*Fighting in the Air.*
[Made Public Sept. 29.]
Wednesday, Sept. 23, was a perfect Autumn day. It passed without
incident as regards major operations. Although the enemy concentrated
their heavy artillery upon the, plateau near Passy, nothing more than
inconvenience was caused.
The welcome absence of wind gave our airmen a chance of which they took
full advantage by gathering much information. Unfortunately, one of our
aviators, who had been particularly active in annoying the enemy by
dropping bombs, was wounded in a duel in the air.
Being alone on a single-seated monoplane, he was not able to use his
rifle, and while circling above a German two-seated machine in an
endeavor to get within pistol shot he was hit by the observer of the
German machine, who was armed with a rifle. He managed to fly back over
our lines, and by great good luck he descended close to a motor
ambulance, which at once conveyed him to a hospital.
Against this may be set off the fact that another of our flyers exploded
a bomb among some led artillery horses, killing several and stampeding
the others.
On Thursday, Sept. 21, the fine weather continued, as did the lull in
the action, the heavy German shells falling mostly near Pargnan, twelve
miles south-southeast of Laon.
On both Wednesday and Thursday the weather was so fine that many flights
were made by the aviators, French, British, and German. These produced a
corresponding activity among the anti-aircraft guns.
So still and clear was the atmosphere toward evening on Wednesday and
during the whole of Thursday that to those not especially on the lookout
the presence of aeroplanes high up above them was first made known by
the bursting of the projectiles aimed at them. The puffs of smoke from
the detonation shell hung in the air for minutes on end, like balls of
fleece cotton, before they slowly expanded and were dissipated.
From the places mentioned as being the chief targets for the enemy's
heavy howitzers, it will be seen that the Germans are not inclined to
concentrate their fire systematically upon definite areas in which
their aviators think they have located our guns, or upon villages where
it is imagined our troops may be billeted. The result will be to give
work to local builders.
The growing resemblance of this battle to siege warfare has already been
pointed out. The fact that the later actions of the Russo-Japanese war
assumed a similar character was thought by many to have been due to
exceptional causes, such as the narrowness of the theatre of operations
between the Chinese frontier on the west and the mountainous country of
Northern Korea on the east; the lack of roads, which limited the extent
of ground over which it was possible for the rival armies to manoeuvre,
and the fact that both forces were tied to one line of railroad.
Such factors are not exerting any influence on the present battle.
Nevertheless, a similar situation has been produced, owing firstly to
the immense power of resistance possessed by an army which is amply
equipped with heavy artillery and has sufficient time to fortify itself,
and, secondly, to the vast size of the forces engaged, which at the
present time stretch more than half way across France.
The extent of the country covered is so great as to render slow any
efforts to manoeuvre and march around to a flank in order to escape the
costly expedient of a frontal attack against heavily fortified
positions.
To state that the methods of attack must approximate more closely to
those of siege warfare the greater the resemblance of the defenses to
those of a fortress is a platitude, but it is one which will bear
repetition if it in any way assists to make the present situation clear.
There is no doubt that the position on the Aisne was not hastily
selected by the German Staff after the retreat had begun. From the
choice of ground, and the care with which the fields of fire had been
arranged to cover all possible avenues of approach, and from the amount
of work already carried out, it is clear that the contingency of having
to act on the defensive was not overlooked when the details of the
strategically offensive campaign were arranged.