*A Fight in the Clouds.*
[Dated Oct. 13.]
From Friday the 9th of October until Monday the 12th so little occurred
that a narrative of the events can be given in a few words. There has
been the usual sporadic shelling of our trenches which has resulted in
but little harm, so well dug in are our men, and on the night of the
10th the Germans made yet a fresh assault, supported by artillery fire,
against the point which has all along attracted most of their attention.
The attempt was again a costly failure toward which our guns were able
to contribute with great effect.
Details have been received of an exciting encounter in midair. One of
our aviators on a fast scouting monoplane sighted a hostile machine. He
had two rifles, fixed one on either side of his engines, and at once
gave chase, but lost sight of his opponent among the clouds. Soon,
however, another machine hove into view which turned out to be a German
Otto biplane, a type of machine which is not nearly so fast as our
scouts. Our officer once again started a pursuit. He knew that owing to
the position of the propeller of the hostile machine he could not be
fired at when astern of his opponent. At sixty yards range he fired one
rifle without apparent result. Then as his pace was carrying him ahead
of his quarry he turned round, and, again coming to about the same
distance behind, emptied his magazine at the German.
The latter began at once to descend as if either he or his machine were
hit, and shutting off his engine and volplaning to free his hands, the
pursuer recharged his magazine. Unfortunately it jammed, but he managed
to insert four cartridges and to fire them at his descending opponent,
who disappeared into a cloud bank with dramatic suddenness. When the
British officer emerged below the clouds he could see no sign of the
other. He, therefore, climbed to an altitude of some 7,000 feet and came
to the conclusion that the German must have come to earth in the French
lines.
The French airmen, too, have been very successful during the last three
days, having dropped several bombs among the German cavalry and caused
considerable loss and disorder, and having by similar means silenced a
battery of field howitzers.
The German anti-aircraft guns recently have been unusually active. From
their rate of fire they seem to be nearly automatic, but so far they
have not had much effect in reducing the air reconnoissances carried out
by us.
A striking feature of our line--to use the conventional term which so
seldom expresses accurately the position taken up by an army--is that it
consists really of a series of trenches not all placed alongside each
other, but some more advanced than others, and many facing in different
directions. At one place they run east and west along one side of a
valley. At another almost north and south up some subsidiary valley.
Here they line the edge of woods, and there they are on the reverse
slope of a hill, or possibly along a sunken road, and at different
points both the German and the British trenches jut out like
promontories into what might be regarded as the opponents' territory.
Though both sides have moved forward at certain points, and withdrawn at
others, no very important change has been effected in their
dispositions, in spite of the enemy's repeated counter attacks. These
have been directed principally against one portion of the position won
by us, but in spite of the lavish expenditure of life they have not so
far succeeded in driving us back.
The situation of the works in the German front line as a whole has been
a matter of deliberate selection, for they have had the advantage of
previous reconnaissance, being first in the field.
Behind the front they now have several lines prepared for a step-by-step
defense. Another point which might cause astonishment to a visitor to
our intrenchments is the evident indifference displayed to the provision
of an extended field of frontal rifle fire, which is generally accepted
as being one of the great requirements of a defensive position. It is
still desirable, if it can be obtained without the usually accompanying
drawback of exposure to the direct fire of hostile artillery, but
experience has shown that a short field of fire is sufficient to beat
back the infantry assaults of the enemy, and by giving up direct fire at
long or medium ranges and placing our trenches on the reverse slope of a
hill or behind the crest, it is in many places possible to gain shelter
from the frontal fire of the German guns, for the men are well trained
in musketry and under good fire control, and the dead ground beyond the
short range from their position has comparatively small terrors.
Many of the front trenches of the Germans equally lack a distant field
of fire, but if lost they would be rendered untenable by us by the fact
that they would be exposed to a fire from the German guns in the rear
and to cross-rifle fire from neighboring works.
The extent to which cross-fire of all kinds is employed is also
remarkable. Many localities and areas along the Aisne are not swept from
the works directly in front of them, but are rendered untenable by
rifle fire from neighboring features or by that of guns that are out of
sight. So much is this the case that among these hills and valleys it is
a difficult matter for troops to find out whence they are being shot at.
There is a perpetual triangular duel. A's infantry can see nothing to
shoot at, but are under fire from B's guns. The action of B's guns then
brings upon them the attention of some of A's artillery waiting for a
target, the latter being in their turn assailed by other batteries. And
so it goes on. In a wooded country in spite of aeroplanes and balloons
smokeless powder has made the localization and identification of targets
a matter of supreme difficulty.