reports repeatedly acknowledged this fact. In 1839 "a careful
revision of these laws" is recommended by the President, in order that
"the integrity and honor of our flag may be carefully preserved."[44] In
June, 1841, the President declares: "There is reason to believe that the
traffic is on the increase," and advocates "vigorous efforts."[45] His
message in December of the same year acknowledges: "That the American
flag is grossly abused by the abandoned and profligate of other nations
is but too probable."[46] The special message of 1845 explains at length
that "it would seem" that a regular policy of evading the laws is
carried on: American vessels with the knowledge of the owners are
chartered by notorious slave dealers in Brazil, aided by English
capitalists, with this intent.[47] The message of 1849 "earnestly"
invites the attention of Congress "to an amendment of our existing laws
relating to the African slave-trade, with a view to the effectual
suppression of that barbarous traffic. It is not to be denied,"
continues the message, "that this trade is still, in part, carried on by
means of vessels built in the United States, and owned or navigated by
some of our citizens."[48] Governor Buchanan of Liberia reported in
1839: "The chief obstacle to the success of the very active measures
pursued by the British government for the suppression of the slave-trade
on the coast, is the _American flag_. Never was the proud banner of
freedom so extensively used by those pirates upon liberty and humanity,
as at this season."[49] One well-known American slaver was boarded
fifteen times and twice taken into port, but always escaped by means of
her papers.[50] Even American officers report that the English are doing
all they can, but that the American flag protects the trade.[51] The
evidence which literally poured in from our consuls and ministers at
Brazil adds to the story of the guilt of the United States.[52] It was
proven that the participation of United States citizens in the trade was
large and systematic. One of the most notorious slave merchants of
Brazil said: "I am worried by the Americans, who insist upon my hiring
their vessels for slave-trade."[53] Minister Proffit stated, in 1844,
that the "slave-trade is almost entirely carried on under our flag, in
American-built vessels."[54] So, too, in Cuba: the British commissioners
affirm that American citizens were openly engaged in the traffic;
vessels arrived undisguised at Havana from the United States, and
cleared for Africa as slavers after an alleged sale.[55] The American
consul, Trist, was proven to have consciously or unconsciously aided
this trade by the issuance of blank clearance papers.[56]
The presence of American capital in these enterprises, and the
connivance of the authorities, were proven in many cases and known in
scores. In 1837 the English government informed the United States that
from the papers of a captured slaver it appeared that the notorious
slave-trading firm, Blanco and Carballo of Havana, who owned the vessel,
had correspondents in the United States: "at Baltimore, Messrs. Peter
Harmony and Co., in New York, Robert Barry, Esq."[57] The slaver
"Martha" of New York, captured by the "Perry," contained among her
papers curious revelations of the guilt of persons in America who were
little suspected.[58] The slaver "Prova," which was allowed to lie in
the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and refit, was afterwards
captured with two hundred and twenty-five slaves on board.[59] The real
reason that prevented many belligerent Congressmen from pressing certain
search claims against England lay in the fact that the unjustifiable
detentions had unfortunately revealed so much American guilt that it was
deemed wiser to let the matter end in talk. For instance, in 1850
Congress demanded information as to illegal searches, and President
Fillmore's report showed the uncomfortable fact that, of the ten
American ships wrongly detained by English men-of-war, nine were proven
red-handed slavers.[60]
The consul at Havana reported, in 1836, that whole cargoes of slaves
fresh from Africa were being daily shipped to Texas in American vessels,
that 1,000 had been sent within a few months, that the rate was
increasing, and that many of these slaves "can scarcely fail to find
their way into the United States." Moreover, the consul acknowledged
that ships frequently cleared for the United States in ballast, taking
on a cargo at some secret point.[61] When with these facts we consider
the law facilitating "recovery" of slaves from Texas,[62] the repeated
refusals to regulate the Texan trade, and the shelving of a proposed
congressional investigation into these matters,[63] conjecture becomes a
practical certainty. It was estimated in 1838 that 15,000 Africans were
annually taken to Texas, and "there are even grounds for suspicion that
there are other places ... where slaves are introduced."[64] Between
1847 and 1853 the slave smuggler Drake had a slave depot in the Gulf,
where sometimes as many as 1,600 Negroes were on hand, and the owners
were continually importing and shipping. "The joint-stock company,"
writes this smuggler, "was a very extensive one, and connected with
leading American and Spanish mercantile houses. Our island[65] was
visited almost weekly, by agents from Cuba, New York, Baltimore,
Philadelphia, Boston, and New Orleans.... The seasoned and instructed
slaves were taken to Texas, or Florida, overland, and to Cuba, in
sailing-boats. As no squad contained more than half a dozen, no
difficulty was found in posting them to the United States, without
discovery, and generally without suspicion.... The Bay Island plantation
sent ventures weekly to the Florida Keys. Slaves were taken into the
great American swamps, and there kept till wanted for the market.
Hundreds were sold as captured runaways from the Florida wilderness. We
had agents in every slave State; and our coasters were built in Maine,
and came out with lumber. I could tell curious stories ... of this
business of smuggling Bozal negroes into the United States. It is
growing more profitable every year, and if you should hang all the
Yankee merchants engaged in it, hundreds would fill their places."[66]
Inherent probability and concurrent testimony confirm the substantial
truth of such confessions. For instance, one traveller discovers on a
Southern plantation Negroes who can speak no English.[67] The careful
reports of the Quakers "apprehend that many [slaves] are also introduced
into the United States."[68] Governor Mathew of the Bahama Islands
reports that "in more than one instance, Bahama vessels with coloured
crews have been purposely wrecked on the coast of Florida, and the crews
forcibly sold." This was brought to the notice of the United States
authorities, but the district attorney of Florida could furnish no
information.[69]
Such was the state of the slave-trade in 1850, on the threshold of the
critical decade which by a herculean effort was destined finally to
suppress it.