_eloquent_, we may presume that neither Cotta, Sulpicius, nor Hortensius
would have succeeded any better. For _Cotta_ had no expansion, _Sulpicius_
no temper, and _Hortensius_ too little dignity. But the two former (I mean
Crassus and Antonius) had a capacity which was better adapted to every
species of Oratory. I had, therefore, to address myself to the ears of a
city which had never been filled by that multifarious and extensive
Eloquence we are discoursing of; and I first allured them (let me have
been what you please, or what ever were my talents) to an incredible
desire of hearing the finished Speaker who is the subject of the present
Essay. For with what acclamations did I deliver that passage in my youth
concerning the punishment of parricides [Footnote: Those unnatural and
infamous wretches, among the Romans, were sown into a leathern sack, and
thus thrown into the sea; to intimate that they were unworthy of having
the lead communication with the common elements of water, earth, and
air.], though I was afterwards sensible it was too warm and extravagant?
--"What is so common, said I, as air to the living, earth to the dead, the
sea to floating corpses, and the shore to those who are caft upon it by
the waves! But these wretches, as long as life remains, so live as not to
breathe the air of heaven;--they so perish, that their limbs are not
suffered to touch the earth;--they are so tossed to and fro' by the waves,
as never to be warned by them;--and when they are cast on the shore, their
dead, carcases cannot rest upon the surface of the rocks!" All this, as
coming from a youth, was much applauded, not for it's ripeness and
solidity, but for the hopes it gave the Public of my future improvement.
From the same capacity came those riper expressions,--"She was the spouse
of her son-in-law, the step-mother of her own offspring? and the mistress
of her daughter's husband [Footnote: This passage occurs in the peroration
of his Defence of Cluentius]."
But I did not always indulge myself in this excessive ardour of
expression, or speak every thing in the same manner: for even that
youthful redundance which was so visible in the defence of _Roscius_, had
many passages which were plain and simple, and some which were, tolerably
humourous. But the Orations in defence of _Habitus_, and _Cornelius_, and
indeed many others; (for no single Orator, even among the peaceful and
speculative Athenians, has composed such a number as I have;)--these, I
say, have all that variety which I so much approve. For have _Homer_ and
_Ennius_, and the rest of the Poets, but especially the tragic writers,
not expressed themselves at all times with the same elevation, but
frequently varied their manner, and sometimes lowered it to the style of
conversation; and shall I oblige myself never to descend from that highest
energy of language? Bit why do I mention the Poets whose talents are
divine! The very actors on the stage, who have most excelled in their
profession, have not only succeeded in very different characters, though
still in the same province; but a comedian has often acted tragedies, and
a tragedian comedies so as to give us universal satisfaction. Wherefore,
then, should not _I_ also exert my efforts? But when I say _myself_, my
worthy Brutus I mean _you_: for as to _me_, I have already done all, I was
capable of doing. Would _you_, then, plead every cause in the same manner?
Or is there any sort of causes which your genius would decline? Or even in
the same cause, would you always express yourself in the same strain, and
without any variety? Your favourite _Demosthenes_, whose brazen statue I
lately beheld among your own, and your family images, when I had the
pleasure to visit you at Tusculanum,--Demosthenes, I say, was nothing
inferior to _Lysias_ in simplicity; to _Hyperides_ in smartness and
poignancy, or to _Aeschines_ in the smoothness and splendor of his
language. There are many of his Orations which are entirely of the close
and simple character, as that against _Lepsines_; many which are all
nervous, and striking, as those against _Philip_; and many which are of a
mixed character, as that against _Aeschines_, concerning the false
embassy, and another against the same person in defence of _Ctesiphon_. At
other times he strikes into the _mean_ at his pleasure, and quitting the
nervous character, descends to this with all the ease imaginable. But he
raises the acclamations of his audience, and his Oratory is then most
weighty and powerful, when he applies himself to the _nervous_.
But as our enquiries relate to the art, and not to the artist, let us
leave _him_ for the present, and consider the nature and the properties of
the object before us,--that is, of _Eloquence_. We must keep in mind,
however, what I have already hinted,--that we are not required to deliver
a system of precepts, but to write as judges and critics, rather than
teachers. But I have expatiated so largely upon the subject, because I
foresee that you (who are, indeed, much better versed in it, than I who
pretend to inform you) will not be my only reader; but that my little
essay, though not much perhaps to my credit, will be made public, and with
your name prefixed to it.
I am of opinion, therefore, that a finished Orator should not only possess
the talent (which, indeed, is peculiar, to himself) of speaking copiously
and diffusively: but that he should also borrow the assistance of it's
nearest neighbour, the art of Logic. For though public speaking is one
thing, and disputing another; and though there is a visible difference
between a private controversy, and a public Harangue; yet both the one and
the other come under the notion of reasoning. But mere discourse and
argument belongs to the Logician, and the art of Speaking gracefully and
ornamentally is the prerogative of the Orator. _Zeno_, the father of the
_Stoics_, used to illustrate the difference between the two by holding up
his hand;--for when he clenched his fingers, and presented a close fist,--
"_that_," he said, "was an emblem of Logic:"--but when he spread them out
again, and displayed his open hand,--"this," said he, "resembles
Eloquence." But Aristotle observed before him, in the introduction to his
Rhetoric, that it is an art which has a near resemblance to that of
Logic;--and that the only difference between them is, that the method of
reasoning in the former is more diffusive, and in the latter more close
and contracted.
I, therefore, advise that our finished Orator make himself master of every
thing in the art of Logic, which is applicable to his profession:--an art
(as your thorough knowledge of it has already informed you) which is
taught after two methods. For Aristotle himself has delivered a variety of
precepts concerning the art of Reasoning:--and besides these, the
_Dialecticians_ (as they are called) have produced many intricate and
thorny speculations of their own. I am, therefore, of opinion, that he who
is ambitious to be applauded for his Eloquence, should not be wholly
unacquainted with this branch of Erudition; but that he ought (at least)
to be properly instructed either in the old method, or in that of
_Chrysippus_. In the first place, he should understand the force, the
extension, and the different species of words as they stand singly, or
connected into sentences. He should likewise be acquainted with the
various modes and forms in which any conception of the mind may be
expressed--the methods of distinguishing a true proposition from a false
one;--the different conclusions which result from different premises;--the
true consequences and opposites to any given proposition;--and, if an
argument is embarrassed by ambiguities, how to unravel each of them by an
accurate distinction. These particulars, I say, should be well understood
by an Orator, because they are such as frequently occur: but as they are
naturally rugged and unpleasing, they should be relieved in practice by an
easy brilliance of expression.
But as in every topic which is discussed by reason and method, we should
first settle what it is we are to discourse upon,--(for unless the parties
in a dispute are agreed about the subject of it, they can neither reason
with propriety, nor bring the argument to an issue;)--it will frequently
be necessary to explain our notions of it, and, when the matter is
intricate, to lay it open by a _definition_;--for a _definition_ is only a
sentence, or explanation, which specifies, in as few words as possible,
the nature of the object we propose to consider. After the _genus_, or
kind, has been sufficiently determined, we must then proceed (you know) to
examine into it's different species, or subordinate parts, that our whole
discourse may be properly distributed among them. Our Orator, then, should
be qualified to make a just definition;--though not in such a close and
contracted form, as in the critical debates of the Academy, but more
explicitly and copiously, and as will be best adapted to the common way of
thinking, and the capacity of the vulgar. He is likewise, as often as
occasion requires, to divide the genus into it's proper species, so as to
be neither defective, nor redundant. But _how_ and _when_ this should be
done, is not our present business to consider: because, as I observed
before, I am not to assume the part of a teacher, but only of a critic and
a judge.
But he ought to acquaint himself not only with the art of Logic, but with
all the common and most useful branches of Morality. For without a
competent knowledge of these, nothing can be advanced and unfolded with
any spirit and energy, or with becoming dignity and freedom, either
concerning religion,--death,--filial piety,--the love of our country,--
things good or evil,--the several virtues and vices,--the nature of moral
obligation,--grief or pleasure, and the other emotions of the mind,--or
the various errors and frailties of humanity,--and a variety of important
topics which are often closely connected with forensic causes; though
_here_(it is true) they must be touched upon more slightly and
superficially. I am now speaking of the _materials_ of Eloquence, and not
of the _art_ itself:--for an Orator should always be furnished with a
plentiful stock of sentiments,--(I mean such as may claim the attention of
the learned, as well as of the vulgar)--before he concerns himself about
the language and the manner in which he ought to express himself.
That he may make a still more respectable and elevated figure (as we have
already observed of _Pericles_) he should not be unacquainted with the
principles of Natural Philosophy. For when he descends, as it were, from
the starry heavens, to the little concerns of humanity, he will both think
and speak with greater dignity and splendor. But after acquainting himself
with those divine and nobler objects of contemplation, I would have him
attend to human concerns. In particular, let him make himself master of
the _Civil Law_, which is of daily, and indeed necessary use in every kind
of causes. For what can be more scandalous, than to undertake the
management of judicial suits and controversies, without a proper knowledge
of the laws, and of the principles of Equity and Jurisprudence? He
should also be well versed in History and the venerable records of
Antiquity, but particularly those of his own country: not neglecting,
however, to peruse the annals of other powerful nations, and illustrious
monarchs;--a toil which has been considerably shortened by our friend
_Atticus_, who (though he has carefully specified the time of every
event, and omitted no transaction of consequence) has comprized the
history of seven hundred years in a single volume. To be unacquainted with
what has passed in the world, before we came into it ourselves, is to be
always children. For what is the age of a single mortal, unless it is
connected, by the aid of History, with the times of our ancestors?
Besides, the relation of past occurrences, and the producing pertinent and
striking examples, is not only very entertaining, but adds a great deal of
dignity and weight to what we say.
Thus furnished and equipped our Orator may undertake the management of
causes. But, in the first place, he should be well acquainted with their
different kinds. He should know, for instance, that every judicial
controversy must turn either upon a matter of _fact_, or upon the meaning
of some particular expression. As to the former, this must always relate
either to the _reality_ of a fast, the _equity_ of it, or the _name_ it
bears in law. As to forms of expression, these may become the subject of
controversy, when they are either _ambiguous_, or _contradictory_. For
when the _spirit_ of a law appears to be at variance with the _letter_ of
it, this must cause an ambiguity which commonly arises from some of the
preceding terms; so that in this case (for such is the nature of an
ambiguity) the law will appear to have a double meaning.
As the kinds of causes are so few, the rules for the invention of
arguments must be few also. The topics, or common places from which those
arguments are derived, are twofold,--the one _inherent_ in the subject,
and the other _assumptive_. A skilful management of the former contributes
most to, give weight to a discourse, and strike the attention of the
hearer: because they are easy, and familiar to the understanding.
What farther remains (within the province of the Art) but that we should
begin our discourses so as to conciliate the hearer's good-will, or raise
his expectation, or prepare him to receive what follows?--to state the
case before us so concisely, and yet so plausibly and clearly, as that the
substance of it may be easily comprehended?--to support our own proofs,
and refute those of our antagonist, not in a confused and disorderly
manner, but so that every inference may be fairly deducible from the
premises?--and, in the last place, to conclude the whole with a peroration
either to inflame or allay the passions of the audience? How each of these
parts should be conducted is a subject too intricate and extensive for our
present consideration: for they are not always to be managed in the same
manner.
But as I am not seeking a pupil to instruct, but an Orator who is to be
the model of his profession, _he_ must have the preference who can always
discern what is proper and becoming. For Eloquence should, above all,
things, have that kind of discretion which makes her a _perfect mistress
of time and character_: because we are not to speak upon every occasion,
or before every audience, or against every opponent, or in defence of
every client, and to every Judge, in the same invariable manner. He,
therefore, is the man of genuine Eloquence, who can adapt his language to
what is most suitable to each. By doing this, he will be sure to say every
thing as it ought to be said. He will neither speak drily upon copious
subjects, nor without dignity and spirit upon things of importance; but
his language will always be proportioned, and equal to his subject. His
introduction will be modest,--not flaming with all the glare of
expression, but composed of quick and lively turns of sentiment, either to
wound the cause of his antagonist, or recommend his own. His narratives
will be clear and plausible,--not delivered with the grave formality of an
Historian, but in the style of polite conversation. If his cause be
slight, the thread of his argument, both in proving and refuting, will be
so likewise, and he will so conduct it in every part, that his language
may rise and expand itself, as the dignity of his subject encreases. But
when his cause will admit a full exertion of the powers of Eloquence, he
will then display himself more openly;--he will then rule, and bend the
passions, and direct them, at his pleasure,--that is, as the nature of his
cause and the circumstances of the time shall require.
But his powers of ornament will be chiefly exerted upon two occasions; I
mean that striking kind of ornament, from which Eloquence derives her
greatest glory. For though every part of an Oration should have so much
merit, as not to contain a single word but what is either weighty or
elegant; there are two very interesting parts which are susceptible of the
greatest variety of ornament. The one is the discussion of an indefinite
question, or general truth, which by the Greeks (as I have before
observed) is called a _thesis_: and the other is employed in amplifying
and exaggerating, which they call an _auxesis_. Though the latter, indeed,
should diffuse itself more or less through the whole body of a discourse,
it's powers will be more conspicuous in the use and improvement of the
_common places_:--which are so called, as being alike _common_ to a number
of causes, though (in the application of them) they are constantly
appropriated to a single one. But as to the other part, which regards
universal truths, or indefinite questions, this frequently extends through
a whole cause:--for the leading point in debate, or that which the
controversy hinges upon, is always most conveniently discussed when it can
be reduced to a general question, and considered as an universal
proposition:--unless, indeed, when the mere truth of a matter of fact: is
the object: of disquisition: for then the case must be wholly conjectural.
We are not, however, to argue like the _Peripatetics_ (who have a neat
method of controversy which they derive from _Aristotle_) but more
nervously and pressingly; and general sentiments must be so applied to
particular cases, as to leave us room to say many extenuating things in
behalf of the Defendant, and many severe ones against the Plaintiff. But
in heightening or softening a circumstance, the powers of language are
unlimited, and may be properly exerted, even in the middle of an argument,
as often as any thing presents itself which may be either exaggerated, or
extenuated; but, in, controul.
There are two parts, however, which must not be omitted;--for when these
are judiciously conducted, the sorce of Eloquence will be amazing. The one
is a certain _propriety of manner_ (called the _ethic_ by the Greeks)
which readily adapts itself to different dispositions and humours, and to
every station of life:--and the other is the pathetic, which rouses and
alarms the passions, and may be considered as the _scepter_ of Eloquence.
The former is mild and insinuating, and entirely calculated to conciliate
the good-will of the hearer: but the latter is all energy and fire, and
snatches a cause by open violence;--and when it's course is rapid and
unrestrained, the shock is irresistible. I [footnote: Here follows the
second passage above-referred to, in which there is a long string of
_Egotisms_. But as they furnish some very instructive hints, the Reader
will peruse them with more pleasure than pain] myself have possessed a
tolerable share of this, or, it may be, a trifling one:--but as I always
spoke with uncommon warmth and impetuosity, I have frequently forced my
antagonist to relinquish the field. _Hortensius_, an eminent Speaker, once
declined to answer me, though in defence of an intimate friend.
_Cataline_, a most audacious traitor, being publicly accused by me in the
Senate-house, was struck dumb with shame: and _Curio_, the father, when he
attempted to reply to me in a weighty and important cause which concerned
the honour of his family, sat suddenly down, and complained that I had
_bewitched_ him out of his memory. As to moving the pity of my audience,
it will be unnecessary to mention this. I have frequently attempted it
with good success, and when several of us have pleaded on the same side,
this part of the defence was always resigned to me; in which my supposed
excellence was not owing to the superiority of my genius, but to the real
concern I felt for the distresses of my client. But what in this respect
have been my talents (for I have had no reason to complain of them) may be
easily discovered in my Orations:--though a book, indeed, must lose much
of the spirit which makes a speech delivered in public appear to greater
advantage than when it is perused in the closet.
But we are to raise not only the pity of our judges, (which I have
endeavoured so passionately, that I once took up an infant in my arms
while I was speaking;--and, at another time, calling up the nobleman in
whose defence I spoke, and holding up a little child of his before the
whole assembly, I filled the Forum with my cries and lamentations:)--but
it is also necessary to rouse the judge's indignation, to appease it, to
excite his jealousy, his benevolence, his contempt, his wonder, his
abhorrence, his love, his desire, his aversion, his hope, his fear, his
joy, and his grief:--in all which variety, you may find examples, in many
accusatory speeches, of rousing the harsher passions; and my Defences will
furnish instances enough of the methods of working upon the gentler. For
there is no method either of alarming or soothing the passions, but what
has been attempted by _me_. I would say I have carried it to perfection,
if I either thought so, or was not afraid that (in this case) even truth
itself might incur the charge of arrogance. But (as I have before
observed) I have been so much transported, not by the force of my genius,
but by the real fervor of my heart, that I was unable to restrain myself:
--and, indeed, no language will inflame the mind of the hearer, unless the
Speaker himself first catches the ardor, and glows with the importance of
his subject. I would refer to examples of my own, unless you had seen them
already; and to those of other Speakers among the Romans, if I could
produce any, or among the Greeks, if I judged it proper. But _Crassus_
will only furnish us with a few, and those not of the forensic kind:--
_Antonius, Cotta_, and _Sulpicius_ with none:--and as to _Hortensius_, he
spoke much better than he wrote. We may, therefore, easily judge how
amazing must be the force of a talent, of which we have so few examples:--
but if we are resolved to seek for them, we must have recourse to
_Demosthenes_, in whom we find almost a continued succession of them, in
that part of his Oration for _Ctesiphon_, where he enlarges on his own
actions, his measures, and his good services to the State, For that
Oration, I must own, approaches so near to the primary form or semblance
of Eloquence which exists in my mind, that a more complete and exalted
pattern is scarcely desirable. But still, there will remain a general
model or character, the true nature and excellence of which may be easily
collected from the hints I have already offered.
We have slightly touched upon the ornaments
of language, both in single words, and in words as they stand connected
with each other;--in which our Orator will so indulge himself, that not a
single expression may escape him, but what is either elegant or weighty.
But he will most abound in the _metaphor_; which, by an aptness of
similitude, conveys and transports the mind from object to object, and
hurries it backwards and forwards through a pleasing variety of images;--a
motion which, in its own nature, (as being full of life and action) can
never fail to be highly delightful. As to the other ornaments of language
which regard words as they are connected with each other, an Oration will
derive much of its lustre from these. They are like the decorations in the
Theatre, or the Forum, which not only embellish, but surprize. [Footnote:
In the following Abstract of the Figures of _Language_ and _Sentiment_, I
have often paraphrased upon my author, to make him intelligible to the
English reader;--a liberty which I have likewise taken in several other
places, where I judged it necessary.] For such also is the effect of the
various _figures_ or decorations of language;--such as the doubling or
repetition of the same word;--the repeating it with a slight variation;
--the beginning or concluding several sentences in the same manner, or
both at once;--the making a word, which concludes a preceding sentence, to
begin the following;--the concluding a sentence with the same expression
which began it;--the repeating the same word with a different meaning;
--the using several corresponding words in the same case, or with the same
termination;--the contrasting opposite expressions;--the using words whose
meaning rises in gradation;--the leaving out the conjunctive particles to
shew our earnestness;--the passing by, or suddenly dropping a circumstance
we were going to mention, and assigning a reason for so doing;
--[Footnote: We have an instance of this, considered as a figure of
language, in the following line of Virgil;
Quos ego--, sed praestat motos componere fluctus.
Aeneid. I.
Whom I--, but let me still the raging waves.
This may likewise serve as an example of the figure which is next
mentioned.] the pretending to correct or reprove ourselves, that we may
seem to speak without artifice or partiality;--the breaking out into a
sudden exclamation, to express our wonder, our abhorrence, or our grief;--
and the using the same noun in different cases.