*Technique of This Warfare.*
[Made Public Oct. 9.]
Wednesday, Sept. 30, merely marked another day's progress in the gradual
development of the situation, and was distinguished by no activity
beyond slight attacks by the enemy. There was also artillery fire at
intervals. One of our airmen succeeded in dropping nine bombs, some of
which fell on the enemy's rolling stock collected on the railway near
Laon. Some of the enemy's front trenches were found empty at night; but
nothing much can be deduced from this fact, for they are frequently
evacuated in this way, no doubt to prevent the men in the back lines
firing on their comrades in front of them.
Thursday, Oct. 1, was a most perfect Autumn day, and the most peaceful
that there has been since the two forces engaged on the Aisne. There was
only desultory gunfire as targets offered. During the night the enemy
made a few new trenches. A French aviator dropped one bomb on a railway
station and three bombs on troops massed near it.
The weather on Friday, the 2d, was very misty in the early hours, and it
continued hazy until the late afternoon, becoming thicker again at
night. The Germans were driven out of a mill which they had occupied as
an advanced post, their guns and machine guns which supported it being
knocked out one by one by well-directed artillery fire from a flank.
During the night they made the usual two attacks on the customary spot
in our lines, and as on previous occasions were repulsed. Two of their
trenches were captured and filled in. Our loss was six men wounded.
Up to Sept, 21 the air mileage made by our airmen since the beginning
of the war amounted to 87,000 miles, an average of 2,000 miles per day,
the total equaling nearly four times the circuit of the world. The total
time spent in the air was 1,400 hours.
There are many points connected with the fighting methods of either side
that may be of interest. The following description was given by a
battalion commander who has been at the front since the commencement of
hostilities and has fought both in the open and behind intrenchments. It
must, however, be borne in mind that it only represents the experiences
of a particular unit. It deals with the tactics of the enemy's infantry:
The important points to watch are the heads of valleys and ravines,
woods--especially those on the sides of hollow ground--and all dead
ground to the front and flanks. The German officers are skilled in
leading troops forward under cover, in closed bodies, but once the
latter are deployed and there is no longer direct personal
leadership the men will not face heavy fire. Sometimes the advance
is made in a series of lines, with the men well opened out at five
or six paces interval; at other times it is made in a line, with
the men almost shoulder to shoulder, followed in all cases by
supports in close formation. The latter either waver when the front
line is checked, or crowd on to it, moving forward under the orders
of their officers, and the mass forms a magnificent target.
Prisoners have described the fire of our troops as pinning them to
the ground, and this is certainly borne out by their action.
When the Germans are not heavily intrenched no great losses are
incurred in advancing against them by the methods in which the
British Army has been instructed. For instance, in one attack over
fairly open ground against about an equal force of infantry
sheltered in a sunken road and in ditches we lost only 10 killed
and 60 wounded, while over 400 of the enemy surrendered after about
50 had been killed. Each side had the support of a battery, but the
fight for superiority from infantry fire took place at about 700
yards and lasted only half an hour. When the Germans were wavering
some of them put up the white flag, but others went on firing, and
our men continued to do the same. Eventually a large number of
white flags, improvised from handkerchiefs, pieces of shirt, white
biscuit bags, &c., were exhibited all along the line, and many men
hoisted their helmets on their rifles.
In the fighting behind intrenchments the Germans endeavor to gain
ground by making advances in line at dusk or just before dawn, and
then digging themselves in, in the hope, no doubt, that they may
eventually get so near as to be able, as at manoeuvres, to reach
the hostile trenches in a single rush. They have never succeeded in
doing this against us. If by creeping up in dead ground they do
succeed in gaining ground by night, they are easily driven back by
fire in the morning. A few of the braver men sometimes remain
behind, at ranges of even 300 or 400 yards, and endeavor to inflict
losses by sniping. Sharpshooters, also, are often noticed in trees
or wriggling about until they get good cover. The remedy is to take
the initiative and detail men to deal with the enemy's
sharpshooters.
A few night attacks have been made against us. Before one of them a
party crept up close to the British line and set alight a hayrick,
so that it should form a beacon on which the centre of the
attacking line marched. Generally, however, in the night and early
morning attacks, groups of forty or fifty men have come on, the
groups sometimes widely separated from one another and making every
endeavor to obtain any advantage from cover. Light balls and
searchlights have on some occasions been used. Latterly the attacks
have become more and more half-hearted. Against us the enemy has
never closed with the bayonet. The German trenches I have seen were
deep enough to shelter a man when firing standing, and had a step
down in rear for the supports to sit in.
As regards our own men, there was at first considerable reluctance
to intrench, as has always been the case at the commencement of a
war. Now, however, having bought experience dearly, their defenses
are such that they can defy the German artillery fire.