friendly interposition of those sovereigns, who are associates in the
war. From Holland, we can properly ask nothing; nor is she, I believe,
in a capacity to grant it if we did ask. The active efforts of France
require all the resources of that great nation, and of consequence the
pecuniary aid which she affords us can but little advance the general
cause, however it may relieve our immediate distress.
We must then turn our eyes to Spain, and we must ask either loans or
subsidies to a very considerable amount. Small sums are not worth the
acceptance. They have the air of obligation without affording relief.
A small sum, therefore, is not an object to the United States, for
they do not mean to beg gratuities, but to make rational requests.
As Congress have empowered you to remove the obstacles, which have
hitherto impeded your negotiations, you will doubtless proceed with
prudent despatch in forming the important treaties, which are to be
the basis of our national connexion. Your own integrity, and the
dispositions which you certainly feel, as the true representative of
your Sovereign, to gratify the wishes of his Catholic Majesty, will
give you just claim to the confidence and friendly support of his
Ministers. And on the other hand, his Majesty's known piety and
justice, will certainly induce him to facilitate a permanent union
between the two countries, and to overturn that power, whose ambition
is known, felt, and detested, throughout the habitable globe.
Having a perfect confidence in the wisdom of his Majesty's Ministers,
I must request that you will submit to their consideration the
reasons, which operate in favor of the advances we expect. In doing
this, it will immediately strike you and them, that the enemy carries
on the operations against us at an expense infinitely greater than
that by which they are opposed. By enabling us, therefore, to increase
our resistance, and redouble our offensive efforts, the British will
be reduced to the necessity of increasing their force in America, or
of submitting beneath a decided superiority. Either must be fatal to
them. In the first instance, they will be crushed by the weight of
expense; and, in the second, they must, while they lose an actual
force, and part forever with the object in contest, feel the increased
weight of the American arms, and make head against those resources,
applied to a marine, which are now consumed in land operations.
Money ought, therefore, to be supplied to us from the Havana, which
will at the same time save the risk of transporting it to Europe,
while, as I have already observed, it must, when employed among us,
absolutely ruin the common enemy. For, when once they are driven from
the United States, they must, at a considerable expense, defend, or,
at a great loss, relinquish the rest of their American possessions;
and, in either case, the resources of this country will enable France
and Spain to carry on operations for the subjection of the British
Islands.
With respect to our finance, I am further to observe, that the
resolutions of Congress, of the 18th of March, 1780, have neither been
so regularly adopted by the States as was hoped and expected, nor been
productive of those consequences, which were intended. It is
unnecessary to travel into the causes, or to explain the reasons of
this event. The fact is clear. The new money is depreciated, and there
is the strong evidence of experience to convince us, that the issuing
of paper, at present, must be ineffectual. Taxation has not yet been
pursued to that extent, which was necessary. Neither is it reasonable
to expect that it should. Time has been required under all governments
to accustom the people by degrees to bear heavy burdens. The people of
America have so patiently endured the various calamities of the war,
that there is good reason to expect they will not shrink at this late
hour from the imposition of just and equal taxes. But many
arrangements are necessary to this purpose, and, therefore, an
immediate pecuniary assistance is the more necessary to us. Our debts,
under which I comprise, as well those of the individual States, as
those of the Union, are but trifling, when we consider the exertions
which have been made. The debt I have already mentioned on
certificates is heavy, not from the real amount, but because it is
beyond what the supplies obtained were reasonably worth, and because
it impedes taxation and impairs its effects. But the amount of other
debts so small, that a few years of peace would bring it within the
bounds of a revenue very moderate, when compared with the wealth of
our country. You well know the rapid increase of that wealth, and how
soon it would relieve us from the weight of debts, which might be in
the first instance very burdensome. There can, therefore, be no doubt,
that we shall be able to pay all those, which it may be necessary to
contract. But, as I have already observed, our great difficulty is the
want of means in our people, and of credit in our government.
It gives me, however, very great pleasure to inform you, that the
determined spirit of the country is by no means abated either by the
continuance of the war, the ravages of our enemy, the expense of blood
and treasure we have sustained, or the artifices, falsehoods, and
delusions of an insidious foe. These last become daily more and more
contemptible in America, and it appears equally astonishing, that they
should longer attempt them here, or boast the success of such attempts
in Europe. Uniform experience has shown the futility of their efforts,
and the falsehood of their assertions. I know they take the advantage
of every little success to vaunt the prowess of their troops and
proclaim hopes of conquest, which they do not feel. But those, who
know anything of our history or situation, must have the utmost
contempt for all these gasconades. It is impossible they should make
impression upon any but weak minds, and I should hardly have thought
of mentioning them, but I learn by letters from Spain, that men, who
are uninformed, have been led into misapprehensions from
circumstances, which were here considered as trivial and even
favorable.
I could hardly have supposed that our enemies had still the folly to
repeat, as I am told they do, that there is an English party in
America. Bribes and deceit have induced some wicked and weak men to
join them; but when we consider the sums they have expended, and the
falsehoods they have used, our wonder is not, that they have got so
many, but that they have gained so few. The independence of America is
considered here as established; so much so, that even those of
equivocal character accustom themselves to cherish the idea; for the
doubt is not now, whether an acknowledgment of it will take place, but
when that acknowledgment will be made. Our exertions also, in the
present moment, are not so much directed to establish our liberties,
as to prevent the ravages of the enemy, abridge the duration and
calamities of the war, and faithfully contribute to the reduction of a
power, whose ambition was equally dangerous and offensive to every
other.
All reasonings on this subject must be deeply enforced, by paying
attention to what has happened in the Southern States. The progress of
the enemy, while in appearance it menaced the conquest of that
extensive region, tended only, in effect, to exhaust him by fruitless
efforts, so that at length a handful of men have rescued the whole
from his possession. The attack on Virginia (if the piratical
incursions there can deserve that name) has been equally futile. The
commanders may indeed have enriched themselves by plunder, and many
worthy families have been distressed; but what is the consequence?
Indignation and resentment have stimulated even the weak and indolent
to action. The wavering are confirmed, and the firm are exasperated,
so that every hour, and by every operation, they create enemies,
instead of gaining subjects.
Our armies, though not very numerous, are powerful. The regular troops
are so much improved in discipline and the habits of a military life,
that they are at least equal to any troops in the world. Our militia
are becoming more and more warlike, so as to supply the wants of
regular troops, when the enemy (taking advantage of that convenience,
which their ships afford them) transfer the scene of action from one
place to another. The number of the British diminishes daily, and of
consequence, our superiority becomes daily more decisive. The greatest
plenty of subsistence is to be had for our armies, and the prospects
from the present harvest are beyond all former experience. I wish I
could add, that clothing and military stores were as abundant as those
other requisites for war. This is not the case; our soldiers, indeed,
are well armed, and, in some degree, they are clothed. We have also
ammunition abundantly sufficient for the common operations of the
field. But many of our militia are unarmed, and the sieges, which will
be necessary to expel the enemy, must make a heavy deduction from our
military stores.
The proposed siege of New York will soon be commenced, and would
undoubtedly be successful, if we could maintain a decided superiority
at sea. This must depend on contingencies, which are not in our power,
nor perhaps in the power of any human being. I am not without hopes,
even if we should not possess that superiority; but the expense will,
from the want of it, be very considerably enhanced, and this is a
circumstance which I cannot but deplore, for I repeat it again, the
want of money can alone prevent us from making the greatest
exertions. What our exertions have already been, our enemies
themselves must acknowledge, and while from insidious views, they
assert that they could not make an impression on us with ninety
thousand soldiers and seamen, we are certainly authorised to conclude
from this confession, that these States form a considerable balance in
the scale against them.
I am now, therefore, again led to reiterate my request of a
considerable sum of money from Spain; for I also again repeat, that
small sums are not worth our acceptance, and I may add, they are
unworthy the dignity of his Catholic Majesty. There can be no doubt,
nor will the Spanish Ministry deny, that there is a considerable risk
in transporting their money from the new world to the old, besides,
that when expended there, it necessarily runs through the different
channels of commerce, to feed the wants and invigorate the forces of
the enemy. There is, therefore, a double policy in expending a part of
it here, where it can not only be brought with safety and despatch,
but be employed to an immense advantage, when compared with its
effects in Europe. If it be asked, what advantages Spain will derive
in particular during the war, and what recompense can be made her
after the peace? I answer, that the weakening more the common enemy by
a given sum, is in itself a great advantage, and that to do this, by
sparing the blood of Spanish subjects, is an advantage still greater.
I add, that when relieved from the enemy, we may assist her in the
reduction of the Floridas and Bahamas, and, perhaps, of Jamaica. We
shall then, also, be in a situation to secure Nova Scotia, thereby
depriving Great Britain of her principal resource for ship-timber, and
enable us to furnish that essential article to the navy of Spain, on
cheaper and better terms, than it can be had elsewhere. On this last
subject, I have further to observe, that there is hardly anything in
which the maritime power of Spain is so much interested; for if we do
not possess that country, it will be impracticable to furnish those
supplies of masts and spars, which both France and Spain may stand in
need of; so that, of consequence, their positive and absolute strength
at sea will be the less, while that of the enemy is positively and
absolutely greater. The comparative inferiority, therefore, will be
still more considerable. Nor is this all. A marine requires men, as
well as ships. The fisheries and collieries are two pillars, which
support the marine of Britain, so far forth as seamen are required.
But it is evident, that the fisheries could not long continue in her
hands, if she were deprived of Nova Scotia. Here again, we are also to
consider, that there is an immense difference between that patient
resistance, whose opposition must at length weary the enemy into
granting our independence, and those vigorous active operations, which
may wrest from them their present possessions. Money is necessary for
the latter, and I can say with confidence, that money alone is
necessary.
But to return. The advantages which will flow to Spain at a peace,
from giving effectual aid to our finances now, will be, in the first
place, the common compensation of repayment, should his Catholic
Majesty prefer loans to subsidies. The having expelled the English
from the Bay of Mexico, and having, by that means, prevented the
contraband commerce, so destructive to his revenue, will be another
striking advantage, which cannot have escaped the penetration of his
Ministers. But this is not all. The opening a port in East Florida, on
the shores of the Atlantic, under proper regulations and
restrictions, would enable us to carry on a commerce very advantageous
to Spain, because we could furnish all such supplies of provisions,
&c. as their possessions might stand in need of, and in return, take
at port, cocoa, logwood, Nicaragua wood, and, indeed, any other
commodities, which his Catholic Majesty should find it for the
advantage of his dominions to permit the exportation of. Our commerce
with Spain is also, in itself, a very considerable object. At this
moment, we take from thence wine, oil, fruit, silk, cloth, &c. And
after the conclusion of the war, our remittances of wheat, corn, fish,
and naval stores, will be of very great consequence to the commerce of
that country. Another article of commerce will be the building of
ships, which can be had on cheaper and better terms here than
elsewhere; and there can be no doubt but that the construction of
ships in this country is equal, if not superior, to that in any other.
Even now, ships might be built on his Majesty's account, though by no
means so cheaply as in times of peace; besides that, as there is now
no seasoned timber in the country, such ships would not be durable,
and, therefore, it might, perhaps, be imprudent to get any more than
are immediately necessary.
To all the other advantages, which would arise to his Catholic
Majesty, I may add, (although that is not so properly within my
department,) the security, which his dominions would derive from our
guarantee. This is an advantage, which must be the more evident from a
consideration of what might have happened, had this country continued
in union with Great Britain, and had Great Britain pursued those
schemes of universal empire, which the virtue and fortitude of America
first checked, and which it is the object of the present war to
frustrate. Our enemies do, I know, allege, that our weakness is unable
to withstand them, and that our force is dangerous to Spain. The
serious refutation of such absurd contradictions would involve an
absurdity. It may not, however, be improper to observe, that the
attention of this country, for a century past, has been, and for a
century to come, most probably will be, entirely turned to agriculture
and commerce. We must always, therefore, be useful neighbors, and
never dangerous, except to those who may have views of dominion. Spain
can never be in this predicament, though the British may and will.
Their solicitude, therefore, to inspire apprehensions of us is, and
ought to be, the strongest argument against entertaining them. But, if
this evident reasoning did not exist, still the conduct of Congress,
with regard to his Catholic Majesty, has been so just, and even
generous, not only in being willing to secure his rights, but to
gratify him by foregoing their own, that there is not room for the
shadow of suspicion. This conduct, I should suppose, would alone have
weight sufficient to procure what it is my object to request, if the
other very cogent and conclusive reasons for it did not apply. And,
after all, if it be considered how much greater is the interest of
Spain at the vigorous continuance of the present war, than that of any
other of the associates, I cannot permit myself one moment to doubt of
your success. I am the more sanguine from the character of the
Catholic King, and of his Ministers, for wisdom, candor, and
integrity. These qualities will, I am sure, meet such corresponding
dispositions in the United States, that the most thorough harmony and
coalition must inevitably take place. This is an object of the
greatest importance to both countries. Mutual benefits and the
reciprocation of good offices will endear a connexion between them,
and their interests require that this connexion should be of the
closest kind.
In every point of view, therefore, that we can consider the subject,
the advance I have mentioned must appear alike beneficial. If the
Governor of Cuba, or any other person, were duly authorised,
stipulations might even now be entered into for furnishing all
necessary supplies of provisions to the fleets and armies of his
Catholic Majesty, which would certainly facilitate their operations.
The advance of money also by Spain would enable the fleets and troops
of France to subsist cheaper than at present, because it would tend to
raise the exchange here, which is now too low.
Your own good sense will suggest to you many other most forcible
arguments, as well as the proper time and manner of applying them. It
is necessary to mention, that the sum of five million dollars may,
perhaps, be sufficient for our present emergencies; but if a greater
sum can be obtained, we shall thereby become more extensively useful.
Whatever the grant may be, it will be proper that it be sent hither in
some Spanish ships of war from the Havana, or advanced to us there; in
which latter case, we will devise the means of bringing it away.
Whether to ask for subsidies, or loans, as well as the terms on which
either are to be obtained, these, Sir, are objects, which you are
fully competent to determine upon. I have only to wish that your
applications may meet with that success, which I am confident you will
not fail to merit. As the means of facilitating your views, I shall
apply to the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty here, to write on
the same subject to the French Ambassador at Madrid. The generous
conduct of France gives just ground of reliance on her friendly
assistance; and you are too well convinced of this, not to act in the
most perfect harmony with the servants of that Court, especially on an
occasion so important as the present. I need not stimulate your
activity, by observing how precious is every moment of time in those
affairs, on which the fate of Empires depends; nor need I suggest the
importance of a treaty, and particularly a subsidiary treaty with
Spain, in that moment, when the judgment of Europe is to be passed on
the fate of America. For, however impracticable it may be to subdue
us, it is undoubtedly of moment to hasten the approach of that period,
when the acknowledgment of our independence shall give the blessings
of peace to so many contending nations. To spare the present lavish
effusion of blood and treasure, is a serious object with those, who
feel, as you do, the emotions of benevolence; and I am confident, that
the patriotism, which has inspired your conduct, will prompt you to
obtain a peace honorable for your country and advantageous to her
friends. The only probable method to effect these things, is a
thorough union of forces and resources, to reduce the pride and power
of that aspiring nation, whose ambition embroils the universe.
With all possible respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
* * * * *
ROBERT MORRIS TO JOHN JAY.
Philadelphia, July 7th, 1781.
Dear Sir,
This will accompany my former letter of the 4th instant, which you
will perceive to be so written, as that it may be shown, if
necessary, to the Spanish Minister. You will make such use of it as
prudence may dictate. I would gladly now give you details of our
situation and plans for reforming it, but I have not yet sufficiently
obtained the one, nor matured the other. Whenever I am in capacity to
apprize you fully of these things, you shall hear from me at large on
the subject. At present I can only inform you that a sum of hard money
will, from particular circumstances, afford us relief and turn to our
advantage far beyond what might be supposed from the amount. Although
I have stated the demand at five millions, yet I beg you will take as
much as you can obtain, though it be far short of that sum. But at the
same time, I repeat, that a very small one is not worth the
acceptance. Knowing our wants to be great, you will judge properly as
to what we can accept consistently with our dignity.
I enclose you a cypher, and with the duplicate of my letters I will
send you another. Should both arrive safe, you will be so kind as to
hand one to Mr Carmichael, letting me know which you keep and write
by.
I have the honor to be your Excellency's most obedient and humble
servant,
ROBERT MORRIS.
* * * * *
ROBERT MORRIS TO JOHN JAY.
Office of Finance, July 9th, 1781.
Dear Sir,
Observing by your correspondence with Congress, that you are put to a
good deal of expense by American seamen arriving from captivity at
Cadiz, where they also grow very troublesome, I offer the following
proposal to your consideration. Authorise Mr Harrison, or whoever may
be your agent at Cadiz, to enter into contracts with such Americans as
present themselves for the bounty of their country, to proceed from
Cadiz, in such ship or vessel as he may provide for the purpose, for
such port within the United States as he may appoint, at the monthly
wages of six or eight Spanish dollars, to be paid as soon after their
arrival in America as the cargo of the vessel shall be landed. After
they sign such contract, he is to supply their wants sparingly, until
he collects a sufficient number to man a suitable vessel, which he may
procure either by charter or purchase, whichever may be in his power,
and shall appear most eligible at the time. If he charter, it should
be on such terms that the owners risk their vessel, putting in their
own master, and, if they choose it, part of the seamen. The vessel to
be loaded with salt for account and risk of the United States; freight
so much per bushel or so much per ton to America and back. But in that
case, let it be always a condition, that the vessel may be ordered
from the first place she arrives, to any one other port in America;
because, it may happen that she will arrive where there cannot be got
a cargo to load her back, or where the salt would be of no use.
If your funds will admit of it, and vessels can be furnished cheap,
this would be the more eligible mode of doing the business, because I
could then either send the vessels back, or sell, as might suit best.
In case of purchase, they should be fast sailers, with good sails and
rigging, well found and fitted, and if armed, so much the better.
Honest, active, industrious, and faithful masters must be provided for
these vessels, and they must all come addressed to my order, directed
for this port, with liberty however to get into any safe port they
can. The master to give me immediate notice of his arrival, when I
shall give proper orders, or probably have them previously ready. An
account of the moneys advanced to each person on board these vessels,
as well as the cost and outfit of the ship and cost of the cargo, must
be sent me by each vessel, in order that proper deductions may be made
from the people, and proper credits be given for the costs. You will
observe, I am duly empowered by Congress to export and import for
account and risk of the United States; and I think this plan so likely
to benefit the public, that I very freely give my sanction to it,
provided you can find the money. Your agent must give me regular
advice of every expedition, and inform you also whenever he commences
them. When a ship is provided and a master appointed, all the men
should sign articles for the voyage in the common form.
I am, Dear Sir, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
* * * * *
ROBERT MORRIS TO JOHN JAY.
Philadelphia, July 13th, 1781.
Dear Sir,