In such a dilemma the Convention listened not unwillingly to the _non

possumus_ arguments of the States' Rights advocates. The "morality and

wisdom" of slavery, declared Ellsworth of Connecticut, "are

considerations belonging to the States themselves;" let every State

"import what it pleases;" the Confederation has not "meddled" with the

question, why should the Union? It is a dangerous symptom of

centralization, cried Baldwin of Georgia; the "central States" wish to

be the "vortex for everything," even matters of "a local nature." The

national government, said Gerry of Massachusetts, had nothing to do with

slavery in the States; it had only to refrain from giving direct

sanction to the system. Others opposed this whole argument, declaring,

with Langdon of New Hampshire, that Congress ought to have this power,

since, as Dickinson tartly remarked, "The true question was, whether the

national happiness would be promoted or impeded by the importation; and

this question ought to be left to the national government, not to the

states particularly interested."

Beside these arguments as to the right of the trade and the proper seat

of authority over it, many arguments of general expediency were

introduced. From an economic standpoint, for instance, General C.C.

Pinckney of South Carolina "contended, that the importation of slaves

would be for the interest of the whole Union. The more slaves, the more

produce." Rutledge of the same State declared: "If the Northern States

consult their interest, they will not oppose the increase of slaves,

which will increase the commodities of which they will become the

carriers." This sentiment found a more or less conscious echo in the

words of Ellsworth of Connecticut, "What enriches a part enriches the

whole." It was, moreover, broadly hinted that the zeal of Maryland and

Virginia against the trade had an economic rather than a humanitarian

motive, since they had slaves enough and to spare, and wished to sell

them at a high price to South Carolina and Georgia, who needed more. In

such case restrictions would unjustly discriminate against the latter

States. The argument from history was barely touched upon. Only once was

there an allusion to "the example of all the world" "in all ages" to

justify slavery,[7] and once came the counter declaration that "Greece

and Rome were made unhappy by their slaves."[8] On the other hand, the

military weakness of slavery in the late war led to many arguments on

that score. Luther Martin and George Mason dwelt on the danger of a

servile class in war and insurrection; while Rutledge hotly replied that

he "would readily exempt the other states from the obligation to protect

the Southern against them;" and Ellsworth thought that the very danger

would "become a motive to kind treatment." The desirability of keeping

slavery out of the West was once mentioned as an argument against the

trade: to this all seemed tacitly to agree.[9]

Throughout the debate it is manifest that the Convention had no desire

really to enter upon a general slavery argument. The broader and more

theoretic aspects of the question were but lightly touched upon here and

there. Undoubtedly, most of the members would have much preferred not to

raise the question at all; but, as it was raised, the differences of

opinion were too manifest to be ignored, and the Convention, after its

first perplexity, gradually and perhaps too willingly set itself to work

to find some "middle ground" on which all parties could stand. The way

to this compromise was pointed out by the South. The most radical

pro-slavery arguments always ended with the opinion that "if the

Southern States were let alone, they will probably of themselves stop

importations."[10] To be sure, General Pinckney admitted that,

"candidly, he did not think South Carolina would stop her importations

of slaves in any short time;" nevertheless, the Convention "observed,"

with Roger Sherman, "that the abolition of slavery seemed to be going on

in the United States, and that the good sense of the several states

would probably by degrees complete it." Economic forces were evoked to

eke out moral motives: when the South had its full quota of slaves, like

Virginia it too would abolish the trade; free labor was bound finally to

drive out slave labor. Thus the chorus of "_laissez-faire_" increased;

and compromise seemed at least in sight, when Connecticut cried, "Let

the trade alone!" and Georgia denounced it as an "evil." Some few

discordant notes were heard, as, for instance, when Wilson of

Pennsylvania made the uncomforting remark, "If South Carolina and

Georgia were themselves disposed to get rid of the importation of slaves

in a short time, as had been suggested, they would never refuse to unite

because the importation might be prohibited."

With the spirit of compromise in the air, it was not long before the

general terms were clear. The slavery side was strongly intrenched, and

had a clear and definite demand. The forces of freedom were, on the

contrary, divided by important conflicts of interest, and animated by no

very strong and decided anti-slavery spirit with settled aims. Under

such circumstances, it was easy for the Convention to miss the

opportunity for a really great compromise, and to descend to a scheme

that savored unpleasantly of "log-rolling." The student of the situation

will always have good cause to believe that a more sturdy and definite

anti-slavery stand at this point might have changed history for the

better.

34. ~The Special Committee and the "Bargain."~ Since the debate had, in

the first place, arisen from a proposition to tax the importation of

slaves, the yielding of this point by the South was the first move

toward compromise. To all but the doctrinaires, who shrank from taxing

men as property, the argument that the failure to tax slaves was

equivalent to a bounty, was conclusive. With this point settled,

Randolph voiced the general sentiment, when he declared that he "was for

committing, in order that some middle ground might, if possible, be

found." Finally, Gouverneur Morris discovered the "middle ground," in

his suggestion that the whole subject be committed, "including the

clauses relating to taxes on exports and to a navigation act. These

things," said he, "may form a bargain among the Northern and Southern

States." This was quickly assented to; and sections four and five, on

slave-trade and capitation tax, were committed by a vote of 7 to 3,[11]

and section six, on navigation acts, by a vote of 9 to 2.[12] All three

clauses were referred to the following committee: Langdon of New

Hampshire, King of Massachusetts, Johnson of Connecticut, Livingston of

New Jersey, Clymer of Pennsylvania, Dickinson of Delaware, Martin of

Maryland, Madison of Virginia, Williamson of North Carolina, General

Pinckney of South Carolina, and Baldwin of Georgia.

The fullest account of the proceedings of this committee is given in

Luther Martin's letter to his constituents, and is confirmed in its main

particulars by similar reports of other delegates. Martin writes: "A

committee of _one_ member from each state was chosen by ballot, to take

this part of the system under their consideration, and to endeavor to

agree upon some report which should reconcile those states [i.e., South

Carolina and Georgia]. To this committee also was referred the following

proposition, which had been reported by the committee of detail, viz.:

'No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of

the members present in each house'--a proposition which the staple and

commercial states were solicitous to retain, lest their commerce should

be placed too much under the power of the Eastern States, but which

these last States were as anxious to reject. This committee--of which

also I had the honor to be a member--met, and took under their

consideration the subjects committed to them. I found the _Eastern_

States, notwithstanding their _aversion to slavery_, were very willing

to indulge the Southern States at least with a temporary liberty to

prosecute the slave trade, provided the Southern States would, in their

turn, gratify _them_, by laying no restriction on navigation acts; and

after a very little time, the committee, by a great majority, agreed on

a report, by which the general government was to be prohibited from

preventing the importation of slaves for a limited time, and the

restrictive clause relative to navigation acts was to be omitted."[13]

That the "bargain" was soon made is proven by the fact that the

committee reported the very next day, Friday, August 24, and that on

Saturday the report was taken up. It was as follows: "Strike out so much

of the fourth section as was referred to the committee, and insert 'The

migration or importation of such persons as the several states, now

existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the

legislature prior to the year 1800; but a tax or duty may be imposed on

such migration or importation, at a rate not exceeding the average of

the duties laid on imports.' The fifth section to remain as in the

report. The sixth section to be stricken out."[14]

35. ~The Appeal to the Convention.~ The ensuing debate,[15] which lasted

only a part of the day, was evidently a sort of appeal to the House on

the decisions of the committee. It throws light on the points of

disagreement. General Pinckney first proposed to extend the

slave-trading limit to 1808, and Gorham of Massachusetts seconded the

motion. This brought a spirited protest from Madison: "Twenty years will

produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to

import slaves. So long a term will be more dishonorable to the American

character than to say nothing about it in the Constitution."[16] There

was, however, evidently another "bargain" here; for, without farther

debate, the South and the East voted the extension, 7 to 4, only New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia objecting. The ambiguous

phraseology of the whole slave-trade section as reported did not pass

without comment; Gouverneur Morris would have it read: "The importation

of slaves into North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, shall not be

prohibited," etc.[17] This emendation was, however, too painfully

truthful for the doctrinaires, and was, amid a score of objections,

withdrawn. The taxation clause also was manifestly too vague for

practical use, and Baldwin of Georgia wished to amend it by inserting

"common impost on articles not enumerated," in lieu of the "average"

duty.[18] This minor point gave rise to considerable argument: Sherman

and Madison deprecated any such recognition of property in man as taxing

would imply; Mason and Gorham argued that the tax restrained the trade;

while King, Langdon, and General Pinckney contented themselves with the

remark that this clause was "the price of the first part." Finally, it

was unanimously agreed to make the duty "not exceeding ten dollars for

each person."[19]

Southern interests now being safe, some Southern members attempted, a

few days later, to annul the "bargain" by restoring the requirement of a

two-thirds vote in navigation acts. Charles Pinckney made the motion, in

an elaborate speech designed to show the conflicting commercial

interests of the States; he declared that "The power of regulating

commerce was a pure concession on the part of the Southern States."[20]

Martin and Williamson of North Carolina, Butler of South Carolina, and

Mason of Virginia defended the proposition, insisting that it would be a

dangerous concession on the part of the South to leave navigation acts

to a mere majority vote. Sherman of Connecticut, Morris of Pennsylvania,

and Spaight of North Carolina declared that the very diversity of

interest was a security. Finally, by a vote of 7 to 4, Maryland,

Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia being in the minority, the

Convention refused to consider the motion, and the recommendation of the

committee passed.[21]

When, on September 10, the Convention was discussing the amendment

clause of the Constitution, the ever-alert Rutledge, perceiving that

the results of the laboriously settled "bargain" might be endangered,

declared that he "never could agree to give a power by which the

articles relating to slaves might be altered by the states not

interested in that property."[22] As a result, the clause finally

adopted, September 15, had the proviso: "Provided, that no amendment

which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the

1st and 4th clauses in the 9th section of the 1st article."[23]

36. ~Settlement by the Convention.~ Thus, the slave-trade article of the

Constitution stood finally as follows:--

"Article I. Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such

Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to

admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year

one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be

imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each

Person."

This settlement of the slavery question brought out distinct differences

of moral attitude toward the institution, and yet differences far from

hopeless. To be sure, the South apologized for slavery, the Middle

States denounced it, and the East could only tolerate it from afar; and

yet all three sections united in considering it a temporary institution,

the corner-stone of which was the slave-trade. No one of them had ever

seen a system of slavery without an active slave-trade; and there were

probably few members of the Convention who did not believe that the

foundations of slavery had been sapped merely by putting the abolition

of the slave-trade in the hands of Congress twenty years hence. Here lay

the danger; for when the North called slavery "temporary," she thought

of twenty or thirty years, while the "temporary" period of the South was

scarcely less than a century. Meantime, for at least a score of years, a

policy of strict _laissez-faire_, so far as the general government was

concerned, was to intervene. Instead of calling the whole moral energy

of the people into action, so as gradually to crush this portentous

evil, the Federal Convention lulled the nation to sleep by a "bargain,"

and left to the vacillating and unripe judgment of the States one of the

most threatening of the social and political ills which they were so

courageously seeking to remedy.

37. ~Reception of the Clause by the Nation.~ When the proposed

Constitution was before the country, the slave-trade article came in for

no small amount of condemnation and apology. In the pamphlets of the day

it was much discussed. One of the points in Mason's "Letter of

Objections" was that "the general legislature is restrained from

prohibiting the further importation of slaves for twenty odd years,

though such importations render the United States weaker, more

vulnerable, and less capable of defence."[24] To this Iredell replied,

through the columns of the _State Gazette_ of North Carolina: "If all

the States had been willing to adopt this regulation [i.e., to prohibit

the slave-trade], I should as an individual most heartily have approved

of it, because even if the importation of slaves in fact rendered us

stronger, less vulnerable and more capable of defence, I should rejoice

in the prohibition of it, as putting an end to a trade which has already

continued too long for the honor and humanity of those concerned in it.

But as it was well known that South Carolina and Georgia thought a

further continuance of such importations useful to them, and would not

perhaps otherwise have agreed to the new constitution, those States

which had been importing till they were satisfied, could not with

decency have insisted upon their relinquishing advantages themselves had

already enjoyed. Our situation makes it necessary to bear the evil as it

is. It will be left to the future legislatures to allow such

importations or not. If any, in violation of their clear conviction of

the injustice of this trade, persist in pursuing it, this is a matter

between God and their own consciences. The interests of humanity will,

however, have gained something by the prohibition of this inhuman trade,

though at a distance of twenty odd years."[25]

"Centinel," representing the Quaker sentiment of Pennsylvania, attacked

the clause in his third letter, published in the _Independent Gazetteer,

or The Chronicle of Freedom_, November 8, 1787: "We are told that the

objects of this article are slaves, and that it is inserted to secure to

the southern states the right of introducing negroes for twenty-one

years to come, against the declared sense of the other states to put an

end to an odious traffic in the human species, which is especially

scandalous and inconsistent in a people, who have asserted their own

liberty by the sword, and which dangerously enfeebles the districts

wherein the laborers are bondsmen. The words, dark and ambiguous, such

as no plain man of common sense would have used, are evidently chosen to

conceal from Europe, that in this enlightened country, the practice of

slavery has its advocates among men in the highest stations. When it is

recollected that no poll tax can be imposed on _five_ negroes, above

what _three_ whites shall be charged; when it is considered, that the

imposts on the consumption of Carolina field negroes must be trifling,

and the excise nothing, it is plain that the proportion of

contributions, which can be expected from the southern states under the

new constitution, will be unequal, and yet they are to be allowed to

enfeeble themselves by the further importation of negroes till the year

1808. Has not the concurrence of the five southern states (in the

convention) to the new system, been purchased too dearly by the

rest?"[26]

Noah Webster's "Examination" (1787) addressed itself to such Quaker

scruples: "But, say the enemies of slavery, negroes may be imported for

twenty-one years. This exception is addressed to the quakers, and a very

pitiful exception it is. The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the

importation of slaves during that period; but the laws against the

importation into particular states, stand unrepealed. An immediate

abolition of slavery would bring ruin upon the whites, and misery upon

the blacks, in the southern states. The constitution has therefore

wisely left each state to pursue its own measures, with respect to this

article of legislation, during the period of twenty-one years."[27]

The following year the "Examination" of Tench Coxe said: "The temporary

reservation of any particular matter must ever be deemed an admission

that it should be done away. This appears to have been well understood.

In addition to the arguments drawn from liberty, justice and religion,

opinions against this practice [i.e., of slave-trading], founded in

sound policy, have no doubt been urged. Regard was necessarily paid to

the peculiar situation of our southern fellow-citizens; but they, on the

other hand, have not been insensible of the delicate situation of our

national character on this subject."[28]

From quite different motives Southern men defended this section. For

instance, Dr. David Ramsay, a South Carolina member of the Convention,

wrote in his "Address": "It is farther objected, that they have

stipulated for a right to prohibit the importation of negroes after 21

years. On this subject observe, as they are bound to protect us from

domestic violence, they think we ought not to increase our exposure to

that evil, by an unlimited importation of slaves. Though Congress may

forbid the importation of negroes after 21 years, it does not follow

that they will. On the other hand, it is probable that they will not.

The more rice we make, the more business will be for their shipping;

their interest will therefore coincide with ours. Besides, we have other

sources of supply--the importation of the ensuing 20 years, added to the

natural increase of those we already have, and the influx from our

northern neighbours who are desirous of getting rid of their slaves,

will afford a sufficient number for cultivating all the lands in this

state."[29]

Finally, _The Federalist_, No. 41, written by James Madison, commented

as follows: "It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of

prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the

year 1808, or rather, that it had been suffered to have immediate

operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this

restriction on the General Government, or for the manner in which the

whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point

gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate

forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly

upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it

will receive a considerable discouragement from the Federal Government,

and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which

continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has

been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for

the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being

redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren!

"Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection

against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal

toleration of an illicit practice, and on another, as calculated to

prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I

mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer,

for they deserve none; but as specimens of the manner and spirit, in

which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed

Government."[30]

38. ~Attitude of the State Conventions.~ The records of the proceedings

in the various State conventions are exceedingly meagre. In nearly all

of the few States where records exist there is found some opposition to

the slave-trade clause. The opposition was seldom very pronounced or

bitter; it rather took the form of regret, on the one hand that the

Convention went so far, and on the other hand that it did not go

farther. Probably, however, the Constitution was never in danger of

rejection on account of this clause.

Extracts from a few of the speeches, _pro_ and _con_, in various States

will best illustrate the character of the arguments. In reply to some

objections expressed in the Pennsylvania convention, Wilson said,

December 3, 1787: "I consider this as laying the foundation for

banishing slavery out of this country; and though the period is more

distant than I could wish, yet it will produce the same kind, gradual

change, which was pursued in Pennsylvania."[31] Robert Barnwell declared

in the South Carolina convention, January 17, 1788, that this clause

"particularly pleased" him. "Congress," he said, "has guarantied this

right for that space of time, and at its expiration may continue it as

long as they please. This question then arises--What will their interest

lead them to do? The Eastern States, as the honorable gentleman says,

will become the carriers of America. It will, therefore, certainly be

their interest to encourage exportation to as great an extent as

possible; and if the quantum of our products will be diminished by the

prohibition of negroes, I appeal to the belief of every man, whether he

thinks those very carriers will themselves dam up the sources from

whence their profit is derived. To think so is so contradictory to the

general conduct of mankind, that I am of opinion, that, without we

ourselves put a stop to them, the traffic for negroes will continue

forever."[32]

In Massachusetts, January 30, 1788, General Heath said: "The gentlemen

who have spoken have carried the matter rather too far on both sides. I

apprehend that it is not in our power to do anything for or against

those who are in slavery in the southern States.... Two questions

naturally arise, if we ratify the Constitution: Shall we do anything by

our act to hold the blacks in slavery? or shall we become partakers of

other men's sins? I think neither of them. Each State is sovereign and

independent to a certain degree, and they have a right, and will

regulate their own internal affairs, as to themselves appears

proper."[33] Iredell said, in the North Carolina convention, July 26,

1788: "When the entire abolition of slavery takes place, it will be an

event which must be pleasing to every generous mind, and every friend of

human nature.... But as it is, this government is nobly distinguished

above others by that very provision."[34]

Of the arguments against the clause, two made in the Massachusetts

convention are typical. The Rev. Mr. Neal said, January 25, 1788, that

"unless his objection [to this clause] was removed, he could not put his

hand to the Constitution."[35] General Thompson exclaimed, "Shall it be

said, that after we have established our own independence and freedom,

we make slaves of others?"[36] Mason, in the Virginia convention, June

15, 1788, said: "As much as I value a union of all the states, I would

not admit the Southern States into the Union unless they agree to the

discontinuance of this disgraceful trade.... Yet they have not secured

us the property of the slaves we have already. So that 'they have done

what they ought not to have done, and have left undone what they ought

to have done.'"[37] Joshua Atherton, who led the opposition in the New

Hampshire convention, said: "The idea that strikes those who are opposed

to this clause so disagreeably and so forcibly is,--hereby it is

conceived (if we ratify the Constitution) that we become _consenters to_

and _partakers in_ the sin and guilt of this abominable traffic, at

least for a certain period, without any positive stipulation that it

shall even then be brought to an end."[38]

In the South Carolina convention Lowndes, January 16, 1788, attacked the

slave-trade clause. "Negroes," said he, "were our wealth, our only

natural resource; yet behold how our kind friends in the north were

determined soon to tie up our hands, and drain us of what we had! The

Eastern States drew their means of subsistence, in a great measure, from

their shipping; and, on that head, they had been particularly careful

not to allow of any burdens.... Why, then, call this a reciprocal

bargain, which took all from one party, to bestow it on the other!"[39]

In spite of this discussion in the different States, only one State,

Rhode Island, went so far as to propose an amendment directing Congress

to "promote and establish such laws and regulations as may effectually

prevent the importation of slaves of every description, into the United

States."[40]

39. ~Acceptance of the Policy.~ As in the Federal Convention, so in the

State conventions, it is noticeable that the compromise was accepted by

the various States from widely different motives.[41] Nevertheless,

these motives were not fixed and unchangeable, and there was still

discernible a certain underlying agreement in the dislike of slavery.

One cannot help thinking that if the devastation of the late war had not

left an extraordinary demand for slaves in the South,--if, for instance,

there had been in 1787 the same plethora in the slave-market as in

1774,--the future history of the country would have been far different.

As it was, the twenty-one years of _laissez-faire_ were confirmed by the

States, and the nation entered upon the constitutional period with the

slave-trade legal in three States,[42] and with a feeling of quiescence

toward it in the rest of the Union.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Conway, _Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph_, ch. ix.

[2] Conway, _Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph_, p. 78.

[3] Elliot, _Debates_, I. 227.

[4] Cf. Conway, _Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph_, pp.

78-9.

[5] For the following debate, Madison's notes (Elliot,

_Debates_, V. 457 ff.) are mainly followed.

[6] Cf. Elliot, _Debates_, V, _passim_.

[7] By Charles Pinckney.

[8] By John Dickinson.

[9] Mentioned in the speech of George Mason.

[10] Charles Pinckney. Baldwin of Georgia said that if the

State were left to herself, "she may probably put a stop to

the evil": Elliot, _Debates_, V. 459.

[11] _Affirmative:_ Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,

Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,--7.

_Negative:_ New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware,--3.

_Absent:_ Massachusetts,--1.

[12] _Negative:_ Connecticut and New Jersey.

[13] Luther Martin's letter, in Elliot, _Debates_, I. 373. Cf.

explanations of delegates in the South Carolina, North

Carolina, and other conventions.

[14] Elliot, _Debates_, V. 471.

[15] Saturday, Aug. 25, 1787.

[16] Elliot, _Debates_, V. 477.

[17] Elliot, _Debates_, V. 477. Dickinson made a similar

motion, which was disagreed to: _Ibid._

[18] _Ibid._, V. 478.

[19] _Ibid._

[20] Aug. 29: _Ibid._, V. 489.

[21] _Ibid._, V. 492.

[22] Elliot, _Debates_, V. 532.

[23] _Ibid._, I. 317.

[24] P.L. Ford, _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 331.

[25] _Ibid._, p. 367.

[26] McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal

Convention_, pp. 599-600. Cf. also p. 773.

[27] See Ford, _Pamphlets_, etc., p. 54.

[28] Ford, _Pamphlets_, etc., p. 146.

[29] "Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Subject

of the Federal Constitution": _Ibid._, p. 378.

[30] Published in the _New York Packet_, Jan. 22, 1788;

reprinted in Dawson's _Foederalist_, I. 290-1.

[31] Elliot, _Debates_, II. 452.

[32] Elliot, _Debates_, IV. 296-7.

[33] Published in _Debates of the Massachusetts Convention_,

1788, p. 217 ff.

[34] Elliot, _Debates_, IV. 100-1.

[35] Published in _Debates of the Massachusetts Convention_,

1788, p. 208.

[36] _Ibid._

[37] Elliot, _Debates_, III. 452-3.

[38] Walker, _Federal Convention of New Hampshire_, App. 113;

Elliot, Debates, II. 203.

[39] Elliot, _Debates_, IV. 273.

[40] Updike's _Minutes_, in Staples, _Rhode Island in the

Continental Congress_, pp. 657-8, 674-9. Adopted by a majority

of one in a convention of seventy.

[41] In five States I have found no mention of the subject

(Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Maryland). In

the Pennsylvania convention there was considerable debate,

partially preserved in Elliot's and Lloyd's _Debates_. In the

Massachusetts convention the debate on this clause occupied a

part of two or three days, reported in published debates. In

South Carolina there were several long speeches, reported in

Elliot's _Debates_. Only three speeches made in the New

Hampshire convention seem to be extant, and two of these are

on the slave-trade: cf. Walker and Elliot. The Virginia

convention discussed the clause to considerable extent: see

Elliot. The clause does not seem to have been a cause of North

Carolina's delay in ratification, although it occasioned some

discussion: see Elliot. In Rhode Island "much debate ensued,"

and in this State alone was an amendment proposed: see

Staples, _Rhode Island in the Continental Congress_. In New

York the Committee of the Whole "proceeded through sections 8,

9 ... with little or no debate": Elliot, _Debates_, II. 406.

[42] South Carolina, Georgia, and North Carolina. North

Carolina had, however, a prohibitive duty.

* * * * *

_Chapter VII_

TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND ANTI-SLAVERY EFFORT, 1787-1806.

40. Influence of the Haytian Revolution.

41. Legislation of the Southern States.

42. Legislation of the Border States.

43. Legislation of the Eastern States.

44. First Debate in Congress, 1789.

45. Second Debate in Congress, 1790.

46. The Declaration of Powers, 1790.

47. The Act of 1794.

48. The Act of 1800.

49. The Act of 1803.

50. State of the Slave-Trade from 1789 to 1803.

51. The South Carolina Repeal of 1803.

52. The Louisiana Slave-Trade, 1803-1805.

53. Last Attempts at Taxation, 1805-1806.

54. Key-Note of the Period.

40. ~Influence of the Haytian Revolution.~ The rôle which the great

Negro Toussaint, called L'Ouverture, played in the history of the United

States has seldom been fully appreciated. Representing the age of

revolution in America, he rose to leadership through a bloody terror,

which contrived a Negro "problem" for the Western Hemisphere,

intensified and defined the anti-slavery movement, became one of the

causes, and probably the prime one, which led Napoleon to sell Louisiana

for a song, and finally, through the interworking of all these effects,

rendered more certain the final prohibition of the slave-trade by the

United States in 1807.

From the time of the reorganization of the Pennsylvania Abolition

Society, in 1787, anti-slavery sentiment became active. New York, New

Jersey, Rhode Island, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia had strong

organizations, and a national convention was held in 1794. The terrible

upheaval in the West Indies, beginning in 1791, furnished this rising

movement with an irresistible argument. A wave of horror and fear swept

over the South, which even the powerful slave-traders of Georgia did not

dare withstand; the Middle States saw their worst dreams realized, and

the mercenary trade interests of the East lost control of the New

England conscience.

41. ~Legislation of the Southern States.~ In a few years the growing

sentiment had crystallized into legislation. The Southern States took

immediate measures to close their ports, first against West India

Negroes, finally against all slaves. Georgia, who had had legal slavery

only from 1755, and had since passed no restrictive legislation, felt

compelled in 1793[1] to stop the entry of free Negroes, and in 1798[2]

to prohibit, under heavy penalties, the importation of all slaves. This

provision was placed in the Constitution of the State, and, although

miserably enforced, was never repealed.

South Carolina was the first Southern State in which the exigencies of a

great staple crop rendered the rapid consumption of slaves more

profitable than their proper maintenance. Alternating, therefore,

between a plethora and a dearth of Negroes, she prohibited the

slave-trade only for short periods. In 1788[3] she had forbidden the

trade for five years, and in 1792,[4] being peculiarly exposed to the

West Indian insurrection, she quickly found it "inexpedient" to allow

Negroes "from Africa, the West India Islands, or other place beyond sea"

to enter for two years. This act continued to be extended, although with

lessening penalties, until 1803.[5] The home demand in view of the

probable stoppage of the trade in 1808, the speculative chances of the

new Louisiana Territory trade, and the large already existing illicit

traffic combined in that year to cause the passage of an act, December

17, reopening the African slave-trade, although still carefully

excluding "West India" Negroes.[6] This action profoundly stirred the

Union, aroused anti-slavery sentiment, led to a concerted movement for a

constitutional amendment, and, failing in this, to an irresistible

demand for a national prohibitory act at the earliest constitutional

moment.

North Carolina had repealed her prohibitory duty act in 1790,[7] but in

1794 she passed an "Act to prevent further importation and bringing of

slaves," etc.[8] Even the body-servants of West India immigrants and,

naturally, all free Negroes, were eventually prohibited.[9]

42. ~Legislation of the Border States.~ The Border States, Virginia and

Maryland, strengthened their non-importation laws, Virginia freeing

illegally imported Negroes,[10] and Maryland prohibiting even the

interstate trade.[11] The Middle States took action chiefly in the final

abolition of slavery within their borders, and the prevention of the

fitting out of slaving vessels in their ports. Delaware declared, in her

Act of 1789, that "it is inconsistent with that spirit of general

liberty which pervades the constitution of this state, that vessels

should be fitted out, or equipped, in any of the ports thereof, for the

purpose of receiving and transporting the natives of Africa to places

where they are held in slavery,"[12] and forbade such a practice under

penalty of £500 for each person so engaged. The Pennsylvania Act of

1788[13] had similar provisions, with a penalty of £1000; and New Jersey

followed with an act in 1798.[14]

43. ~Legislation of the Eastern States.~ In the Eastern States, where

slavery as an institution was already nearly defunct, action was aimed

toward stopping the notorious participation of citizens in the

slave-trade outside the State. The prime movers were the Rhode Island

Quakers. Having early secured a law against the traffic in their own

State, they turned their attention to others. Through their

remonstrances Connecticut, in 1788,[15] prohibited participation in the

trade by a fine of £500 on the vessel, £50 on each slave, and loss of

insurance; this act was strengthened in 1792,[16] the year after the

Haytian revolt. Massachusetts, after many fruitless attempts, finally

took advantage of an unusually bold case of kidnapping, and passed a

similar act in 1788.[17] "This," says Belknap, "was the utmost which

could be done by our legislatures; we still have to regret the

impossibility of making a law _here_, which shall restrain our citizens

from carrying on this trade _in foreign bottoms_, and from committing

the crimes which this act prohibits, _in foreign countries_, as it is

said some of them have done since the enacting of these laws."[18]

Thus it is seen how, spurred by the tragedy in the West Indies, the

United States succeeded by State action in prohibiting the slave-trade

from 1798 to 1803, in furthering the cause of abolition, and in

preventing the fitting out of slave-trade expeditions in United States

ports. The country had good cause to congratulate itself. The national

government hastened to supplement State action as far as possible, and

the prophecies of the more sanguine Revolutionary fathers seemed about

to be realized, when the ill-considered act of South Carolina showed the

weakness of the constitutional compromise.

44. ~First Debate in Congress, 1789.~ The attention of the national

government was early directed to slavery and the trade by the rise, in

the first Congress, of the question of taxing slaves imported. During

the debate on the duty bill introduced by Clymer's committee, Parker of

Virginia moved, May 13, 1789, to lay a tax of ten dollars _per capita_

on slaves imported. He plainly stated that the tax was designed to check

the trade, and that he was "sorry that the Constitution prevented

Congress from prohibiting the importation altogether." The proposal was

evidently unwelcome, and caused an extended debate.[19] Smith of South

Carolina wanted to postpone a matter so "big with the most serious

consequences to the State he represented." Roger Sherman of Connecticut

"could not reconcile himself to the insertion of human beings as an

article of duty, among goods, wares, and merchandise." Jackson of

Georgia argued against any restriction, and thought such States as

Virginia "ought to let their neighbors get supplied, before they imposed

such a burden upon the importation." Tucker of South Carolina declared

it "unfair to bring in such an important subject at a time when debate

was almost precluded," and denied the right of Congress to "consider

whether the importation of slaves is proper or not."

Mr. Parker was evidently somewhat abashed by this onslaught of friend

and foe, but he "had ventured to introduce the subject after full

deliberation, and did not like to withdraw it." He desired Congress, "if

possible," to "wipe off the stigma under which America labored." This

brought Jackson of Georgia again to his feet. He believed, in spite of

the "fashion of the day," that the Negroes were better off as slaves

than as freedmen, and that, as the tax was partial, "it would be the

most odious tax Congress could impose." Such sentiments were a distinct

advance in pro-slavery doctrine, and called for a protest from Madison

of Virginia. He thought the discussion proper, denied the partiality of

the tax, and declared that, according to the spirit of the Constitution

and his own desire, it was to be hoped "that, by expressing a national

disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it, and save ourselves from

reproaches, and our posterity the imbecility ever attendant on a country

filled with slaves." Finally, to Burke of South Carolina, who thought

"the gentlemen were contending for nothing," Madison sharply rejoined,

"If we contend for nothing, the gentlemen who are opposed to us do not

contend for a great deal."

It now became clear that Congress had been whirled into a discussion of

too delicate and lengthy a nature to allow its further prolongation.

Compromising councils prevailed; and it was agreed that the present

proposition should be withdrawn and a separate bill brought in. This

bill was, however, at the next session dexterously postponed "until the

next session of Congress."[20]

45. ~Second Debate in Congress, 1790.~ It is doubtful if Congress of its

own initiative would soon have resurrected the matter, had not a new

anti-slavery weapon appeared in the shape of urgent petitions from

abolition societies. The first petition, presented February 11,

1790,[21] was from the same interstate Yearly Meeting of Friends which

had formerly petitioned the Confederation Congress.[22] They urged

Congress to inquire "whether, notwithstanding such seeming impediments,

it be not in reality within your power to exercise justice and mercy,

which, if adhered to, we cannot doubt, must produce the abolition of the

slave trade," etc. Another Quaker petition from New York was also

presented,[23] and both were about to be referred, when Smith of South

Carolina objected, and precipitated a sharp debate.[24] This debate had

a distinctly different tone from that of the preceding one, and

represents another step in pro-slavery doctrine. The key-note of these

utterances was struck by Stone of Maryland, who "feared that if Congress

took any measures indicative of an intention to interfere with the kind

of property alluded to, it would sink it in value very considerably, and

might be injurious to a great number of the citizens, particularly in

the Southern States. He thought the subject was of general concern, and

that the petitioners had no more right to interfere with it than any

other members of the community. It was an unfortunate circumstance, that

it was the disposition of religious sects to imagine they understood the

rights of human nature better than all the world besides."

In vain did men like Madison disclaim all thought of unconstitutional

"interference," and express only a desire to see "If anything is within

the Federal authority to restrain such violation of the rights of

nations and of mankind, as is supposed to be practised in some parts of

the United States." A storm of disapproval from Southern members met

such sentiments. "The rights of the Southern States ought not to be

threatened," said Burke of South Carolina. "Any extraordinary attention

of Congress to this petition," averred Jackson of Georgia, would put

slave property "in jeopardy," and "evince to the people a disposition

towards a total emancipation." Smith and Tucker of South Carolina

declared that the request asked for "unconstitutional" measures. Gerry

of Massachusetts, Hartley of Pennsylvania, and Lawrence of New York

rather mildly defended the petitioners; but after considerable further

debate the matter was laid on the table.

The very next day, however, the laid ghost walked again in the shape of

another petition from the "Pennsylvania Society for promoting the

Abolition of Slavery," signed by its venerable president, Benjamin

Franklin. This petition asked Congress to "step to the very verge of the

power vested in you for discouraging every species of traffic in the

persons of our fellow-men."[25] Hartley of Pennsylvania called up the

memorial of the preceding day, and it was read a second time and a

motion for commitment made. Plain words now came from Tucker of South

Carolina. "The petition," he said, "contained an unconstitutional

request." The commitment would alarm the South. These petitions were

"mischievous" attempts to imbue the slaves with false hopes. The South

would not submit to a general emancipation without "civil war." The

commitment would "blow the trumpet of sedition in the Southern States,"

echoed his colleague, Burke. The Pennsylvania men spoke just as boldly.

Scott declared the petition constitutional, and was sorry that the

Constitution did not interdict this "most abominable" traffic. "Perhaps,

in our Legislative capacity," he said, "we can go no further than to

impose a duty of ten dollars, but I do not know how far I might go if I

was one of the Judges of the United States, and those people were to

come before me and claim their emancipation; but I am sure I would go as

far as I could." Jackson of Georgia rejoined in true Southern spirit,

boldly defending slavery in the light of religion and history, and

asking if it was "good policy to bring forward a business at this moment

likely to light up the flame of civil discord; for the people of the

Southern States will resist one tyranny as soon as another. The other

parts of the Continent may bear them down by force of arms, but they

will never suffer themselves to be divested of their property without a

struggle. The gentleman says, if he was a Federal Judge, he does not

know to what length he would go in emancipating these people; but I

believe his judgment would be of short duration in Georgia, perhaps even

the existence of such a Judge might be in danger." Baldwin, his

New-England-born colleague, urged moderation by reciting the difficulty

with which the constitutional compromise was reached, and declaring,

"the moment we go to jostle on that ground, I fear we shall feel it

tremble under our feet." Lawrence of New York wanted to commit the

memorials, in order to see how far Congress might constitutionally

interfere. Smith of South Carolina, in a long speech, said that his

constituents entered the Union "from political, not from moral motives,"

and that "we look upon this measure as an attack upon the palladium of

the property of our country." Page of Virginia, although a slave owner,

urged commitment, and Madison again maintained the appropriateness of

the request, and suggested that "regulations might be made in relation

to the introduction of them [i.e., slaves] into the new States to be

formed out of the Western Territory." Even conservative Gerry of

Massachusetts declared, with regard to the whole trade, that the fact

that "we have a right to regulate this business, is as clear as that we

have any rights whatever."

Finally, by a vote of 43 to 11, the memorials were committed, the South

Carolina and Georgia delegations, Bland and Coles of Virginia, Stone of

Maryland, and Sylvester of New York voting in the negative.[26] A

committee, consisting of Foster of New Hampshire, Huntington of

Connecticut, Gerry of Massachusetts, Lawrence of New York, Sinnickson of

New Jersey, Hartley of Pennsylvania, and Parker of Virginia, was charged

with the matter, and reported Friday, March 5. The absence of Southern

members on this committee compelled it to make this report a sort of

official manifesto on the aims of Northern anti-slavery politics. As

such, it was sure to meet with vehement opposition in the House, even

though conservatively worded. Such proved to be the fact when the

committee reported. The onslaught to "negative the whole report" was

prolonged and bitter, the debate _pro_ and _con_ lasting several

days.[27]

46. ~The Declaration of Powers, 1790.~ The result is best seen by

comparing the original report with the report of the Committee of the

Whole, adopted by a vote of 29 to 25 Monday, March 23, 1790:[28]--

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE.

That, from the nature of the matters contained in these

memorials, they were induced to examine the powers vested in

Congress, under the present Constitution, relating to the

Abolition of Slavery, and are clearly of opinion,

_First._ That the General Government is expressly restrained

from prohibiting the importation of such persons 'as any of

the States now existing shall think proper to admit, until the

year one thousand eight hundred and eight.'

_Secondly._ That Congress, by a fair construction of the

Constitution, are equally restrained from interfering in the

emancipation of slaves, who already are, or who may, within

the period mentioned, be imported into, or born within, any of

the said States.

_Thirdly._ That Congress have no authority to interfere in the

internal regulations of particular States, relative to the

instructions of slaves in the principles of morality and

religion; to their comfortable clothing, accommodations, and

subsistence; to the regulation of their marriages, and the

prevention of the violation of the rights thereof, or to the

separation of children from their parents; to a comfortable

provision in cases of sickness, age, or infirmity; or to the

seizure, transportation, or sale of free negroes; but have the

fullest confidence in the wisdom and humanity of the

Legislatures of the several States, that they will revise

their laws from time to time, when necessary, and promote the

objects mentioned in the memorials, and every other measure

that may tend to the happiness of slaves.

_Fourthly._ That, nevertheless, Congress have authority, if

they shall think it necessary, to lay at any time a tax or

duty, not exceeding ten dollars for each person of any

description, the importation of whom shall be by any of the

States admitted as aforesaid.

_Fifthly._ That Congress have authority to interdict,[29] or

(so far as it is or may be carried on by citizens of the

United States, for supplying foreigners), to regulate the

African trade, and to make provision for the humane treatment

of slaves, in all cases while on their passage to the United

States, or to foreign ports, so far as respects the citizens

of the United States.

_Sixthly._ That Congress have also authority to prohibit

foreigners from fitting out vessels in any port of the United

States, for transporting persons from Africa to any foreign

port.

_Seventhly._ That the memorialists be informed, that in all

cases to which the authority of Congress extends, they will

exercise it for the humane objects of the memorialists, so far

as they can be promoted on the principles of justice,

humanity, and good policy.

* * * * *

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

_First._ That the migration or importation of such persons as

any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,

cannot be prohibited by Congress, prior to the year one

thousand eight hundred and eight.

_Secondly._ That Congress have no authority to interfere in

the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within

any of the States; it remaining with the several States alone

to provide any regulation therein, which humanity and true

policy may require.

_Thirdly._ That Congress have authority to restrain the

citizens of the United States from carrying on the African

trade, for the purpose of supplying foreigners with slaves,

and of providing, by proper regulations, for the humane

treatment, during their passage, of slaves imported by the

said citizens into the States admitting such importation.

_Fourthly._ That Congress have authority to prohibit

foreigners from fitting out vessels in any port of the United

States for transporting persons from Africa to any foreign

port.

47. ~The Act of 1794.~ This declaration of the powers of the central

government over the slave-trade bore early fruit in the second Congress,

in the shape of a shower of petitions from abolition societies in

Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania,

Maryland, and Virginia.[30] In some of these slavery was denounced as

"an outrageous violation of one of the most essential rights of human

nature,"[31] and the slave-trade as a traffic "degrading to the rights

of man" and "repugnant to reason."[32] Others declared the trade

"injurious to the true commercial interest of a nation,"[33] and asked

Congress that, having taken up the matter, they do all in their power to

limit the trade. Congress was, however, determined to avoid as long as

possible so unpleasant a matter, and, save an angry attempt to censure a

Quaker petitioner,[34] nothing was heard of the slave-trade until the

third Congress.

Meantime, news came from the seas southeast of Carolina and Georgia

which influenced Congress more powerfully than humanitarian arguments

had done. The wild revolt of despised slaves, the rise of a noble black

leader, and the birth of a new nation of Negro freemen frightened the

pro-slavery advocates and armed the anti-slavery agitation. As a result,

a Quaker petition for a law against the transport traffic in slaves was

received without a murmur in 1794,[35] and on March 22 the first

national act against the slave-trade became a law.[36] It was designed

"to prohibit the carrying on the Slave Trade from the United States to

any foreign place or country," or the fitting out of slavers in the

United States for that country. The penalties for violation were

forfeiture of the ship, a fine of $1000 for each person engaged, and of

$200 for each slave transported. If the Quakers thought this a triumph

of anti-slavery sentiment, they were quickly undeceived. Congress might

willingly restrain the country from feeding West Indian turbulence, and

yet be furious at a petition like that of 1797,[37] calling attention to

"the oppressed state of our brethren of the African race" in this

country, and to the interstate slave-trade. "Considering the present

extraordinary state of the West India Islands and of Europe," young John

Rutledge insisted "that 'sufficient for the day is the evil thereof,'

and that they ought to shut their door against any thing which had a

tendency to produce the like confusion in this country." After excited

debate and some investigation by a special committee, the petition was

ordered, in both Senate and House, to be withdrawn.

48. ~The Act of 1800.~ In the next Congress, the sixth, another petition

threw the House into paroxysms of slavery debate. Waln of Pennsylvania

presented the petition of certain free colored men of Pennsylvania

praying for a revision of the slave-trade laws and of the fugitive-slave

law, and for prospective emancipation.[38] Waln moved the reference of

this memorial to a committee already appointed on the revision of the

loosely drawn and poorly enforced Act of 1794.[39] Rutledge of South

Carolina immediately arose. He opposed the motion, saying, that these

petitions were continually coming in and stirring up discord; that it

was a good thing the Negroes were in slavery; and that already "too much

of this new-fangled French philosophy of liberty and equality" had found

its way among them. Others defended the right of petition, and declared

that none wished Congress to exceed its powers. Brown of Rhode Island, a

new figure in Congress, a man of distinguished services and from a

well-known family, boldly set forth the commercial philosophy of his

State. "We want money," said he, "we want a navy; we ought therefore to

use the means to obtain it. We ought to go farther than has yet been

proposed, and repeal the bills in question altogether, for why should we

see Great Britain getting all the slave trade to themselves; why may not

our country be enriched by that lucrative traffic? There would not be a

slave the more sold, but we should derive the benefits by importing from

Africa as well as that nation." Waln, in reply, contended that they

should look into "the slave trade, much of which was still carrying on

from Rhode Island, Boston and Pennsylvania." Hill of North Carolina

called the House back from this general discussion to the petition in

question, and, while willing to remedy any existing defect in the Act of

1794, hoped the petition would not be received. Dana of Connecticut

declared that the paper "contained nothing but a farrago of the French

metaphysics of liberty and equality;" and that "it was likely to produce

some of the dreadful scenes of St. Domingo." The next day Rutledge again

warned the House against even discussing the matter, as "very serious,

nay, dreadful effects, must be the inevitable consequence." He held up

the most lurid pictures of the fatuity of the French Convention in

listening to the overtures of the "three emissaries from St. Domingo,"

and thus yielding "one of the finest islands in the world" to "scenes

which had never been practised since the destruction of Carthage." "But,

sir," he continued, "we have lived to see these dreadful scenes. These

horrid effects have succeeded what was conceived once to be trifling.

Most important consequences may be the result, although gentlemen little

apprehend it. But we know the situation of things there, although they

do not, and knowing we deprecate it. There have been emissaries amongst

us in the Southern States; they have begun their war upon us; an actual

organization has commenced; we have had them meeting in their club

rooms, and debating on that subject.... Sir, I do believe that persons

have been sent from France to feel the pulse of this country, to know

whether these [i.e., the Negroes] are the proper engines to make use of:

these people have been talked to; they have been tampered with, and this

is going on."

Finally, after censuring certain parts of this Negro petition, Congress

committed the part on the slave-trade to the committee already

appointed. Meantime, the Senate sent down a bill to amend the Act of

1794, and the House took this bill under consideration.[40] Prolonged

debate ensued. Brown of Rhode Island again made a most elaborate plea

for throwing open the foreign slave-trade. Negroes, he said, bettered

their condition by being enslaved, and thus it was morally wrong and

commercially indefensible to impose "a heavy fine and imprisonment ...

for carrying on a trade so advantageous;" or, if the trade must be

stopped, then equalize the matter and abolish slavery too. Nichols of

Virginia thought that surely the gentlemen would not advise the

importation of more Negroes; for while it "was a fact, to be sure," that

they would thus improve their condition, "would it be policy so to do?"

Bayard of Delaware said that "a more dishonorable item of revenue" than

that derived from the slave-trade "could not be established." Rutledge

opposed the new bill as defective and impracticable: the former act, he

said, was enough; the States had stopped the trade, and in addition the

United States had sought to placate philanthropists by stopping the use

of our ships in the trade. "This was going very far indeed." New England

first began the trade, and why not let them enjoy its profits now as

well as the English? The trade could not be stopped.

The bill was eventually recommitted and reported again.[41] "On the

question for its passing, a long and warm debate ensued," and several

attempts to postpone it were made; it finally passed, however, only

Brown of Rhode Island, Dent of Maryland, Rutledge and Huger of South

Carolina, and Dickson of North Carolina voting against it, and 67 voting

for it.[42] This Act of May 10, 1800,[43] greatly strengthened the Act

of 1794. The earlier act had prohibited citizens from equipping slavers

for the foreign trade; but this went so far as to forbid them having any

interest, direct or indirect, in such voyages, or serving on board

slave-ships in any capacity. Imprisonment for two years was added to the

former fine of $2000, and United States commissioned ships were directed

to capture such slavers as prizes. The slaves though forfeited by the

owner, were not to go to the captor; and the act omitted to say what

disposition should be made of them.

49. ~The Act of 1803.~ The Haytian revolt, having been among the main

causes of two laws, soon was the direct instigation to a third. The

frightened feeling in the South, when freedmen from the West Indies

began to arrive in various ports, may well be imagined. On January 17,

1803, the town of Wilmington, North Carolina, hastily memorialized

Congress, stating the arrival of certain freed Negroes from Guadeloupe,

and apprehending "much danger to the peace and safety of the people of

the Southern States of the Union" from the "admission of persons of that

description into the United States."[44] The House committee which

considered this petition hastened to agree "That the system of policy

stated in the said memorial to exist, and to be now pursued in the

French colonial government, of the West Indies, is fraught with danger

to the peace and safety of the United States. That the fact stated to

have occurred in the prosecution of that system of policy, demands the

prompt interference of the Government of the United States, as well

Legislative as Executive."[45] The result was a bill providing for the

forfeiture of any ship which should bring into States prohibiting the

same "any negro, mulatto, or other person of color;" the captain of the

ship was also to be punished. After some opposition[46] the bill became

a law, February 28, 1803.[47]

50. ~State of the Slave-Trade from 1789 to 1803.~ Meantime, in spite of

the prohibitory State laws, the African slave-trade to the United States

continued to flourish. It was notorious that New England traders carried

on a large traffic.[48] Members stated on the floor of the House that

"it was much to be regretted that the severe and pointed statute against

the slave trade had been so little regarded. In defiance of its

forbiddance and its penalties, it was well known that citizens and

vessels of the United States were still engaged in that traffic.... In

various parts of the nation, outfits were made for slave-voyages,

without secrecy, shame, or apprehension.... Countenanced by their

fellow-citizens at home, who were as ready to buy as they themselves

were to collect and to bring to market, they approached our Southern

harbors and inlets, and clandestinely disembarked the sooty offspring of

the Eastern, upon the ill fated soil of the Western hemisphere. In this

way, it had been computed that, during the last twelve months, twenty

thousand enslaved negroes had been transported from Guinea, and, by

smuggling, added to the plantation stock of Georgia and South Carolina.

So little respect seems to have been paid to the existing prohibitory

statute, that it may almost be considered as disregarded by common

consent."[49]

These voyages were generally made under the flag of a foreign nation,

and often the vessel was sold in a foreign port to escape confiscation.

South Carolina's own Congressman confessed that although the State had

prohibited the trade since 1788, she "was unable to enforce" her laws.

"With navigable rivers running into the heart of it," said he, "it was

impossible, with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren, who, in

some parts of the Union, in defiance of the authority of the General

Government, have been engaged in this trade, from introducing them into

the country. The law was completely evaded, and, for the last year or

two [1802-3], Africans were introduced into the country in numbers

little short, I believe, of what they would have been had the trade been

a legal one."[50] The same tale undoubtedly might have been told of

Georgia.

51. ~The South Carolina Repeal of 1803.~ This vast and apparently

irrepressible illicit traffic was one of three causes which led South

Carolina, December 17, 1803, to throw aside all pretence and legalize

her growing slave-trade; the other two causes were the growing certainty

of total prohibition of the traffic in 1808, and the recent purchase of

Louisiana by the United States, with its vast prospective demand for

slave labor. Such a combination of advantages, which meant fortunes to

planters and Charleston slave-merchants, could not longer be withheld

from them; the prohibition was repealed, and the United States became

again, for the first time in at least five years, a legal slave mart.

This action shocked the nation, frightening Southern States with visions

of an influx of untrained barbarians and servile insurrections, and

arousing and intensifying the anti-slavery feeling of the North, which

had long since come to think of the trade, so far as legal enactment

went, as a thing of the past.

Scarcely a month after this repeal, Bard of Pennsylvania solemnly

addressed Congress on the matter. "For many reasons," said he, "this

House must have been justly surprised by a recent measure of one of the

Southern States. The impressions, however, which that measure gave my

mind, were deep and painful. Had I been informed that some formidable

foreign Power had invaded our country, I would not, I ought not, be more

alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina had repealed her law

prohibiting the importation of slaves.... Our hands are tied, and we are

obliged to stand confounded, while we see the flood-gate opened, and

pouring incalculable miseries into our country."[51] He then moved, as

the utmost legal measure, a tax of ten dollars per head on slaves

imported.

Debate on this proposition did not occur until February 14, when Lowndes

explained the circumstances of the repeal, and a long controversy took

place.[52] Those in favor of the tax argued that the trade was wrong,

and that the tax would serve as some slight check; the tax was not

inequitable, for if a State did not wish to bear it she had only to

prohibit the trade; the tax would add to the revenue, and be at the same

time a moral protest against an unjust and dangerous traffic. Against

this it was argued that if the tax furnished a revenue it would defeat

its own object, and make prohibition more difficult in 1808; it was

inequitable, because it was aimed against one State, and would fall

exclusively on agriculture; it would give national sanction to the

trade; it would look "like an attempt in the General Government to

correct a State for the undisputed exercise of its constitutional

powers;" the revenue would be inconsiderable, and the United States had

nothing to do with the moral principle; while a prohibitory tax would be

defensible, a small tax like this would be useless as a protection and

criminal as a revenue measure.

The whole debate hinged on the expediency of the measure, few defending

South Carolina's action.[53] Finally, a bill was ordered to be brought

in, which was done on the 17th.[54] Another long debate took place,

covering substantially the same ground. It was several times hinted that

if the matter were dropped South Carolina might again prohibit the

trade. This, and the vehement opposition, at last resulted in the

postponement of the bill, and it was not heard from again during the

session.

52. ~The Louisiana Slave-Trade, 1803-1805.~ About this time the cession

of Louisiana brought before Congress the question of the status of

slavery and the slave-trade in the Territories. Twice or thrice before

had the subject called for attention. The first time was in the Congress

of the Confederation, when, by the Ordinance of 1787,[55] both slavery

and the slave-trade were excluded from the Northwest Territory. In 1790

Congress had accepted the cession of North Carolina back lands on the

express condition that slavery there be undisturbed.[56] Nothing had

been said as to slavery in the South Carolina cession (1787),[57] but it

was tacitly understood that the provision of the Northwest Ordinance

would not be applied. In 1798 the bill introduced for the cession of

Mississippi contained a specific declaration that the anti-slavery

clause of 1787 should not be included.[58] The bill passed the Senate,

but caused long and excited debate in the House.[59] It was argued, on

the one hand, that the case in Mississippi was different from that in

the Northwest Territory, because slavery was a legal institution in all

the surrounding country, and to prohibit the institution was virtually

to prohibit the settling of the country. On the other hand, Gallatin

declared that if this amendment should not obtain, "he knew not how

slaves could be prevented from being introduced by way of New Orleans,

by persons who are not citizens of the United States." It was moved to

strike out the excepting clause; but the motion received only twelve

votes,--an apparent indication that Congress either did not appreciate

the great precedent it was establishing, or was reprehensibly careless.

Harper of South Carolina then succeeded in building up the Charleston

slave-trade interest by a section forbidding the slave traffic from

"without the limits of the United States." Thatcher moved to strike out

the last clause of this amendment, and thus to prohibit the interstate

trade, but he failed to get a second.[60] Thus the act passed, punishing

the introduction of slaves from without the country by a fine of $300

for each slave, and freeing the slave.[61]

In 1804 President Jefferson communicated papers to Congress on the

status of slavery and the slave-trade in Louisiana.[62] The Spanish had

allowed the traffic by edict in 1793, France had not stopped it, and

Governor Claiborne had refrained from interference. A bill erecting a

territorial government was already pending.[63] The Northern "District

of Louisiana" was placed under the jurisdiction of Indiana Territory,

and was made subject to the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787. Various

attempts were made to amend the part of the bill referring to the

Southern Territory: first, so as completely to prohibit the

slave-trade;[64] then to compel the emancipation at a certain age of all

those imported;[65] next, to confine all importation to that from the

States;[66] and, finally, to limit it further to slaves imported before

South Carolina opened her ports.[67] The last two amendments prevailed,

and the final act also extended to the Territory the Acts of 1794 and

1803. Only slaves imported before May 1, 1798, could be introduced, and

those must be slaves of actual settlers.[68] All slaves illegally

imported were freed.

This stringent act was limited to one year. The next year, in accordance

with the urgent petition of the inhabitants, a bill was introduced

against these restrictions.[69] By dexterous wording, this bill, which

became a law March 2, 1805,[70] swept away all restrictions upon the

slave-trade except that relating to foreign ports, and left even this

provision so ambiguous that, later, by judicial interpretation of the

law,[71] the foreign slave-trade was allowed, at least for a time.

Such a stream of slaves now poured into the new Territory that the

following year a committee on the matter was appointed by the House.[72]

The committee reported that they "are in possession of the fact, that

African slaves, lately imported into Charleston, have been thence

conveyed into the territory of Orleans, and, in their opinion, this

practice will be continued to a very great extent, while there is no law

to prevent it."[73] The House ordered a bill checking this to be

prepared; and such a bill was reported, but was soon dropped.[74]

Importations into South Carolina during this time reached enormous

proportions. Senator Smith of that State declared from official returns

that, between 1803 and 1807, 39,075 Negroes were imported into

Charleston, most of whom went to the Territories.[75]

53. ~Last Attempts at Taxation, 1805-1806.~ So alarming did the trade

become that North Carolina passed a resolution in December, 1804,[76]

proposing that the States give Congress power to prohibit the trade.

Massachusetts,[77] Vermont,[78] New Hampshire,[79] and Maryland[80]

responded; and a joint resolution was introduced in the House, proposing

as an amendment to the Constitution "That the Congress of the United

States shall have power to prevent the further importation of slaves

into the United States and the Territories thereof."[81] Nothing came

of this effort; but meantime the project of taxation was revived. A

motion to this effect, made in February, 1805, was referred to a

Committee of the Whole, but was not discussed. Early in the first

session of the ninth Congress the motion of 1805 was renewed; and

although again postponed on the assurance that South Carolina was about

to stop the trade,[82] it finally came up for debate January 20,

1806.[83] Then occurred a most stubborn legislative battle, which lasted

during the whole session.[84] Several amendments to the motion were

first introduced, so as to make it apply to all immigrants, and again to

all "persons of color." As in the former debate, it was proposed to

substitute a resolution of censure on South Carolina. All these

amendments were lost. A long debate on the expediency of the measure

followed, on the old grounds. Early of Georgia dwelt especially on the

double taxation it would impose on Georgia; others estimated that a

revenue of one hundred thousand dollars might be derived from the tax, a

sum sufficient to replace the tax on pepper and medicines. Angry charges

and counter-charges were made,--e.g., that Georgia, though ashamed

openly to avow the trade, participated in it as well as South Carolina.

"Some recriminations ensued between several members, on the

participation of the traders of some of the New England States in

carrying on the slave trade." Finally, January 22, by a vote of 90 to

25, a tax bill was ordered to be brought in.[85] One was reported on the

27th.[86] Every sort of opposition was resorted to. On the one hand,

attempts were made to amend it so as to prohibit importation after 1807,

and to prevent importation into the Territories; on the other hand,

attempts were made to recommit and postpone the measure. It finally got

a third reading, but was recommitted to a select committee, and

disappeared until February 14.[87] Being then amended so as to provide

for the forfeiture of smuggled cargoes, but saying nothing as to the

disposition of the slaves, it was again relegated to a committee, after

a vote of 69 to 42 against postponement.[88] On March 4 it appeared

again, and a motion to reject it was lost. Finally, in the midst of the

war scare and the question of non-importation of British goods, the bill

was apparently forgotten, and the last attempt to tax imported slaves

ended, like the others, in failure.

54. ~Key-Note of the Period.~ One of the last acts of this period

strikes again the key-note which sounded throughout the whole of it. On

February 20, 1806, after considerable opposition, a bill to prohibit

trade with San Domingo passed the Senate.[89] In the House it was

charged by one side that the measure was dictated by France, and by the

other, that it originated in the fear of countenancing Negro

insurrection. The bill, however, became a law, and by continuations

remained on the statute-books until 1809. Even at that distance the

nightmare of the Haytian insurrection continued to haunt the South, and

a proposal to reopen trade with the island caused wild John Randolph to

point out the "dreadful evil" of a "direct trade betwixt the town of

Charleston and the ports of the island of St. Domingo."[90]

Of the twenty years from 1787 to 1807 it can only be said that they

were, on the whole, a period of disappointment so far as the suppression

of the slave-trade was concerned. Fear, interest, and philanthropy

united for a time in an effort which bade fair to suppress the trade;

then the real weakness of the constitutional compromise appeared, and

the interests of the few overcame the fears and the humanity of the

many.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Prince, _Digest of the Laws of Georgia_, p. 786; Marbury

and Crawford, _Digest of the Laws of Georgia_, pp. 440, 442.

The exact text of this act appears not to be extant. Section

I. is stated to have been "re-enacted by the constitution."

Possibly this act prohibited slaves also, although this is not

certain. Georgia passed several regulative acts between 1755

and 1793. Cf. Renne, _Colonial Acts of Georgia_, pp. 73-4,

164, note.

[2] Marbury and Crawford, _Digest_, p. 30, § 11. The clause

was penned by Peter J. Carnes of Jefferson. Cf. W.B. Stevens,

_History of Georgia_ (1847), II. 501.

[3] Grimké, _Public Laws_, p. 466.

[4] Cooper and McCord, _Statutes_, VII. 431.

[5] _Ibid._, VII. 433-6, 444, 447.

[6] _Ibid._, VII. 449.

[7] Martin, _Iredell's Acts of Assembly_, I. 492.

[8] _Ibid._, II. 53.

[9] Cf. _Ibid._, II. 94; _Laws of North Carolina_ (revision of

1819), I. 786.

[10] Virginia codified her whole slave legislation in 1792

(_Va. Statutes at Large_, New Ser., I. 122), and amended her

laws in 1798 and 1806 (_Ibid._, III. 251).

[11] Dorsey, _Laws of Maryland, 1796_, I. 334.

[12] _Laws of Delaware, 1797_ (Newcastle ed.), p. 942, ch. 194 b.

[13] Dallas, _Laws_, II. 586.

[14] Paterson, _Digest of the Laws of New Jersey_ (1800), pp.

307-13. In 1804 New Jersey passed an act gradually to abolish

slavery. The legislation of New York at this period was

confined to regulating the exportation of slave criminals

(1790), and to passing an act gradually abolishing slavery

(1799). In 1801 she codified all her acts.

[15] _Acts and Laws of Connecticut_ (ed. 1784), pp. 368, 369, 388.

[16] _Ibid._, p. 412.

[17] _Perpetual Laws of Massachusetts, 1780-89_, pp. 235-6.

[18] _Queries Respecting Slavery_, etc., in _Mass. Hist. Soc.

Coll._, 1st Ser., IV. 205.

[19] _Annals of Cong._, 1 Cong, 1 sess. pp. 336-41.

[20] _Annals of Cong._, 1 Cong. 1 sess. p. 903.

[21] _Ibid._, 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1182-3.

[22] _Journals of Cong., 1782-3_, pp. 418-9. Cf. above, pp.

56-57.

[23] _Annals of Cong._, 1 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1184.

[24] _Ibid._, pp. 1182-91.

[25] _Annals of Cong._, 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1197-1205.

[26] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 1 Cong. 2 sess. I. 157-8.

[27] _Annals of Cong._, I Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1413-7.

[28] For the reports and debates, cf. _Annals of Cong._, 1

Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1413-7, 1450-74; _House Journal_ (repr.

1826), 1 Cong. 2 sess. I. 168-81.

[29] A clerical error in the original: "interdict" and

"regulate" should be interchanged.

[30] See _Memorials presented to Congress_, etc. (1792),

published by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.

[31] From the Virginia petition.

[32] From the petition of Baltimore and other Maryland

societies.

[33] From the Providence Abolition Society's petition.

[34] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 2 Cong. 2 sess. I. 627-9;

_Annals of Cong._, 2 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 728-31.

[35] _Annals of Cong._, 3 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 64, 70, 72; _House

Journal_ (repr. 1826), 3 Cong. 1 sess. II. 76, 84-5, 96-100;

_Senate Journal_ (repr. 1820), 3 Cong. 1 sess. II. 51.

[36] _Statutes at Large_, I. 347-9.

[37] _Annals of Cong._, 5 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 656-70, 945-1033.

[38] _Annals of Cong._, 6 Cong. 1 sess. p. 229.

[39] Dec. 12, 1799: _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 6 Cong. 1

sess. III. 535. For the debate, see _Annals of Cong._, 6 Cong.

1 sess. pp. 230-45.

[40] _Senate Journal_ (repr. 1821), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III. 72,

77, 88, 92; see _Ibid._, Index, Bill No. 62; _House Journal_

(repr. 1826), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III., Index, House Bill No. 247.

For the debate, see _Annals of Cong._, 6 Cong. 1 sess. pp.

686-700.

[41] _Annals of Cong._, 6 Cong. 1 sess. p. 697.

[42] _Ibid._, p. 699-700.

[43] _Statutes at Large_, II. 70.

[44] _Annals of Cong._, 7 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 385-6.

[45] _Ibid._, p. 424.

[46] See House Bills Nos. 89 and 101; _Annals of Cong._, 7

Cong. 2 sess. pp. 424, 459-67. For the debate, see _Ibid._,

pp. 459-72.

[47] _Statutes at Large_, II. 205.

[48] Cf. Fowler, _Local Law in Massachusetts and Connecticut_,

etc., p. 126.

[49] Speech of S.L. Mitchell of New York, Feb. 14, 1804:

_Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1000. Cf. also speech of

Bedinger: _Ibid._, pp. 997-8.

[50] Speech of Lowndes in the House, Feb. 14, 1804: _Annals of

Cong._, 8 Cong., 1 sess. p. 992. Cf. Stanton's speech later:

_Ibid._, 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 240.

[51] _Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 820, 876.

[52] _Ibid._, pp. 992-1036.

[53] Huger of South Carolina declared that the whole South

Carolina Congressional delegation opposed the repeal of the

law, although they maintained the State's right to do so if

she chose: _Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1005.

[54] _Ibid._, pp. 1020-36; _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 8

Cong. 1 sess. IV 523, 578, 580, 581-5.

[55] On slavery in the Territories, cf. Welling, in _Report

Amer. Hist. Assoc._, 1891, pp. 133-60.

[56] _Statutes at Large_, I. 108.

[57] _Journals of Cong._, XII. 137-8.

[58] _Annals of Cong._, 5 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 511, 515, 532-3.

[59] _Ibid._, 5 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1235, 1249, 1277-84,

1296-1313.

[60] _Annals of Cong._, 5 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1313.

[61] _Statutes at Large_, I. 549.

[62] _Amer. State Papers, Miscellaneous_, I. No. 177.

[63] _Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 106, 211, 223,

231, 233-4, 238.

[64] _Ibid._, pp. 240, 1186.

[65] _Ibid._, p. 241.

[66] _Ibid._, p. 240.

[67] _Ibid._, p. 242.

[68] For further proceedings, see _Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 1

sess. pp. 240-55, 1038-79, 1128-9, 1185-9. For the law, see

_Statutes at Large_, II. 283-9.

[69] First, a bill was introduced applying the Northwest

Ordinance to the Territory (_Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 2 sess.

pp. 45-6); but this was replaced by a Senate bill (_Ibid._, p.

68; _Senate Journal_, repr. 1821, 8 Cong. 2 sess. III. 464).

For the petition of the inhabitants, see _Annals of Cong._, 8

Cong. 2 sess. p. 727-8.

[70] The bill was hurried through, and there are no records of

debate. Cf. _Annals of Cong._, 8 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 28-69, 727,

871, 957, 1016-20, 1213-5. In _Senate Journal_ (repr. 1821),

III., see Index, Bill No. 8. Importation of slaves was allowed

by a clause erecting a Frame of Government "similar" to that

of the Mississippi Territory.

[71] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 443. The whole

trade was practically foreign, for the slavers merely entered

the Negroes at Charleston and immediately reshipped them to

New Orleans. Cf. _Annals of Cong._, 16 Cong. 1 sess. p. 264.

[72] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1 sess. V. 264;

_Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 445, 878.

[73] _House Reports_, 9 Cong. 1 sess. Feb. 17, 1806.

[74] House Bill No. 123.

[75] _Annals of Cong._, 16 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 73-7. This report

covers the time from Jan. 1, 1804, to Dec. 31, 1807. During

that time the following was the number of ships engaged in the

traffic:--

From Charleston, 61 From Connecticut, 1

" Rhode Island, 59 " Sweden, 1

" Baltimore, 4 " Great Britain, 70

" Boston, 1 " France, 3

" Norfolk, 2 202

The consignees of these slave ships were natives of

Charleston 13

Rhode Island 88

Great Britain 91

France 10

----

202

The following slaves were imported:--

By British vessels 19,949

" French " 1,078

------

21,027

By American vessels:--

" Charleston merchants 2,006

" Rhode Island " 7,958

" Foreign " 5,717

" other Northern " 930

" " Southern " 1,437 18,048

------ ------

Total number of slaves imported, 1804-7 39,075

It is, of course, highly probable that the Custom House

returns were much below the actual figures.

[76] McMaster, _History of the People of the United States_,

III. p. 517.

[77] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 2 sess. V. 171;

_Mass. Resolves_, May, 1802, to March, 1806, Vol. II. A.

(State House ed., p. 239).

[78] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1 sess. V. 238.

[79] _Ibid._, V. 266.

[80] _Senate Journal_ (repr. 1821), 9 Cong. 1 sess. IV. 76,

77, 79.

[81] _House Journal_ (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 2 sess. V. 171.

[82] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 274.

[83] _Ibid._, pp. 272-4, 323.

[84] _Ibid._, pp. 346-52, 358-75, etc., to 520.

[85] _Ibid._, pp. 374-5.

[86] See House Bill No. 94.

[87] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 466.

[88] _Annals of Cong._, 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 519-20.

[89] _Ibid._, pp. 21, 52, 75, etc., to 138, 485-515, 1228. See

House Bill No. 168. Cf. _Statutes at Large_, II. 421-2.

[90] A few months later, at the expiration of the period,

trade was quietly reopened. _Annals of Cong._, 11 Cong. 1

sess. pp. 443-6.

* * * * *

_Chapter VIII_

THE PERIOD OF ATTEMPTED SUPPRESSION. 1807-1825.

55. The Act of 1807.

56. The First Question: How shall illegally imported Africans be

disposed of?

57. The Second Question: How shall Violations be punished?

58. The Third Question: How shall the Interstate Coastwise Slave-Trade

be protected?

59. Legislative History of the Bill.

60. Enforcement of the Act.

61. Evidence of the Continuance of the Trade.

62. Apathy of the Federal Government.

63. Typical Cases.

64. The Supplementary Acts, 1818-1820.

65. Enforcement of the Supplementary Acts, 1818-1825.

55. ~The Act of 1807.~ The first great goal of anti-slavery effort in

the United States had been, since the Revolution, the suppression of the

slave-trade by national law. It would hardly be too much to say that the

Haytian revolution, in addition to its influence in the years from 1791

to 1806, was one of the main causes that rendered the accomplishment of

this aim possible at the earliest constitutional moment. To the great

influence of the fears of the South was added the failure of the French

designs on Louisiana, of which Toussaint L'Ouverture was the most

probable cause. The cession of Louisiana in 1803 challenged and aroused

the North on the slavery question again; put the Carolina and Georgia

slave-traders in the saddle, to the dismay of the Border States; and

brought the whole slave-trade question vividly before the public

conscience. Another scarcely less potent influence was, naturally, the

great anti-slavery movement in England, which after a mighty struggle of

eighteen years was about to gain its first victory in the British Act of

1807.

President Jefferson, in his pacificatory message of December 2, 1806,

said: "I congratulate you, fellow-citizens, on the approach of the

period at which you may interpose your authority constitutionally, to

withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further

participation in those violations of human rights which have been so

long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the

morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our country, have

long been eager to proscribe. Although no law you may pass can take

prohibitory effect till the first day of the year one thousand eight

hundred and eight, yet the intervening period is not too long to

prevent, by timely notice, expeditions which cannot be completed before

that day."[1]

In pursuance of this recommendation, the very next day Senator Bradley

of Vermont introduced into the Senate a bill which, after a complicated

legislative history, became the Act of March 2, 1807, prohibiting the

African slave-trade.[2]

Three main questions were to be settled by this bill: first, and most

prominent, that of the disposal of illegally imported Africans; second,

that of the punishment of those concerned in the importation; third,

that of the proper limitation of the interstate traffic by water.

The character of the debate on these three questions, as well as the

state of public opinion, is illustrated by the fact that forty of the

sixty pages of officially reported debates are devoted to the first

question, less than twenty to the second, and only two to the third. A

sad commentary on the previous enforcement of State and national laws is

the readiness with which it was admitted that wholesale violations of

the law would take place; indeed, Southern men declared that no strict

law against the slave-trade could be executed in the South, and that it

was only by playing on the motives of personal interest that the trade

could be checked. The question of punishment indicated the slowly

changing moral attitude of the South toward the slave system. Early

boldly said, "A large majority of people in the Southern States do not

consider slavery as even an evil."[3] The South, in fact, insisted on

regarding man-stealing as a minor offence, a "misdemeanor" rather than a

"crime." Finally, in the short and sharp debate on the interstate

coastwise trade, the growing economic side of the slavery question came

to the front, the vested interests' argument was squarely put, and the

future interstate trade almost consciously provided for.

From these considerations, it is doubtful as to how far it was expected

that the Act of 1807 would check the slave traffic; at any rate, so far

as the South was concerned, there seemed to be an evident desire to

limit the trade, but little thought that this statute would definitively

suppress it.

56. ~The First Question: How shall illegally imported Africans be

disposed of?~ The dozen or more propositions on the question of the

disposal of illegally imported Africans may be divided into two chief

heads, representing two radically opposed parties: 1. That illegally

imported Africans be free, although they might be indentured for a term

of years or removed from the country. 2. That such Africans be sold as

slaves.[4] The arguments on these two propositions, which were many and

far-reaching, may be roughly divided into three classes, political,

constitutional, and moral.

The political argument, reduced to its lowest terms, ran thus: those

wishing to free the Negroes illegally imported declared that to enslave

them would be to perpetrate the very evil which the law was designed to

stop. "By the same law," they said, "we condemn the man-stealer and

become the receivers of his stolen goods. We punish the criminal, and

then step into his place, and complete the crime."[5] They said that the

objection to free Negroes was no valid excuse; for if the Southern

people really feared this class, they would consent to the imposing of

such penalties on illicit traffic as would stop the importation of a

single slave.[6] Moreover, "forfeiture" and sale of the Negroes implied

a property right in them which did not exist.[7] Waiving this technical

point, and allowing them to be "forfeited" to the government, then the

government should either immediately set them free, or, at the most,

indenture them for a term of years; otherwise, the law would be an

encouragement to violators. "It certainly will be," said they, "if the

importer can find means to evade the penalty of the act; for there he

has all the advantage of a market enhanced by our ineffectual attempt to

prohibit."[8] They claimed that even the indenturing of the ignorant

barbarian for life was better than slavery; and Sloan declared that the

Northern States would receive the freed Negroes willingly rather than

have them enslaved.[9]

The argument of those who insisted that the Negroes should be sold was

tersely put by Macon: "In adopting our measures on this subject, we must

pass such a law as can be executed."[10] Early expanded this: "It is a

principle in legislation, as correct as any which has ever prevailed,

that to give effect to laws you must not make them repugnant to the

passions and wishes of the people among whom they are to operate. How

then, in this instance, stands the fact? Do not gentlemen from every

quarter of the Union prove, on the discussion of every question that has

ever arisen in the House, having the most remote bearing on the giving

freedom to the Africans in the bosom of our country, that it has excited

the deepest sensibility in the breasts of those where slavery exists?

And why is this so? It is, because those who, from experience, know the

extent of the evil, believe that the most formidable aspect in which it

can present itself, is by making these people free among them. Yes, sir,

though slavery is an evil, regretted by every man in the country, to

have among us in any considerable quantity persons of this description,

is an evil far greater than slavery itself. Does any gentleman want

proof of this? I answer that all proof is useless; no fact can be more

notorious. With this belief on the minds of the people where slavery

exists, and where the importation will take place, if at all, we are

about to turn loose in a state of freedom all persons brought in after

the passage of this law. I ask gentlemen to reflect and say whether such

a law, opposed to the ideas, the passions, the views, and the affections

of the people of the Southern States, can be executed? I tell them, no;

it is impossible--why? Because no man will inform--why? Because to

inform will be to lead to an evil which will be deemed greater than the

offence of which information is given, because it will be opposed to the

principle of self-preservation, and to the love of family. No, no man

will be disposed to jeopard his life, and the lives of his countrymen.

And if no one dare inform, the whole authority of the Government cannot

carry the law into effect. The whole people will rise up against it.

Why? Because to enforce it would be to turn loose, in the bosom of the

country, firebrands that would consume them."[11]

This was the more tragic form of the argument; it also had a mercenary

side, which was presented with equal emphasis. It was repeatedly said

that the only way to enforce the law was to play off individual

interests against each other. The profit from the sale of illegally

imported Negroes was declared to be the only sufficient "inducement to

give information of their importation."[12] "Give up the idea of

forfeiture, and I challenge the gentleman to invent fines, penalties, or

punishments of any sort, sufficient to restrain the slave trade."[13]

If such Negroes be freed, "I tell you that slaves will continue to be

imported as heretofore.... You cannot get hold of the ships employed in

this traffic. Besides, slaves will be brought into Georgia from East

Florida. They will be brought into the Mississippi Territory from the

bay of Mobile. You cannot inflict any other penalty, or devise any other

adequate means of prevention, than a forfeiture of the Africans in whose

possession they may be found after importation."[14] Then, too, when

foreigners smuggled in Negroes, "who then ... could be operated on, but

the purchasers? There was the rub--it was their interest alone which, by

being operated on, would produce a check. Snap their purse-strings,

break open their strong box, deprive them of their slaves, and by

destroying the temptation to buy, you put an end to the trade, ...

nothing short of a forfeiture of the slave would afford an effectual

remedy."[15] Again, it was argued that it was impossible to prevent

imported Negroes from becoming slaves, or, what was just as bad, from

being sold as vagabonds or indentured for life.[16] Even our own laws,

it was said, recognize the title of the African slave factor in the

transported Negroes; and if the importer have no title, why do we

legislate? Why not let the African immigrant alone to get on as he may,

just as we do the Irish immigrant?[17] If he should be returned to

Africa, his home could not be found, and he would in all probability be

sold into slavery again.[18]

The constitutional argument was not urged as seriously as the foregoing;

but it had a considerable place. On the one hand, it was urged that if

the Negroes were forfeited, they were forfeited to the United States

government, which could dispose of them as it saw fit;[19] on the other

hand, it was said that the United States, as owner, was subject to State

laws, and could not free the Negroes contrary to such laws.[20] Some

alleged that the freeing of such Negroes struck at the title to all

slave property;[21] others thought that, as property in slaves was not

recognized in the Constitution, it could not be in a statute.[22] The

question also arose as to the source of the power of Congress over the

slave-trade. Southern men derived it from the clause on commerce, and

declared that it exceeded the power of Congress to declare Negroes

imported into a slave State, free, against the laws of that State; that

Congress could not determine what should or should not be property in a

State.[23] Northern men replied that, according to this principle,

forfeiture and sale in Massachusetts would be illegal; that the power of

Congress over the trade was derived from the restraining clause, as a

non-existent power could not be restrained; and that the United States

could act under her general powers as executor of the Law of

Nations.[24]

The moral argument as to the disposal of illegally imported Negroes was

interlarded with all the others. On the one side, it began with the

"Rights of Man," and descended to a stickling for the decent appearance

of the statute-book; on the other side, it began with the uplifting of

the heathen, and descended to a denial of the applicability of moral

principles to the question. Said Holland of North Carolina: "It is

admitted that the condition of the slaves in the Southern States is much

superior to that of those in Africa. Who, then, will say that the trade

is immoral?"[25] But, in fact, "morality has nothing to do with this

traffic,"[26] for, as Joseph Clay declared, "it must appear to every man

of common sense, that the question could be considered in a commercial

point of view only."[27] The other side declared that, "by the laws of

God and man," these captured Negroes are "entitled to their freedom as

clearly and absolutely as we are;"[28] nevertheless, some were willing

to leave them to the tender mercies of the slave States, so long as the

statute-book was disgraced by no explicit recognition of slavery.[29]

Such arguments brought some sharp sarcasm on those who seemed anxious

"to legislate for the honor and glory of the statute book;"[30] some

desired "to know what honor you will derive from a law that will be

broken every day of your lives."[31] They would rather boldly sell the

Negroes and turn the proceeds over to charity.

The final settlement of the question was as follows:--

"SECTION 4.... And neither the importer, nor any person

or persons claiming from or under him, shall hold any right or

title whatsoever to any negro, mulatto, or person of color, nor

to the service or labor thereof, who may be imported or brought

within the United States, or territories thereof, in violation

of this law, but the same shall remain subject to any

regulations not contravening the provisions of this act, which

the Legislatures of the several States or Territories at any

time hereafter may make, for disposing of any such negro,

mulatto, or person of color."[32]

57. ~The Second Question: How shall Violations be punished?~ The next

point in importance was that of the punishment of offenders. The

half-dozen specific propositions reduce themselves to two: 1. A

violation should be considered a crime or felony, and be punished by

death; 2. A violation should be considered a misdemeanor, and be

punished by fine and imprisonment.[33]

Advocates of the severer punishment dwelt on the enormity of the

offence. It was "one of the highest crimes man could commit," and "a

captain of a ship engaged in this traffic was guilty of murder."[34] The

law of God punished the crime with death, and any one would rather be

hanged than be enslaved.[35] It was a peculiarly deliberate crime, in

which the offender did not act in sudden passion, but had ample time for

reflection.[36] Then, too, crimes of much less magnitude are punished

with death. Shall we punish the stealer of $50 with death, and the

man-stealer with imprisonment only?[37] Piracy, forgery, and fraudulent

sinking of vessels are punishable with death, "yet these are crimes only

against property; whereas the importation of slaves, a crime committed

against the liberty of man, and inferior only to murder or treason, is

accounted nothing but a misdemeanor."[38] Here, indeed, lies the remedy

for the evil of freeing illegally imported Negroes,--in making the

penalty so severe that none will be brought in; if the South is sincere,

"they will unite to a man to execute the law."[39] To free such Negroes

is dangerous; to enslave them, wrong; to return them, impracticable; to

indenture them, difficult,--therefore, by a death penalty, keep them

from being imported.[40] Here the East had a chance to throw back the

taunts of the South, by urging the South to unite with them in hanging

the New England slave-traders, assuring the South that "so far from

charging their Southern brethren with cruelty or severity in hanging

them, they would acknowledge the favor with gratitude."[41] Finally, if

the Southerners would refuse to execute so severe a law because they did

not consider the offence great, they would probably refuse to execute

any law at all for the same reason.[42]

The opposition answered that the death penalty was more than

proportionate to the crime, and therefore "immoral."[43] "I cannot

believe," said Stanton of Rhode Island, "that a man ought to be hung for

only stealing a negro."[44] It was argued that the trade was after all

but a "transfer from one master to another;"[45] that slavery was worse

than the slave-trade, and the South did not consider slavery a crime:

how could it then punish the trade so severely and not reflect on the

institution?[46] Severity, it was said, was also inexpedient: severity

often increases crime; if the punishment is too great, people will

sympathize with offenders and will not inform against them. Said Mr.

Mosely: "When the penalty is excessive or disproportioned to the

offence, it will naturally create a repugnance to the law, and render

its execution odious."[47] John Randolph argued against even fine and

imprisonment, "on the ground that such an excessive penalty could not,

in such case, be constitutionally imposed by a Government possessed of

the limited powers of the Government of the United States."[48]

The bill as passed punished infractions as follows:--

For equipping a slaver, a fine of $20,000 and forfeiture of the

ship.

For transporting Negroes, a fine of $5000 and forfeiture of the

ship and Negroes.

For transporting and selling Negroes, a fine of $1000 to

$10,000, imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, and forfeiture of the

ship and Negroes.

For knowingly buying illegally imported Negroes, a fine of $800

for each Negro, and forfeiture.

58. ~The Third Question: How shall the Interstate Coastwise Slave-Trade

be protected?~ The first proposition was to prohibit the coastwise

slave-trade altogether,[49] but an amendment reported to the House

allowed it "in any vessel or species of craft whatever." It is probable

that the first proposition would have prevailed, had it not been for the

vehement opposition of Randolph and Early.[50] They probably foresaw the

value which Virginia would derive from this trade in the future, and

consequently Randolph violently declared that if the amendment did not

prevail, "the Southern people would set the law at defiance. He would

begin the example." He maintained that by the first proposition "the

proprietor of sacred and chartered rights is prevented the

Constitutional use of his property."[51] The Conference Committee

finally arranged a compromise, forbidding the coastwise trade for

purposes of sale in vessels under forty tons.[52] This did not suit

Early, who declared that the law with this provision "would not prevent

the introduction of a single slave."[53] Randolph, too, would "rather

lose the bill, he had rather lose all the bills of the session, he had

rather lose every bill passed since the establishment of the Government,

than agree to the provision contained in this slave bill."[54] He

predicted the severance of the slave and the free States, if disunion

should ever come. Congress was, however, weary with the dragging of the

bill, and it passed both Houses with the compromise provision. Randolph

was so dissatisfied that he had a committee appointed the next day, and

introduced an amendatory bill. Both this bill and another similar one,

introduced at the next session, failed of consideration.[55]

59. ~Legislative History of the Bill.~[56] On December 12, 1805, Senator

Stephen R. Bradley of Vermont gave notice of a bill to prohibit the

introduction of slaves after 1808. By a vote of 18 to 9 leave was

given, and the bill read a first time on the 17th. On the 18th, however,

it was postponed until "the first Monday in December, 1806." The

presidential message mentioning the matter, Senator Bradley, December 3,

1806, gave notice of a similar bill, which was brought in on the 8th,

and on the 9th referred to a committee consisting of Bradley, Stone,

Giles, Gaillard, and Baldwin. This bill passed, after some

consideration, January 27. It provided, among other things, that

violations of the act should be felony, punishable with death, and

forbade the interstate coast-trade.[57]

Meantime, in the House, Mr. Bidwell of Massachusetts had proposed,

February 4, 1806, as an amendment to a bill taxing slaves imported, that

importation after December 31, 1807, be prohibited, on pain of fine and

imprisonment and forfeiture of ship.[58] This was rejected by a vote of

86 to 17. On December 3, 1806, the House, in appointing committees on

the message, "_Ordered_, That Mr. Early, Mr. Thomas M. Randolph, Mr.

John Campbell, Mr. Kenan, Mr. Cook, Mr. Kelly, and Mr. Van Rensselaer be

appointed a committee" on the slave-trade. This committee reported a

bill on the 15th, which was considered, but finally, December 18,

recommitted. It was reported in an amended form on the 19th, and amended

in Committee of the Whole so as to make violation a misdemeanor

punishable by fine and imprisonment, instead of a felony punishable by

death.[59] A struggle over the disposal of the cargo then ensued. A

motion by Bidwell to except the cargo from forfeiture was lost, 77 to

39. Another motion by Bidwell may be considered the crucial vote on the

whole bill: it was an amendment to the forfeiture clause, and read,

_"Provided, that no person shall be sold as a slave by virtue of this

act."_[60] This resulted in a tie vote, 60 to 60; but the casting vote

of the Speaker, Macon of North Carolina, defeated it. New England voted

solidly in favor of it, the Middle States stood 4 for and 2 against it,

and the six Southern States stood solid against it. On January 8 the

bill went again to a select committee of seventeen, by a vote of 76 to

46. The bill was reported back amended January 20, and on the 28th the

Senate bill was also presented to the House. On the 9th, 10th, and 11th

of February both bills were considered in Committee of the Whole, and

the Senate bill finally replaced the House bill, after several

amendments had been made.[61] The bill was then passed, by a vote of 113

to 5.[62] The Senate agreed to the amendments, including that

substituting fine and imprisonment for the death penalty, but asked for

a conference on the provision which left the interstate coast-trade

free. The six conferees succeeded in bringing the Houses to agree, by

limiting the trade to vessels over forty tons and requiring registry of

the slaves.[63]

The following diagram shows in graphic form the legislative history of

the act:--[64]

_Senate._ _1805._ _House._

Bradley gives notice. + Dec. 12.

Leave given; bill read. + 17.

Postponed one year. + 18.

| _1806._

Feb. 4. + Bidwell's amendment.

Notice. + Dec. 3. + Committee on

Bill introduced. + 8. | slave trade.

Committed. + 9. |

| 15. + Bill reported.

| 17. |

| 18. |

| 19. |

| 23. |

| 29. |

| 31. |

| _1807._ |

| Jan. 5. |

| 7. |

| 8. + Read third time;

Reported. + 15. | recommitted.

| 16. |

| 20. + Reported

Third reading. + 26. | amended.

PASSED. + 27. |

\ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |

28. | | Senate bill

Feb. 9. | | reported.

10. | |

11. + | Senate bill

12. | amended.

Reported from House. 13. + PASSED.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |

Reported to House. | 17. Reported back.

- - - - - - - - - - -

18. | House insists;

- - - - - - - - - - - asks conference.

\ /

- - _ __ - - - - - -

X

House asks conference. _ _ _/ \_ __

\ _

2|5 - - - -_ Conference report

_ _ _ _ _ _-|- - - - - adopted.

Conference report / 2|6

adopted. \_ _ _ |

Bill enrolled. - - - -2|8

March |2.

V

Signed by the President.

This bill received the approval of President Jefferson, March 2, 1807,

and became thus the "Act to prohibit the importation of Slaves into any

port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and

after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand

eight hundred and eight."[65] The debates in the Senate were not

reported. Those in the House were prolonged and bitter, and hinged

especially on the disposal of the slaves, the punishment of offenders,

and the coast-trade. Men were continually changing their votes, and the

bill see-sawed backward and forward, in committee and out, until the

House was thoroughly worn out. On the whole, the strong anti-slavery

men, like Bidwell and Sloan, were outgeneraled by Southerners, like

Early and Williams; and, considering the immense moral backing of the

anti-slavery party from the Revolutionary fathers down, the bill of 1807

can hardly be regarded as a great anti-slavery victory.

60. ~Enforcement of the Act.~ The period so confidently looked forward

to by the constitutional fathers had at last arrived; the slave-trade

was prohibited, and much oratory and poetry were expended in celebration

of the event. In the face of this, let us see how the Act of 1807 was

enforced and what it really accomplished. It is noticeable, in the first

place, that there was no especial set of machinery provided for the

enforcement of this act. The work fell first to the Secretary of the

Treasury, as head of the customs collection. Then, through the activity

of cruisers, the Secretary of the Navy gradually came to have oversight,

and eventually the whole matter was lodged with him, although the

Departments of State and War were more or less active on different

occasions. Later, at the advent of the Lincoln government, the

Department of the Interior was charged with the enforcement of the

slave-trade laws. It would indeed be surprising if, amid so much

uncertainty and shifting of responsibility, the law were not poorly

enforced. Poor enforcement, moreover, in the years 1808 to 1820 meant

far more than at almost any other period; for these years were, all

over the European world, a time of stirring economic change, and the set

which forces might then take would in a later period be unchangeable

without a cataclysm. Perhaps from 1808 to 1814, in the midst of

agitation and war, there was some excuse for carelessness. From 1814 on,

however, no such palliation existed, and the law was probably enforced

as the people who made it wished it enforced.

Most of the Southern States rather tardily passed the necessary

supplementary acts disposing of illegally imported Africans. A few

appear not to have passed any. Some of these laws, like the

Alabama-Mississippi Territory Act of 1815,[66] directed such Negroes to

be "sold by the proper officer of the court, to the highest bidder, at

public auction, for ready money." One-half the proceeds went to the

informer or to the collector of customs, the other half to the public

treasury. Other acts, like that of North Carolina in 1816,[67] directed

the Negroes to "be sold and disposed of for the use of the state."

One-fifth of the proceeds went to the informer. The Georgia Act of

1817[68] directed that the slaves be either sold or given to the

Colonization Society for transportation, providing the society reimburse

the State for all expense incurred, and pay for the transportation. In

this manner, machinery of somewhat clumsy build and varying pattern was

provided for the carrying out of the national act.

61. ~Evidence of the Continuance of the Trade.~ Undoubtedly, the Act of

1807 came very near being a dead letter. The testimony supporting this

view is voluminous. It consists of presidential messages, reports of

cabinet officers, letters of collectors of revenue, letters of district

attorneys, reports of committees of Congress, reports of naval

commanders, statements made on the floor of Congress, the testimony of

eye-witnesses, and the complaints of home and foreign anti-slavery

societies.

"When I was young," writes Mr. Fowler of Connecticut, "the slave-trade

was still carried on, by Connecticut shipmasters and Merchant

adventurers, for the supply of southern ports. This trade was carried

on by the consent of the Southern States, under the provisions of the

Federal Constitution, until 1808, and, after that time, clandestinely.

There was a good deal of conversation on the subject, in private

circles." Other States were said to be even more involved than

Connecticut.[69] The African Society of London estimated that, down to

1816, fifteen of the sixty thousand slaves annually taken from Africa

were shipped by Americans. "Notwithstanding the prohibitory act of

America, which was passed in 1807, ships bearing the American flag

continued to trade for slaves until 1809, when, in consequence of a

decision in the English prize appeal courts, which rendered American

slave ships liable to capture and condemnation, that flag suddenly

disappeared from the coast. Its place was almost instantaneously

supplied by the Spanish flag, which, with one or two exceptions, was now

seen for the first time on the African coast, engaged in covering the

slave trade. This sudden substitution of the Spanish for the American

flag seemed to confirm what was established in a variety of instances by

more direct testimony, that the slave trade, which now, for the first

time, assumed a Spanish dress, was in reality only the trade of other

nations in disguise."[70]

So notorious did the participation of Americans in the traffic become,

that President Madison informed Congress in his message, December 5,

1810, that "it appears that American citizens are instrumental in

carrying on a traffic in enslaved Africans, equally in violation of the

laws of humanity, and in defiance of those of their own country. The

same just and benevolent motives which produced the interdiction in

force against this criminal conduct, will doubtless be felt by Congress,

in devising further means of suppressing the evil."[71] The Secretary of

the Navy wrote the same year to Charleston, South Carolina: "I hear, not

without great concern, that the law prohibiting the importation of

slaves has been violated in frequent instances, near St. Mary's."[72]

Testimony as to violations of the law and suggestions for improving it

also came in from district attorneys.[73]

The method of introducing Negroes was simple. A slave smuggler says:

"After resting a few days at St. Augustine, ... I agreed to accompany

Diego on a land trip through the United States, where a _kaffle_ of

negroes was to precede us, for whose disposal the shrewd Portuguese had

already made arrangements with my uncle's consignees. I soon learned how

readily, and at what profits, the Florida negroes were sold into the

neighboring American States. The _kaffle_, under charge of negro

drivers, was to strike up the Escambia River, and thence cross the

boundary into Georgia, where some of our wild Africans were mixed with

various squads of native blacks, and driven inland, till sold off,

singly or by couples, on the road. At this period [1812], the United

States had declared the African slave trade illegal, and passed

stringent laws to prevent the importation of negroes; yet the Spanish

possessions were thriving on this inland exchange of negroes and

mulattoes; Florida was a sort of nursery for slave-breeders, and many

American citizens grew rich by trafficking in Guinea negroes, and

smuggling them continually, in small parties, through the southern

United States. At the time I mention, the business was a lively one,

owing to the war then going on between the States and England, and the

unsettled condition of affairs on the border."[74]

The Spanish flag continued to cover American slave-traders. The rapid

rise of privateering during the war was not caused solely by patriotic

motives; for many armed ships fitted out in the United States obtained a

thin Spanish disguise at Havana, and transported thousands of slaves to

Brazil and the West Indies. Sometimes all disguise was thrown aside, and

the American flag appeared on the slave coast, as in the cases of the

"Paz,"[75] the "Rebecca," the "Rosa"[76] (formerly the privateer

"Commodore Perry"), the "Dorset" of Baltimore,[77] and the "Saucy

Jack."[78] Governor McCarthy of Sierra Leone wrote, in 1817: "The slave

trade is carried on most vigorously by the Spaniards, Portuguese,

Americans and French. I have had it affirmed from several quarters, and

do believe it to be a fact, that there is a greater number of vessels

employed in that traffic than at any former period."[79]

62. ~Apathy of the Federal Government.~ The United States cruisers

succeeded now and then in capturing a slaver, like the "Eugene," which

was taken when within four miles of the New Orleans bar.[80] President

Madison again, in 1816, urged Congress to act on account of the

"violations and evasions which, it is suggested, are chargeable on

unworthy citizens, who mingle in the slave trade under foreign flags,

and with foreign ports; and by collusive importations of slaves into the

United States, through adjoining ports and territories."[81] The

executive was continually in receipt of ample evidence of this illicit

trade and of the helplessness of officers of the law. In 1817 it was

reported to the Secretary of the Navy that most of the goods carried to

Galveston were brought into the United States; "the more valuable, and

the slaves are smuggled in through the numerous inlets to the westward,

where the people are but too much disposed to render them every possible

assistance. Several hundred slaves are now at Galveston, and persons

have gone from New-Orleans to purchase them. Every exertion will be

made to intercept them, but I have little hopes of success."[82] Similar

letters from naval officers and collectors showed that a system of slave

piracy had arisen since the war, and that at Galveston there was an

establishment of organized brigands, who did not go to the trouble of

sailing to Africa for their slaves, but simply captured slavers and sold

their cargoes into the United States. This Galveston nest had, in 1817,

eleven armed vessels to prosecute the work, and "the most shameful

violations of the slave act, as well as our revenue laws, continue to be

practised."[83] Cargoes of as many as three hundred slaves were arriving

in Texas. All this took place under Aury, the buccaneer governor; and

when he removed to Amelia Island in 1817 with the McGregor raid, the

illicit traffic in slaves, which had been going on there for years,[84]

took an impulse that brought it even to the somewhat deaf ears of

Collector Bullock. He reported, May 22, 1817: "I have just received

information from a source on which I can implicitly rely, that it has

already become the practice to introduce into the state of Georgia,

across the St. Mary's River, from Amelia Island, East Florida, Africans,

who have been carried into the Port of Fernandina, subsequent to the

capture of it by the Patriot army now in possession of it ...; were the

legislature to pass an act giving compensation in some manner to

informers, it would have a tendency in a great degree to prevent the

practice; as the thing now is, no citizen will take the trouble of

searching for and detecting the slaves. I further understand, that the

evil will not be confined altogether to Africans, but will be extended

to the worst class of West India slaves."[85]

Undoubtedly, the injury done by these pirates to the regular

slave-trading interests was largely instrumental in exterminating them.

Late in 1817 United States troops seized Amelia Island, and President

Monroe felicitated Congress and the country upon escaping the "annoyance

and injury" of this illicit trade.[86] The trade, however, seems to have

continued, as is shown by such letters as the following, written three

and a half months later:--

PORT OF DARIEN, March 14, 1818.

... It is a painful duty, sir, to express to you, that I am in

possession of undoubted information, that African and West India

negroes are almost daily illicitly introduced into Georgia, for

sale or settlement, or passing through it to the territories of

the United States for similar purposes; these facts are

notorious; and it is not unusual to see such negroes in the

streets of St. Mary's, and such too, recently captured by our

vessels of war, and ordered to Savannah, were illegally bartered

by hundreds in that city, _for_ this bartering or bonding (as

_it is called_, but in reality _selling_,) actually took place

before any decision had [been] passed by the court respecting

them. I cannot but again express to you, sir, that these

irregularities and mocking of the laws, by men who understand

them, and who, it was presumed, would have respected them, are

such, that it requires the immediate interposition of Congress

to effect a suppression of this traffic; for, as things are,

should a faithful officer of the government apprehend such

negroes, to avoid the penalties imposed by the laws, the

proprietors disclaim them, and some agent of the executive

demands a delivery of the same to him, who may employ them as he

pleases, or effect a sale by way of a bond, for the restoration

of the negroes when legally called on so to do; which bond, it

is _understood_, is to be _forfeited_, as the amount of the bond

is so much less than the value of the property.... There are

many negroes ... recently introduced into this state and the

Alabama territory, and which can be apprehended. The undertaking

would be great; but to be sensible that we shall possess your

approbation, and that we are carrying the views and wishes of

the government into execution, is all we wish, and it shall be

done, independent of every personal consideration.

I have, etc.[87]

This "approbation" failed to come to the zealous collector, and on the

5th of July he wrote that, "not being favored with a reply," he has been

obliged to deliver over to the governor's agents ninety-one illegally

imported Negroes.[88] Reports from other districts corroborate this

testimony. The collector at Mobile writes of strange proceedings on the

part of the courts.[89] General D.B. Mitchell, ex-governor of Georgia

and United States Indian agent, after an investigation in 1821 by

Attorney-General Wirt, was found "guilty of having prostituted his

power, as agent for Indian affairs at the Creek agency, to the purpose

of aiding and assisting in a conscious breach of the act of Congress of

1807, in prohibition of the slave trade--and this from mercenary

motives."[90] The indefatigable Collector Chew of New Orleans wrote to

Washington that, "to put a stop to that traffic, a naval force suitable

to those waters is indispensable," and that "vast numbers of slaves will

be introduced to an alarming extent, unless prompt and effectual

measures are adopted by the general government."[91] Other collectors

continually reported infractions, complaining that they could get no

assistance from the citizens,[92] or plaintively asking the services of

"one small cutter."[93]

Meantime, what was the response of the government to such

representations, and what efforts were made to enforce the act? A few

unsystematic and spasmodic attempts are recorded. In 1811 some special

instructions were sent out,[94] and the President was authorized to

seize Amelia Island.[95] Then came the war; and as late as November 15,

1818, in spite of the complaints of collectors, we find no revenue

cutter on the Gulf coast.[96] During the years 1817 and 1818[97] some

cruisers went there irregularly, but they were too large to be

effective; and the partial suppression of the Amelia Island pirates was

all that was accomplished. On the whole, the efforts of the government

lacked plan, energy, and often sincerity. Some captures of slavers were

made;[98] but, as the collector at Mobile wrote, anent certain cases,

"this was owing rather to accident, than any well-timed arrangement." He

adds: "from the Chandalier Islands to the Perdido river, including the

coast, and numerous other islands, we have only a small boat, with four

men and an inspector, to oppose to the whole confederacy of smugglers

and pirates."[99]

To cap the climax, the government officials were so negligent that

Secretary Crawford, in 1820, confessed to Congress that "it appears,

from an examination of the records of this office, that no particular

instructions have ever been given, by the Secretary of the Treasury,

under the original or supplementary acts prohibiting the introduction of

slaves into the United States."[100] Beside this inactivity, the

government was criminally negligent in not prosecuting and punishing

offenders when captured. Urgent appeals for instruction from prosecuting

attorneys were too often received in official silence; complaints as to

the violation of law by State officers went unheeded;[101] informers

were unprotected and sometimes driven from home.[102] Indeed, the most

severe comment on the whole period is the report, January 7, 1819, of

the Register of the Treasury, who, after the wholesale and open

violation of the Act of 1807, reported, in response to a request from

the House, "that it doth not appear, from an examination of the records

of this office, and particularly of the accounts (to the date of their

last settlement) of the collectors of the customs, and of the several

marshals of the United States, that any forfeitures had been incurred

under the said act."[103]