representation in order to make clear to himself the development out
of the One: “How then this process is accomplished, how out of unity
proceed two and plurality in general—if we would know how to express
this, we must call on God, not, however, with audible voice, but
pouring out our soul in prayer to Him; this we can do only by coming
all alone to Him who is alone. He who contemplates must retire into his
secret heart as into a temple, and remain there at rest, being elevated
above all things, and in such contemplation as admits of no change.”
This is always the mood of the thinking soul, to which Plotinus exhorts
and would lead everything back. In this pure thought or contemplation
the νοῦς is actual; and this is divine activity itself.
Plotinus continues: “This production is not a movement nor a change;
change and what comes to pass through change, the changeable, we
arrive at only in the third place;” change implies other-Being and is
directed to something else, νοῦς is still the remaining at home with
self of meditation. “The finite understanding originating thus from
absolute essence, yet without change, is the immediate reflection of
the same; it is not established by an act of will or a resolution.
But God,” as One, the Good, “is the immovable; and production is a
light proceeding from Him who endures. The One sheds light round about
Himself; the finite understanding flows from Him, the enduring one,
just as the light from the sun encircles it. All things which are
permanent give forth and diffuse from their substance an essence which
is dependent upon them;” or, as Plotinus really says, it is identical
with them. “As fire diffuses warmth, and snow cold, around itself, but
especially as the fragrance of things clings round them,” so does νοῦς,
like light, diffuse Being around. “That which has come to perfection
passes into the emanation, into the circle of light,” spreads a
fragrance around.[232] For this going forth (πρόοδον) or production,
Plotinus also employs the image of overflowing, whereby, however, the
One remains simply one. “Because it is complete in itself, without
anything lacking, it overflows; and this overflow is what is produced.
This that is produced merely, however, returns to the One,” the Good,
“which is its object, content and fulfilling; and this is finite
understanding,”—this the reversion of what is produced to the original
unity. “The first state of Being that is restful is absolute essence,
and finite understanding is the contemplation of this essence;” or it
comes into existence by means of the first essence, through return upon
itself, seeing itself, by its being a seeing seeing. The light shed
around is a contemplation of the One; this reflection of self on self
(ἐπιστρέφειν) is then thought, or the νοῦς is this movement in a circle
(ἐπιστροφή).[233]
These are the main principles of Plotinus; and he has in this way
truly determined the nature of the Idea in all its moments. Only there
is a difficulty here which makes us pause; and it is found in this
development. We can imagine the infinite disclosing itself in a variety
of ways; in later times there has been much talk of an issuing-forth
from God, which, however, is still a sensuous conception or something
quite immediate. The necessity of self-disclosure is not expressed
thereby, for it is stated only as something having come to pass. That
the Father begets the eternal Son satisfies the imagination; the Idea
is according to its content quite correctly conceived as the Trinity,
and this is an important matter. But although these determinations are
true, the form of the immediacy of movement is at the same time neither
sufficient nor satisfying for the Notion. For because the Becoming of
the simple unity, as the abrogation of all predicates, is that same
absolute negativity which is implicitly the production of itself, we
must not begin with unity and only then pass over into duality, but we
must grasp them both as one. For, according to Plotinus, the object of
the finite understanding is clearly nothing which is alien or opposite
to this or to itself; the manifold Ideas are alone the content of the
same. God therefore through distinction and extension is likewise a
return to Himself, that is, this very duality is simply in the unity,
and is its object. What is thought is not outside of νοῦς in thought
νοῦς merely possesses itself as thinking. The object of thought, that
to which thought turns back, is absolute unity; into this, however, as
such, there is no forcing a way, and it is not determined, but remains
the unknown. Since thinking is, however, only the fact of having itself
as object, it has thus already an object which contains mediation and
activity, or, to speak generally, duality in itself. This is Thought as
the thought of Thought. Or in the perfecting of this thought in itself,
inasmuch as it is its own object, there lies for Plotinus the first
and truly intellectual world, which thus stands to the world of sense
in such a relation that the latter is only a distant imitation of the
former. Things, looked at as they exist in this absolute Thought, are
their own Notions and essence (λόγοι); and these are the patterns of
sensuous existences, as Plato also expressed it.[234]
That the nature of thought is to think itself, is a quite Aristotelian
definition. But with Plotinus and the Alexandrians it is likewise the
case that the true universe, the intellectual worlds is produced from
thought; what Plato termed the Ideas, is here the understanding that
forms, the intelligence that produces, which is actual in that which
is produced, and has itself as object, thinks itself. Of the relation
of these many Notions in the understanding, Plotinus states that they
are present there, just as the elements are present in a thing, and
therefore not as mutually indifferent species, but as being diverse
and yet entirely one. They are not indifferent through space, but
only differ through an inner difference, that is, not in the manner
of existent parts.[235] The finite understanding is thereby expressed
as negative unity. But it is utterly inappropriate when the relation
of the elements which constitute a thing is defined as that of the
parts of which the whole consists, and each of which is absolute—for
instance, when it is represented that in a crystal, water, flint,
&c., are still present as such. Their Being is really neutrality, in
which each of them is abrogated as indifferent and existent: therefore
their unity is negative unity, the inner essence, the principle of
individuality as containing in itself elements that differ.
_c._ The world that changes, which is subject to difference, arises
from this, that the multiplicity of these forms is not only implicitly
in the understanding, but they also exist for it in the form of its
object. Further, there is for it a three-fold mode of thinking: in the
first place it thinks the unchangeable, its unity, as object. This
first mode is the simple undifferentiated contemplation of its object,
or it is light; not matter, but pure form, activity. Space is the
abstract pure continuity of this activity of light, not the activity
itself, but the form of its uninterruptedness. The understanding, as
the thought of this light, is itself light, but light real in itself,
or the light of light.[236] In the second place the understanding
thinks the difference between itself and essence; the differentiated
multiplicity of the existent is object for it. It is the creation of
the world; in it everything has its determinate form in regard to
everything else, and this constitutes the substance of things. Since,
in the third place, substantiality or permanency in the faculty of
thought is determination, its production, or the flowing out of all
things from it, is of such a nature that it remains filled with all
things, or likewise absorbs all immediately. It is the abrogation
of these differences, or the passing over from one to another; this
is its manner of thinking itself, or it is object to itself in this
fashion. This is change; thinking has thus the three principles in
it. Inasmuch as νοῦς thinks of itself as changing, but yet in change
remaining simple and at home with itself, the subject of its thought
is life as a whole; and the fact of its establishing its moments as
existing in opposition to each other is the true, living universe. This
turning round on itself of the outflow from itself, this thinking of
itself, is the eternal creation of the world.[237] It is plain that
in these thoughts of Plotinus the Being-another, the foreign element,
is abrogated, existent things are implicitly Notions. The Divine
understanding is the thinking of them, and their existence is nothing
else than this very fact of their being the object of thought of the
Divine understanding; they are moments of thought and, for this very
reason, of Being. Plotinus thus distinguishes in νοῦς thinking (νοῦς),
the object thought of (νοητόν), and thought (νόησις), so that νοῦς is
one, and at the same time all; but thought is the unity of what had
been distinguished.[238] We would term thought not so much unity as
product; yet even thought, that is, the subject, soars upwards to God.
The distinction between thought and an external God is thus doubtless
at an end; for this reason the Neo-Platonists are accused of being
visionaries, and in truth they do themselves propound wondrous things.
α. Plotinus now goes on to describe the third principle, the soul:
“Νοῦς is eternally active in exactly the same way as now. The movement
to it and around it is the activity of the soul. Reason (λόγος), which
passes from it to the soul, confers on the soul a power of thought,
placing nothing between them. Thinking (νοῦς) is not a manifold;
thinking is simple, and consists in the very fact of thinking. The
true νοῦς (not ours, as it is found, for instance, in desire) thinks
in thoughts, and the object of its thought is not beyond it; for it is
itself the object of its thought, has of necessity itself in thought
and sees itself; and sees itself not as non-thinking, but as thinking.
Our soul is partly in the eternal” (light), “a part of the universal
soul; this itself is in part in the eternal, and flows out thence,
remaining in contemplation of itself, without any designed regulation.
The embellishment of the whole gives to every corporeal object what in
view of its determination and nature it is capable of carrying out,
just as a central fire diffuses warmth all around it. The One must not
be solitary, for were it so all things would be hidden, and would have
no form present in them; nothing of what exists would exist if the
One stood by itself, neither would there be the multitude of existent
things, produced by the One, if those who have attained to the order of
souls had not received the power to go forth. Similarly souls must not
exist alone, as if what is produced through them should not appear, for
in every nature it is immanent to make and bring to light something in
conformity with itself, as the seed does from an undivided beginning.
There is nothing to prevent all from having a share in the nature of
the Good.”[239] Plotinus leaves the corporeal and sensuous on one
side, as it were, and does not take pains to explain it, his sole and
constant aim being to purify therefrom, in order that the universal
soul and our soul may not be thereby endangered.
β. Plotinus speaks, moreover, of the principle of the sensuous
world, which is matter, and with which the origin of evil is closely
connected. He dwells much on this subject of matter in his philosophy.
Matter is the non-existent (οῦκ ὄν), which presents an image of the
existent. Things differ in their pure form, the difference that
distinguishes them; the universal of difference is the negative, and
this is matter. As Being is the first absolute unity, this unity of the
objective is the pure negative; it lacks all predicates and properties,
figure, &c. It is thus itself a thought or pure Notion, and indeed the
Notion of pure indeterminateness; or it is universal potentiality
without energy. Plotinus describes this pure potentiality very well,
and defines it as the negative principle. He says, “Brass is a statue
only in potentiality; for in what is not permanent, the possible, as we
have seen, was something utterly different. But when the grammarian in
potentiality becomes the grammarian in actuality, the potential is the
same as the actual. The ignorant man may be a grammarian, as it were
by accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), and it is not in virtue of his present
ignorance that he has the possibility of knowledge. It is for the very
reason of its possessing a certain measure of knowledge that the soul
which is actual attains to what it was potentially. It would not be
inappropriate to give the name of form and idea to energy, in so far as
it exists as energy and not as mere potentiality—not simply as energy,
but as the energy of something determinate. For we might give the
name more properly, perhaps, to another energy, namely that which is
opposed to the potentiality which leads to actuality, for the possible
has the possibility of being something else in actuality. But through
possibility the possible has also in itself actuality, just as skill
has the activity related thereto, and as bravery has brave action. When
in the object of thought (ἐν τοῖς νοηντοῖς)[240] there is no matter,—as
in the case of something existing in potentiality—and it does not
become something that does not yet exist, nor something that changes
into something else, nor something that—itself permanent—produces
another, or emerging from itself permits another to exist in its
place—in that case we have then no mere potential but the existent,
which has eternity and not time. Should we consider matter to be there
as form, as even the soul, although a form, is matter in respect to
what is different? But, speaking generally, matter is not in actuality,
it is what exists in potentiality. Its Being only announces a Becoming,
so that its Being has always to do with future Being. That which is
in potentiality is thus not something, but everything;” energy alone
is determinate. “Matter consequently always leans towards something
else, or is a potentiality for what follows; it is left behind as
a feeble and dim image that cannot take shape. Is it then an image
in respect to reality, and therefore a deception? This is the same
as a true deception, this is the true non-existent;” it is untrue
by reason of energy. “That is therefore not existent in actuality
which has its truth in the non-existent;” it exists not in truth, for
“it has its Being in non-Being. If you take away from the false its
falseness, you take away all the existence that it has. Similarly, if
you introduce actuality into that which has its Being and its essence
in potentiality, you destroy the cause of its substance (ὑποστάσεως),
because Being consisted for it in potentiality. If we would therefore
retain matter uninjured, we must keep it as matter; apparently we must
therefore say that it is only in potentiality, in order that it may
remain what it is.”[241]
In accordance with this, therefore, Plotinus (Ennead. III. l. 6,
c. 7, 8) defines it: “Matter is truly non-existent, a motion which
abrogates itself, absolute unrest, yet itself at rest—what is opposed
in itself; it is the great which is small, the small which is great,
the more which is less, the less which is more. When defined in one
mode, it is really rather the opposite; that is to say, when looked
at and fixed, it is not fixed and escapes, or when not fixed it is
fixed—the simply illusory.” Matter itself is therefore imperishable;
there is nothing into which it can change. The Idea of change is itself
imperishable, but what is implied in this Idea is changeable. This
matter is nevertheless not without form; and we have seen that the
finite understanding has a third relationship to its object, namely in
reference to differences. As now this relation and alteration, this
transition, is the life of the universe, the universal soul of the
same, its Being is in like manner not a change which takes place in
the understanding, for its Being is its being the immediate object of
thought through the understanding.
γ. The Evil likewise, as contrasted with the Good, now begins to be
the object of consideration, for the question of the origin of evil
must always be a matter of interest to the human consciousness. These
Alexandrians set up as matter the negative of thought, but since the
consciousness of the concrete mind entered in, the abstract negative
is apprehended in this concrete fashion as within the mind itself,
therefore as the mentally negative. Plotinus regards this question of
evil from many sides; but thoughtful consideration of this subject does
not yet go very far. The following conceptions are those that prevail
at this time: “The Good is νοῦς, but not the understanding in the sense
it used to bear for us, which from a pre-supposition both satisfies
itself and understands what is said to it, which forms a conclusion
and from what follows draws up a theory, and from the consequence
comes to a knowledge of what is, having now obtained something not
formerly possessed; for before this its knowledge was empty, although
it was understanding. But νοῦς, as we now understand it, contains all
things in itself, is all things, and is at home with itself; it has all
things while not having them,” because it is in itself ideal. “But it
does not possess all in the sense in which we regard what we possess
as something different or alien from ourselves; what is possessed is
not distinguished from itself. For it is each thing and everything
and not confounded, but absolute. What partakes of the same does not
partake of all things at once, but partakes in so far as it can. Νοῦς
is the first energy and the first substance of the soul, which has
activity in regard thereto. The soul, externally revolving round νοῦς,
contemplating it and gazing into its depths, beholds God by means of
it; and this is the life of the gods, free from evil and filled with
blessedness”—in so far as the intelligence which goes forth from itself
has in its difference to do only with itself, and remains in its divine
unity. “If it remained thus constant there would be no evil. But there
are goods of the first and second and third rank, all surrounding the
King over all; and He is the originator of all good, and all is His,
and those of the second rank revolve round the second, and those of
the third round the third. If this is the existent and something even
higher than the existent, evil is not included in what is existent or
higher than the existent; for this is the good. Nothing remains then
but that evil, if it exists, is in the non-existent, as a form of the
non-existent—but the non-existent not as altogether non-existent,
but only as something other than the existent.” Evil is no absolute
principle independent of God, as the Manichæans held it to be. “It is
not non-existent in the same way that motion and rest are existent, but
is like an image of the existent, or non-existent in an even greater
degree; it is the sensuous universe.”[242]. Thus evil has its root in
the non-existent.
In the eighth book of the first Ennead Plotinus says (c. 9, 3, 4, 7):
“But how is evil recognized? It is owing to thought turning away from
itself that matter arises; it exists only through the abstraction of
what is other than itself. What remains behind when we take away the
Ideas is, we say, matter; thought accordingly becomes different, the
opposite of thought, since it dares to direct itself on that which
is not within its province. Like the eye turning away from the light
in order to see the darkness which in the light it does not see—and
this is a seeing which yet is non-seeing—so thought experiences the
opposite of what it is, in order that it may see what is opposed to
itself.” This abstract other is nothing but matter, and it is also
evil; the seeing of the less measure is nothing but a non-seeing. “The
sensuous in regard to measure, or the limited, is the less measure, the
boundless, the undefined, unresting, insatiable, the utterly deficient;
such is not accidental to it, but its substance.” Its aim is always
Becoming; we cannot say that it is, but only that it is always about to
be. “The soul which makes νοῦς its aim is pure, holds off matter and
all that is indeterminate and measureless. But why then, when there is
the Good, is there also necessarily Evil? Because there must be matter
in the whole, because the whole necessarily consists of opposites. It
would not be there, if matter were not present; the nature of the world
is compounded of νοῦς and necessity. To be with the gods means to be
in thought; for they are immortal. We may also apprehend the necessity
of evil in this wise: As the Good cannot exist alone, matter is a
counterpart to the Good, necessary to its production. Or we might also
say that Evil is that which by reason of constant deterioration and
decay has sunk until it can sink no lower; but something is necessary
after the first, so that the extreme is also necessary. But that is
matter, which has no longer any element of good in it; and this is the
necessity of evil.”
With Plotinus, as with Pythagoras, the leading of the soul to virtue
is also an important subject. Plotinus has for this reason blamed the
Gnostics frequently, especially in the ninth book of the second Ennead
(c. 15), because “they make no mention at all of virtue and the Good,
nor of how they may be reached, and the soul rendered better and purer.
For no purpose is served by saying,[243] ‘Look unto God;’ it must
also be shown how we can succeed in causing man thus to behold God.
For it may be asked, What is to prevent a man from beholding, while
at the same time he refrains from the gratification of no desire, and
allows anger to take possession of him? Virtue, which sets a final end
before itself and dwells in the soul with wisdom, manifests God; but
without true virtue God is an empty word.” The Gnostics limit truth
to the mental and intellectual; to this mere intellectuality Plotinus
declares himself distinctly opposed, and holds firmly to the essential
connection of the intelligible and the real. Plotinus honoured the
heathen gods, attributing to them a deep meaning and a profound
efficacy. He says in the same treatise (c. 16), “It is not by despising
the world and the gods in it, and all else that is beautiful, that man
attains to goodness. The wicked man holds the gods in contempt, and
it is only when he has completely reached this stage that he becomes
utterly depraved. The above-mentioned reverence of the Gnostics for the
intelligible gods (νοητοὺς θεούς) is nothing corresponding with this
(ἀσυμπαθὴς ἂν γένοιτο):” that is to say, there is no harmony between
thoughts and the real world, when one does not go beyond the object of
thought. “He who loves anything loves also all things related to the
same, therefore also the children of the father whom he loves. Every
soul is the daughter of this father. But souls in the heavenly spheres
are more intelligible, and better, and far more nearly related to the
higher Power than our souls are. For how could this world of reality
be cut off from that higher sphere? Those who despise that which is
related thereto know it only in name. How could it be pious to believe
that Divine providence (πρόνοια) does not reach to matters here below?
Why is God not also here? For how otherwise could He know what takes
place within this sphere? Therefore He is universally present, and is
in this world, in whatever way it be, so that the world participates in
Him. If He is at a distance from the world, He is at a distance also
from us, and you could say nothing of Him or of what He produces. This
world also partakes of Him, and is not forsaken by Him, and never will
be so. For the whole partakes of the divine much more than the part
does, and the world-soul shares in it to a still greater degree. The
Being and the rationality of the world are a proof of this.”