are some who place the highest merit of _Demosthenes_ in the frequent use
he makes of them. For be his subject what it will, almost all his
sentences have a figurative air: and, indeed, a plentiful intermixture of
this sort of figures is the very life and soul of a popular Eloquence. But
as you are thoroughly acquainted with these, my Brutus, what occasion is
there to explain and exemplify them? The bare mention of them will be
sufficient.--Our Orator, then, will sometimes exhibit an idea in different
points of view, and when he has started a good argument, he will dwell
upon it with an honest exultation;--he will extenuate what is
unfavourable, and have frequent recourse to raillery;--he will sometimes
deviate from his plan, and seem to alter his first purpose:--he will
inform his audience beforehand, what are the principal points upon which
he intends to rest his cause;--he will collect and point out the force of
the arguments he has already discussed; he will check an ardent
expression, or boldly reiterate what he has said;--he will close a lively
paragraph with some weighty and convincing sentiment;--he will press upon
his adversary by repeated interrogations;--he will reason with himself,
and answer questions of his own proposing;--he will throw out expressions
which he designs to be otherwise understood than they seem to mean;--he
will pretend to doubt what is most proper to be said, and in what order;--
he will divide an action, &c. into its several parts and circumstances, to
render it more striking;--he will pretend to pass over and relinquish a
circumstance which might have been urged to advantage;--he will secure
himself against the known prejudices of his audience;--he will turn the
very circumstance which is alledged against him to the prejudice of his
antagonist;--he will frequently appeal to his hearers, and sometimes to
his opponent;--he will represent the very language and manners of the
persons he is speaking of;--he will introduce irrational and even
inanimate beings, as addressing themselves to his audience;--he will (to
serve some necessary purpose) steal off their attention from the point in
debate;--he will frequently move them to mirth and laughter;--he will
answer every thing which he foresees will be objected;--he will compare
similar incidents,--refer to past examples,--and by way of amplification
assign their distinguishing qualities to opposite characters and
circumstances;--he will check an impertinent plea which may interrupt his
argument;--he will pretend not to mention what he might have urged to good
purpose;--he will caution his hearers against the various artifices and
subterfuges which may be employed to deceive them;--he will sometimes
appear to speak with an honest, but unguarded freedom;--he will avow his
resentment;--he will entreat;--he will earnestly supplicate;--he will
apologize;--he will seem for a moment to forget himself;--he will express
his hearty good wishes for the deserving, and vent his execrations against
notorious villainy;--and now and then he will descend imperceptibly to the
most tender and insinuating familiarities. There are likewise Other
beauties of composition which he will not fail to pursue;--such as brevity
where the subject requires it;--a lively and pathetic description of
important occurrences;--a passionate exaggeration of remarkable
circumstances;--an earnestness of expression which implies more than is
said;--a well-timed variety of humour;--and a happy imitation of different
characters and dispositions. Assisted and adorned by such figures as
these, which are very numerous, the force of Eloquence will appear in its
brightest lustre. But even these, unless they are properly formed and
regulated, by a skilful disposition of their constituent words, will never
attain the merit we require;--a subject which I shall be obliged to treat
of in the sequel, though I am restrained partly by the circumstances
already mentioned, but much more so by the following. For I am sensible
not only that there are some invidious people, to whom every improvement
appears vain and superfluous; but that even those, who are well-wishers to
my reputation, may think it beneath the dignity of a man whose public
services have been so honourably distinguished by the Senate, and the
whole body of the Roman people, to employ my pen so largely upon the art
of Speaking. [Footnote: The long apology which our author is now going to
make for bestowing his time in composing a treatise of Oratory, is in fact
a very artful as well as an elegant digression; to relieve the dryness and
intricacy of the abstract he has just given us of the figures of rhetoric,
and of the subsequent account of the rules of prosaic harmony. He has also
enlivened that account (which is a very long one) in the same manner, by
interspersing it, at convenient distances, with fine examples, agreeable
companions, and short historical digressions to elucidate the subject.]
If, however, I was to return no other answer to the latter, but that I was
unwilling to deny any thing to the request of Brutus, the apology must be
unexceptionable; because I am only aiming at the satisfaction of an
intimate friend, and a worthy man, who desires nothing of me but what is
just and honourable.
But was I even to profess (what I wish I was capable of) that I mean to
give the necessary precepts, and point out the road to Eloquence to those
who are desirous to qualify themselves for the Forum, what man of sense
could blame me for it? For who ever doubted that in the decision of
political matters, and in time of peace, Eloquence has always borne the
sway in the Roman state, while Jurisprudence has possessed only the second
post of honour? For whereas the former is a constant source of authority
and reputation, and enables us to defend ourselves and our friends in the
most effectual manner;--the other only furnishes us with formal rules for
indictments, pleas, protests, &c. in conducting which she is frequently
obliged to sue for the assistance of Eloquence;--but if the latter
condescends to oppose her, she is scarcely able to maintain her ground,
and defend her own territories. If therefore to teach the Civil Law has
always been reckoned a very honourable employment, and the houses of the
most eminent men of that profession, have been crowded with disciples; who
can be reasonably censured for exciting our youth to the study of
Eloquence, and furnishing them with all the assistance in his power? If it
is a fault to speak gracefully, let Eloquence be for ever banished from
the state. But if, on the contrary, it reflects an honour, not only upon
the man who possesses it, but upon the country which gave him birth, how
can it be a disgrace to _learn_, what it is so glorious to _know_? Or why
should it not be a credit to _teach_ what it is the highest honour to
have _learned_?
But, in one case, they will tell me, the practice has been sanctified by
custom, and in the other it has not. This I grant: but We may easily
account for both. As to the gentlemen of the law, it was sufficient to
hear them, when they decided upon such cases as were laid before them in
the course of business;--so that when they taught, they did not set apart
any particular time for that purpose, but the same answers satisfied their
clients and their pupils. On the other hand, as our Speakers of eminence
spent their time, while at home, in examining and digesting their causes,
and while in the Forum in pleading them, and the remainder of it in a
seasonable relaxation, what opportunity had they for teaching and
instructing others? I might venture to add that most of our Orators have
been more distinguishied by their _genius_, than by their _learning_; and
for that reason were much better qualified to be _Speakers_ than
_Teachers_; which it is possible may be the reverse of my case.--"True,"
say they; "but teaching is an employment which is far from being
recommended by its dignity." And so indeed it is, if we teach like mere
pedagogues. But if we only direct, encourage, examine, and inform our
pupils; and sometimes accompany them in reading or hearing the
performances of the most eminent Speakers;--if by these means we are able
to contribute to their improvement, what should hinder us from
communicating a few instructions, as opportunity offers? Shall we deem it
an honourable employment, as indeed with us it is, to teach the form of a
legal process, or an excommunication from the rites and privileges of our
religion; and shall it not be equally honourable to teach the methods by
which those privileges may be defended and secured?--"Perhaps it may,"
they will reply; "but even those who know scarcely any thing of the law
are ambitious to be thought masters of it; whereas those who are well
furnished with the powers of Eloquence pretend to be wholly unacquainted
with them; because they are sensible that useful knowledge is a valuable
recommendation, whereas an artful tongue is suspected by every one." But
is it possible, then, to exert the powers of Eloquence without discovering
them? Or is an Orator really thought to be no Orator, because he disclaims
the title? Or is it likely that, in a great and noble art, the world will
judge it a scandal to _teach_ what it is the greatest honour to _learn_?
Others, indeed, may have been more reserved; but, for my part, I have
always owned my profession. For how could I do otherwise, when, in my
youth, I left my native land, and crossed the sea, with no other view but
to improve myself in this kind of knowledge; and, when afterwards my house
was crowded with the ablest professors, and my very style betrayed some
traces of a liberal education? Nay, when my own writings were in every
body's hands, with what face could I pretend that I had not studied? Or
what excuse could I have for submitting my abilities to the judgment of
the public, if I had been apprehensive that they would think I had studied
to no purpose? [Footnote: This sentence in the original runs thus;--_Quid
erat cur probarem_ (i.e. scripta nostra), _nisi quod parum fortasse
profeceram_?--"Wherefore did I approve of them," (that is, of my writings,
so far as to make them public) "but because I had," (in my own opinion)
"made a progress, though perhaps a small one, in useful literature?" This,
at least, is the only meaning I am able to affix to it; and I flatter
myself, that the translation I have given of it, will be found to
correspond with the general sense of my author.] But the points we have
already discussed are susceptible of greater dignity and elevation, than
those which remain to be considered. For we are next to treat of the
arrangement of our words; and, indeed, I might have said, of the art of
numbering and measuring our very syllables; which, though it may, in
reality, be a matter of as much consequence as I judge it to be, cannot
however be supposed to have such a striking appearance in precept as in
practice. This, indeed, might be said of every other branch of useful
knowledge; but it is more remarkably true with respect to this. For the
actual growth and improving height of all the sublimer arts, like that of
trees, affords a pleasing prospect; whereas the roots and stems are
scarcely beheld with indifference: and yet the former cannot subsist
without the latter. But whether I am restrained from dissembling the
pleasure I take in the subject, by the honest advice of the Poet, who
says,
"Blush not to own the art you love to practise."
or whether this treatise has been extorted from me by the importunity of
my friend, it was proper to obviate the censures to which it will probably
expose me. And yet, even supposing that I am mistaken in my sentiments,
who would shew himself so much of a savage, as to refuse me his indulgence
(now all my forensic employments and public business are at an end) for
not resigning myself to that stupid inactivity which is contrary to my
nature, or to that unavailing sorrow which I do my best to overcome,
rather than devote myself to my favourite studies? These first conducted
me into the Forum and the Senate-House, and they are now the chief
comforts of my retirement. I have, however, applied myself not only to
such speculations as form the subject of the present Essay, but to others
more sublime and interesting; and if I am able to discuss them in a proper
manner, my private studies will be no disparagement to my forensic
employments.
But it is time to return to our subject.--Our words, then, should be so
disposed that every following one may be aptly connected with the
preceding, so as to make an agreeable sound;--or that the mere form and
_concinnity_ of our language may give our sentences their proper measure
and dimensions;--or, lastly, that our periods may have a numerous and
measured cadence.
The first thing, then, to be attended to, is the _structure_ of our
language, or the agreeable connection of one word with another; which,
though it certainly requires care, ought not to be practised with a
laborious nicety. For this would be an endless and puerile attempt, and is
justly ridiculed by _Lucilius_, when he introduces _Scaevola_ thus
reflecting upon _Albucius_:
"As in the checquer'd pavement ev'ry square
Is nicely fitted by the mason's care:
So all thy words are plac'd with curious art,
And ev'ry syllable performs its part."
But though we are not to be minutely exact in the _structure_ of our
language, a moderate share of practice will habituate us to every thing of
this nature which is necessary. For as the eye in _reading_, so the mind
in _speaking_, will readily discern what ought to follow,--that, in
connecting our words, there may neither be a chasm, nor a disagreeable
harshness. The most lively and interesting sentiments, if they are harshly
expressed, will offend the ear, that delicate and fastidious judge of
rhetorical harmony. This circumstance, therefore, is so carefully attended
to in the Roman language, that there is scarcely a rustic among us who is
not averse to a collision of vowels,--a defect which, in the opinion of
some, was too scrupulously avoided by _Theopompus_, though his master
_Isocrates_ was equally cautious. But _Thucydides_ was not so exact; nor
was Plato, (though a much better writer)--not only in his _Dialogues_, in
which it was necessary to maintain an easy negligence, to resemble the
style of conversation, but in the famous _Panegyric_, in which (according
to the custom of the Athenians) he celebrated the praises of those who
fell in battle, and which was so greatly esteemed, that it is publicly
repeated every year. In that Oration a collision of vowels occurs very
frequently; though _Demosthenes_ generally avoids it as a fault.
But let the Greeks determine for themselves: we Romans are not allowed to
interrupt the connection of our words. Even the rude and unpolished
Orations of _Cato_ are a proof of this; as are likewise all our poets,
except in particular instances, in which they were obliged to admit a few
breaks, to preserve their metre. Thus we find in _Naevius_,
"_Vos_ QUI ACCOLITIS _histrum_ FLUVIUM ATQUE ALGIDUM."
And in another place,
"_Quam nunquam vobis_ GRAII ATQUE _Barbari_."
But _Ennius_ admits it only once, when he says,
"_Scipio invicte_;"
and likewise I myself in
"_Hoc motu radiantis_ ETESIAE IN _Vada Ponti_."
This, however, would seldom be suffered among us, though the Greeks often
commend it as a beauty.
But why do I speak of a collision of vowels? for, omitting this, we have
frequently _contracted_ our words for the sake of brevity; as in _multi'
modis, vas' argenteis, palm' et crinibus, tecti' fractis_, &c. We have
sometimes also contracted our proper _names_, to give them a smoother
sound: for as we have changed _Duellum_ into _Bellum_, and _duis_ into
_bis_, so _Duellius_, who defeated the Carthagenians at sea, was called
_Bellius_, though all his ancestors were named _Duellii_. We likewise
abbreviate our words, not only for convenience, but to please and gratify
the ear. For how otherwise came _axilla_ to be changed into _ala_, but by
the omission of an unweildy consonant, which the elegant pronunciation of
our language has likewise banished from the words _maxillae, taxillae,
vexillum_, and _paxillum_?
Upon the same principle, two or more words have been contracted into one,
as _sodes_ for _si audes_, _sis_ for _si vis_, _capsis_ for _cape si vis_,
_ain'_ for _aisne_, _nequire_ for _non quire_, _malle_ for _magis velle_,
and _nolle_ for _non velle_; and we often say _dein'_ and _exin'_ for
_deinde_ and _exinde_. It is equally evident why we never say _cum nobis_,
but _nobiscum_; though we do not scruple to say _cum illis_;--_viz._
because, in the former case, the union of the consonants _m_ and _n_ would
produce a jarring sound: and we also say _mecum_ and _tecum_, and not _cum
me_ and _cum te_, to correspond with _nobiscum_ and _vobiscum_. But some,
who would correct antiquity rather too late, object to these contractions:
for, instead of _prob_ DEÛM _atque hominum fidem_, they say _Deorum_. They
are not aware, I suppose, that custom has sanctified the licence. The same
Poet, therefore, who, almost without a precedent, has said _patris mei
MEÛM FACTÛM pudet_, instead of _meorum factorum_,--and _textitur exitiûm
examen rapit_ for _exitiorum_, does not choose to say _liberum_, as we
generally do in the expressions _cupidos liberûm_, and _in liberûm loco_,
but, as the literary virtuosos above-mentioned would have it,
_neque tuum unquam in gremium extollas_
LIBERORUM _ex te genus_,
and,
_namque Aesculapî_ LIBERORUM.
But the author before quoted says in his Chryses, not only
_Cives, antiqui amici majorum_ MEÛM,
which was common enough--, but more harshly still,
CONSILIÛM, AUGURIÛM, _atque_ EXTÛM _interpretes_;
and in another place,
_Postquam_ PRODIGIÛM HORRIFERÛM PORTENTÛM _pavos_.
a licence which is not customary in all neuters indifferently: for I
should not be so willing to say armûm _judicium_, as _armorum_; though in
the same writer we meet with _nihilne ad te de judicio_ armûm _accidit_?
And yet (as we find it in the public registers) I would venture to say
_fabrûm_, and _procûm_, and not _fabrorum_ and _procorum_. But I would
never say duorum virorum _judicium_, or _trium_ virorum _capitalium_, or
_decem_ virorum _litibus judicandis_. In Accius, however, we meet with
_Video sepulchra duo_ duorum _corporum_;
though in another place he says,
_Mulier una_ duum virum.
I know, indeed, which is most conformable to the rules of grammar: but yet
I sometimes express myself as the freedom of our language allows me, as
when I say at pleasure, either _prob deum_, or _prob deorum_;--and, at
other times, as I am obliged by custom, as when I say _trium_ virum for
_virorum_, or sestertium nummum for _nummorum_: because in the latter case
the mode of expression is invariable.
But what shall we say when these humourists forbid us to say _nosse_ and
_judicasse_ for _novisse_ and _judicavisse_; as if we did not know, as
well as themselves, that, in these instances, the verb at full length is
most agreeable to the laws of grammar, though custom has given the
preference to the contracted verb? Terence, therefore, has made use of
both, as when he says, _eho tu cognatum tuum non norâs_? and afterwards,
_Stilphonem, inquam, noveras_?
Thus also, _fiet_ is a perfect verb, and _fit_ a contracted one; and
accordingly we find in the same Comedian,
_Quam cara_ SINTQUE _post carendo intelligunt_,
and
_Quamque attinendi magni dominatus_ SIENT.
In the same manner I have no objection to _scripsere alii rem_, though I
am sensible that _scripserunt_ is more grammatical; because I submit with
pleasure to the indulgent laws of custom which delights to gratify the
ear. _Idem campus habet_, says Ennius; and in another place, _in templis
îsdem_; _eisdem_, indeed, would have been more grammatical, but not
sufficiently harmonious; and _iisdem_ would have sounded still worse.
But we are allowed by custom even to dispense with the rules of etymology
to improve the sweetness of our language; and I would therefore rather
say, _pomeridianas Quadrigas_, than _postmeridianas_; and _mehercule_,
than _mehercules_. For the same reason _non scire_ would now be deemed a
barbarism, becaule _nescire_ has a smoother sound; and we have likewise
substituted _meridiem_ for _medidiem_, because the latter was offensive to
the ear. Even the preposition _ab_, which so frequently occurs in our
compound verbs is preserved entire only in the formality of a Journal,
and, indeed, not always there: in every other sort of language it is
frequently altered. Thus we say _amovit_, _abegit_, and _abstulit_; so
that you can scarcely determine whether the primitive preposition should
be _ab_ or _abs_. We have likewise rejected even _abfugit_, and _abfer_,
and introduced _aufugit_ and _aufer_ in their stead;--thus forming a new
preposition, which is to be found in no other verb but these. _Noti_,
_navi_, and _nari_, have all been words in common use: but when they were
afterwards to be compounded with the preposition _in_, it was thought more
harmonious to say _ignoti_, _ignavi_, and _ignari_, than to adhere
strictly to the rules of etymology. We likewise say _ex usu_, and _e
Republicâ_; because, in the former case, the preposition is followed by a
vowel, and, in the latter, it would have sounded harshly without omitting
the consonant; as may also be observed in _exegit, edixit, refecit,
retulit_, and _reddidit_.
Sometimes the preposition alters or otherwise affects the first letter of
the verb with which it happens to be compounded; as in _subegit,
summutavit_, and _sustutit_. At other times it changes one of the
subsequent letters; as when we say _insipientem_ for _insapientem_,
_iniquum_ for inaequum_, _tricipitem_ for _tricapitem_, and _concisum_ for
_concaesum_: and from hence some have ventured to say _pertisum_ for
_pertaesum_, which custom has never warranted.
But what can be more delicate than our changing even the natural quantity
of our syllables to humour the ear? Thus in the adjectives _inclytus_, and
_inhumanus_, the first syllable after the preposition is short, whereas
_insanus_ and _infelix_ have it long; and, in general, those words whose
first letters are the same as in _sapiens_ and _felix_, have their first
syllable long in composition, but all others have the same syllable short,
as _composuit, consuevit, concrepuit, confecit_. Examine these liberties
by the strict rules of etymology, and they must certainly be condemned;
but refer them to the decision of the ear, and they will be instantly
approved.--What is the reason? Your ear will inform you they have an
easier sound; and every language must submit to gratify the ear. I myself,
because our ancestors never admitted the aspirate, unless where a syllable
began with a vowel, used to say _pulcros, Cetegos, triumpos_, and
_Cartaginem_: but some time afterwards, though not very soon, when this
grammatical accuracy was wrested from me by the censure of the ear, I
resigned the mode of language to the vulgar, and reserved the theory to
myself. But we still say, without any hesitation, _Orcivios, Matones,
Otones, coepiones, sepulcra, coronas_, and _lacrymas_, because the ear
allows it. _Ennius_ always uses _Burrum_, and never _Pyrrhum_; and the
ancient copies of the same author have
_Vi patefecerunt BRUGES_,