NATURE
I
We regard a form and figure out of nature with more pleasure than
another, though the thing in itself is not necessarily altogether
better or worse.
Life in nature showeth forth the truth of these things (the words of
difference--i.e., the character of bodily habit to which they refer),
wherefore regard it well, order thyself thereby and depart not from
nature in thine opinions, neither imagine of thyself to invent aught
better, else shalt thou be led astray, for art standeth firmly fixed in
nature, and whoso can rend her forth thence he only possesseth her. If
thou acquirest her, she will remove many faults for thee from thy work.
Neither must the figure be made youthful before and old behind, or
contrariwise; for that unto which nature is opposed is bad. Hence it
followeth that each figure should be of one kind alone throughout,
either young or old, or middle-aged, or lean or fat, or soft or hard.
The more closely thy work abideth by life in its form, so much the
better will it appear; and this is true. Wherefore never more imagine
that thou either canst or shalt make anything better than God hath given
power to His creatures to do. For thy power is weakness compared to
God's creating hand. (_See_ continuation of passage, p. 10.)
Compare also passages quoted (pp. 289-291).
II
In these and other passages Dürer speaks about "nature," and enjoins on
the artist respect for and conformity to "nature" in a manner which
reminds us of that still current in dictums about art. Indeed, it seems
probable that Dürer's use of this term was almost as confused as that of
a modern art-critic. There are two senses in which the word nature is
employed, the confusion of which is ten times more confounded than any
of the others, and deserves, indeed, utter damnation, so prolific of
evil is it. We call the objects of sensory perception "nature"--whatever
is seen, heard, felt, smelt or tasted is a part of nature. And yet we
constantly speak of seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting
monstrous and unnatural things. And a monstrous and unnatural thing is
not merely one which is rare, but even more decidedly one of which we
disapprove. So that the second use of the term conveys some sense of
exceptionality, but far more of lack of conformity to human desires and
expectations. Now, many things which do not exist are perfectly natural
in this second sense: fairy-lands, heavens, &c. We perfectly understand
what is meant by a natural and an unnatural imagination, we perceive
readily all kind of degrees between the monstrous and the natural in
pure fiction. Now, this second use of the term nature is the only one
which is of any vital importance to our judgments upon works of art; yet
current judgments are more often than not based wholly on the first
sense, which means merely all objects perceived by the senses; and this,
draped in the authority and phrases belonging to judgments based on the
second and really pertinent sense.
Whole schools of painting and criticism have arisen and flourish whose
only reason for existence is the extreme facility with which this
confusion is made in European languages. It sounds so plausible that
some have censured Michael Angelo for bad drawing because men are not
from 9 to 15 or 16 heads high, and have not muscles so developed as the
gods and Titans of his creation. And others have objected to the angels,
the anatomical ambiguity of their wing articulations. To say that a
sketch or picture is out of tone or drawing damns, in many circles
to-day; in spite of the fact that the most famous masterpieces, if
judged by the same standard, would be equally offensive. This absurdity,
even where its grosser developments are avoided, breeds abundant
contradictions and confusion in the mouths of those who plume themselves
on culture and discernment. I hope not to have been too saucy,
therefore, in pointing out this pitfall to my readers in regard to these
sentences which I thought it worth while to quote from Dürer, merely
because if I did not do so I foresaw that they would be quoted
against me.