as may become the basis of the proposed treaty between his
Catholic Majesty and the United States of North America, is
very short, he should fear the consequences of haste and
inaccuracy, if he were not persuaded that the candor, with
which they will be received, will secure him from the
inconveniences to which these circumstances might otherwise
expose him.
"Mr Jay presumes that it is not expected he should offer a
plan of a treaty drawn at length, but only general
propositions, which may be so modified and enlarged, as on
due consideration and discussion may appear expedient. With
this view, he begs leave to present the following as the
basis of a treaty of amity and alliance, viz.
PROPOSITIONS.
I.
"There shall forever subsist an inviolable and universal
peace and friendship between his Catholic Majesty and the
United States, and the subjects and citizens of both.
II.
"That every privilege, exemption, and favor, with respect to
commerce, navigation, and personal rights, which now are, or
hereafter may be granted, by either, to any the most favored
nation, be also granted by them to each other.
III.
"That they mutually extend to the vessels, merchants, and
inhabitants of each other, all that protection, which is
usual and proper between friendly and allied nations.
IV.
"That the vessels, merchants, or other subjects of his
Catholic Majesty, and the United States, shall not resort to,
or be permitted (except in cases which humanity allows to
distress,) to enter into any of those ports or dominions of
the other, from which the most favored nation shall be
excluded.
V.
"That the following commerce be prohibited, and declared
contraband between the subjects of his Catholic Majesty and
the United States, viz.
"All such as his Catholic Majesty may think proper to
specify.
REMARKS. "On this proposition Mr Jay can offer nothing, but
an assurance of his being ready to concur in every reasonable
regulation that may be proposed.
VI.
"The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic Majesty,
and in future forbear to use, or attempt to use, the
navigation of the river Mississippi from the thirtyfirst
degree of north latitude, that is, from the point where it
leaves the United States, down to the ocean.
REMARKS. "The impression made upon the United States by the
magnanimity of his Majesty's conduct towards them; the
assistance they hope to receive from the further exertions of
the same magnanimity; the deep wound which an alliance with
so great a monarch would give to the hopes and efforts of the
enemy; the strong support it would afford to their
independence; the favorable influence which the example of
such a King would have on other nations, and the many other
great and extensive good consequences which would result at
this interesting period from his Majesty's taking so noble
and decided a part in their favor, have all conspired in
prevailing upon Congress to offer to relinquish in his favor,
the enjoyment of this territorial and national privilege, the
importance of which, to their constituents, can only be
estimated by the value they set upon his Majesty's
friendship.
"By this proposition, the United States offer to forego all
the advantages and conveniences, which nature has given to
the country bordering on the upper parts of that river, by
ceasing to export their own, and receiving in return the
commodities of other countries by that only channel, thereby
greatly reducing the value of that country, retarding its
settlement, and diminishing the benefits which the United
States would reap from its cultivation.
"Mr Jay thinks it his duty frankly to confess, that the
difficulty of reconciling this measure to the feelings of
their constituents, has appeared to Congress in a serious
light, and they now expect to do it, only by placing in the
opposite scale the gratitude due to his Catholic Majesty, and
the great and various advantages, which the United States
will derive from the acknowledgment and generous support of
their independence by the Spanish monarchy, at a time when
the vicissitudes, dangers, and difficulties of a distressing
war, with a powerful, obstinate, and vindictive nation,
renders the friendship and avowed protection of his Catholic
Majesty in a very particular manner interesting to them. The
offer of this proposition, therefore, being dictated by these
expectations and this combination of circumstances, must
necessarily be limited by the duration of them, and
consequently, that if the acceptance of it should, together
with the proposed alliance, be postponed to a general peace,
the United States will cease to consider themselves bound by
any propositions, or offers, which he may now make in their
behalf.
"Nor can Mr Jay omit mentioning the hopes and expectations of
Congress, that his Majesty's generosity and greatness of
mind will prompt him to alleviate, as much as possible, the
disadvantages to which this proposition subjects the United
States, by either granting them a free port, under certain
restrictions, in the vicinity, or by such other marks of his
liberality and justice, as may give him additional claims to
the affection and attachment of the United States.
VII.
"That his Catholic Majesty shall guaranty to the United
States all their respective territories.
VIII.
"That the United States shall guaranty to his Catholic
Majesty all his dominions in North America.
Lastly.
"As the aforegoing propositions appear to Mr Jay the most
essential, he omits proposing those less and subordinate
ones, which seem to follow of course. He therefore concludes
this subject with a general offer and propositions to make
and admit all such articles as, in the course of this
negotiation, shall appear conducive to the great objects of
the proposed treaty.
REMARKS. "Nothing on Mr Jay's part shall be wanting to
expedite the happy conclusion of this business, by adhering
constantly to the dictates of candor, frankness, and
unsuspecting confidence.
"He is ready to receive the treaty between the United States
and his Christian Majesty, as a model for this, or with such
alterations as, founded on the principles of reciprocity, may
be more agreeable to his Catholic Majesty, it being his
earnest desire to arrive at the important objects of his
mission in any way his Majesty may be pleased to prefer.
"The subject of aids, either by subsidy or loan as may be
most convenient to his Majesty, will require a particular
convention, but as the manner, extent, and terms depend on
his Majesty's pleasure, it is impossible for Mr Jay, without
some knowledge of it, to offer propositions adapted thereto.
All that he can at present say on that subject is, that
Congress are ready to do everything in their power. He will
not, however, endeavor to conceal their incapacity to do much
in the way of compensation, while the enemy shall continue to
make the United States the theatre of a desolating war, and
the object of their predatory operations. But when those
obstacles shall cease, it will be in their power, as well as
their inclination, to make retribution, and render important
services to his Majesty. Mr Jay will therefore continue to
decline attempting to induce his Majesty to take any
measures, however favorable to his country, by delusive
promises, or rash engagements; but on the other hand, he is
ready to enter into such reasonable ones, as he may have good
reason to say shall be faithfully and punctually performed.
"A particular treaty regulating the conduct to be observed by
his Catholic Majesty, and the United States, towards each
other during the war, also appears to Mr Jay important to
both; but as the proper plans and articles of such a treaty
can only result from a free conference on the subject, he can
upon this occasion only express his readiness to concur in
every provision, which may be calculated to give energy and
success to the operations and objects of both.
JOHN JAY."
Your Excellency will be pleased to observe, that among my remarks on
the sixth proposition, I have limited the duration of the offer
contained in it. I did this from a persuasion, that such limitation
was not only just and reasonable in itself, but absolutely necessary
to prevent this Court's continuing to delay a treaty to a general
peace. Besides what the Minister dropped upon this head in his
conference with me at Aranjues, I think it probable that they still
wish to adhere to that idea. To me they appear desirous of avoiding
the expense that the aids, which a treaty we should expect would
render unavoidable, and which at present would not be very convenient
for them. They wish to see our independence established, and yet not
be among the first to subscribe a precedent, that may one day be
turned against them. They wish not to exclude themselves, by any
present engagements, from taking advantage of the chances and events
of the war, not choosing on the one hand, that in case we sink, that
we should be fastened to them by any particular ties, nor on the other
hand, in case we survive the storm, to be so circumstanced as not to
make the most of us. I think it is their design, therefore, to draw
from us all such concessions as our present distress, and the hopes of
aid may extort, and by protracting negotiations about the treaty,
endeavor to avail themselves of these concessions at a future day,
when our inducements to offer them shall have ceased. As this would
evidently be unjust, I think the limitation in question can give them
no offence, and I hope Congress will be pleased to communicate to me
their sentiments on the subject.
I must also remark, that after what has passed, and considering how
well they are acquainted with my instructions, it would not only have
been useless, but absurd, to have made these propositions otherwise
than agreeably to those instructions.
Congress may at first view be a little surprised at the extent of the
fifth proposition, but when they compare it with the second, I am
persuaded they will find it sufficiently restrained.
In forming these propositions, it was my determination to leave them
so free from disputed, or disputable points, as that no plausible
pretexts for delay should arise from the face of them. I am well
apprised, nevertheless, that in the course of the negotiation, it will
be impossible for me to prevent their practising as much
procrastination as they may find convenient. Almost the only hope I
have of their seriously doing business arises from their fearing, that
the instruction respecting the Mississippi will be recalled the moment
that either any very decided successes on our part in America may
render a treaty with Spain of less importance to us, or a general
treaty of peace give us different views and prospects.
These are my conjectures and opinions. Perhaps they may prove
erroneous; as facts accompany them, Congress will be enabled to judge
for themselves. I will add, that from everything I can hear, the King
is honestly disposed to do us good, and were he alone to be consulted
in this business, I believe it would soon be concluded.
On the 23d of September, the foregoing propositions were to be laid
before the King. I heard nothing further from the Minister until the
27th, when he sent me the following note.
Translation.
"Although the last letter of Mr Jay, accompanied with a
certain plan, was transmitted on Saturday in the evening to
the Count de Florida Blanca, and although he could not inform
himself of their contents until translated from the English,
he nevertheless did not fail to render an account thereof to
the King in his despatch of Sunday. His Majesty having then
shown himself disposed to appoint some person to confer with
Mr Jay, it is become necessary to prepare a suitable
instruction, and present it to the King for his approbation.
The Count de Florida Blanca flatters himself, that he shall
be able to arrange this affair before the departure of the
Count for the Escurial, and in the meanwhile, he has the
honor to transmit to Mr Jay a passport for Major Franks.
"_Thursday, September 27th, 1781._"
I have been given to understand, though not officially, that M. Del
Campo, the Minister's Secretary, is the person who will be appointed
to confer with me, and though that gentleman is constantly about the
Minister, yet it seems, that a set of formal instructions are to be
prepared for him. When the Minister will be able to find either time
or health to complete them is uncertain.
There is reason to believe, that still less progress would have been
made in this affair, had Major Franks not have arrived. I regret his
detention, but hope the reasons assigned for it will be deemed
sufficient; I am perfectly satisfied with him.
Notwithstanding Congress had given me reason to expect, that the plan
of drawing bills upon me had been laid aside, I have now bills to the
amount of between seventy and eighty thousand dollars to pay, and no
funds provided. What am I to do? Dr Franklin writes me, that so far from
being able to give me further aids, he does not expect to have it in
his power even to pay our salaries in future.
From the facts stated in this letter, Congress will perceive that this
Court neither refuse nor promise to afford us further aid. Delay is
their system; when it will cease I cannot conjecture, for that is a
question which I doubt whether they themselves have as yet determined.
I am indebted largely to Mr Harrison for money advanced by him to
distressed seamen. He ought to be paid, and it is so far from being in
my power to do it, that I have been reduced to the mortifying
necessity of desiring him for the present to hold his hand. A great
many of this valuable class of people are confined in English gaols,
without other means of obtaining their enlargement than by entering
into the enemy's service. They complain bitterly of being neglected by
their country, and I really think not without reason. Retaliation
ought to be practised, and if we have not a sufficient number of
marine officers and seamen in our power to make the objects of it, why
would it be improper to substitute landsmen?
As to Portugal, I have more than once spoken to the Minister on the
subject. He admits the justice of our being treated by that as by
other neutral nations. He has promised to interfere in our behalf, but
nothing efficacious has yet been done. To send an agent there, could
do no harm, and might do good; I am therefore for it. The Ambassador
of France thinks with me, that before that step is taken, it ought to
be confidentially communicated to this Court, and I am persuaded
difficulties will arise from it. I shall do my best.
M. Gardoqui's departure is uncertain. He is still attending the orders
of the Court. I doubt his receiving them till the campaign closes, and
perhaps not then.
I do not despair of seeing some good result, finally, from all this
complication of political solecisms. It would not surprise me if we
should in the end be the gainers by them. My greatest fears are about
the fate of the bills. If protested, for want of payment, they will
become the source of much evil.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN JAY.
_P. S._ I have this instant received a letter from Commodore Gillon,
dated at Corunna, the 28th of September, and one from Colonel Searle
of the 26th of September. I herewith enclose copies of them. Their
contents are interesting. J. J.
FOOTNOTES:
[30] See these letters at large in the _Secret Journal of Congress_,
Vol. II. pp. 323, 326. The latter was drawn up by Mr Madison.
[31] Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 393.
[32] Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 404.
[33] See this letter above, p. 449.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Madrid, October 18th, 1781.
Sir,
Major Franks delivered me the despatches committed to his care on the
30th of August. He set out for France the 5th instant. My letters by
him to your Excellency will account for his remaining here so long. I
also beg leave to refer to them for other more interesting
particulars.
Congress will doubtless be informed that I have refused to accept some
of their bills. As the enemies of America in Europe had, with some
success, endeavored to render the credit of our paper suspected, it
appeared to me expedient to state the reasons for these refusals very
particularly, and I caused them to be recited at large in the
protests. I have sent copies of them to Dr Franklin and Mr Adams,
that in case these transactions should be represented to our
disadvantage, either in France or Holland, they might be enabled to
set the matter right. I now send copies to Congress, to prevent their
being alarmed at any general report that may arrive in America, of my
having refused to accept their bills drawn upon me.
Our merchants would, in my opinion, do well to write their
endorsements on bills at length, and in their own hand writing. There
is reason to believe that the enemy often turn blank endorsements to
good account.
M. Gardoqui is here. Those ships of the Spanish flotilla, which
carried the treasure, are arrived at Cadiz. Trenches are not yet
opened against Fort St Philip at Minorca. Another expedition is
preparing at Cadiz; its destination is uncertain.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN JAY.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.
Philadelphia, November 1st, 1781.
Dear Sir,
Your letter to Congress of April last having been read and answered by
them, though not so minutely as I would wish, I forbear making any
remarks upon it, because I am not yet perfectly acquainted with their
sentiments, (and would not wish any which might interfere with them)
having just entered upon the office, in consequence of which I open
this correspondence, though long since appointed. I beg of you,
agreeably to the directions of Congress, to address in future your
public letters to me, and to notify the Count de Florida Blanca of
this alteration in our system, our unacknowledged situation rendering
it improper to do it formally.
Congress have at length completed the organization of their executive
departments, by the choice of General Lincoln for their Secretary at
War. It is expected that order and system will arise out of this mode
of doing business, and the strictest economy.
If the great powers of Europe, with every advantage that settled
governments enjoy, feel themselves under the necessity of making
foreign loans, can it be expected that a war of six years, in the
heart of our country, should not have abridged the resources of a
State, which had every necessary for their army to import; which never
manufactured for itself; which had no marine; and which, with a number
of internal enemies in their bosom, had civil governments to
establish? Perhaps it would be impossible to offer a better picture of
the resources of this country, and the stability of her funds when
they shall be well managed, than by comparing our present debt with
the duration of the war and the exertions we have made. For though our
enemies may allege, that our debt was relieved by the depreciation of
our bills, yet it must be remembered, that that very depreciation was
a tax, though an unequal one, borne by the people of these States, and
as it has not produced national ruin, it must follow, that the States
had sufficient resources to bear this burthen. These resources, though
lessened, still remain.
The only object for which Britain continues the war, is the recovery
of this country. What better plan of finance then can be adopted by
France or Spain, than by timely aids of ships and money to blast this
hope, and by a speedy peace to terminate their expenses? If, on the
contrary, they wish to linger out the war till Britain is more
exhausted, this country affords them the easiest means of doing it.
Armies may be maintained here for one third of the expense that
Britain lays out upon hers. This France has experienced. Though her
affairs were not perhaps managed with the strictest economy, though
her bills were extremely low, her supplies cost at least one third
less than the British paid at New York, without taking into account
the hire of transports, the seamen employed, paid, and fed in that
service, and the number of them that fell into our hands. Be persuaded
yourself, and endeavor to persuade others, that if this is a war of
finance, which all modern wars are, Britain is most vulnerable in
America.
I congratulate you upon the important success of our aims in South
Carolina and Virginia, of which I enclose you official accounts. On
the returns you will remark a number of British American nominal
regiments. These were recruiting in Virginia and North Carolina, and
their success will show the truth of what Britain advances with
respect to the number of her partisans in America. I will venture to
say, that with similar advantages, their recruiting parties would have
been more successful in any country in Europe. Besides the troops
mentioned in the returns, the enemy lost during the siege near two
thousand negroes. Previous to the surrender, they had a naval
engagement with the Count de Grasse. The Terrible, a British
seventyfour, was burnt, so that our affairs here stand upon the most
respectable footing imaginable.--[Upwards of thirty lines follow
interspersed with a cypher, the key to which is not to be found.]
But this is a delicate subject, and I quit it till I am more fully
acquainted with the views of Congress thereon, for I confess to you,
that the sentiments I have hazarded are rather my own, than any that I
know to be theirs, and should weigh accordingly with you. The
provision trade with the Havana being very considerable and important
to Spain, while she has fleets and armies to maintain there, it might
be proper to suggest to the Spanish Ministry the advantage of allowing
small convoys of frigates, which would enable us to carry it on in
vessels of greater burden, and by that means diminish the expense of
freight and insurance, both of which, eventually, fall upon Spain. A
few frigates would answer the purpose, as the stations of the enemy's
ships are almost always known on this coast, and, indeed, they seldom
have any out but frigates cruising singly.
Another thought strikes me, which, perhaps, if digested, might be
ripened into a plan advantageous to France, Spain, and America. While
France keeps an army here, she must draw bills, or export money. She
has, for the most part, preferred the former, at the loss of forty per
cent discount. The money of Spain is lodged at the Havana, and cannot
be brought to Europe without great hazard; whereas the risk of sending
it here under convoy is extremely small. It may be vested in European
bills to such advantage, as to pay the whole expense of
transportation, and even an interest, till the bills are negotiated in
Europe. This plan affords France a market for her bills, Spain a cheap
and easy way of bringing her money home, and America a circulating
medium, which enables her to tax with advantage.
The enclosed act of Congress informs you of the appointment of Mr
Hanson, of Maryland, to the Presidentship.
I shall write very frequently to you, and shall in return expect that
you will omit no opportunity of letting me hear from you. A Court
kalendar, if one is printed with you, with notes of your own thereon,
might be of some service to us. I shall use our private cypher, as
corrected by that sent by Mr Toscan, till you receive the one
transmitted by Mr Thomson, in which case, as it is less troublesome,
be pleased to use that, if you are sure it came safe.
I am, dear Sir, with the sincerest regard and esteem, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.
Philadelphia, November 28th, 1781.
Dear Sir,
I wrote so fully to you not long since, that I should not trouble you
at this time, if I had not determined to omit no opportunity of
letting you hear from this side of the water, and enabling you at all
times to meet any falsehood the enemy may find it politic to publish.