portion of Mr. Pearson’s forecast, as regards the people of the tropic
zones, will be justified by events. It is impossible for the dominant
races of the temperate zones ever bodily to displace the peoples of
the tropics. It is highly probable that these people will cast off the
yoke of their European conquerors sooner or later, and will become
independent nations once more; though it is also possible that the
modern conditions of easy travel may permit the permanent rule in the
tropics of a vigorous northern race, renewed by a complete change every
generation.
Mr. Pearson’s further proposition is that these black, red, and yellow
nations, when thus freed, will threaten the dominance of the higher
peoples, possibly by military, certainly by industrial, rivalry, and
that the mere knowledge of the equality of these stocks will cow and
dispirit the higher races.
This part of his argument is open to very serious objections. In the
first place, Mr. Pearson entirely fails to take into account the
difference in character among the nationalities produced in the tropics
as the result of European conquest. In Asia, doubtless, the old races
now submerged by European predominance will reappear, profoundly
changed in themselves and in their relations to one another, but as
un-European as ever, and not appreciably affected by any intermixture
of European blood. In Africa, the native States will probably range
somewhere between the Portuguese half-caste and quarter-caste
communities now existing on certain of the tropic coasts, and pastoral
or agricultural communities, with a Mohammedan religious cult and
Asiatic type of government, produced by the infusion of a conquering
semitic or hamitic caste on a conquered negro people. There may be a
dominant caste of European blood in some of these States, but that
is all. In tropical America, the change has already taken place.
The States that there exist will not materially alter their form.
It is possible that here and there populations of Chinese, pure or
half-caste, or even of coolies, may spring up; but taken as a whole,
these States will be in the future what they are now, that is, they
will be by blood partly white, but chiefly Indian or negro, with
their language, law, religion, literature, and governmental system
approaching those of Europe and North America.
Suppose that what Mr. Pearson foresees comes to pass, and that the
black and yellow races of the world attain the same independence
already achieved by the mongrel reddish race. Mr. Pearson thinks
that this will expose us to two dangers. The first is that of actual
physical distress caused by the competition of the teeming myriads
of the tropics, or perhaps by their invasion of the Temperate zones.
Mr. Pearson himself does not feel any very great anxiety about this
invasion assuming a military type, and I think that even the fear he
does express is unwarranted by the facts. He is immensely impressed by
the teeming population of China. He thinks that the Chinese will some
day constitute the dominant portion of the population, both politically
and numerically, in the East Indies, New Guinea, and Farther India. In
this he is probably quite right; but such a change would merely mean
the destruction or submersion of Malay, Dyak, and Papuan and would be
of hardly any real consequence to the white man. He further thinks
that the Chinese may jeopardize Russia in Asia. Here I am inclined to
think he is wrong. As far as it is possible to judge in the absence of
statistics, the Chinaman at present is not increasing relatively as
fast as the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon. Half a century or so more will
put both of them within measurable distance of equality with him, even
in point of numbers. The movement of population in China is toward the
south, not the north; the menace is real for the English and French
protectorates in the south; in the north the difficulty hitherto has
been to keep Russian settlers from crossing the Chinese frontier. When
the great Trans-Siberian railroad is built, and when a few millions
more of Russian settlers stretch from the Volga to the valley of the
Amoor, the danger of a military advance by the Chinese against Asiatic
Russia will be entirely over, even granting that it now exists. The
Chinaman never has been, and probably never will be, such a fighter as
Turk or Tartar, and he would have to possess an absolutely overwhelming
superiority of numbers to give him a chance in a war of aggression
against a powerful military race. As yet, he has made no advance
whatever towards developing an army capable of offensive work against
European foes. In China there are no roads; the military profession
is looked down on; Chinese troops would be formidable only under a
European leader, and a European leader would be employed only from dire
necessity; that is to repel, not to undertake an invasion. Moreover,
China is merely an aggregate of provinces with a central knot at Pekin;
and Pekin could be taken at any time by a small trained army. China
will not menace Siberia until after undergoing some stupendous and
undreamed-of internal revolution. It is scarcely within the bounds of
possibility to conceive of the Chinaman expelling the European settler
from lands in which that settler represents the bulk of a fairly thick
population, not merely a small intrusive caste. It is, of course,
always possible that in the far-distant future (though there is no
sign of it now) China may travel on the path of Japan, may change her
policy, may develop fleets and armies; but if she does do this, there
is no reason why this fact should stunt and dwarf the people of the
higher races. In Elizabeth’s day the Turkish fleets and armies stood
towards those of European powers in a far higher position than those of
China, or of the tropics generally, can ever hope to stand in relation
to the peoples of the Temperate zones; and yet this did not hinder
the Elizabethan Age from being one of great note both in the field of
thought and in the field of action.
The anticipation of what might happen if India became solidified seems
even more ill-founded. Here Mr. Pearson’s position is that the very
continuance of European rule, doing away with war and famine, produces
an increase of population and a solidity of the country, which will
enable the people to overthrow that European rule. He assumes that the
solidified and populous country will continue to remain such after the
overthrow of the Europeans, and will be capable of deeds of aggression;
but, of course, such an assumption is contrary to all probabilities.
Once the European rule was removed, famine and internecine war would
again become chronic, and India would sink back to her former place.
Moreover, the long continuance of British rule undoubtedly weakens the
warlike fibre of the natives, and makes the usurer rather than the
soldier the dominant type.
The danger to which Mr. Pearson alludes, that even the negro peoples
may in time become vast military powers, constituting a menace to
Europe, really seems to belong to a period so remote that every
condition will have changed to a degree rendering it impossible for us
to make any estimate in reference thereto. By that time the descendant
of the negro may be as intellectual as the Athenian. Even prophecy must
not look too many thousand years ahead. It is perfectly possible that
European settlements in Africa will be swamped some time by the rising
of natives who outnumber them a hundred or a thousand to one, but it is
not possible that the negroes will form a military menace to the people
of the north, at least for a space of time longer than that which now
separates us from the men of the River Drift. The negroid peoples,
the so-called “hamatic,” and bastard semitic, races of eastern middle
Africa are formidable fighters; but their strength is not fit for any
such herculean tasks.
There is much more reason to fear the industrial competition of these
races; but even this will be less formidable as the power of the State
increases and especially as the democratic idea obtains more and more
currency. The Russians are not democratic at all, but the State is very
powerful with them; and therefore they keep the Chinese out of their
Siberian provinces, which are being rapidly filled up with a population
mainly Slav, the remainder of which is being Slavicized. From the
United States and Australia the Chinaman is kept out because the
democracy, with much clearness of vision, has seen that his presence is
ruinous to the white race.
Nineteenth century democracy needs no more complete vindication for its
existence than the fact that it has kept for the white race the best
portions of the new worlds’ surface, temperate America and Australia.
Had these regions been under aristocratic governments, Chinese
immigration would have been encouraged precisely as the slave trade is
encouraged of necessity by any slave-holding oligarchy, and the result
would in a few generations have been even more fatal to the white race;
but the democracy, with the clear instinct of race selfishness, saw the
race foe, and kept out the dangerous alien. The presence of the negro
in our Southern States is a legacy from the time when we were ruled
by a trans-oceanic aristocracy. The whole civilization of the future
owes a debt of gratitude greater than can be expressed in words to that
democratic policy which has kept the temperate zones of the new and the
newest worlds a heritage for the white people.
As for the industrial competition, the Chinaman and the Hindoo may
drive certain kinds of white traders from the tropics; but more than
this they cannot do. They can never change the status of the white
laborer in his own home, for the latter can always protect himself, and
as soon as he is seriously menaced, always will protect himself, by
protective tariffs and stringent immigration laws.
Mr. Pearson fears that when once the tropic races are independent, the
white peoples will be humiliated and will lose heart: but this does not
seem inevitable, and indeed seems very improbable. If the Englishman
should lose his control over South Africa and India, it might indeed be
a serious blow to the Englishman of Britain; though it may be well to
remember that the generation of Englishmen which grew up immediately
after England had lost America, accomplished feats in arms, letters,
and science such as, on the whole, no other English generation ever
accomplished. Even granting that Britain were to suffer as Mr. Pearson
thinks she would, the enormous majority of the English-speaking
peoples, those whose homes are in America and Australia, would be
absolutely unaffected; and Continental Europe would be little more
affected than it was when the Portuguese and Dutch successively saw
their African and Indian empires diminish. France has not been affected
by the expulsion of the French from Hayti; nor have the freed negroes
of Hayti been capable of the smallest aggressive movement. No American
or Australian cares in the least that the tan-colored peoples of Brazil
and Ecuador now live under governments of their own instead of being
ruled by viceroys from Portugal and Spain; and it is difficult to see
why they should be materially affected by a similar change happening in
regard to the people along the Ganges or the upper Nile. Even if China
does become a military power on the European model, this fact will
hardly affect the American and Australian at the end of the twentieth
century more than Japan’s effort to get admitted to the circle of
civilized nations has affected us at the end of the nineteenth.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that if any one of the tropical races
ever does reach a pitch of industrial and military prosperity which
makes it a menace to European and American countries, it will almost
necessarily mean that this nation has itself become civilized in the
process; and we shall then simply be dealing with another civilized
nation of non-aryan blood, precisely as we now deal with Magyar, Fin,
and Basque, without any thought of their being ethnically distinct from
Croat, Rouman, or Wend.
In Mr. Pearson’s second chapter he deals with the stationary order
of society, and strives to show that while we are all tending toward
it, some nations, notably France, have practically come to it. He
adds that when this stationary state is reached, it will produce
general discouragement, and will probably affect the intellectual
energy of the people concerned. He further points out that our races
now tend to change from faith in private enterprises to faith in
State organizations, and that this is likely to diminish the vigorous
originality of any race. He even holds that we already see the
beginning of a decadence, in the decline of speculative thought, and
still more in the way of mechanical inventions. It is perfectly true
that the _laissez-faire_ doctrine of the old school of political
economists is receiving, less and less favor; but after all, if we
look at events historically, we see that every race, as it has grown
to civilized greatness, has used the power of the State more and more.
A great State cannot rely on mere unrestricted individualism, any more
than it can afford to crush out all individualism. Within limits, the
mercilessness of private commercial warfare must be curbed as we have
curbed the individual’s right of private war proper. It was not until
the power of the State had become great in England, and until the
lawless individualism of feudal times had vanished, that the English
people began that career of greatness which has put them on a level
with the Greeks in point of intellectual achievement, and with the
Romans in point of that material success which is measured by extension
through settlement, by conquest, by triumphant warcraft and statecraft.
As for Mr. Pearson’s belief that we now see a decline in speculative
thought and in mechanical invention, all that can be said is that the
facts do not bear him out.
There is one side to this stationary state theory which Mr. Pearson
scarcely seems to touch. He points out with emphasis the fact, which
most people are prone to deny, that the higher orders of every society
tend to die out; that there is a tendency, on the whole, for both lower
classes and lower civilizations to increase faster than the higher.
Taken in the rough, his position on this point is undoubtedly correct.
Progressive societies, and the most progressive portions of society,
fail to increase as fast as the others, and often positively decrease.
The great commanders, great statesmen, great poets, great men of
science of any period taken together do not average as many children
who reach years of maturity as a similar number of mechanics, workmen,
and farmers, taken at random. Nevertheless, society progresses,
the improvement being due mainly to the transmission of acquired
characters, a process which in every civilized State operates so
strongly as to counterbalance the operation of that baleful law of
natural selection which tells against the survival of some of the most
desirable classes. Mr. Balfour, by the way, whose forecast for the race
is in some respects not unlike Mr. Pearson’s, seems inclined to adopt
the view that acquired characteristics cannot be inherited; a position
which, even though supported by a few eminent names, is hardly worthy
serious refutation.
The point I wish to dwell upon here, however, is that it is precisely
in those castes which have reached the stationary state, or which
are positively diminishing in numbers, that the highest culture
and best training, the keenest enjoyment of life, and the greatest
power of doing good to the community, are to be found at present.
Unquestionably, no community that is actually diminishing in numbers
is in a healthy condition: and as the world is now, with huge waste
places still to fill up, and with much of the competition between the
races reducing itself to the warfare of the cradle, no race has any
chance to win a great place unless it consists of good breeders as well
as of good fighters. But it may well be that these conditions will
change in the future, when the other changes to which Mr. Pearson looks
forward with such melancholy, are themselves brought about. A nation
sufficiently populous to be able to hold its own against aggression
from without, a nation which, while developing the virtues of
refinement, culture, and learning, has yet not lost those of courage,
bold initiative, and military hardihood, might well play a great part
in the world, even though it had come to that stationary state already
reached by the dominant castes of thinkers and doers in most of the
dominant races.
In Mr. Pearson’s third chapter he dwells on some of the dangers of
political development, and in especial upon the increase of the town
at the expense of the country, and upon the growth of great standing
armies. Excessive urban development undoubtedly does constitute a real
and great danger. All that can be said about it is that it is quite
impossible to prophesy how long this growth will continue. Moreover,
some of the evils, as far as they really exist, will cure themselves.
If towns-people do, generation by generation, tend to become stunted
and weak, then they will die out, and the problem they cause will
not be permanent; while on the other hand, if the cities can be made
healthy, both physically and morally, the objections to them must
largely disappear. As for standing armies, Mr. Pearson here seems to
have too much thought of Europe only. In America and Australia there
is no danger of the upgrowing of great standing armies: and, as he well
shows, the fact that every citizen must undergo military training, is
by no means altogether a curse to the nations of Continental Europe.
There is one point, by the way, although a small point, where it
may be worth while to correct Mr. Pearson’s statement of a fact.
In dwelling on what is undoubtedly the truth, that raw militia are
utterly incompetent to make head against trained regular forces,
he finds it necessary to explain away the defeat at New Orleans.
In doing this, he repeats the story as it has been told by British
historians from Sir Archibald Alison to Goldwin Smith. I hasten to
say that the misstatement is entirely natural on Mr. Pearson’s part;
he was simply copying, without sufficiently careful investigation,
the legend adopted by one side to take the sting out of defeat. The
way he puts it is that six thousand British under Pakenham, without
artillery, were hurled against strong works defended by twice their
numbers, and were beaten, as they would have been beaten had the works
been defended by almost any troops in the world. In the first place,
Pakenham did not have six thousand men; he had almost ten thousand. In
the second place, the Americans, instead of being twice as numerous as
the British, were but little more than half as numerous. In the third
place, so far from being without artillery, the British were much
superior to the Americans in this respect. Finally, they assailed a
position very much less strong than that held by Soult when Wellington
beat him at Toulouse with the same troops which were defeated by
Jackson at New Orleans. The simple truth is that Jackson was a very
good general, and that he had under him troops whom he had trained in
successive campaigns against Indians and Spaniards, and that on the
three occasions when he brought Pakenham to battle--that is, the night
attack, the great artillery duel, and the open assault--the English
soldiers, though they fought with the utmost gallantry, were fairly and
decisively beaten.
This one badly-chosen premise does not, however, upset Mr. Pearson’s
conclusions. Plenty of instances can be taken from our war of 1812 to
show how unable militia are to face trained regulars; and an equally
striking example was that afforded at Castlebar, in Ireland, in 1798,
when a few hundred French regulars attacked with the bayonet and drove
in headlong flight from a very strong position, defended by a powerful
artillery, five times their number of English, Scotch, and Irish
militia.
In Mr. Pearson’s fourth chapter he deals, from a very noble standpoint,
with some advantages of national feeling. With this chapter and with
his praise of patriotism, and particularly of that patriotism which
attaches itself to the whole country, and not to any section of it, we
can only express our hearty agreement.
In his fifth chapter, on “The Decline of the Family” he sets forth,
or seems to set forth, certain propositions with which I must as
heartily disagree. He seems to lament the change which is making the
irresponsible despot as much of an anomaly in the family as in the
State. He seems to think that this will weaken the family. It may do
so, in some instances, exactly as the abolition of a despotism may
produce anarchy; but the movement is essentially as good in one case as
in the other. To all who have known really happy family lives, that is
to all who have known or have witnessed the greatest happiness which
there can be on this earth, it is hardly necessary to say that the
highest ideal of the family is attainable only where the father and
mother stand to each other as lovers and friends, with equal rights.
In these homes the children are bound to father and mother by ties of
love, respect, and obedience, which are simply strengthened by the fact
that they are treated as reasonable beings with rights of their own,
and that the rule of the household is changed to suit the changing
years, as childhood passes into manhood and womanhood. In such a home
the family is not weakened; it is strengthened. This is no unattainable
ideal. Every one knows hundreds of homes where it is more or less
perfectly realized, and it is an ideal incomparably higher than the
ideal of the beneficent autocrat which it has so largely supplanted.
The final chapter of Mr. Pearson’s book is entitled “The Decay of
Character.” He believes that our world is becoming a world with less
adventure and energy, less brightness and hope. He believes that
all the great books have been written, all the great discoveries
made, all the great deeds done. He thinks that the adoption of State
socialism in some form will crush out individual merit and the higher
kinds of individual happiness. Of course, as to this, all that can
be said is that men differ as to what will be the effect of the
forces whose working he portrays, and that most of us who live in the
American democracy do not agree with him. It is to the last degree
improbable that State socialism will ever be adopted in its extreme
form, save in a few places. It exists, of course, to a certain extent
wherever a police force and a fire department exist; and the sphere
of the State’s action may be vastly increased without in any way
diminishing the happiness of either the many or the few. It is even
conceivable that a combination of legislative enactments and natural
forces may greatly reduce the inequalities of wealth without in any
way diminishing the real power of enjoyment or power for good work of
what are now the favored classes. In our own country the best work
has always been produced by men who lived in castes or social circles
where the standard of essential comfort was high; that is, where men
were well clothed, well fed, well housed, and had plenty of books and
the opportunity of using them; but where there was small room for
extravagant luxury. We think that Mr. Pearson’s fundamental error
here is his belief that the raising of the mass necessarily means
the lowering of the standard of life for the fortunate few. Those of
us who now live in communities where the native American element is
largest and where there is least inequality of conditions, know well
that there is no reason whatever in the nature of things why, in the
future, communities should not spring up where there shall be no great
extremes of poverty and wealth, and where, nevertheless, the power of
civilization and the chances for happiness and for doing good work
shall be greater than ever before.