THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HUDSON.
BY GEORGE W. CULLUM,
_Major-General United States Army._
WHEN, in March, 1776, the British evacuated Boston, Washington felt
assured that New York, already threatened, would be their objective
point, not only on account of its commercial and strategical
importance, but because it was the great arsenal of America. He
therefore, as soon as practicable, concentrated in and about it his
whole disposable force, and pushed forward the defences of the city
and of its vicinity, already planned and partly executed by General
Lee. Until the arrival of Washington, April 13, 1776, General Putnam
commanded at New York, and General Greene, with a considerable body
of troops, took charge of the incomplete intrenchments of Brooklyn,
extending from the Wallabout (the present Navy Yard) to Gowanus Cove
on New York Bay. These were now strengthened by four redoubts armed
with twenty pieces of artillery, and by a strong interior keep mounting
seven guns. These Brooklyn Heights, from their proximity and command of
New York, were considered the key of the defence of this valuable city.
Fort George, with several redoubts and batteries, guarded the southern
end of Manhattan Island, while the fortified hills overlooking
Kingsbridge protected its northern extremity. On Red and Paulus
Hooks, and at various points along the shores of the East and Hudson
rivers, were erected earthworks, and a strong redoubt was built upon
Governor's Island. Between the latter and the "Battery", hulks were
sunk to obstruct the main channel. Notwithstanding all these defences,
Manhattan Island, as events proved, was assailable at many points.
To defend these works, scattered over more than twenty miles,
Washington had an army of only 17,225 men, of whom 6,711 were sick,
on furlough, or detached, leaving but 10,514 present for duty. Most
of these were militia, badly clothed, imperfectly armed, without
discipline or military experience, and their artillery was old and of
various patterns and calibres.
There had been dispatched from England a powerful fleet under Lord
Howe, convoying a large body of troops to reinforce those already in
America. The army of General William Howe (brother of the Admiral)
on Staten Island in August (including some 8,600 German hirelings)
numbered, as stated by General Clinton, 31,625 rank and file, of whom
24,464 were well-appointed, disciplined soldiers, fit for duty and
equal to any in Europe.
The struggle for the Hudson, by the coöperation of the army of Canada
with Howe, was now about to begin; but Washington was at his wits' end
to foresee the particular point upon which the blow would fall. Hence
he was obliged to retain the greater part of his troops in New York to
defend the city, holding them ready, however, to support any point in
the vicinity whether assailed by the enemy's large fleet or by their
powerful army.
[Illustration: THE MORTIER HOUSE, RICHMOND HILL. (_Washington's
Headquarters._)
From a plate in the _New York Magazine_, June, 1790, when the
house, then owned by Mrs. Jephson, was occupied by John Adams, as
Vice-President of the United States. It was at one time the home of
Aaron Burr. See Parton's _Burr_, i. 81.
Washington's first headquarters in New York were probably at a house,
180 Pearl St., opposite Cedar St., sometimes called the house of Gov.
Geo. Clinton, of which a view is given in Valentine's _Manual_, 1854,
p. 446, and in Lossing's _Mary and Martha Washington_ (N. Y., 1886), p.
153. He is also supposed by some to have occupied for a short interval
the Kennedy mansion, No. 1 Broadway, known to have been used certainly
by Col. Knox as artillery headquarters, of which a view is given in
Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed. ii. 211, and in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U.
S._, iii. 495. (Cf. Drake's _Knox_; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 594;
Johnston's _Campaign of 1776_, p. 86.) In June, if not earlier, he
removed to the Mortier House on Richmond Hill, and remained there till
September, when he transferred his headquarters first to the Apthorp
House (view in _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, 1885, p. 227), still standing at
the corner of Ninth Avenue and Ninety-first Street, and next to the
Morris House at Harlem.—ED.]
On the morning of August 22, 1776, General Howe, under cover of the
guns of the British ships, without mishap, delay, or opposition,
debarked, as stated by Admiral Howe, about 15,000 men, with artillery,
baggage, and stores, on Long Island, in the vicinity of the Narrows;
and on the 25th, General de Heister's German division was landed at
Gravesend Cove. This invading force of "upwards of 20,000 rank and
file", well armed and with forty cannon, promptly occupied a line
extending from the Narrows, through Gravesend, to Flatlands, and made
ready for an immediate advance through the passes of the long range of
densely wooded hills running eastwardly from the Narrows to Jamaica,
about two and a half miles in front of Brooklyn. To oppose this large
force of regular troops, the Americans had not quite 8,000 men, most of
whom were raw militia, and of these about one half were outside of the
defences of Brooklyn, ready to participate in the impending battle.
[Illustration: LORD HOWE.
From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, Lond., 1785, vol. ii.—ED.]
The most direct route from the British landing-place to the Brooklyn
intrenchments was by the road running nearly parallel to the bay,
and passing through a gorge just back of the Red Lion Tavern, where
Martense Lane joins the usual thoroughfare at the edge of Greenwood
Cemetery. A second road led from Flatbush directly through the pass
defended by General Sullivan's intrenchments. The third was by the road
from Flatbush to Bedford. Finally, the fourth, extending to Flushing,
intersected the Bedford and Jamaica road at the pass between the
present Evergreen and Cypress Cemeteries, about three miles east of
Bedford, or about ten miles from the Narrows.
[Illustration: GEN. SIR WM. HOWE.
From the upper part of an engraving of full length in _An Impartial
Hist. of the War in America_, Lond., 1780, p. 204. Smith in his _Brit.
Mez. Portraits_ records a print, standing posture, sash and star, right
elbow on block, left hand on hip, marked "Corbutt delin't et fecit.
Lond. 10 Nov. 1777."—ED.]
When the British landed on the 22d, Colonel Hand's regiment was
deployed to oppose them, but the enemy proving to be in too great
force, Hand fell back to Prospect Hill and thence to Flatbush, burning
property which would be of immediate use to the foe; but he did not
at once apprise the commanding general of the real character of the
British movement. So soon, however, as Washington heard of the landing,
he dispatched six regiments to reinforce the garrison of Brooklyn
Heights, and ordered additional forces to be in readiness to cross the
East River from Manhattan Island, if Howe's movement did not prove
to be a feint to cover a real attack upon New York. General Greene,
unfortunately, was too sick to retain the active command on Long
Island, every point of which, between Hell Gate and the Narrows, he had
carefully studied. He was succeeded, August 20th, by General Sullivan,
a far inferior officer. As Washington said of him, he was "active,
spirited, and zealously attached to the cause", but was tinctured with
"vanity, which now and then led him into embarrassments;" besides which
he lacked "experience to move on a large scale", as he had just shown
in Canada. On the 24th of August, Washington placed Putnam in command
over Sullivan. Putnam was a brave soldier, but wholly ignorant of
the science of war, besides being advanced in years. He was entirely
unacquainted with the arrangements which had been made for the defence
of his position, and he never went beyond the Brooklyn Heights
intrenchments on the day of the battle. The truth is, no one exercised
a general command in that conflict.
De Heister's division, constituting the enemy's centre, occupied
Flatbush August 26th, threatening the pass in front, which Sullivan
held with a large force under cover of intrenchments. During the
evening, Cornwallis withdrew from Flatbush to Flatlands, there becoming
the reserve of the British right, which was composed of choice
regiments under General Clinton, aided by Lord Percy and accompanied by
the commander-in-chief.
The British plan of attack would have been very hazardous in the
presence of an enterprising enemy; but against undisciplined troops,
small in numbers and without skilful leadership, it proved a brilliant
success. The right, under Clinton, by a night march was to seize the
Cypress Hill pass, and then move down the Jamaica road towards Bedford
to get in the rear of Sullivan's left. To divert the attention of the
Americans from this stealthy march, General Grant was to menace their
right, towards Gravesend, before daybreak, and De Heister at the same
time was to cannonade the American centre under Colonel Hand. These
attacks were not, however, to be pressed till General Clinton's guns
were heard in the rear of Sullivan, when the Americans were to be
assailed with the utmost vigor from all quarters. Besides these land
operations a squadron of five ships, under Sir Peter Parker, was to
menace New York and keep up a cannonade against Governor's Island and
the right flank of the American defences.
Sir Henry Clinton, the principal actor in this contest, with his heavy
column and its artillery, guided by a Tory farmer, at nine in the
evening of the 26th, moved silently forward from Flatlands through
New Lots (now East New York), having successfully crossed Shoemaker's
narrow causeway over a long marsh. At three on the morning of the
27th, Clinton arrived within half a mile of the pass he was to force,
being followed and joined before daybreak by the main body under Lord
Percy. Soon after daylight a small American patrol was captured and the
unguarded pass occupied. Thus the whole right wing of the enemy, after
partaking of refreshments, was marching unopposed directly to Brooklyn
Heights. The battle, by this bold and lucky manœuvre, was in this way
virtually gained before any real struggle had begun.
General Grant, on the enemy's left, with two brigades and a regiment,
two companies of Tories and ten pieces of artillery, in the mean
time advanced along the bay road against the flying Americans, and,
at daybreak of the 27th, got through the pass in the hills and was
marching on the Brooklyn lines. General Parsons, in command of the
American outpost on the right, succeeded in rallying some of the
fugitives and posting them advantageously on a hill until the arrival
of Lord Stirling, who, with 1,500 choice Continental troops, had been
sent by Putnam on learning the condition of affairs. For some hours
Grant amused Stirling by slight skirmishes about Battle Hill (now
in Greenwood Cemetery), till Clinton had reached his destined goal,
when Grant, with quadruple forces, pushed forward to grapple in a
death-struggle with his gallant foe. At the same time De Heister, who
had slept upon his arms during the night at Flatbush, as soon as he
heard Clinton's signal guns, sent Count Donop to storm the redoubt
which protected Sullivan and defended the pass through the hills,
while he himself pressed forward with the main body of the Hessians.
Sullivan, hemmed in on all sides, ordered a retreat to the Brooklyn
lines, but it was too late, as he was already ensnared in the prepared
net, and before long all was a scene of confusion, consternation, and
slaughter. Some of the Americans, after fighting desperately, broke
through the enemy's line, but a large number were killed, wounded,
or taken prisoners. Washington, from Brooklyn, witnessed this sad
catastrophe, but was powerless to prevent it.
Stirling in like manner, met by the force under Cornwallis, which had
been detached from Clinton's column, was nearly surrounded, having no
chance for escape except across Gowanus Creek, in which the tide was
fast rising. After a terrible conflict of twenty minutes, the mass
of Stirling's command succeeded in passing the muddy stream, but the
general and some of his bravest companions were compelled to surrender
to superior numbers. Washington wrung his hands in agony at the sight
of such disaster. "Good God", he cried, "what brave fellows I must this
day lose!"
[Illustration: STIRLING.
After a photograph of a portrait in a family brooch, attested by H. S.
Watts, Oct. 8, 1879 (in Harvard College library, given by Professor
C. E. Norton). There is a picture, taken at a later day, engraved in
Duer's _Life of Stirling._—ED.]
By two o'clock in the afternoon, this battle, or rather this series
of skirmishes between forces very unequal in numbers, quality, and
skill, was terminated by the retreat of the remnant of Americans which
had escaped capture. Howe stated his loss at 367 killed, wounded,
and missing; and he estimated that of the Americans at 3,300, though
probably it did not exceed one half of that number, of whom 1,076,
including Generals Stirling, Sullivan, and Woodhull (captured at
Jamaica on the next day), were made prisoners.
Fortunately the victor, instead of pressing his advantage and at once
assaulting the Brooklyn intrenchments, which covered the demoralized
troops, waited till the next day, when he broke ground as for a regular
siege, and began cannonading the American works. "By such ill-timed
caution", says Lord Mahon, "arising probably from an overestimate of
the insurgents' force, the English general flung away the fairest
opportunity of utterly destroying or capturing the flower of the
American army;" yet such was the joy of the British government over
this cheap success that General Howe was knighted for a victory over
inexperienced troops one fifth his own numbers.
Washington, promptly profiting by the over-caution of his antagonist,
strengthened his position, and conceived the masterly measures for
his retreat from Long Island. Without the knowledge of Howe, availing
himself of a dense fog and rain, and favored by a fair wind, he safely
crossed the East River with all his troops, stores, and artillery,
except a few heavy pieces which the mud prevented him from moving. The
army reached New York on the morning of the 30th, Washington leaving in
the last boat after having been forty-eight hours almost continuously
in the saddle without once closing his eyes. "Whoever", says Botta,
"will attend to all the details of this retreat will easily believe
that no military operation was ever conducted by great captains with
more ability and prudence, or under more unfavorable auspices."
Though the British general had gained a decided success, he was as far
as ever from the object of his campaign—the capture of New York. The
victors and the vanquished now confronted each other from opposite
sides of a stream half a mile broad, each making ready for a decisive
effort. Howe possessed a large, veteran, and disciplined European
army, while Washington's troops, for the most part, were a demoralized
assemblage of heterogeneous organizations, not much superior to an
armed mob.
"Our situation", writes Washington to the President of Congress, "is
truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th
ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled
their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of
calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in
order to repair our losses, are discouraged, intractable, and impatient
to return. Great numbers of them have gone off: in some instances
almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time.
This circumstance of itself, independently of others, when fronted by a
well-appointed enemy superior in numbers to our whole collected force,
would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when their example has infected
another part of the army, when their want of discipline and refusal
of almost every kind of restraint and government have produced a like
conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that
order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army, and
which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military
establishment would admit of, our condition becomes more alarming; and,
with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence
in the generality of the troops.
"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained,
and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning
to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia, or other
troops, than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our
regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully
convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties
must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their
defence is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean, one to
exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of
such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every emergency
far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new
enlistments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good
consequences. Men who have been free and subject to no control cannot
be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions,
which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others; and
the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder,
irregularity, and confusion they occasion."
Three weeks later, he again writes: "It becomes evident to me, then,
that, as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the
war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have
good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but
by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your
officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to
engage; and till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons
as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you
have little to expect from them.... But while the only merit an officer
possesses is his ability to raise men, while these men consider and
treat him as an equal, and in the character of an officer regard him
no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no
order nor discipline can prevail; nor will the officer ever meet with
that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination. To
place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken
staff.... To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the
work of a day, a month, or even a year; and unhappily for us and the
cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring
to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner
done away with by having such a mixture of troops as have been called
together within these few months....
"The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended
from one are remote, and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced
as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting
one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is
certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare upon
oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon
the whole, I should subscribe to the latter."
The defeat of the American army on Long Island, a heavy blow to
the patriot cause, suggested a desperate remedy to the mind of
Washington,—no less a measure than the deliberate destruction of the
great commercial city of New York. "Till of late", he writes to the
President of Congress, "I had no doubt in my own mind of defending
this place; nor should I have yet if the men would do their duty, but
this I despair of.... If we should be obliged to abandon the town,
ought it to stand as winter-quarters for the enemy? They would derive
great conveniences from it on the one hand, and much property would
be destroyed on the other.... At present I dare say the enemy mean to
preserve it if they can. If Congress, therefore, should resolve upon
the destruction of it, the resolution should be a profound secret, as
the knowledge of it will make a capital change in their plans." General
Greene, John Jay, and many others of note were of the same opinion.
Congress decided otherwise, and Howe forbore to bombard it from
Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island, both belligerents deeming its
possession of far greater service to either than its destruction.
As New York was not to be destroyed, it became a serious question
how a city swarming with Tories was to be defended with less than
twenty thousand militia against a powerful army. Washington, Greene,
Putnam, and others were opposed to the attempt, but were overruled by
a council of war. The question was finally left by Congress to the
commander-in-chief, who, deeming the city untenable, made preparations,
September 10th, for its speedy evacuation, which was concurred in, two
days later, by a new council of war. This determination was timely, as
the Americans were about to be driven out.
Howe, anticipating Washington's design, determined to prevent the
execution of it by the same manœuvre he had tried so successfully on
Long Island,—that was to threaten the city's front and right flank by
the fleet, while his army, assembled about the present site of Astoria,
should cross the East River, turn Washington's left flank, cut off his
communications with the mainland, oblige him to fight on the enemy's
terms, and force him to surrender at discretion, or by a brilliant
stroke break the American army in pieces, and secure their arms and
stores.
On the evening of September 14th Howe began his crossing of the East
River by taking possession of Montressor (Randall's) Island, and the
next morning he sent three ships up the Hudson as high as Bloomingdale,
which stopped any further evacuation of the city by water. Soon after,
under the fire of ten vessels-of-war, the main British force, under
Sir Henry Clinton, embarked upon flatboats, barges, and galleys, at
the mouth of Newtown Creek, and by the favoring tide was carried to
Kip's Bay (34th Street), where they disembarked and quickly put to
rout the panic-stricken American militia, and pursued the fugitives in
disorderly flight over the fields to Murray Hill.
So soon as Washington heard the enemy's cannonade he rode with all
speed to the front, and used every exertion to rally the runaways; but
his efforts, though seconded by the officers in immediate command,
were utterly futile. Mortified and in despair at such poltroonery, the
commander-in-chief almost lost control of himself, and, says General
Greene, "sought death rather than life" at the hands of the enemy.
Unopposed, the British marched to the Incleberg on Murray Hill and
encamped, while the Americans retreated to Harlem Heights. Putnam,
at the sacrifice of baggage and stores, and of most of his heavy
artillery, by taking the river road, barely escaped with the troops
remaining in the city. Howe was in close pursuit of this rear-guard of
about four thousand men, but unexpectedly stopped for nearly two hours
at the residence of Mrs. Murray[721] to enjoy her old Madeira, so that,
in the language of the times, "Mrs. Murray saved the American army."
[Illustration: WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS AT HARLEM (Sept., 1776)
This was the house of Col. Roger Morris, and at a later day the
residence of Madam Jumel. It follows a drawing in Valentine's _N. Y.
City Manual_, 1854, p. 362. Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 816; Gay's
_Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 505; and for a view of the hall, _Harper's
Magazine_, lii. 640. Its position was east of Tenth Avenue, near One
Hundred and Sixtieth Street.—ED.]
The British, on September 15, 1776, took possession of New York with a
large detachment under General Robertson; while Howe with the main body
of the army encamped on the outskirts of the city. The northern line of
their camp extended from Horen's Hook on the East River to Bloomingdale
on the Hudson, which line was fortified with field-works and protected
on the flanks by vessels-of-war. Behind this line lay their disciplined
army of twenty-five thousand British and Germans.
Washington took position in their front, and for the protection of
his army of about fourteen thousand fit for duty he fortified Harlem
Heights with a triple line of intrenchments extending across Manhattan
Island. Immediately after securing his position, Washington, to arouse
some military ardor in his discomfited militia, formed the design of
cutting off some of the enemy's light troops, who, encouraged by their
recent successes, had advanced to the extremity of the high ground
opposite to the American camp. To effect this object, Colonel Knowlton,
of Bunker Hill fame, and Major Leitch were detached with parties of
rangers and riflemen to get in their rear, while Washington diverted
their attention by a feigned direct attack. By some mistake, the fire
was begun on the front instead of upon their flank and rear, by which
the enemy, though defeated, secured their escape to their main body.
This successful skirmish, called the battle of Harlem Plains, was
purchased by the loss of the brave Knowlton and Leitch, both of whom
were mortally wounded.
The British rejoicings upon the occupation of their snug
winter-quarters in New York were suddenly interrupted, early on the
morning of September 21st, by the breaking out of flames from a low
groggery near Whitehall Slip, which, for want of proper fire apparatus
to check them, spread rapidly over one fourth of the city, consuming
five hundred buildings, including the Lutheran and Trinity churches.
Whether this was the work of incendiaries is not positively known.
Congress and the city's inhabitants had strenuously opposed such an
act, though it was strongly recommended as a military necessity by
Washington and by others of high rank and position.
While Howe "continued at gaze" awaiting coming events, Washington
continued to strengthen his position on Harlem Heights, and established
alarm posts on the east side of Harlem River as far as Throg's Neck on
the Sound, to insure surveillance of the whole field of operations.
The Harlem lines being too strong for a front attack, Howe, after
leaving a sufficient force under Lord Percy to watch them and guard the
city, embarked, October 12th, his main army on ninety flatboats, to
execute by his favorite manœuvre the turning of these obstacles and of
Washington's left flank. His object was to cut off Washington's retreat
and shut him up on Manhattan Island, the only exit from which was by
Kingsbridge. Adverse winds so delayed the British general that he only
passed Hell Gate on the afternoon of the 14th, and the fleet did not
reach Throg's Neck till nightfall. Here Howe had previously landed his
advance-guard, but Washington had anticipated him by occupying, on the
12th, the passes leading to the mainland.
The enemy's design being now fully developed, it was decided in a
council of war, held in the American camp on the 16th, to leave Harlem
Heights, no longer tenable, and to evacuate the whole of Manhattan
Island except Fort Washington, which General Greene deemed impregnable
and of great value for future operations. Accordingly, the American
army formed a series of intrenched camps on the hills skirting the
right bank of the swollen Bronx, and extending thirteen miles, from
Fordham Heights to White Plains, and protected from the enemy by the
river in front.
After waiting five days for supplies, Howe, on the 18th, left Throg's
Neck, debarked again on Pell's Point, and on the march northward
encountered Glover's brigade well posted behind stone fences. After
a hot skirmish Glover slowly fell back, while the enemy advanced to
the heights of New Rochelle. Here the British encamped till the 22d,
when they were joined by the second division of Hessians under General
Knyphausen. This delay gave Washington ample time to strengthen himself
at White Plains, where he held a strong and important strategic
position commanding the roads leading up the Hudson and to New England.
On the morning of the 28th of October the opposing armies, each
about thirteen thousand strong, confronted each other. Washington's
intrenchments, partly a double line, occupied the hilly ground within
the village of White Plains, the left resting upon a mill-pond and
the right on a bend of the Bronx, which protected its flank and rear.
Across the Bronx rose Chatterton's Hill, presenting a steep rocky front
to the enemy, but it was not fortified.
Howe, believing he was now to fight the decisive battle of the war,
moved up in two heavy columns, Clinton commanding the one on the right
and De Heister that on the left. They seemed at first as if intending
to attack in front; but they soon filed off to the left, extending
their line to the front of Chatterton's Hill. Here the main body
halted, while a column four thousand strong proceeded to cross the
Bronx and storm the hill under cover of the fire of twenty pieces of
artillery. General McDougall with fifteen hundred Continentals and
militia, and Captain Alexander Hamilton with two pieces of artillery,
immediately arrayed themselves on the rocky brow of the hill for its
defence. As the main British body, under General Leslie, clambered up
the steep acclivity it was met by a withering fire from the infantry
and artillery, from which it recoiled and sought shelter. A second
assault up the slope met with an equally determined resistance, and
for some time the enemy was held in check. Rahl, with two regiments
that had forded the Bronx a quarter of a mile below, now appeared on
the American right, and drove the militia from their post. This break
compelled McDougall, exposed to a heavy fire in front and flank, to
retreat across the Bronx to White Plains, though with his six hundred
Continentals he maintained an obstinate conflict for an hour, and
carried off all his wounded and artillery. The American loss in the
engagement was 30 prisoners and 130 killed and wounded, while their
opponents' losses were 231.
Howe contemplated an assault, the next morning, upon the American camp,
but was deterred by the apparent strength of the lines. These had
been built hastily, as General Heath says, of _corn-stalks_, the tops
being turned inwards, and the roots with the adhering earth outwards.
The British army, strongly reinforced by the arrival of Lord Percy
on the 30th, designed attacking the American works on the following
day, but a storm delayed their operations, and gave Washington time
to withdraw his forces to the heights of New Castle, where he erected
strong defences. In the meanwhile Knyphausen had been ordered to move
from New Rochelle to Kingsbridge, where he encamped on November 2d, the
Americans retiring to Fort Washington on his approach. Howe in person
suddenly left White Plains on the night of the 5th for Dobbs's Ferry,
to which his army was already moving. "The design of this manœuvre",
wrote Washington on the 6th to the President of Congress, "is a matter
of much conjecture and speculation, and cannot be accounted for with
any degree of certainty." A council of war which met that day evidently
inferred that it threatened a movement across or up the Hudson, for it
was unanimously agreed immediately to throw a body of troops into New
Jersey, and station three thousand at Peekskill to guard the Highlands.
Howe really contemplated a far different move—the capture of Fort
Washington.
Why Sir William did not again attack Washington, and why he changed
his whole plan, is now well understood to be due to the treason of
William Demont, the adjutant of Colonel Magaw, in command of Fort
Washington. This man, on the 2d of November, undiscovered, passed into
the British camp, and placed in the hands of Lord Percy complete plans
of the defences of Mount Washington and a statement of their armament
and garrisons. This detailed information was immediately sent, with
its author, to Howe, and must have reached him a day or two before
his sudden departure from White Plains. The conclusive evidence of
this treason is furnished by the culprit himself in his letter,[722]
dated London, January 16, 1792, to the Rev. Dr. Peters, of the Church
of England, which was first published by Mr. E. F. DeLancey, in the
_Magazine of American History_ (Feb., 1877).
Fort Washington, built by Colonel Rufus Putnam soon after the
evacuation of Boston, occupied the highest ground at the northern
end of Manhattan Island. It was a pentagonal bastioned earthwork
without a keep, having a feeble profile and scarcely any ditch. In its
vicinity were batteries, redoubts, and intrenched lines. These various
field fortifications, of which Fort Washington may be considered the
citadel, extended north and south over two and a half miles, and had
a circuit of six miles. The three intrenched lines of Harlem Heights,
crossing the island, were to the south; Laurel Hill, with Fort George
at its northern extremity, lay to the east; upon the River Ridge, near
Tubby Hook, was Fort Tryon, and close to Spuyten Duyvel Creek were
some slight works known as "Cork Hill Fort;" and across the creek,
on Tetard's Hill, was Fort Independence. The main communication with
these various works was the old Albany road, crossing Harlem River
at Kingsbridge. This road was obstructed by three lines of abatis,
extending from Laurel Hill to the River Ridge.
Fort Washington mounted not more than eighteen guns _en barbette_, of
various calibres, from nines to thirty-twos. The garrison of all the
various works was less than 3,000 men, mostly Pennsylvanians, who
were commanded by Colonel Magaw, an officer of but little military
experience. The ground about the fort was well suited for defence, and
the works not only protected the upper part of Manhattan Island, but
in conjunction with Fort Lee, on the palisades opposite, commanded
the Hudson. However, from their too elevated positions and distance
from each other, these two works, on the opposite sides of the river,
with their feeble armament, proved insufficient, even with a partially
constructed barrier of sunken hulks, to prevent the passage of the
British vessels-of-war.
As these forts did not close the river, Washington did not deem it
expedient to weaken his force, which was necessary to him for field
operations, by leaving a large garrison on an island essentially in
the hands of the enemy. To the opinion of General Greene, in general
command of these works, and in deference to the expressed wishes of
Congress to hold them at any cost, Washington yielded his better
judgment. His modesty and sense of imperfect knowledge of the science
and practice of war led him, as it did on several occasions, to defer
too much to others, and though he did not think it "prudent to hazard
the men and stores at Mount Washington", he left it discretionary with
Greene to give the necessary orders for its evacuation.
Howe, November 15th, demanded the surrender of Fort Washington, stating
that, if he were compelled to take it by assault, the garrison would be
put to the sword. Magaw replied that to propose such an alternative was
unworthy of a British officer, and that, for himself, he should defend
the fort to the last extremity.
On the 15th Washington started across the river from Fort Lee, to
which he had come, to determine the condition of the garrison at Fort
Washington. He says, "I had partly crossed the North River when I met
General Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence,
and they informed me that the troops were in high spirits and would
make a good defence, and, it being late at night, I returned."
Magaw, awaiting the enemy's attack, made a judicious disposition of
his forces to defend Fort Washington and the various intrenchments
in its vicinity. Colonel Rawlings took command of Fort Tryon and the
northern end of the River Ridge, with an outpost at Cork Hill Fort;
Colonel Baxter held Fort George and the summit of Laurel Hill; Colonel
Cadwallader occupied the Harlem Lines; while Magaw, at his central
position of Fort Washington, directed the whole.
Howe's attack upon Fort Washington was skilfully planned and admirably
executed. A vessel-of-war, the "Pearl", took up a position in the
Hudson to protect the contemplated movement of the Hessian troops
and enfilade the northern outworks of Fort Washington; while thirty
flatboats were in the Harlem River for ferrying troops,—these boats
having eluded the vigilance of the American sentries on the night of
the 14th, when passing up the Hudson and through Spuyten Duyvel Creek.
On the morning of the 16th, under a furious cannonade from the heights
on the east bank of the Harlem, three distinct assaults were ordered
to be made upon the American defences, besides a fourth movement,
which, though designed as a feint, became a real attack at the critical
moment. The _first_ British column, under General Knyphausen, moved
down from Kingsbridge, and with him were Rahl's Germans marching close
to the Hudson; the _second_, under General Matthews, supported by Lord
Cornwallis, crossed the Harlem and moved upon Fort George and the
northern end of Laurel Hill; the _third_, or feint, under Lieut.-Col.
Stirling, floated down the Harlem to threaten the southerly part of
Laurel Hill; while the _fourth_, of British and Hessians, led by Earl
Percy and accompanied by Howe, moved from Harlem Plain upon the triple
lines of Harlem Heights.
[Illustration]
The latter column, advancing from the south, began the attack upon
the outer or southernmost American line, where Cadwallader, unable to
check Lord Percy's superior forces, fell back to his stronger middle
line. Howe then ordered Stirling to land from the Harlem and clamber
up the steep slope of Laurel Hill to threaten the rear of Cadwallader.
The latter sent a detachment, as did also Colonel Magaw, to oppose
Stirling's landing, without avail. Matthews at the same time debarked
his column and attacked the Americans on Laurel Hill, where Baxter
was killed. The united forces of Matthews and Stirling overcame all
opposition and took 170 prisoners. Baxter's force was compelled, as
was also Cadwallader, when pressed by Percy, to seek refuge in Fort
Washington. About noon the Hessian column from the north was in motion.
Rahl soon scattered the small guard in Cork Hill Fort and advanced upon
Fort Tryon, crowding Rawlings by superior force nearly back to Fort
Washington, when, being joined by Knyphausen, who had made his way over
wooded and difficult ground and across abatis, the reunited German
columns bore down all opposition. The Americans at this point also,
after a spirited resistance, were compelled to take refuge in Fort
Washington, which, now overcrowded and exposed to the deadly concentric
fire of the enemy, left Magaw no alternative but surrender. He asked
for a parley of four hours, but he was allowed only half an hour. In
the end he capitulated, upon honorable terms, to General Knyphausen,
to whom the glory of the day belonged. Magaw had received a promise
from Washington to attempt to bring off the troops if he would hold
out till night, which Magaw deemed impossible, with troops huddled
together and exposed to destruction from the enemy's near circle of
fire. This capture cost the enemy nearly 500 men in killed and wounded.
The American loss was 150 killed and wounded, 2,634 taken prisoners
(including many of their best troops), 43 pieces of artillery of from
three to thirty-two pounds calibre, a large number of small arms, and
much ammunition and stores. The whole of Manhattan Island thus passed
into British hands.
Immediately after the capture of Fort Washington, Sir William Howe
crossed with his army into New Jersey, it being too late for any
coöperation with the Northern army under General Carleton, who had
already retreated from Crown Point into Canada.[723]
* * * * *
This New York campaign had been most disastrous to the American cause;
yet it was far from a brilliant success for the Anglo-Hessian arms.
Washington, with troops inferior in numbers, arms, organization,
discipline, and experience, had outgeneralled Howe, with a superior
veteran army, whenever he acted upon his own good judgment and did not
yield his convictions to his subordinates, to whom most of the errors
of the campaign were due.
It is doubtful whether there was any necessity whatever for the British
to fight the battle of Long Island, as their fleet might have occupied
the East River, as it subsequently did, and thus have caged the part
of Washington's army which was on Long Island. It is true that the
American batteries on Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island might have
done the fleet much damage; but if it was too dangerous to run the
gauntlet of the Buttermilk Channel, four fathoms deep, it would have
been an easy matter to sail around the eastern end of Long Island, and
safely enter the East River from that direction.
Had the East River been occupied by the British fleet, it could, while
cutting off half of our army from the defence of New York, at the same
time have threatened the city front pending the transportation of the
British army by water to points above the city from whence to turn
either or both flanks of Manhattan Island. Washington, thus shut up,
would have been compelled to fight at great disadvantage, and possibly
surrender at discretion.
Even admitting that the battle of Long Island was necessary, Howe, in
dividing his army into three masses, stretching over a line of more
than ten miles, ran great risk of being beaten in detail had all of the
American forces on the island been concentrated at a central position,
ready to be thrown successively upon his isolated columns. It is true
the undisciplined American forces might not have been able to cope in
the open field with British and German regulars; but Howe had no right
to presume their inferiority after his own experience of their good
conduct at Bunker Hill and Clinton's trial at Sullivan's Island.
The American general also committed a great military blunder in leaving
with raw troops the shelter of the Brooklyn intrenchments for the
precarious protection of the Long Island Ridge, several important
passes in which were left entirely unguarded, though Washington had
ordered their careful observation.
After the retreat of the American army to New York, Howe wasted two
precious weeks, during which Washington had time to organize his
defence; and when the British general crossed the East River, he
committed a great mistake in debarking at Kip's Bay,—a halfway measure
which involved a long land march to his objective, White Plains.
Washington, with great vigor, seized his advantage, and, by availing
himself of his shorter interior line, arrived first at the coveted
position and fortified it. Had Howe moved to this point by water
immediately after the battle of Long Island, he undoubtedly would have
succeeded in turning Washington's left flank, and would thus have cut
off his retreat. The British general's delay of _two months_ after the
battle of Long Island in moving less than thirty miles to reach White
Plains was inexcusable. In a shorter period Moltke began and ended the
campaign of 1866, which so humbled the great power of the Austrian
empire.
When Howe decided to attack the American army at White Plains he should
have thrown his entire force upon Washington's centre, and thus have
won a decisive victory with his superior troops; whereas he used less
than one third of his army in driving Washington's right wing from
Chatterton's Hill upon his main body, which then successfully retreated
before the tardy and inert British general.
Howe's good fortune in capturing Fort Washington was due more to the
treason of Magaw's adjutant and to Washington's yielding to bad advice,
than to any skill of the British commander.[724]
* * * * *
With the invasion of New Jersey by the Anglo-Hessian army all military
operations at the mouth of the Hudson were terminated. The struggle
for the control of this great river was to be transferred to its upper
waters, and it was expected that the coming campaign would be so
conducted as soon to force the whole power of the colonies into silence
and submission.
General Gates, who was appointed the successor of Sullivan in the
command of the army of Canada, was, says Horace Walpole, "the son of
a housekeeper of the second Duke of Leeds." He had neither brilliant
qualities nor military genius, but possessed the vanity and ambition to
covet the highest position, for the attainment of which he resorted to
disgraceful intrigue. When assigned to this command, in June, 1776, the
army of Canada was flying to Crown Point; so, like Sancho Panza, Gates
found himself a governor without a government; but, nothing abashed,
he at once claimed the command of the Northern department, then under
Schuyler. Congress sustained the latter, whereupon Gates took post at
Ticonderoga, where the remnant of the American army had retired upon
the abandonment of Crown Point, and promptly adopted vigorous measures
to put the work in good condition for defence and to reinforce its
garrison against any forward movement of General Carleton.
To secure control of Lake Champlain, a squadron of small vessels was
ordered to be constructed at its head (Skenesborough), which, to the
number of nine, mounting in all fifty-five guns, were completed by
the middle of August. Arnold, in command of these and some additional
galleys from Ticonderoga, moved down to the foot of the lake, and
anchored his vessels across it to bar the passage of the enemy.
[Illustration:
From _Political Magazine_ (1780), i. 743, with a memoir of Burgoyne.
There are modern engravings of this likeness in Moore's _Diary of the
Amer. Rev._, i. p. 513; and in Lossing's _Field Book_, i. 37.—ED.]
Carleton, as active as his adversary, had built at St. Johns a flotilla
of "thirty fighting vessels." When Arnold discovered the superiority of
the enemy's fleet in vessels and guns to be more than double his own,
and that they were manned by picked British sailors, he fell back and
formed line of battle between Valcour's Island and the western shore
of the lake. In this disadvantageous position he was attacked, October
11th, by Captain Pringle, of the British navy, with thirty-eight
vessels and boats, mounting 123 guns. Though the crews of Arnold's
flotilla were landsmen, he maintained a desperate fight from eleven in
the forenoon until dark, when, availing himself of the obscurity of a
thick fog, he escaped with part of his vessels, unobserved, through the
enemy's fleet; but, owing to adverse winds and his crippled condition,
he was overtaken on the 13th off Split Rock, where he was again
attacked. Some of his flotilla escaped and some were captured, but he
himself, after fighting four hours, ran his remaining vessels ashore,
set them on fire with their flags flying, and escaped with their crews
through the forests to Ticonderoga. General Carleton now advanced to
Crown Point, of which he took possession October 14th, and pushed a
reconnoissance to within sight of Ticonderoga. When Carleton's boats
appeared, Gates made an effective display of his garrison, whereupon
the British general fell back to Crown Point, which he evacuated, and,
it being too late for further active operations, he retired to Canada.
[Illustration: BURGOYNE.
From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. iii. Fonblanque
gives a likeness painted by Ramsay at Rome in 1750, and this is
repeated in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 567. Reynolds painted him in
1766 (Fonblanque, p. 86). J. C. Smith (_Brit. Mez. Portraits_, ii. 710)
records a picture by Pine. Cf. Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest of
Canada_, p. 194, and the illus. ed. of Irving's _Washington_, iii.—ED.]
The enemy had scarcely departed when Schuyler applied himself with
tireless assiduity to prepare against a new invasion during that
winter or in the coming year. He continually pressed upon Congress and
Washington the wants of his department in men and munitions of war.
In every way he tried to conciliate the Indian tribes; and he lost no
opportunity of gaining information of the enemy's designs and movements.
Burgoyne, after the battle of Bunker Hill, had suggested to Lord
Rochefort, Secretary of State for the colonies, that, as there was
"no probable prospect of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion with
any force that Great Britain and Ireland could supply", there should
be employed "a large army of such foreign troops as might be hired,
to begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army, composed
partly of old disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from
Canada; a large levy of Indians and a supply of arms for the blacks,
to awe the Southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of regulars;
and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast,—might possibly do the
business in one campaign."
The importance of securing the control of the Hudson, thereby to
separate the New England from the Middle and Southern States, was
eminently correct; but the proposed mode of accomplishing it was, as
the sequel proved, entirely wrong.
Burgoyne, like many other Englishmen, had held American prowess in
contempt, and ridiculed the enrolment of provincials as "a preposterous
parade of military arrangement." His later experience probably changed
his views, for when he had supplanted that noble soldier Sir Guy
Carleton in the command of the British army in Canada, through "family
support" more than from "military merit", he took good care to secure a
strong and veteran force, commanded by officers of noted skill and long
experience.
Burgoyne's army, which took the field in July, 1777, had a total,
rank and file, of 7,902, of which 4,135 were British, 3,116 Germans,
148 Canadian militia, and 503 Indians. The artillery corps and train
were of the most serviceable character, "probably the finest and most
excellently supplied as to officers and private men that had ever been
allotted to second the operations of any army."
The commander-in-chief was a polished gentleman, a popular dramatist,
an effective speaker, a useful member of Parliament, and a gallant
officer who had won laurels in Portugal; Major-General Phillips, the
second in command, was a distinguished artillerist who had earned a
high reputation in Germany; Major-General Riedesel had been selected
because of his long experience, especially in the Seven Years' War;
Brigadier-General Fraser, who commanded the light brigade, was a
knightly soldier, ambitious of glory, who had seen much service in
America; Hamilton and Powel, who commanded brigades, had been twenty
years on active duty; Lord Balcarras and Major Acland, commanding
respectively the light infantry and grenadiers, were soldiers of high
professional attainments; La Corne St. Luc, the commander of the
Indians, had been an active partisan of the French in Canada wars,
and "was notorious for brutal inhumanity;" and the many staff and
regimental officers were already men of mark, or subsequently rose to
high positions.
With such a thoroughly disciplined and well-appointed army, Burgoyne
fondly anticipated making a triumphal march of two hundred miles
to Albany, there to meet St. Leger descending the Mohawk, and Howe
ascending the Hudson, and thus by combined movements to dismember the
thirteen United States. This march of the Northern army seemed not
arduous, as most of Burgoyne's way was by water through the Sorel, Lake
Champlain, and the upper Hudson; but he had taken little account of the
extraordinary physical difficulties he was doomed to encounter, and the
hostility of the inhabitants along much of his route.
[Illustration: LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.
From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, i. 190.—ED.]
Another embarrassment greatly marred the British plans. Lord
George Germain, the Secretary of State for the colonies, had given
Burgoyne positive orders for his march to Albany, from which he was
not to deviate; while Howe was left, through a piece of criminal
negligence,[725] without any imperative instructions to coöperate with
the army in Canada; besides which, it was almost impossible to arrange
any concerted action between forces separated by four hundred miles of
hostile country.
Burgoyne, however, like a true soldier, determined to obey orders,
though it might break empires. Consequently, on June 13th, at St.
Johns, the standard of England was hoisted on board the "Radeau", and
saluted by all the rest of the shipping and forts, thus announcing the
beginning of this eventful and important campaign.
On the 20th, Burgoyne issued, with seeming royal prerogative, a
bombastic proclamation, commending the justice and clemency of the
king, who had directed "that Indians be employed;" denouncing the
obstinacy of Americans as "wilful outcasts;" threatening the terrors
of savage warfare of the "thousands of Indians" under his command, "to
overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain;" and, "in consciousness
of Christianity and the honor of soldiership", warned all of his
opposers that "the messengers of justice and wrath await them on
the field, and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror
that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must
occasion."[726]
Burgoyne, after delivering himself of this pronunciamiento of
loving-kindness towards his American erring brothers, and setting
forth the sweet humanity of his dusky allies, who "had sharpened their
affections upon their hatchets", proceeded up Lake Champlain, pioneered
by these children of the forest in their birch canoes, the fleet and
army following, with music and banners, as if engaged in a splendid
regatta.
While Burgoyne with the main army was moving south, Lieutenant-Colonel
St. Leger, in conformity with instructions from the British cabinet,
with a detachment of about 1,000 men (English regulars, provincials,
and Indians), was rapidly advancing west to Fort Stanwix, by the St.
Lawrence and Lakes Ontario and Oneida. After reducing this post and
subjugating the patriots of the Mohawk valley, he was ordered to join
his chief at or near Albany.
Burgoyne's formidable invading force of 7,863 men, with 42 pieces of
artillery, which reached Crown Point June 27th, advanced thence, July
1st, in battle array: the right wing of British troops under General
Phillips, upon Fort Ticonderoga on the west bank of the lake; the left
wing of Germans under General Riedesel, upon Fort Independence on the
east bank; and the floating batteries in line across the lake. Burgoyne
had announced in orders: "This army must not retreat."
General Schuyler had recently visited Forts Ticonderoga and
Independence, where, instead of a garrison of 5,000 men, he found only
2,546 half-armed and poorly provided Continental troops and 900 raw
militia, "many of them mere boys, and one third of the whole force
unfit for duty." He noted, with serious forebodings, the unfitness of
the works to resist attack, a state to which lack of workmen and the
neglect of Gates had brought them. The reduction of this stronghold
was indispensable to Burgoyne's progress, not only as insuring his
communications with Canada, but because of the danger of leaving such a
force in his rear.
In an endeavor to strengthen these fortifications, of which General
St. Clair had recently taken command, the works had been too much
extended, and the key-points—Mount Hope, commanding Fort Ticonderoga,
and Mount Defiance, a supposed inaccessible eminence at the confluence
of the waters of Lakes George and Champlain—had not been occupied;
consequently, they were seized by the British and artillery was planted
upon them.
St. Clair, no favorite of fortune, finding himself nearly invested
on the 5th, and exposed to a plunging fire from these heights, which
he could not return, wisely determined to evacuate all his works
that night, under pretence of making a sortie. As soon as it was
dark enough, the women and wounded, together with some ammunition
and stores, were placed upon 200 bateaux, which were to be escorted
to Skenesborough by five armed galleys and a guard of 600 men, all
under the command of Colonel Long. In thus abandoning Ticonderoga, St.
Clair justified himself, saying that "we had lost a post, but saved a
province."
St. Clair, leaving his heavy artillery and many supplies behind, with
the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga passed undisturbed, at midnight, over
the floating bridge across the lake. On the southern side the troops
from Fort Independence joined him, and all were safely escaping, when,
without orders, General De Fermois's headquarters were fired, the
blaze of which disclosed the retreat to the enemy. The alarm was at
once given, and the deserted forts were seized by the British. General
Fraser was in pursuit at daylight of the 6th, followed soon after by
General Riedesel with the German grenadiers.
[Illustration: ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.
From a photograph of a miniature furnished by Mr. F. D. Stone. It was
painted near the close of the war. Daniel Goodwin, Jr., _Provincial
Pictures_, p. 72, says there is another miniature on ivory, owned by
Miss Mary R. Sheets, of Indianapolis.
[Illustration]
A likeness by C. W. Peale hangs in Independence Hall in Philadelphia.
It was drawn by J. B. Longacre, and engraved by E. Wellmore. It
represents him at the time he was governor of the Northwest Territory.
Cf. _St. Clair Papers_; Goodwin's _Provincial Pictures_, p.72. There is
also a pencil sketch by John Trumbull given in the _St. Clair Papers_,
and in the illustrated edition of Irving's _Washington_. Cf. 2 _Penna.
Archives_, vol. x.; Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 132. A view of his home
is given in Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 1156.—ED.]
Meanwhile, Burgoyne and Phillips, in the fleet, broke through the boom
and bridge across the lake, in chase of Colonel Long and the American
flotilla, which, on the afternoon of the 7th, was overtaken and
attacked at the wharves of Skenesborough. Two of the covering galleys
struck their colors, and the others were blown up by their crews. The
bateaux, mills, and stockade there were promptly burned, and then
the detachment fled to Fort Anne, eleven miles below. Early the next
morning Long sallied out and had a sharp encounter with his pursuers
under Colonel Hill; but when victory was almost within his grasp, the
enemy was reinforced by a number of savages sent forward by Burgoyne,
who had remained at Skenesborough. Colonel Long, after burning Fort
Anne, retreated sixteen miles to Fort Edward, where he met Schuyler on
his way to Ticonderoga with a small reinforcement.
St. Clair, with the main body, was even less fortunate. He retreated
through the wilderness to Castleton, his rear-guard of 1,200 men,
under Colonel Warner, stopping over night at Hubbardton, where on
the morning of the 8th it was attacked by Fraser with an inferior
force. After a spirited engagement Hale's militia regiment abandoned
the field, and the enemy was reinforced by the arrival of Riedesel's
Brunswickers, which latter turned the American right flank and
compelled their retreat to Rutland, the rendezvous appointed by St.
Clair in the event of disaster. From here the remnant of St. Clair's
forces, by a circuitous march of more than a hundred miles, on the
12th reached Fort Edward, where Schuyler, on the 20th, could muster
only 4,467 men fit for duty. This little army was deficient in almost
every requisite for battle, while Burgoyne, flushed with victory, lay
within a day's forced march with his veteran army of nearly double the
American force.
Schuyler was charged by Congress with "neglect of duty" in not ordering
a timely retreat of the garrison from Ticonderoga, if untenable; and,
if to be defended, not to have been present at the attack upon it.
The court-martial, of thirteen distinguished officers, unanimously
acquitted him "with the highest honor."[727]
These reverses, which closed the first act of the drama of varied
events in this checkered campaign, seemed to open the way to Burgoyne's
triumph, and they spread universal alarm among the patriots, who had
considered Ticonderoga the closed gate to northern invasion. These
disasters, however, were blessings in disguise, despite the desertion
of the militia. Washington predicted ultimate success, and Schuyler was
roused to great efforts to oppose the enemy's advance. Wood Creek was
at once obstructed with logs and huge stones; all roads were broken up
and their bridges destroyed; dry land was converted into morass, trees
were felled in every direction, and the whole of this wild and savage
country was stripped of cattle and supplies, for which the enemy had
consequently to depend upon Canada and remoter England.
Having provided this barrier against the enemy, Schuyler, who had
been joined by Arnold, fell back to Fort Miller with his artillery
(brought from Fort George), where he tarried till he had ruined the
road over which he passed, and thence proceeded to Stillwater to await
reinforcements, making that his fortified headquarters, while his
little army occupied a camp, which was intrenched on Van Schaick's
Island, near the mouth of the Mohawk.
Burgoyne was so elated by his successes that he dispatched his
aide-de-camp Captain Gardner to England, "with news so important to
the king's service, and so honorable to the troops under his command."
But while the British colors were flying over Ticonderoga, he little
dreamed of the difficulties and reverses which were awaiting him. To
provide garrisons for these works in his rear, to which he had sent
all his surplus artillery and baggage, he was compelled "to drain the
life-blood of his army", since Carleton had declined to supply the
necessary troops for their defence, on the ground that his jurisdiction
as governor did not extend beyond the bounds of Canada.
Burgoyne availed himself of the water transportation of Lake George for
most of his artillery and stores; but, for the march of his army from
Skenesborough, a trackless wilderness confronted him, through which he
had to remove countless obstacles, cut a new pathway, and build no less
than forty bridges, one of which, over a swamp, was two miles long.
Wood Creek had also to be opened for his bateaux. In these laborious
undertakings his army was exhausted with overwork, and suffered
terribly with midsummer heat and innumerable insects. Consequently,
with his utmost efforts, he did not reach Fort Edward till July 30th,
or twenty-four days after leaving Lake Champlain, a distance of only
twenty-six miles. Burgoyne remained at Fort Edward till August 15th,
awaiting the transportation across the portage from Lake George of
the necessary artillery, ammunition, provisions, and bateaux for his
descent of the Hudson.
During this enforced delay important events were occurring elsewhere,
on the Mohawk and near Bennington. General Lincoln at the same time was
recruiting troops in New England, with which to attempt the recapture
of Ticonderoga and cut off the British retreat to Canada.
Fort Stanwix, or Fort Schuyler as it was subsequently called, on the
head-waters of the Mohawk, near the present Rome, N. Y., was built in
1758, and in April, 1777, was put under command of Colonel Gansevoort,
who, with Colonel Marinus Willet, placed it in a better condition of
defence. The garrison of the work was 750 Continental troops, before
which St. Leger, accompanied by the loyalist Sir John Johnson, and
Joseph Brant the great Mohawk chief, appeared, August 2, and the
next day summoned it to surrender. Gansevoort paying no attention to
this, the British colonel prepared for a regular siege, and sent out
detachments to cut off all succor.
The inhabitants of Tryon County were panic-stricken, but the aged
General Herkimer by great efforts collected 800 militia and marched
to Oriskany, within eight miles of the fort, to which he sent a
messenger with a request that upon the messenger's arrival three guns
should be fired and a sortie made to facilitate the advance of the
succoring party through the besiegers. The signal was delayed, and,
unfortunately, Herkimer's better judgment was overruled by his younger
officers, who were impatient of delay. This led to his moving forward
and to his being ambushed in a valley, the head of which was held by
loyalists, while Indian allies under Brant occupied the sides. Here a
desperate hand-to-hand fight of five hours ensued, early in which the
brave Herkimer was mortally wounded; but seated upon his saddle, and
propped against a tree, he calmly continued to give his orders and
animate his men with his own heroism till the end of the battle.
At length the long-expected signal guns were heard, when Colonel Willet
with 250 men made a sudden dash upon a weak part of the besiegers'
camp. Though he failed to reach Herkimer, he destroyed two sections of
the enemy's intrenchments, and captured the British camp equipage, Sir
John Johnson's papers, five flags, and some prisoners.
The Indians, who had lost many of their braves at Oriskany, hearing
the sound of Willet's musketry in their rear, quickly retreated, and
were soon followed by the loyalists, leaving Herkimer in possession of
the field. St. Leger still continued the siege of the fort, where now
floated for the first time the American flag, just adopted by Congress,
made of alternate stripes of a soldier's white shirt and a camp-woman's
red petticoat, the field being cut out of an old blue overcoat. Beneath
this were hung the five captured British standards.
St. Leger on the 7th again demanded the surrender of the fort,
threatening Indian vengeance, and falsely stating that Burgoyne was in
possession of Albany. Gansevoort returned an indignant refusal to this
disgraceful threat. Soon came rumors of the approach of the intrepid
Arnold to raise the siege. Statements sent forward of his numbers,
purposely exaggerated, caused the flight of the panic-stricken Indians,
and St. Leger, August 22, abandoned his trenches, some artillery and
camp equipage, and fled to Canada. The right wing of the invaders being
thus paralyzed, Arnold returned in triumph to join Schuyler.
Burgoyne's difficulties increased. His Indian allies were
insubordinate, and the patriots swelled the American ranks. Finding
that his scanty supplies had to be replenished from his distant base
in Canada, or rather from England, he decided to make a raid upon
Bennington, to secure horses, cattle, and provisions from the depot
there. He hoped also that this move would strike terror among the
unfriendly inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants, who hung "like a
gathering storm upon his left", and also would elevate the flagging
spirits of his army, by a victory which he supposed would be easy.
Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Baum was dispatched with a select corps
of 550 British, German, and loyalist troops and 150 Indians. Colonel
Breyman, with 642 heavy dismounted Brunswick chasseurs, was sent on
the 15th as a support. To oppose this expedition, General John Stark
hastily collected 1,400 trained militia.
[Illustration: JOHN STARK.
After a silhouette given in Rev. Albert Tyler's _Bennington, the
battle, 1777; Centennial Celebration, 1877_ (Worcester, 1878). This
book is of some interest for its account of the ground and its
landmarks, and relics of the battle. A view of Stark's monument is
given in Potter's _Manchester_, N. H., p. 584; and an account of his
homestead is in the _Granite Monthly_, v. 84. The usual portrait of
Stark is that given in Caleb Stark's _Memoir of Gen. John Stark_
(Concord, 1860), and in the illustrated ed. of Irving's _Washington_,
ii. 437. Cf. _N. E. Hist. Geneal. Reg._, July, 1853, and the original
ed. of the Stark _Memoirs_, for another likeness.—ED.]
Though constant skirmishing took place on the 15th, a pouring rain
prevented a general engagement till the next day, when the determined
Yankee leader declared he would beat the invader or "before night
Molly Stark would be a widow." To fulfil his pledge he seized the
initiative, attacked the enemy on three sides, stormed their
intrenchments on the Walloomscoick River and captured their guns,
dispersed the Indians and loyalists, and went in hot pursuit of
the Germans and British, when his exhausted forces were checked by
Breyman's supporting detachment. Colonel Warner's excellent regiment,
at once fresh and eager, arrived that afternoon and renewed the action,
which was continued till dark, when Breyman, under the cover of night,
made good his retreat. Baum was mortally wounded, 207 men were killed,
700 were captured, including the wounded; and 1,000 stand of small
arms, all the enemy's artillery and most of their baggage fell into the
hands of the Americans. Had there been another hour of daylight, none
would have escaped. Stark's losses were 40 killed and 42 wounded.
This victory and the success in the Mohawk valley were as inspiriting
to the American as depressing to the Anglo-German army. Burgoyne was
now beset with danger on every side. Formidable obstacles accumulated
in his path, famine stared him in the face; all his English flour and
beef had been consumed, and the whole surrounding country was sending
enthusiastic volunteers to bar his progress.
Nearly a month before, Washington had predicted that Burgoyne's
successes "would precipitate his ruin", and that his "acting in
detachments was the course of all others most favorable to the American
cause", as cutting off any of them "would inspirit the people and do
away with much of their present anxiety." The beginning of the end had
already come.
The first stage in this eventful campaign was for Burgoyne a great
success; the second was an equally great failure; and now the last was
coming, in which the most decisive results and the highest plaudits
were to be won or lost. Schuyler unquestionably would have been the
hero of this final development had he not most inopportunely been
replaced by Gates, a mediocre soldier. Fortunately, the latter's
deficiencies were compensated by officers inferior in rank but superior
in ability,—the dashing Arnold, the daring Morgan, not to name others.
[Illustration: HORATIO GATES.
From _An Impartial Hist. of the War in Amer._, London, 1780, p. 494.
The engraving in the Boston edition, 1781, vol. ii., is by J. Norman.
Smith (_Brit. Mez. Portraits_) records an engraving published in
London, Jan. 2, 1778, which represents him holding a similar scroll,
but "with right hand on hip."—ED.]
Congress, in the exercise of its prerogative, made and displaced
generals at its will, and too often was influenced by sectional
interests and rivalries. The command of the Northern Department was
especially the prize of party favorites. Wooster, Thomas, Sullivan,
Schuyler, and Gates had in rapid succession followed each other, and
now Schuyler, after all he had done to baffle the enemy and organize
victory, was to be the victim of prejudice—of New England against
New York—which dated back to colonial days. Schuyler placed little
reliance upon New England troops, and their representatives in Congress
had as little confidence in Schuyler's generalship.
[Illustration: Horatio Gates
From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, vol. ii. There is a
portrait by Stuart, published in 1798 as engraved by Tiebout, given in
steel (bust only) by H. B. Hall in Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest
of Canada_ (p. 140), and in photogravure (whole picture) in Mason's
Stuart (p. 183). The expression in this last is wholly different
from the steel engraving. There is also a picture in the _Heads of
Illustrious Americans_, London, 1783. There are other likenesses,—cf.
Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 586; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 669.
Gates after the war lived for a while on his estate in the Shenandoah
valley (view of his house in _Appleton's Journal_, July 19, 1873, p.
69, and Mrs. Lamb's _Homes of America_), but finally removed to New
York, and lived near what is now Second Avenue and Twenty-third Street.
A view of the house occupied by him as headquarters at Saratoga is in
Lossing's _Hudson River_, p. 94.—ED.]
Each misjudged the other; but the outcome of this feeling between Dutch
and Puritan blood was unfortunate in superseding the soldierly Schuyler
by the intriguing Gates. And it was a cruel reverse to the former, just
as his skilful plans were culminating in the utter discomfiture of
the enemy, and his successes at Stanwix and Bennington were bringing
reinforcements from every quarter to his standard with which to take
the offensive, that he should be shorn of the laurels which were about
to crown him as the brilliant leader in this most important campaign of
the Revolution. If Schuyler had been left in command, probably all the
after-complications connected with Burgoyne's surrender would have been
avoided.
The resolution of Congress superseding Schuyler reached him on the 10th
of August. The noble patriot responded to this ungenerous censure by
renewed efforts for his army till Gates's arrival on the 19th, and then
he extended to his unworthy successor the courtesy of a true gentleman,
for with him the country's welfare was paramount to all personal wrongs.
Gates, clothed with plenary powers and granted by Congress almost
everything denied to Schuyler, moved, after a delay of three weeks,
with his army, 6,000 strong, from the mouth of the Mohawk to Bemis's
Heights, a commanding position on the west bank of the Hudson, which
was selected by Arnold and fortified by the engineer Kosciusko. The
principal hill was occupied on three sides by extensive intrenchments
and redoubts with an abatis. A line of breastworks on the east extended
from the hill to the Hudson, to guard a floating bridge across the
river and to sweep the plain in front; and on the west was a lower hill
which was only partially fortified. The whole position was covered by a
ravine in front, through which flowed a branch of Mill Creek.
Gates took personal command of the right wing of the army, occupying
the intrenchments between the Hudson and the heights to the west;
Learned held the centre; while Arnold had charge of the left wing,
comprising Morgan's riflemen, some Continental troops, and a body of
militia.
To coöperate in checking the advance of the enemy, General Lincoln with
2,000 militia was sent to threaten Burgoyne's communications. Colonel
Brown with 500 of Lincoln's force, on September 18th, surprised the
outposts and key-points of Ticonderoga, destroyed over two hundred
bateaux and gunboats, captured 293 prisoners and 5 cannon, released 100
Americans, and brought away the Continental standard left flying over
the fort when abandoned by St. Clair.
Burgoyne was greatly perplexed. To retreat was to acknowledge his
weakness, and to advance was possibly to sacrifice his army and
lose his coveted peerage. Under these circumstances he stood still,
hoping his recent defeats would soon be forgotten, and he should be
strengthened for the future.
Having finally received from Lake George his artillery, military
stores, and thirty days' provisions, Burgoyne crossed to the west bank
of the Hudson; September 13th-14th, he moved with his army to Saratoga;
on the 15th-16th he tarried at Dovegot (near Coveville) to reconnoitre,
repair bridges, and open roads over this rugged country; on the 17th
he marched to Sword's Farm; on the 18th he advanced to Wilbur's Basin,
within two miles of the American position, having constantly to
skirmish with Arnold; and on the morning of the 19th he was engaged
in reconnoitring and making preparations to attack Gates, if deemed
expedient.
A table-land, intersected with ravines through which flowed Mill Creek
and its branches, separated the two armies. Except a narrow cultivated
strip, adjoining the Hudson, the ground was covered in great part by a
dense forest. The river formed its eastern boundary, and on the north,
west, and south sides were wooded heights, separated from each other by
valleys.
While the Americans occupied the south heights, the Anglo-German army
made ready to take possession of those on the north, and then to turn
the western hills, thus to get in rear of the American left by a flank
movement of their right, while their centre attacked in front and was
supported by their left.
About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Burgoyne's army
advanced in three columns. He, in person, in command of the centre
column, moved towards Freeman's Farm, opposite to the American left;
Riedesel and Phillips with a large train of artillery, forming the
left column, followed the river road, and, after the attack had begun,
turned westward to support and prolong the line of battle of the
deployed centre; while, by a circuitous march, Fraser, with Breyman's
German riflemen, having his flanks covered by Canadians, loyalists,
and Indians, moved with the right column, taking post westward of
the centre, thus greatly overlapping the American left, which it was
designed to turn and rout.
Gates, called by Burgoyne "an old midwife", impassively looked on,
giving no orders and evincing no desire to fight, while the impatient
Arnold, foreseeing the enemy's movement to turn his left, sent Morgan's
riflemen and some of Dearborn's light infantry to check it. They rushed
upon the enemy, and dispersed the Canadians and Indians; but following
up their success too eagerly, they soon encountered the British line of
battle, and were overpowered by superior numbers. This being reported
to Gates, the Continental troops were sent to support Morgan, but the
entire force proved insufficient to cope with and counteract Fraser's
movement. Arnold, undismayed, then changed his direction, and fell
suddenly upon the enemy's centre with a view of separating Burgoyne
from Fraser. The battle was waged with great fury by both antagonists,
and as each received reinforcements the conflict deepened, and, with
varying success, became more and more stubborn. Burgoyne finally
escaped defeat by the timely coming up of Riedesel with Pausch's
artillery. After this death-struggle of four hours' duration, darkness
terminated the contest. The Americans fell back in good order to their
intrenchments, while the Anglo-German army, lying on their arms,
retained the barren field of their foiled efforts to advance. Though
both sides claimed the victory, neither had triumphed at "Freeman's
Farm." It was in reality a drawn battle. The forces engaged in the
conflict were nearly equal, the Americans having about 3,000 and the
enemy nearly 3,500 of their best troops. The loss of the former was
65 killed, 218 wounded, and 38 missing; while that of the latter,
according to their own authorities, was about 600 killed and wounded.
British bayonets and abundant artillery were fully matched by American
rifles, without a single piece of ordnance. Had Arnold been properly
reinforced by Gates, he might have broken the enemy's line and have
gained a complete victory.
Gates's army was confident and jubilant as to the issue of the
campaign, Burgoyne's anxious and despondent; while both generals
strengthened their positions, and their camps resounded with "dreadful
note of preparation" for a coming conflict.
[Illustration:
From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. iii. There is
also a likeness in Murray's _Impartial Hist._ Cf. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._
October, 1883, p. 326.—ED.]
The quarrel which had been brewing between Gates and Arnold, growing
out of former jealousy and the supersedure of Schuyler, ripened into
open hostility. The crisis of the feud came when Gates failed in his
official report to make any mention of Arnold's personal participation
in the battle of Freeman's Farm. Thereupon a violent altercation
ensued, resulting in Arnold being relieved of his command and excluded
from headquarters.
Though unemployed, he continued with the army, the officers of his
division begging him not to leave them, as another battle was impending.
The two armies confronted each other within cannon-shot, and scarcely a
night passed without some contest between pickets or foraging parties.
Burgoyne, anxiously awaiting news of Sir Henry Clinton's coöperation
from New York, tenaciously held his ground, though living upon half
rations. Gates in the mean time supinely rested in his camp, awaiting
the day when the ripened fruit of Schuyler's skill, in retarding the
enemy's march and cutting off his detachments, should fall at his feet,
and Burgoyne be compelled to starve or pass under the Caudine Forks.
* * * * *
Sir Henry Clinton, having been reinforced from England, left New
York, October 3, with a large fleet and 3,000 troops, to effect the
long-expected junction with Burgoyne. On the 5th he reached Verplanck's
Point, on the Hudson River, from which he made a feint upon Peekskill.
Having by this ruse deceived the aged Putnam, in command of the Hudson
Highlands, Clinton crossed with his main body on the 6th to King's
Ferry, and, by following a circuitous route around the Dunderberg
Mountain, the British general in the afternoon carried by assault the
feebly garrisoned but bravely defended Forts Montgomery and Clinton.
The enemy's fleet then destroyed the boom and chain across the river,
forced the Americans to burn two frigates, which could not escape,
and ended their excursion up the Hudson at Esopus (now Kingston) by
laying it in ashes and returning to New York, it being too late to save
Burgoyne.
* * * * *
[Illustration: SIR HENRY CLINTON.
From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, i. p. 526.—ED.]
The American army, after the battle of Freeman's Farm, was daily
growing stronger in men and fortifications, while the Anglo-German
force was constantly becoming weaker and worn out by watching and
incessant alarms. Burgoyne's situation was critical, for he could
neither advance nor retreat with safety, and to stand still was to
starve. Already the loyalists and Canadians were deserting in numbers,
and his Indians, having little opportunity for plundering and scalping,
were abandoning him altogether.
Receiving no tidings from Sir Henry Clinton, Burgoyne determined
to make an armed reconnoissance of the American left on the 7th of
October, and attack the next day, should there be a reasonable prospect
of success; if not, to fall back on the 11th behind the Batten-Kill.
Accordingly, leaving proper guards for his camp, Burgoyne in person,
at ten A. M. of the 7th, with 1,500 choice troops and ten pieces of
artillery, moved out for the contemplated reconnoissance, which was
at the same time to cover a foraging party to gather wheat for the
pressing necessities of his army. His troops were formed in three
columns, and when within three quarters of a mile of the American left
were deployed in line of battle upon open ground behind a screen of
dense forest. Fraser, with 500 picked men, formed the right, ready
to fall upon Gates's left; Riedesel, with his Brunswickers, held the
centre; Phillips was in charge of the British left; while the Indians,
rangers, and provincials were to work their way through the woods to
gain the left and rear of the American camp, in which Lincoln then
commanded the right, and Gates had taken Arnold's place on the left.
So soon as the enemy moved and the foragers were at work, Gates ordered
out Morgan. Divining Burgoyne's intention, Morgan was to seize the
high ground on the enemy's right by making a wide sweep; Learned was
to hold the German centre in check; and Poor, with his brigade of
Continentals and some militia, concealed by the woods, was to assail
the British left. Poor, supported by Learned, opened the battle at
half past two with great fury against Major Acland's grenadiers, and
extended his blows to Riedesel's centre; Morgan and Dearborn almost
simultaneously fell like a thunderbolt upon the enemy's right.
[Illustration: GEORGE CLINTON.
Reproduced from Delaplaine's _Repository of the lives and portraits
of Distinguished Americans_ (Philad.). It was painted by Ames. It is
engraved on steel in Allen C. Beach's _Centennial Celebrations of the
State of New York_ (Albany, 1879), and by J. B. Forrest in Irving's
_Washington_, ii. 209. A profile likeness by St. Memin is engraved in
the _Doc. Hist. N. Y._, vol. iv. A portrait in uniform at an earlier
age was etched by H. B. Hall, in 1866, and appears in the _Mag. of
American History_, December, 1881. An engraving of a bust by Ceracchi
(owned by the N. Y. Hist. Soc.) accompanies a memoir of Clinton by W.
L. Stone in _Ibid._, iii. 336.—ED.]
Burgoyne, seeing the danger of Fraser's right being turned, ordered
him to fall back to a new position, in doing which Fraser was mortally
wounded by one of Morgan's sharpshooters. In the mean time, Poor was
playing wild havoc with Acland's grenadiers, captured Phillips's
artillery after killing nearly all of its gunners, and then turned
their own pieces upon the British, putting the entire left of their
army to flight.
The Germans still firmly held their ground in the centre, when Arnold,
maddened by his wrongs, dashed wildly into the thickest of the
fight, without authority assumed command of his old division, with
audacity and judgment led regiment after regiment to the attack at
different points, roused his troops to the highest enthusiasm, and
forced back by his impetuous assaults the already shattered British
line, which Burgoyne then courageously led in person. But all of the
British commander's determination was of little avail, his entire
forces being driven back into their intrenched camp. Here the wreck
of the Anglo-German army made a firm stand; but Arnold still sought
new dangers. With desperation he and his fearless followers mounted
embankments and abatis to assail Balcarras, then dashed upon the strong
works of the German camp, and ceased not his furious onsets till the
whole of the enemy's fortified position lay open, when night closed the
scene.
The American army in this decisive battle lost 50 killed and 150
wounded, including among the latter the dauntless Arnold. The enemy,
besides nine guns, a large supply of ammunition, and much baggage, lost
176 killed, about 250 wounded, and some 200 prisoners. Among those who
lost their lives were the gallant Fraser and the sturdy Breyman, and
included in the wounded were several British officers of high rank.
Burgoyne, signally defeated and exposed to a new attack by double his
fighting force, prudently retreated, on the stormy night of the 8th,
to Saratoga, leaving behind his sick, wounded, and everything he could
possibly spare. General Fraser was buried, as he had requested, in a
large redoubt near the Hudson, the guns fired over his grave being the
American artillery aimed at the group of distinguished mourners before
knowing the occasion of their assembling.
Gates, who had not been personally engaged in either battle of his
army, remained two days with his main body in the abandoned camp of the
enemy at Wilbur's Basin, he judiciously having sent detachments to take
advantageous positions to hem in Burgoyne. On the 11th, Gates ordered
his main body to cross the Fishkill, supposing Burgoyne had further
retreated; but his advanced guard of 1,500 men under Nixon quickly
withdrew, having discovered the enemy intrenched and in battle array on
the other side of the stream.
Burgoyne, now finding himself exposed to the concentric fire of the
Americans, who nearly surrounded him, and having no opening through
which to retreat to Lake George or to Lake Champlain, called a council
of war to deliberate upon his desperate situation. "By their unanimous
concurrence and advice", says he, "I was induced to open a treaty with
Major-General Gates." At ten A. M. of the 14th, a flag of truce was
sent by Burgoyne, asking for a parley, during which Gates demanded an
unconditional surrender of the enemy's troops as prisoners of war. This
proposition Burgoyne peremptorily refused to entertain. Hostilities in
the mean time were suspended, and modified proposals were made. After
two days' delay, Gates, hearing of Sir Henry Clinton's advance up the
Hudson, and fearing that he might reach Albany, agreed upon the terms,
dictated by Burgoyne, as follows:—
The Anglo-German troops to march out of their camp with all the honors
of war, and their artillery to be moved to the bank of the Hudson
River, and there left, together with the soldiers' arms, which were
to be piled at the word of command from their own officers. It was
further agreed that a free passage to Great Britain should be granted
to the troops on condition of their not serving again in the present
contest; that all officers should retain their baggage and side-arms,
and not be separated from their men; and that all, of whatever country
they might be, following the camp, should be included in the terms of
capitulation. Before signing the treaty, Burgoyne demurred to designate
it as a _capitulation_, whereupon Gates readily consented to its being
called a TREATY OF CONVENTION, and as such it was signed October 16,
1777.
[Illustration: BURGOYNE TO GATES.
Somewhat reduced, after the fac-simile in Wilkinson's _Memoirs_, i.
282.—ED.]
Burgoyne in a rich uniform, accompanied by his brilliant staff and
general officers, rode, on October 17, to the headquarters of General
Gates, who was simply attired in a plain blue coat. Reining up their
horses, Burgoyne gracefully raising his cocked hat, said, "The fortune
of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner;" to which the victor,
gracefully returning the salute, replied, "I shall always be ready
to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your
excellency."
[Illustration: WASHINGTON AND GATES.
From _Bickerstaff's Boston Almanac_. This is from the title of the
number for 1778, and shows the kind of effigies popularly current in
such publications.—ED.]
On the site of old Fort Hardy the Anglo-German army, October 17,
grounded their arms at the command of their own officers, none of the
American troops being present to witness this humiliation of the enemy.
In the afternoon the captured troops crossed the Hudson, and, escorted
by a company of light dragoons, were marched between the parallel
lines of American soldiers, preceded by two officers, unfurling "the
stars and stripes" just adopted by Congress. While this ceremony took
place in the presence of Burgoyne and Gates, the former drew his sword
and presented it to the latter, which being received was courteously
returned, when both generals retired into Gates's tent.[728]
While the prisoners, under guard of General Heath, were marching to
Boston, Gates hurried to Albany to oppose any movement of Sir Henry
Clinton; and Major Wilkinson was sent to Congress to communicate
the joyful tidings of Burgoyne's surrender. Rejoicings were heard
throughout the United States, and the successful general was so elated
and his vanity so stimulated that he aspired to supplant Washington, as
he had Schuyler.
* * * * *
A few criticisms upon the plan of the campaign of 1777, and the mode
of conducting it, may be permitted. The British cabinet wisely decided
upon the seizure of the Hudson as the most efficient way of breaking
the power of the revolted colonies; but, in carrying out its design, it
violated a fundamental maxim of war. No principle of strategy is better
established than the superiority of _interior_ as against _exterior_
lines of operation of armies, as was so admirably illustrated in the
"Seven Years' War." Frederic the Great, without any frontier barriers
and open to attack on all sides, from his central position kept at bay
France, Austria, Russia, Saxony, Sweden, and the Germanic body, whose
united population was over twenty times as great as that of Prussia,
including Silesia, a recently conquered province. In like manner, the
Americans, in July, 1777, were within a great circle,—Schuyler on the
upper Hudson, Putnam at the Highlands, and Washington in New Jersey,
within supporting distance of each other; while the British armies were
widely separated upon its vast circumference,—St. Leger moving to
the upper Mohawk, Burgoyne from Canada, Clinton at New York, and Howe
sailing to the Chesapeake.
In the struggle for the Hudson, the two independent British armies—one
in Canada and the other in New York—were expected to coöperate in
order to attain a common object, while Burgoyne with the one was tied
down by fixed orders, and Clinton with the other had no instructions
as to the part he was expected to perform. Besides, their bases were
separated by about four hundred miles of wild, hostile, and thinly
populated country, rendering intercommunication so difficult that, of
ten messengers sent out by different routes to Howe, not one returned
to Burgoyne.
No precaution was taken to provide for the losses of Burgoyne's
army, nor to supply the necessary drafts upon it to garrison the
posts in his rear, guarding his communications with Canada. When he
gained possession of Ticonderoga, he called upon Sir Guy Carleton to
furnish the necessary force to hold the place; but Carleton did not
feel justified, under his precise orders, to send troops beyond his
jurisdiction. Consequently, Burgoyne "drained the life-blood of his
force" in the field to provide for the defence of this and other works
left behind.
Burgoyne's _logistics_, or means of supplying and moving his army, were
very defective. Not till June 7, 1777, a month after his arrival in
Canada, did he make provision for the transportation of either stores
or artillery, and then his arrangements were so entirely inadequate
that they seemed based upon the assumption that his adversary was his
inferior in all military qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the
resources of the expedition for the rest", while for his own personal
baggage he used no less than "_thirty carts_." Most of his provisions
had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from
Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the
hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on
reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its
existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington.
After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his
army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead
of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward,
which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th.
Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned
measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route
were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and
from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been
followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled
to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them
over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would
have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany.
General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne
could have been reassembled at 'Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have
been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy
guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there
or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort
Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is
about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of
ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have
swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay
for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the
British commander had proclaimed, "This army must not retreat." Though
he subsequently tried to palliate his mistake, all his correspondence
shows that pride in carrying out his declaration, not military
principles, made him persevere in the false movement which lost him the
campaign, and secured in the end American independence.
Burgoyne, after his brilliant success at the opening of the campaign,
suddenly relapsed into the sluggishness of his German allies. Instead
of rapidly pursuing his demoralized foe, he tarried at Skenesborough
till his pathway was thoroughly obstructed and the fugitives had
recovered from their panic. After he had lost his prestige and the
Americans had gained confidence by success at Stanwix and Bennington,
he attempted with diminished forces to cope with the growing strength
of his opponent. Thus, by delay, he lost in September what he might
have achieved in July. From his arrival at Skenesborough till he had
reached his southernmost point at Freeman's Farm, he moved only _fifty
miles in seventy-four days_.
Slow in all his movements, Burgoyne's tardiness was increased by his
large and superfluous train of artillery which accompanied all his
toilsome marches. Even when he required the greatest celerity, he chose
for his raid upon Bennington, not the nimble-footed light infantry
under the dashing Fraser, but cumbrous dismounted German dragoons
moving only a mile and a third an hour.
Burgoyne was not only slow, but he was irresolute. After his disastrous
defeat at Bemis's Heights he lost five precious days in fatal
indecision while retreat was possible. On October 12th his last chance
had passed, he then being completely invested by the Americans, and
nothing was left to him but surrender. According to Madame Riedesel,
he had given in this crisis of his fate more attention to his mistress
than to his army. Aspasia had triumphed over Mars.
While Burgoyne committed many blunders, his opponents had their
shortcomings also. The fortifications of Ticonderoga, after falling
into the hands of the Americans, were too much extended for their
defence by a moderate garrison; but the most fatal error was the
failure to occupy Mount Defiance, which completely commanded all the
American works, and, when seized by the British, left St. Clair no
alternative but hasty retreat and the abandonment of much artillery and
considerable supplies. The fugitives then counted largely on the delay
of their pursuers, who followed them with celerity, severely punishing
them at Skenesborough and Hubbardton.
Congress committed the most criminal error, outweighing all others, in
substituting, at the most critical moment of the campaign, a military
charlatan for an accomplished soldier,—in supplanting Schuyler, who
was the organizer of the victories, by Gates, who "had no fitness for
command and wanted personal courage." To say nothing of the difference
in merit of the two commanders, the time for making the change was most
inopportune.
Putnam, a brave officer but no general, managed things so badly in the
Highlands that Forts Montgomery and Clinton were lost, and the Hudson
was opened to the enemy whenever he chose to advance.[729]
CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
THE titles alone of the numerous works which have been consulted in the
preparation of the foregoing narratives would fill many of these pages.
Therefore, to avoid repetition, as most of them are common to all the
chapters of this History of the American Revolution, reference will
be made only to those authorities which have a bearing upon disputed
points, or to newly discovered facts respecting the "Struggle for the
Hudson."