is based, the general conceptions to which everything particular is
led back; the instances in which this is done are often, however,
figurative. What, in the first place, is lacking in them, as we have
already remarked, is the Notion. Severance, emanation, effluence
or process, emergence, occurrence, are words which in modern times
have also had to stand for much, but in fact nothing is expressed
by them. Scepticism and dogmatism, as consciousness or knowledge,
establish the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity. Plotinus
has rejected it, has soared upwards into the highest region, into
the Aristotelian thought of Thought; he has much more in common with
Aristotle than with Plato, and thereby he is not dialectic, nor does
he proceed out of himself, nor as consciousness does he go back out
of himself into himself again. With this, in the second place, there
is connected the fact that the further descent either to nature or
to manifested consciousness, even when expressed as the operation of
the higher soul, yet contains much that is arbitrary, and is devoid
of the necessity of the Notion; for that which ought to be defined
in Notions is expressed in many-coloured pictures, in the form of
a reality; and this, to say the least, is a useless and inadequate
expression. I quote one example only: our soul belongs not only to
the sphere of the finite understanding, where it was perfect, happy,
lacking nothing; its power of thought alone belongs to the first, the
finite understanding. Its power of motion, or itself looked on as life,
had as its source the intelligent world-soul, but sensation had its
source in the soul of the world of sensation. That is to say, Plotinus
makes the first world-soul to be the immediate activity of the finite
understanding, which is an object to itself; it is pure soul above the
sublunar region, and dwells in the upper heaven of the fixed stars.
This world-soul has power to originate; from it again there flows an
entirely sensuous soul. The desire of the individual and particular
soul separated from the whole gives it a body; this it receives in
the higher region of the heavens. With this body it obtains fancy and
memory. At last it repairs to the soul of the sensible world; and from
this it acquires sensation, desires, and the life that is vegetative in
nature.[244]
This declension, this further step towards the corporeality of the
soul, is described by the followers of Plotinus as if the soul sank
from the Milky Way and the Zodiac into the orbits of planets which
have their place lower down, and in each of these it receives new
powers, and in each begins also to exercise these powers. In Saturn
the soul first acquires the power of forming conclusions with regard
to things; in Jupiter it receives the power of effectiveness of the
will; in Mars, affections and impulses; in the Sun, sensation, opinion,
and imagination; in Venus, sensuous desires aiming at the particular;
in the Moon, lastly, the power of production.[245] In such a way as
this Plotinus makes into a particular existence for the spiritual the
very things that he declares to be, on the one hand, intelligible
moments. The soul which only has desires is the beast; that which only
vegetates, which has only power of reproduction, is the plant. But
what we spoke of above are not particular conditions of mind, outside
of the universal spirit, in the world-spirit’s particular stages
of its self-consciousness regarding itself; and Saturn and Jupiter
have nothing further to do with it. When they in their potency are
expressed as moments of the soul, this is not a whit better than when
each of them was supposed to express a particular metal. As Saturn
expresses lead, Jupiter tin, and so forth, so Saturn also expresses
argumentation, Jupiter will, &c. It is doubtless easier to say that
Saturn corresponds with lead, &c., that it is the power of drawing
conclusions, or that it represents lead and the power of drawing
conclusions, or anything else you like, instead of expressing its
Notion, its essence. The above is a comparison with a thing that in
like manner does not express a Notion, but is apparent to the senses,
which is laid hold of out of the air, or rather indeed from the ground.
Such representations are warped and false; for if we say that this is
lead, we mean thereby the essence or the implicitness of lead, with
which the soul has an affinity; but this is no longer the sensuous
Being which is known as lead, nor has this moment of such a state any
reality for the soul.
3. PORPHYRY AND IAMBLICHUS.
Porphyry and Iamblichus, who have already been mentioned as the
biographers of Pythagoras (Vol. I. p. 197), are distinguished followers
of Plotinus. The first, a Syrian, died in 304: the latter, likewise
of Syria, in the year 333.[246] Amongst other works by Porphyrius,
we possess an “Introduction to the Organon of Aristotle on Genera,
Species, and Judgments,” in which his logic is propounded in its
principal elements. This work is one which has at all times been the
text-book of Aristotelian Logic, and also an authority from which the
knowledge of its form has been derived; and our ordinary books of logic
contain little more than what is found in this Introduction. The fact
that Porphyry devoted himself to logic shows that a determinate form
of thought was coming into favour with the Neo-Platonists; but this is
something pertaining altogether to the understanding and very formal.
Thus we here have the characteristic fact that with the Neo-Platonists
the logic of the understanding, the quite empiric treatment of the
sciences, is found in conjunction with the entirely speculative
Idea, and in respect of practical life with a belief in theurgy, the
marvellous and strange: in his life of Plotinus, Porphyry, indeed,
describes him a miracle-worker, which statement we, however, must set
aside as appertaining to literature.
Iamblichus evinces more mistiness and confusion still; he certainly
was a teacher highly esteemed in his time, so that he even received
the name of divine instructor; but his philosophic writings
form a compilation without much specially to characterize them,
and his biography of Pythagoras does not do much credit to his
understanding. It was likewise in the Pythagorean philosophy that the
Neo-Platonists gloried, and more particularly they revived the form of
number-determination which pertains to it. In Iamblichus thought sinks
into imagination, the intellectual universe to a kingdom of demons
and angels with a classification of the same, and speculation comes
down to the methods of magic. The Neo-Platonists called this theurgy
(θεουργία); for in the miracle speculation, the divine Idea, is, so to
speak, brought into immediate contact with actuality, and not set forth
in a universal way. As to the work _De mysteriis Ægyptiorum_, it is not
known for certain whether it had Iamblichus as its author or not; later
on Proclus makes great ado concerning him, and testifies that he was
indebted to Iamblichus for his main ideas.[247]
4. PROCLUS.
Proclus, a later Neo-Platonist who has still to be mentioned, is more
important. He was born in 412 at Constantinople, but carried on his
studies and spent most of his life with Plutarchus in Athens, where he
also died in 485. His life is written by Marinus, in a style similar
to that of the biographies just mentioned. According to this his
parents came from Xanthus in Lycia, a district of Asia Minor; and since
Apollo and Minerva were the tutelary deities of this town, he rendered
grateful worship to them. They, themselves, vouchsafed to him, as their
favourite, particular regard and personal manifestations; indeed, he
was healed of an illness by Apollo touching his head; by Minerva,
however, he was called upon to go to Athens. First of all he went to
Alexandria to study rhetoric and philosophy, and then to Athens, to be
with Plutarchus and Syrianus, the Platonists. Here he first studied
Aristotelian and then Platonic philosophy. Above all the daughter of
Plutarchus, Asclepigenia, initiated him into the profound secrets of
philosophy; she, as Marinus assures us, was the only individual at that
time who retained the knowledge, transmitted to her by her father, of
the mystic ceremonies and of the whole theurgic discipline. Proclus
studied everything pertaining to the mysteries, the Orphic hymns, the
writings of Hermes, and religious institutions of every kind, so that,
wherever he went, he understood the ceremonies of the pagan worship
better than the priests who were placed there for the purpose of
performing them. Proclus is said to have had himself initiated into
all the pagan mysteries. He himself kept all the religious festivals
and observances pertaining to nations the most various; he was even
familiar with the Egyptian form of worship, observed the Egyptian days
of purification and festivals, and spent certain fast days in offering
up prayers and praise. Proclus himself composed many hymns—of which we
still possess some that are very beautiful—both in honour of the better
known divinities and of those whose fame is entirely local. Of the
circumstance that he—“the most God-fearing man”—had dealings with so
many religions, he himself says: “It is not fitting for a philosopher
to be minister (θεραπευτήν) to the worship of one town or of what
pertains to the few, for he should be the universal hierophant of the
whole world.” He considered Orpheus to be the originator of all Greek
theology, and set a specially high value on the Orphic and Chaldaic
oracles. It was in Athens that he taught. Of course his biographer,
Marinus, relates the most marvellous things about him, that he brought
down rain from heaven and tempered great heat, that he stilled the
earthquake, healed diseases, and beheld visions of the divine.[248]
Proclus led a most intellectual life; he was a profoundly speculative
man, and the scope of his knowledge was very great. In his case, as
also in that of Plotinus, the contrast between the insight of such
philosophers and what their disciples relate of them in biographies,
must strike one very forcibly, for of the wonders described by the
biographers few traces are to be found in the works of the subjects
themselves. Proclus left behind him a great number of writings, many of
which we now possess; he was the author of several mathematical works
which we also have, such as that on the Sphere. His more important
philosophic works are the Commentaries on Plato’s Dialogues, certain
of which have been published from time to time; that on the Timæus was
the most famous. But several were only found in manuscript, and of
these Cousin issued in Paris the Commentaries on the Alcibiades (Vols.
II. III.), and the Parmenides (Vols. IV.-VI.) for the first time. The
first volume of Cousin’s edition contains some writings by Proclus
which now exist only in Latin, on Freedom, Providence, and Evil. Works
separately published are his important writings, The Platonic Theology
(εἰς τὲν Πλάτωνος θεολογίαν) and his Theological Elements (συοιχείωσις
θεολογική); the latter short work Creuzer has had re-published, as also
some of the before-mentioned Commentaries.
Proclus lived, so to speak, in the worship of science. We cannot fail
to see in him great profundity of perception, and greater capacity for
working a matter out and clearness of expression than are found in
Plotinus; scientific development also advanced with him, and on the
whole he possesses an excellent manner of expression. His philosophy,
like that of Plotinus, has the form of a Commentary on Plato; his book
“On the Theology of Plato,” is in this respect his most interesting
work. The main ideas of his philosophy may easily be recognized from
this work, which possesses many difficulties for this reason in
particular, that in it the pagan gods are considered, and philosophic
significations derived from them. But he distinguishes himself entirely
from Plotinus by the fact that with him the Neo-Platonic philosophy, as
a whole, has at least reached a more systematic order, and also a more
developed form; thus in his Platonic theology especially (dialectic as
the work undoubtedly is) a more distinct progression and distinction
between the spheres in the Idea is to be found, than is noticeable in
Plotinus. His philosophy is an intellectual system; we must see how
we can work it out. His way of putting it is not perfectly clear, but
leaves much to be desired.
Proclus differs first of all from Plotinus in not making Being his
principle or purely abstract moment, but by beginning from unity,
and for the first time understanding Being or subsistence as the
third; thus to him everything has a much more concrete form. But the
self-development of this unity is not made the necessity of the Notion
with Proclus any more than with Plotinus; we must once for all give up
seeking here for the Notion of disunion. Proclus (Theol. Plat. II. p.
95) says, “The one is in itself inexpressible and unknowable; but it is
comprehended from its issuing forth and retiring into itself.” Proclus
in the same place (pp. 107, 108) defines this self-differentiation, the
first characteristic of unity, as a production (παράγειν), a going
forth (πρόοδος), and also as a representation or demonstration. The
relation to difference of the unity which brings forth is, however, not
an issuing forth from self, for an issuing forth would be a change,
and unity would be posited as no more self-identical. Hence through
its bringing forth unity suffers no loss or diminution, for it is
the thought that suffers no deterioration through the creation of a
determinate thought, but remains the same, and also receives what is
brought forth into itself.[249] As far as this goes, the Notion is,
properly speaking, no clearer than with Plotinus.
What distinguishes Plotinus is his more profound study of the Platonic
dialectic; in this way he occupies himself in his Platonic theology
with the most acute and far-reaching dialectic of the One. It is
necessary for him to demonstrate the many as one and the one as many,
to show forth the forms which the One adopts. But it is a dialectic
which to a greater or less extent is externally worked out, and which
is most wearisome. But while with Plato these pure notions of unity,
multiplicity, Being, &c., appear naturally, and so to speak devoid of
other significance than that which they immediately possess (for we
designate them as universal ideas which are present in our thought),
with Proclus they have another and higher meaning; and hence it comes
to pass that, as we have seen (pp. 59, 60), he found in the apparently
negative result of the Platonic Parmenides the nature of absolute
existence particularly and expressly recognized. Proclus now shows,
according to the Platonic dialectic, how all determinations, and
particularly that of multiplicity, are resolved into themselves and
return into unity. What to the conceiving consciousness is one of its
most important truths—that many substances exist, or that the many
things, each of which is termed a one, and hence substance, exist in
truth in themselves—is lost in this dialectic, and the result ensues
that only unity is true existence, all other determinations are merely
vanishing magnitudes, merely moments, and thus their Being is only
an immediate thought. But since we now ascribe no substantiality,
no proper Being to a thought, all such determinations are only
moments of a thing in thought. The objection at this point made and
constantly maintained against the Neo-Platonists and Proclus is this,
that certainly for thought everything goes back within unity, but
that this is a logical unity alone, a unity of thought and not of
actuality, and that consequently there can be no arguing from the
formal to actuality. From this they say it by no means follows that all
actual things are not actual substances, that they have not different
principles independent of one another, and even that they are not
different substances, each of which is separated from the other and in
and for itself. That is to say, this contradiction always begins the
whole matter over again when it says of actuality that it is something
implicit, for those who do this call actuality a thing, a substance, a
one—which last are merely thoughts; in short they always again bring
forward, as something implicitly existent, that whose disappearance or
non-implicitude has been already demonstrated.
But in this regard Proclus displays great sagacity in a remark he
makes on the manner in which this mode of production appears in the
Parmenides of Plato, who shows in a negative way in this Dialogue that
if the existence of unity is affirmed, the existence of multiplicity,
&c., must be denied. Respecting these negations (ἀποφάσεις) Proclus
now says (Theol. Plat. II. pp. 108, 109) that they do not signify an
abrogation of the content (στερητικαὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων) of which they
are predicated, but are the creation of determinatives in accordance
with their opposites (γεννητικαὶ τῶν οἷον ἀντικειμένων). “Thus if
Plato shows that the first is not many, this has the significance that
the many proceed from the first; if he shows that it is not a whole,
it proves that the fact of being a whole proceeds from it. The mode
(τρόπος) of negations is thus to be taken as perfection which remains
in unity, issues forth from everything, and is in an inexpressible
and ineffable preponderance of simplicity. On the other hand, God
must likewise be derived from these negations; else there would be
no Notion (λόγος) of them, and also no negation. The Notion of the
inexpressible revolves round itself, never resting, and it strives with
itself;” _i.e._ the one implies its determinations ideally, the whole
is contained in the one. Multiplicity is not taken empirically and then
merely abrogated; the negative, as dividing, producing, and active, not
merely contains what is privative, but also affirmative determinations.
In this way the Platonic dialectic wins for Proclus a positive
significance; through dialectic he would lead all differences back to
unity. With this dialectic of the one and many Proclus makes much ado,
more especially in his famous elementary doctrines. The submersion of
everything in unity remains, however, merely beyond this unity, instead
of which this very negativity must really be grasped as signifying its
production.
That which brings forth, according to Proclus, furthermore brings forth
through a superfluity of power. There certainly also is a bringing
forth through want; all need, all desire, for example, becomes cause
through want; and its bringing forth is its satisfaction. The end here
is incomplete, and the energy arises from the endeavour to complete
itself, so that only in production the need becomes less, the desire
ceases to be such, or its abstract Being-for-self disappears. Unity,
on the other hand, goes forth out of itself through the superfluity
of potentiality, and this superabundant potentiality is actuality
generally: this reflection of Proclus is quite Aristotelian. Hence
the coming forth of the unity consists in the fact that it multiplies
itself, pure number comes forth; but this multiplication does not
negate or diminish that first unity, but rather takes place in the
method of unity (ἑνιαίως). The many partakes of the unity, but the
unity does not partake of multiplicity.[250] The absolute unity
which multiplies itself into many ones has consequently generated
multiplicity as it is in these ones. Proclus makes use of a many-sided
dialectic to show that the many does not exist in itself, is not the
creator of the many, that everything goes back into unity, and thus
unity is also the originator of the many. It is, however, not made
clear how this is the negative relation of the one to itself; what we
see is then a manifold dialectic, which merely passes backwards and
forwards over the relationship of the one to the many.
To Proclus an important characteristic of this progression is the fact
that it takes place through analogy, and what is dissimilar to the
truth is the further removed from the same. The many partakes of unity,
but it is in a measure likewise not one, but dissimilar to one. But
since the many is also similar to what produces it, it likewise has
unity as its essence; hence the many are independent unities (ἑνάδες).
They contain the principle of unity within themselves, for if as being
many they are likewise different, they are, so to speak, only many
for a third, being in and for themselves unities. These unities again
beget others which must, however, be less perfect, for the effect
is not exactly like the cause, that which is brought forth is not
quite similar to what brings it forth. These next unities are wholes,
_i.e._, they are no longer real unities, unities in themselves, since
in them the unity is only an accident. But because things themselves
are in their synthetic nature merely wholes because their souls bind
them together, they are dissimilar to the first unity, and cannot be
immediately united to it. The abstractly conceived multiplicity is
thus their mean; multiplicity is analogous to absolute unity, and is
that which unites unity with the whole universe. Pure multiplicity
makes the different elements like one another, and hence unites them to
unity; but things only have similarity to unity. Thus things that are
begotten ever remove themselves more and more from unity, and partake
of it less and less.[251]
The further determination of the Idea is known as the trinity (τριάς).
Of this Proclus (Theol. Plat. III. p. 140) first of all gives the
abstract definition that its three forms are three gods, and now we
have more especially to find out how he defined the trinity. This
trinity is certainly interesting in the Neo-Platonists, but it is
specially so in the case of Proclus, because he did not leave it in
its abstract moments. For he again considers these three abstract
determinations of the absolute, each on its own account, as a totality
of triunity, whereby he obtains one real trinity. Thus in the whole
there are three spheres, separated from one another, which constitute
the totality, but in such a way that each has again to be considered
as complete and concrete in itself; and this must be acknowledged as a
perfectly correct point of view which has been reached. Because each
of these differences in the Idea, as remaining in unity with itself,
is really again the whole of these moments, there are different orders
in production; and the whole is the process of the three totalities
establishing themselves in one another as identical. It will be shown
directly which orders these are, and Proclus occupies himself much with
these, because he tries to demonstrate the different powers again in
them. Proclus is hence much more detailed, and he went much further
than did Plotinus; it may indeed be said that in this respect we find
in him the most excellent and best that was formulated by any of the
Neo-Platonists.