statements made by the Egestans, for the fleet to content itself with
making a demonstration and then returning home. The scheme of
Alcibiades, however, was adopted for gaining over the other Sicilian
states in order to crush Syracuse. But at this moment dispatches arrived
requiring the return of Alcibiades to stand trial. Athens was in a panic
over the Hermæ affair, which was supposed to portend an attempt to
reestablish the despotism which had been ended a hundred years before by
the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. Alcibiades, however, made his escape,
and for years pursued a life of political intrigue against the Athenian
government.
Nicias and Lamachus, left in joint command, drew off the Syracusan
forces by a ruse, and were thus enabled to occupy unchecked a strong
position before Syracuse. Although, however, they inflicted a defeat on
the returned Syracusan forces, they withdrew into winter quarters; the
Syracusans were roused by Hermocrates to improve their military
organisation; and both sides entered on a diplomatic contest for winning
over the other states of Sicily. Alcibiades, now an avowed enemy of
Athens, was received by the Lacedæmonians, whom he induced to send an
able Spartan officer, Gylippus, to Syracuse, and to determine on the
establishment of a military post corresponding to that of Pylos on Attic
soil at Decelea.
_IV.--The Disaster of Syracuse_
In the spring the Athenians succeeded in establishing themselves on the
heights called Epipolæ, overlooking Syracuse, began raising a wall of
circumvallation, and carried by a surprise the counter-stockade which
the Syracusans were raising. In one of the skirmishes, while the
building of the wall was in progress, Lamachus was killed; otherwise
matters went well for the Athenians and ill for the Syracusans, till
Gylippus was allowed to land at Himera, force his way into Syracuse, and
give new life. Nicias was guilty of the blunder of allowing Gylippus to
land at Himera, to aid the defence, at the moment when it was on the
point of capitulation. A long contest followed, the Athenians
endeavouring to complete the investing lines, the Syracusans to pierce
them with counterworks. Nicias sent to Athens for reinforcements, while
the Syracusans were energetically fitting out a fleet and appealing for
air in the Peloponnese. Nicias, in fact, was extremely despondent and
anxious to resign; the Athenians, however, answered his dispatches by
preparing a great reinforcement under the command of Demosthenes,
without accepting the resignation of Nicias. The Lacedæmonians, however,
also sent some reinforcements; at the same time they formally declared
war, and carried out the plan of occupying and fortifying Decelea, which
completely commanded the Athenian territory and was the cause of untold
loss and suffering.
Now, at Syracuse the besieged took the offensive both by sea and land,
and were worsted on the water, but captured some of the Athenian forts,
commanding the entry to the besiegers' lines--a serious disaster. By the
time that Demosthenes with his reinforcements reached Sicily nearly the
whole island had come over to the side of Syracuse. Before this, the
Syracusans had again challenged an engagement both by sea and land, with
results indecisive on the first day but distinctly in their favour on
the second. At this juncture, Demosthenes arrived, and, seeing the
necessity for immediate action, made a night attack on the Syracusan
lines; but, his men falling into confusion after a first success, the
attempt was disastrously repulsed.
Demosthenes was quick to realise that the whole situation was hopeless;
but Nicias lacked nerve to accept the responsibility of retiring, and
also had some idea that affairs within Syracuse were favourable. His
obstinacy gave Demosthenes and his colleague Eurymedon the impression
that he was guided by secret information. And now it became the primary
object of Gylippus and the Syracusans to keep the Athenians from
retiring. Another naval defeat reduced the Athenians to despair; they
resolved that they must cut their way out.
The desperate attempt was made, but by almost hopeless men against an
enemy now full of confidence. To the excited, almost agonised, watchers
on shore, it seemed for a brief space that the ships might force a
passage; the fight was a frenzied scuffle; but presently the terrible
truth was realised--the Athenian ships were being driven ashore. The
last hope of escape by sea was gone, for, though there were still ships
enough, the sailors were too utterly demoralised to make the attempt.
Hermocrates and Gylippus, sure that a retreat by land would not be
tried, succeeded by a trick in detaining the Athenians till they had
themselves sent out detachments to hold the roads. On the third day the
Athenians began their retreat in unspeakable misery, amid the
lamentations of the sick and wounded, whom they were forced to leave
behind. For three days they struggled on, short of food and perpetually
harassed, cut off from all communications. On the third day their
passage was barred in a pass, and they found themselves in a trap. On
the third night they attempted to break away by a different route, but
the van and the rear lost touch. Overtaken by the Syracusans,
Demosthenes attempted to fight a rearguard action, but in vain, and he
was forced to surrender at discretion with his whole force. Next day,
Nicias with the van was overtaken, and, after a ghastly scene of
confusion and slaughter, the remnants of the vanguard were forced to
surrender also. Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death; great numbers
were seized as private spoil by their captors, the rest of the
prisoners--more than 7,000--were confined for weeks under the most
noisome conditions in the quarries, and finally the survivors were sold
as slaves. So pitiably ended that once magnificent enterprise in the
nineteenth year of the war.
The terrific disaster filled every enemy of Athens with confident
expectation of her immediate and utter ruin. Lacedæmonians anticipated
an unqualified supremacy. At Athens there was a stubborn determination
to prepare for a desperate stand; but half the islanders were intriguing
for Lacedæmonian or Persian aid in breaking free, while Alcibiades
became extremely busy.
The first Peloponnesian squadron which attempted to move was promptly
driven into Piræus by an Athenian fleet and blockaded. On the open
revolt of some of the states, the Athenians for the first time brought
into play their reserve fund and reserve navy--the emergency had arisen.
While one after another of the subject cities revolted, the Athenians
struck hard at Chios, and especially Miletus, and obtained marked
successes. Meanwhile, a revolution in Samos had expelled the oligarchy
and re-established the democracy, to which the Athenians accorded
freedom, thereby securing an ally. In Lesbos also they recovered their
challenged supremacy.
Phrynicus now came into prominence as a shrewd commander and a crafty
politician, while the intricate intrigues of Alcibiades, whose great
object was to recover his position at Athens, created perpetual
confusion. These events took place in the twentieth year of the war, and
to them must be added a Lacedæmonian treaty with Persia through the
satrap Tissaphernes. All the leading men, however, were engaged in
playing fast and loose, each of them having his personal ambitions in
view. Of this labyrinth of plots and counter-plots, the startling
outcome was the sudden abrogation of the constitution at Athens and the
capture of the government by a committee of five with a council of four
hundred and a supplementary assembly of five thousand--in place of the
whole body of citizens as formerly. The Five and the Four Hundred in
effect were the Government, and established a reign of terror.
At Athens, the administration thus formed was effective; but the army
and fleet at Satnos repudiated the revolution and swore loyalty to the
democracy, claiming to be the true representatives of the Athenian
state. Moreover, they allied themselves with Alcibiades, expecting
through him to receive Persian support; and, happily for Athens, he
succeeded in restraining the fleet--which was still more than a match
for all adversaries--from sailing back to the Piræus to subvert the rule
of the Four Hundred. The more patriotic of the oligarchs saw, in fact,
that the best hopes for the state lay in the establishment of a limited
democracy; with the result that the extreme oligarchs, who would have
joined hands with the enemy, were overthrown, and the rule of the Five
Thousand replaced that of the Four Hundred, providing Athens with the
best administration it had ever known. A great naval victory was won by
the Athenian fleet, under the command of Thrasybulus, over a slightly
larger Peloponnesian fleet at Cynossema.
* * * * *
XENOPHON
Anabasis
Xenophon was born at Athens about B.C. 430, and died probably
in 355. He was an Athenian gentleman who in his early-manhood
was an intimate member of the Socratic circle. In 401 he
joined the expedition of Cyrus, recorded in the "Anabasis,"
and did not again take up his residence in Athens. The
"Anabasis" must be introduced by an historical note. In the
year 404 B.C. the Peloponnesian war was brought to a close by
a peace establishing the Lacedæmonian supremacy consequent
upon the crowning disaster to the Athenians at Aegos Potami.
In the same year the Persian king Darius Nothus died, and was
succeeded on the throne by his son Artaxerxes. His younger
son, Cyrus, determined to make a bid for the throne. He had
personal knowledge of the immense superiority of the Greek
soldiery and the Greek discipline over those of the Eastern
nations. Accordingly, he planned to obtain the services of a
large contingent of Greek mercenaries, who had become the more
readily available since the internecine struggle between the
two leading states of Hellas had been brought to an end. The
term "Anabasis," or "going up," applies properly to the
advance into the interior; the retreat, with which the work is
mainly concerned, is the "Katabasis." The author writes his
record in the third person. This epitome has been specially
adapted for THE WORLD'S GREATEST BOOKS from the Greek text.
_I.--The Going-up of Cyrus_
Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes the king, began his
preparations for revolt by gradually gathering and equipping an army on
the pretext of hostile relations between himself and another of the
western satraps, Tissaphernes. Notably, he secretly furnished Clearchus,
a Lacedæmonian, with means to equip a Greek force in Thrace; another
like force was ready to move from Thessaly under Aristippus; while a
Boeotian, Proxenus, and two others friends were commissioned to collect
more mercenaries to aid in the war with Tissaphernes.
Next, an excuse for marching up-country, at the head of all these
forces, was found in the need of suppressing the Pisidians. He advanced
from Sardis into Phrygia, where his musters were completed at Celænæ. A
review was held at Tyriæum, where the Cilician queen, who had supplied
funds, was badly frightened by a mock charge of the Greek contingent.
When the advance had reached Tarsus, there was almost a mutiny among the
Greeks, who were suspicious of the intentions of Cyrus. The diplomacy,
however, of their principal general, Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian,
coupled with promises of increased pay, prevailed, though it had long
been obvious that Pisidia was not the objective of the expedition.
Further reinforcements were received at Issus, the eastern seaport of
Cilicia; Cyrus then marched through the Cilician gate into Syria. At
Myriandrus two Greek commanders, probably through jealousy of Clearchus,
deserted. Cyrus won popularity by refusing to presume thereon; and the
whole force now struck inland to Thapsacus, on the Euphrates.
At Thapsacus, Cyrus announced his purpose. The Greek soldiers were angry
with their generals for having, as they supposed, wilfully misled them,
but were mollified by promise of large rewards. One of the commanders,
Menon, won the approval of Cyrus by being the first to lead his own
contingent across the Euphrates on his own initiative. The advance was
now conducted by forced marches through a painfully sterile country. In
the course of this, the troops of Clearchus and Menon very nearly came
to blows; the intervention of Proxenus only made matters worse; and
order was restored by the arrival of Cyrus, who pointed out that the
whole expedition must be ruined if the Greeks fell out among themselves.
By this time, Artaxerxes had realised that the repeated warnings of
Tissaphernes and others were justified; and as the expedition neared
Babylonia, signs of the enemy became apparent in the deliberate
devastation of the country. Here Orontes, one of the principal Persian
officers of Cyrus, was convicted of treason and put to death.
The army was again reviewed, the whole force amounting to some 100,000
barbarians and nearly 14,000 Greeks; the enemy were reputed to number
over 1,000,000, though not so many took part in the engagement. Cyrus
now advanced, expecting battle immediately at an entrenched pass; but,
finding this unoccupied, he did not maintain battle order; which was
hurriedly taken up on news of the approach of the royal forces. The
Greeks, under Clearchus, occupied the right wing, Cyrus being in the
centre, and Ariæus on the left. The king's army was so large that its
centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus.
The Greeks advanced on the royalist left, which broke and fled almost
without a blow. Thinking that the Greeks might be intercepted and cut
off, Cyrus charged the centre in person with his bodyguard, and routed
the opposing troops; but dashing forward in the hope of capturing
Artaxerxes, was himself pierced by a javelin, and fell dead on the
field. So ended the career of the most brilliant Persian since Cyrus the
Great had established the Persian Empire; brave, accomplished, the
mirror of honour, just himself and the rewarder of justice in others,
generous and most loyal to his friends.
_II.--The Homeward March_
When Cyrus fell, the left wing, under Ariæus, broke and fled. The Greeks
had meantime poured on in pursuit of the royalist left, while the main
body of the royalists were in possession of the rebel camp, though a
Greek guard, which had been left there, held the Greek quarter.
Artaxerxes, however, had no mind to give battle to the returning Greek
column.
It was not till next day that Clearchus and his colleagues learned by
messengers from Ariæus that Cyrus was slain, and that Ariæus had fallen
back to the last halting-place, where he proposed to wait twenty-four
hours, and no more, before starting in his retreat westward. Clearchus
replied, that the Greeks, for their part, had been victorious, and that
if Ariæus would rejoin them they would win the Persian crown for him,
since Cyrus was dead. The next message was from Artaxerxes inviting the
Greeks to give up their arms; to which they replied that he might come
and take them if he could, but if he meant to treat them as friends,
they would be no use to him without their arms, if as enemies, they
would keep them to defend themselves.
Though no formal appointment was made, the Greeks recognised Clearchus
as their leader. They fell back to join Ariæus, who declined the
proposal to seat him on the Persian throne; and it was agreed to follow
a new route in retreat to Ionia, the way by which the force had advanced
being now impracticable.
Now, however, Artaxerxes began to negotiate through Tissaphernes, the
Greeks maintaining a bold and even contemptuous front, warranted by the
king's obvious fear of risking an engagement.
Finally, an offer came to conduct the Greeks back to Grecian territory,
providing them, at their own cost, with necessaries. Prolonged delays,
however, aroused suspicions of treachery among the Greeks, who
distrusted Tissaphernes and Ariæus alike; but Clearchus held it better
not to break openly with the Persians. The march at last began along a
northerly route towards the Black Sea, the Greeks keeping rigidly apart
from the Persian forces which accompanied them, in readiness for an
attack.
At the crossing of the Tigris suspicion was particularly active, the
conduct of Ariæus being especially dubious; but still no overt
hostilities were attempted until the river Zabatus was reached, after
three weeks of marching. Here Clearchus endeavoured to end the extremely
strained relations between the Greeks and the barbarian commanders by an
interview with Tissaphernes. Both men carefully repudiated any idea of
hostile intentions, and the Persian invited Clearchus and the Greek
officers generally to attend a conference. Not all, but a considerable
number--five generals, including Clearchus, Proxenus, and Menon, with
twenty more officers and nearly two hundred others--attended. At a given
signal all were treacherously massacred; but a fugitive reached the
Greek camp, where the men sprang to arms. Ariæus, approaching with an
escort, declared that Clearchus had been proved guilty of treason, but
was received with fierce indignation, and withdrew.
Of the murdered generals, Clearchus was a man of high military capacity,
but a harsh disciplinarian, feared and respected, but very unpopular;
Proxenus, a particular friend of Xenophon, was an amiable but not a
strong man; Menon, the Thessalian, was a crafty and hypocritical
time-server, of whom no good can be spoken.
The ten thousand Greeks were now in an ugly predicament; they were a
thousand miles from home, while between them and the Black Sea lay the
mountains of Armenia. They were surrounded by hostile hordes, and were
without cavalry. They had no recognised chief, and their most trusted
leaders were gone. The whole company seemed paralysed under a universal
despondency. It was at this juncture that Xenophon, an Athenian
gentleman-volunteer, was stirred to action by a dream. He rose and
roused the officers of the contingent of Proxenus, to which he was
attached. Heartened by an address, in which he pointed out that, on the
one hand they had to depend on their own courage, skill, and
resourcefulness, and, on the other, were released from all obligation to
the Persians, they unanimously chose him their leader, and at his
instigation roused the senior officers of all the other contingents to
assemble for deliberation.
The council thus summoned, inspired again by the words of Xenophon,
vigorously backed up by other leaders, appointed new generals, among
them Xenophon himself, and set about actively to organise a retreat to
the sea. The contagion of resolute determination spread through the
ranks of the whole force. Cheirisophus the Lacedæmonian was given the
chief command, the two youngest generals, Xenophon and Timerion, were
placed in charge of the rear-guard. A troop of slingers was organised;
all horses with the arroy were sequestrated to form a cavalry squadron.
The army started on its march through the unknown, formed in a hollow
square, which was shortly so organised that the columns could be
broadened or narrowed according to the ground without creating
confusion.
They soon found themselves able to repulse without difficulty even
attacks in force by the troops of Tissaphernes, the enemy being entirely
outmatched in hand-to-hand fighting. The slingers and archers, however,
proved troublesome, and hostile forces, though keeping out of reach,
were never far off. At last Tissaphernes and Ariæus drew off altogether,
and the Greek generals having as alternative courses the march east upon
Susa, north upon Babylon, and west towards Ionia, decided to revert to
the course northwards to the Black Sea.
_III.--The Sea! The Sea!_
This route led at first through the country of the Carduchi, a very
warlike folk who had never been subjugated. Here there was a good deal
of hard fighting, the Carduchi being adepts in hill warfare, and
particularly expert archers. Such was the length and weight of their
arrows that Greeks collected them, and used them as javelins. Seven days
of this brought the retreating force to the river Centrites, which parts
the Carduchian mountains from the province of Armenia. With a barely
fordable river, troops in evidence on the other side, and the Carduchi
hanging on their rear, the passage offered great difficulties, solved by
the discovery of a much shallower ford. A feint at one point by the
rearguard drew off the enemy on the opposite bank, while the main body
crossed at the shallows, which the rearguard also managed to pass by a
successful ruse which misled the Carduchi.
The Persian governor of Western Armenia, Tiribazus, offered safe passage
through his province, but scouts brought information that large forces
were collecting, and would dispute the passage of a defile through which
the army must pass. This point, however, was reached by a forced march,
and the enemy was put to rout.
For some days after this the marching was very severe; the men had to
struggle forward on very nearly empty stomachs, through blizzards,
suffering terribly from frostbite and the blinding effect of the snow on
their eyes, so that at times nothing short of actual threats from the
officers could induce the exhausted men to toil forward; and all the
time the enemy's skirmishers were harassing the troops and cutting off
stragglers. These, however, were finally dispersed by a sudden onslaught
of the rearguard, and after this a more populous district was reached,
where food and wine abounded, and the Greeks, who were not ill-received,
made some days' halt to recuperate.
Here a guide was obtained for the next stages; but on the third night he
deserted, because Cheirisophus had lost his temper and struck him. This
incident was the only occasion of a serious difference between Xenophon
and the elder commander. On the seventh day after this the river Phasis
was crossed; but two days later, on approaching a mountain pass, it was
seen to be occupied in force. A council of war was held, at which some
jesting passed, Xenophon remarking on the reputation of the
Lacedæmonians as adepts in thieving, a jibe which Cheirisophus retorted
on the Athenians; as the business in hand was to "steal a match" on the
enemy, each encouraged the other to act up to the national reputation.
In the night, a detachment of volunteers captured the ridge above the
pass; the enemy facing the main body beat a hasty retreat when they
found their position turned.
Another five days brought the army into the country of the Taochi, where
the Greeks had to rush a somewhat dangerous position in order to capture
supplies. A space of some twenty yards was open to such a storm of
missiles from above that it could only be passed by drawing the enemy's
fire and making a dash before fresh missiles were accumulated. When this
was accomplished, however, the foe offered no practical resistance, but
flung themselves over the cliffs.
Eighteen days later the Greeks reached a town called Gymnise, where they
obtained a guide. Their course lay through tribes towards whom the
governor was hostile, and the Greeks had no objection to gratifying him
by spoiling and burning on their way. On the fifth day after leaving
Gymnise, a mountain pass was reached.