auxilio._ I have the honor to be more particularly acquainted with M.
Brantzen, who is certainly a very able man, and universally
acknowledged to be so by all who know him. The arguments, which I know
he has used with the British Minister, are such as can never be
answered, both upon the liberty of navigation, and the compensation
for damages. He is an entire master of his subject, and has urged it
with a degree of perspicuity and eloquence, that I know has much
struck his antagonists.
Unnecessary, however, as any exertions of mine have been, I have not
omitted any opportunity of throwing in any friendly suggestions in my
power, where there was a possibility of doing any good to our good
friends, the Dutch. I have made such suggestions to Mr Fitzherbert.
But with Mr Oswald, I have had several very serious conversations upon
the subject. So I have also with Mr Vaughan and Mr Whiteford.
To Mr Oswald I urged the necessity of Great Britain's agreeing with
the Dutch upon the unlimited freedom of navigation, from a variety of
topics, some of which I may explain to you more particularly
hereafter. Thus much I may say at present, that I told him, that it
was impossible for Great Britain to avoid it; it would probably be
insisted upon by all the other powers. France and Spain, as well as
Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, the Emperor, and Portugal, as well
as Holland, had already signed the armed neutrality. The United States
of America had declared themselves ready to sign, and were ready. The
combination being thus powerful, Great Britain could not resist it.
But if she should refuse to agree to it with Holland, and the other
powers should acquiesce, and Holland should make peace without it
(which would never, however, be the case,) yet all would be
ineffectual, for Holland would forever be able to make use of other
neutral bottoms, and would thus enjoy the benefit of this liberty and
reality, though denied it by treaty, and in appearance. It would,
therefore, be more for the honor and interest of Great Britain to
agree to it with a good grace, in the treaty with Holland. Nay, the
wisest part she could act would be to set on foot a negotiation
immediately for signing herself the Treaty of Armed Neutrality, and
then admitting it into the treaty with Holland would be a thing of
course. At one of these conversations Dr Franklin was present, who
supported me with all his weight; at another, Mr Jay seconded me with
all his abilities and ingenuity. Mr Oswald has several times assured
me, that he had written these arguments and his own opinion, in
conformity with them, to the King's Ministers in London, and I doubt
not they will be adopted.
With respect to the compensation for damages, it is impossible to add
anything to the arrangements M. Brantzen has urged to show the justice
of it, and if Britain is really wise, she will think it her policy to
do everything in her power to soften the resentment of the Dutch, and
regain their good will and good humor.
The rage of Great Britain, however, has carried her to such
extravagant lengths, in a cause unjust from beginning to end, that she
is scarcely able to repair the injuries she has done. America has a
just claim to compensation for all her burnt towns and plundered
property, and indeed for all her slaughtered sons, if that were
possible. I shall continue to embrace every opportunity that presents,
of doing all the little service in my power to our good friends the
Dutch, whose friendship for us I shall not soon forget. This must be
communicated with great discretion, if at all.
My best respects to all.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, January 22d, 1783.
Sir,
Upon a sudden notification from the Count de Vergennes, Dr Franklin
and myself, in the absence of Mr Jay and Mr Laurens, went to
Versailles, and arrived at the Count's office at ten o'clock on
Monday, the 20th of this month. At eleven, arrived the Count d'Aranda
and Mr Fitzherbert. The Ministers of the three Crowns, signed and
sealed the preliminaries of peace and an armistice, in presence of
Doctor Franklin and myself, who also signed and sealed a declaration
of an armistice between the Crown of Great Britain and the United
States of America, and received a counter declaration from Mr
Fitzherbert. Copies of these declarations are enclosed.[3]
The King of Great Britain has made a declaration concerning the terms,
that he will allow to the Dutch; but they are not such as will give
satisfaction to that unfortunate nation, for whom, on account of their
friendship for us, and the important benefits we have received from
it, I feel very sensibly and sincerely. Yesterday we went to
Versailles again to make our court to the King and royal family upon
the occasion, and received the compliments of the Foreign Ministers.
The Count d'Aranda invited me to dine with him on Sunday next, and
said he hoped that the affairs of Spain and the United States would be
soon adjusted _a l'aimable_. I answered, that I wished it with all my
heart. The two Floridas and Minorca are more than a _quantum meruit_
for what this Power has done, and the Dutch unfortunately are to
suffer for it. It is not in my power to say when the definitive treaty
will be signed. I hope not before the Dutch are ready, in six weeks or
two months at farthest I suppose.
It is no longer necessary for Congress to appoint another person in my
place in the commission for peace, because it will be executed before
this reaches America. But I beg leave to renew the resignation of the
credence to the States-General, and the commission for borrowing money
in Holland, and to request, that no time may be lost in transmitting
the acceptance of this resignation, and another person to take that
station, that I may be able to go home in the spring ships.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[3] Contained in the Correspondence of the Ministers for negotiating
peace.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, January 23d, 1783.
Sir,
The letters you did me the honor to write on the 6th, and 18th of
November, came safe to hand.
You do me honor, Sir, in applauding the judgment I have formed from
time to time of the Court of Britain, and future ages will give me
credit for the judgment I have formed of some other Courts. The true
designs of a Minister of State are not difficult to be penetrated by
an honest man of common sense, who is in a situation to know anything
of the secret of affairs, and to observe constantly the chain of
public events; for whatever ostensible appearances may be put on,
whatever obliquities may be imagined, however the web may be woven, or
the thread doubled and twisted, enough will be seen to unravel the
whole.
My opinions, as you observe, sometimes run counter to those generally
received; but the reason of this has generally been, that I have had
earlier evidence than the generality, and I have had the satisfaction
to find, that others have formed the same judgment, when they have
had the same intelligence. I do not affect singularity, nor love to be
in a minority, though truth and justice have sometimes obliged me to
be so. You say, that nothing can be more conformable to your wishes
than the instructions I transmitted. I am not surprised at this; it is
very natural. Had I never been on this side of the Atlantic, I believe
I should have been of your mind in this particular. At present I
cannot be, and I believe, by this time, the Dutch regret having given
them. You will hear enough of the reason of it. I have lived long
enough, and had experience enough of the conduct of governments, and
people, nations, and courts, to be convinced, that gratitude,
friendship, unsuspecting confidence, and all the most amiable passions
in human nature, are the most dangerous guides in politics. I assure
you, Sir, if we had not been more cautious than the Dutch, we should
have been worse off than they, and our country would have suffered
much more.
Mr Laurens has been here, and has behaved with great caution,
firmness, and wisdom. He arrived so late, as only to attend the two
last days of the conferences, the 29th and 30th of November. But the
short time he was with us, he was of great service to the cause. He
has done great service to America in England, where his conversation
has been such as the purest and firmest American could wish it, and
has made many converts. He is gone again to Bath, and his journey will
do as much good to his country as to his health. He will return to the
signature of the definitive treaty.
The ratifications of my contracts have been received.
The release of Captain Asgill was so exquisite a relief to my
feelings, that I have not much cared what interposition it was owing
to. It would have been a horrid damp to the joys of peace, if we had
received a disagreeable account of him.
The difference between Denmark and Holland is of no serious nature.
The clue to the whole is, the Queen Dowager is sister to the Duke of
Brunswick; but there is nothing to fear from Denmark. As to the
northern powers, we have nothing to fear from any of them. All of
them, and all the neutral powers, would have acknowledged our
independence before now, by receiving Mr Dana to sign the principles
of the armed neutrality, if he had not been restrained from acting.
The unlimited confidence of Congress has been grossly abused, and we
should have been irreparably injured, if we had not been upon our
guard. As our liberties and most important interests are now secured,
as far as they can be, against Great Britain, it would be my wish to
say as little as possible of the policy of any Minister of our first
ally, which has not been as we could desire, and to retain forever a
grateful remembrance of the friendly assistance we have received. But
we have evidence enough to warn us against unlimited confidence in any
European Minister of State.
I have never drawn upon Dr Franklin for any money, since the end of my
two and a half years' salary; and he tells me he has made no use of
the bills. I had received money for my subsistence of Messieurs
Willinks, and as it will be but a few months more, at farthest, that I
shall have to subsist in Europe, I beg leave to proceed to the end in
the same way. I shall receive only the amount of my salary, and settle
the account with Congress on my return.
I hope to be safely landed on my native shore in the month of June;
and to this end, I beg that an appointment may be made to the Dutch
mission, and the acceptance of my resignation be transmitted to me by
the first ships.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO C. W. F. DUMAS.
Paris, January 29th, 1783.
Sir,
Upon receiving the letter, which you did me the honor to write me on
the 24th, late last evening, I went immediately to consult with my
colleague, Mr Jay, and we agreed to go this morning to Dr Franklin.
Accordingly today we went together to Passy, and communicated your
letter to him, and after recollecting the powers we have received, we
all agreed that I should make you the following answer.
You will readily recollect the resolutions of Congress, which I did
myself the honor two years ago to communicate to the President of
their High Mightinesses, and to the Ministers of Russia, Sweden, and
Denmark, at the Hague. The letter to the President was sent "_au
greffe_," and there may, perhaps, be now found. These resolutions
contained the approbation of Congress, of the principles of the
declaration of the Empress of Russia, and authorised any of the
American Ministers in Europe, if invited thereto, to pledge the faith
of the United States to the observance of them.
Sometime after this, Congress sent Mr Dana a commission with full
power to accede to the principles of the Marine Treaty between the
neutral powers, and he is now at Petersburg, vested with these powers,
and, according to late intelligence received from him, has well
founded expectations of being soon admitted.
It is the opinion of my colleagues, as well as my own, that no
commission of mine to their High Mightinesses contains authority to
negotiate this business, and we are all of opinion, that it is most
proper that Mr Dana should negotiate it.
But as there has been no express revocation of the power given to all
or any of us, by the first resolutions, and if the case should happen,
that Mr Dana could not attend in season, on account of the distance,
for the sake of accelerating the signature of the definitive treaty of
peace, we should not hesitate to pledge the faith of the United States
to the observance of the principles of the armed neutrality. I wish it
were in my power to give you a more satisfactory answer, but candor
will warrant no other.
With great respect to the gentlemen, as well as to you,
I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, February 5th, 1783.
Sir,
The resolution of Congress of the 12th of July, 1781, "That the
commission and instructions, for negotiating a Treaty of Commerce
between these United States and Great Britain, given to the Honorable
John Adams, on the 29th day of September, 1779, be, and they are
hereby revoked," was duly received by me in Holland; but no
explanation of the motives to it, or the reasons on which it was
founded, was ever transmitted to me by Congress, or the Committee of
Foreign Affairs, or any individual member, nor has anybody in Europe,
or America, ever once attempted, that I know of, to guess at the
reason. Whether it was intended as a punishment to me, or with a
charitable design not to lead me into temptation; whether it was
intended as a punishment to the English for their insolence and
barbarity; whether it was intended to prevent or remove suspicions of
allies, or the envy and green eyed jealousy of copatriots, I know not.
Of one thing, however, I am fully satisfied, that Congress had
reasons, and meant well; but whether those reasons were founded on
true or mistaken information, I know not.
When I recollect the instructions, which were given and revoked with
that commission, I can guess, and only guess, at some considerations,
which might, or might not, operate with Congress. In these
instructions, Congress determined,
1st. That the common right of fishing should in no case be given up.
2dly. That it is essential to the welfare of all these United States,
that the inhabitants thereof, at the expiration of the war, should
continue to enjoy the free and undisturbed exercise of their common
right to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and the other fishing
banks and seas of North America, preserving inviolate the treaties
between France and the said States, &c. &c.
3dly. "That our faith be pledged to the several States, that without
their unanimous consent no Treaty of Commerce shall be entered into,
nor any trade or commerce whatever carried on with Great Britain,
without the explicit stipulation hereinafter mentioned. You are,
therefore, not to consent to any Treaty of Commerce with Great
Britain, without an explicit stipulation on her part, not to molest or
disturb the inhabitants of the United States of America, in taking
fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and other fisheries in the American
seas, anywhere, excepting within the distance of three leagues of the
shores of the territories remaining to Great Britain at the close of
the war, if a nearer distance cannot be obtained by negotiation. And
in the negotiation you are to exert your most strenuous endeavors to
obtain a nearer distance in the Gulf of St Lawrence, and particularly
along the shores of Nova Scotia; as to which latter we are desirous,
that even the shores may be occasionally used for the purpose of
carrying on the fisheries by the inhabitants of these States."
These instructions are very decisive in favor of our indubitable right
to the fisheries; and it is possible, that Congress might be of
opinion, that commerce would be the strongest inducement to the
English to make peace, and at the same time, that there was something
so naval in the fisheries, that the dread of acknowledging our right
to them would be the strongest obstacle in the way of peace. They
might think, too, that peace was of more importance to the United
States, than a British acknowledgment of our right to the fisheries,
which, to be sure, would have been enjoyed by our people in a good
degree without it.
Reasonings like these might influence Congress to revoke the
commission and instructions in question. But whatever probability
there might appear in them at that time, experience has since shown,
that they were not well founded. On the contrary, arguments have been
found to convince the British Ministers themselves, that it was the
interest of their King and country, not only to acknowledge the
American right to the fisheries, but to encourage the unrestrained
exercise of it. These considerations, therefore, can be no longer of
any weight against a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, or against
accrediting a Minister to the Court of St James. Nor can I conceive of
any motive now existing against this measure. On the contrary, so many
advantages present themselves to view, that I think it my duty to
recommend them to Congress as proper to be adopted without loss of
time. If there are in Congress any of those gentlemen, with whom I had
the honor to serve in the years 1775 and 1776, they may possibly
remember, that in arguing in favor of sending Ministers to Versailles,
to propose a connexion with that Court, I laid it down as a first
principle, that we should calculate all our measures and foreign
negotiations in such a manner, as to avoid a too great dependence upon
any one power of Europe; to avoid all obligations and temptations to
take any part in future European wars. That the business of America
with Europe was commerce, not politics or war. And above all, that it
never could be our interest to ruin Great Britain, or injure or weaken
her any further than should be necessary to support our independence,
and our alliances; and that as soon as Great Britain should be brought
to a temper to acknowledge our sovereignty and our alliances, and
consent that we should maintain the one, and fulfil the others, it
would be our interest and duty to be her friends, as well as the
friends of all the other powers of Europe, and enemies to none.
We are now happily arrived, through many tremendous tempests, at that
period. Great Britain respects us as sovereign States, and respects
all our political engagements with foreign nations, and as long as she
continues in this temper of wisdom, it is our duty to respect her. We
have accordingly made a treaty with her and mutually sworn to be
friends. Through the whole period of our warfare and negotiations, I
confess I have never lost sight of the principles and the system, with
which I set out, which appeared to me to be the sentiments of Congress
with great unanimity, and I have no reason to believe that any change
of opinion has taken place; if there has not, every one will agree
with me, that no measure we can pursue will have such a tendency to
preserve the government and people of England in the right system for
their own and our interest, and the interest of our allies too, well
understood, as sending a Minister to reside at the Court of London.
In the next place, the Court of London is the best station to collect
intelligence from every part, and by means of the freedom of the press
to communicate information for the benefit of our country, to every
part of the world. In time of peace, there is so frequent travelling
between Paris, London, and the Hague, that the correspondence of our
Ministers at those Courts may be carried on by private hands, without
hazarding anything from the infidelity of the posts, and Congress may
reasonably expect advantages from this circumstance.
In the third place, a treaty of commerce with Great Britain is an
affair of great importance to both countries. Upon this occasion I
hope I shall be excused if I venture to advise, that Congress should
instruct their Minister not to conclude such a treaty, without sending
the project to them for their observations and fresh instructions, and
I think it would not be improper, on this occasion, to imitate the
Dutch method, and take the project, _ad referendum_, and transmit it
to the Legislatures of all the States for their remarks, before
Congress finally resolve. Their Minister may be authorised and
instructed, in the mean time, to enter into a temporary convention for
regulating the present trade, for a limited number of months or years,
or until the treaty of commerce shall be completed.
In the fourth place, it is our part to be the first to send a Minister
to Great Britain, which is the older, and as yet the superior State.
It becomes us to send a Minister first, and I doubt not the King of
Great Britain will very soon return the compliment. Whereas if we do
not begin, I believe there will be many delicacies at St James',
about being the first to send. I confess I wish a British Minister at
Philadelphia, and think we should derive many benefits from his
residence there. While we have any foreign Ministers among us, I wish
to have them from all the great powers with whom we are much
connected. The _Corps Diplomatique_ at every Court is, or ought to be,
a system representing at least that part of the system of Europe, with
which that Court is most conversant.
In the same manner, or at least from similar reasons, as long as we
have any one Minister abroad at any European Court, I think we ought
to have one at every one to which we are most essentially related,
whether in commerce or policy, and therefore while we have any
Minister at Versailles, the Hague, or London, I think it clear we
ought to have one at each, though I confess I have sometimes thought,
that after a very few years, it will be the best thing we can do to
recall every Minister from Europe, and send embassies only on special
occasions.
If, however, any members of Congress should have any delicacies, lest
an American Minister should not be received with a dignity becoming
his rank and character at London, they may send a commission to make
a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, to their Minister at Madrid,
or Versailles, or the Hague, or St Petersburg, and instruct him to
carry on the negotiation from the Court where he may be, until he
shall be invited to London, or a letter of credence may be sent to one
of these, with instructions to go to London, as soon as the King shall
appoint a Minister to go to Philadelphia.
After all, however, my opinion is, that none of these manoeuvres are
necessary, but that the best way will be to send a Minister directly
to St James', with a letter of credence to the King, as a Minister
Plenipotentiary, and a commission to treat of a treaty of commerce,
but with instructions not to come to any irrevocable conclusion, until
Congress and all the States have an opportunity to consider of the
project, and suggest their amendments.
There is one more argument in favor of sending a Minister forthwith;
it is this, while this mission lies open, it will be a source of
jealousy among present Ministers, and such as are or may be candidates
to be foreign Ministers, a source of intrigue and faction among their
partisans and adherents, and a source of animosity and division among
the people of the States. For this reason, it is a pity, that the
first choice had not been such as Congress could have continued to
approve, and the first measure such as Congress could have constantly
persevered in. If this had been the case, the door of faction would
have been kept shut. As this, however, was once my department, by the
voice of eleven States, in twelve present, and as I will be answerable
at any hazard, it will never be the department of any one by a greater
majority, there seems to be a propriety in my giving my advice
concerning it, on taking leave of it, if such is the will of
Congress, as I have before done in this letter, according to the best
of my judgment. And if it should not be thought too presumptuous, I
would beg leave to add, what is my idea of the qualifications
necessary for an American foreign Minister in general, and
particularly and above all to the Court of St James'.