II.

*The Slow Fight on the Aisne.*

[Made Public Sept. 24.]

The enemy is still maintaining himself along the whole front, and, in

order to do so, is throwing into the fight detachments composed of units

from different formations, the active army, reserve, and Landwehr, as is

shown by the uniforms of the prisoners recently captured.

Our progress, although slow on account of the strength of the defensive

positions against which we are pressing, has in certain directions been

continuous; but the present battle may well last for some days more

before a decision is reached, since it now approximates somewhat to

siege warfare.

The Germans are making use of searchlights. This fact, coupled with

their great strength in heavy artillery, leads to the supposition that

they are employing material which may have been collected for the siege

of Paris.

The nature of the general situation after the operations of the 18th,

19th, and 20th cannot better be summarized than as expressed recently

by a neighboring French commander to his corps: "Having repulsed

repeated and violent counter-attacks made by the enemy, we have a

feeling that we have been victorious."

So far as the British are concerned, the course of events during these

three days can be described in a few words. During Friday, the 18th,

artillery fire was kept up intermittently by both sides during daylight.

At night the German centre attacked certain portions of our line,

supporting the advance of their infantry, as always, by a heavy

bombardment. But the strokes were not delivered with great vigor, and

ceased about 2 A.M. During the day's fighting an aircraft gun of the

Third Army Corps succeeded in bringing down a German aeroplane.

News also was received that a body of French cavalry had demolished part

of the railway to the north, so cutting, at least temporarily, one line

of communication which is of particular importance to the enemy.

On Saturday, the 19th, the bombardment was resumed by the Germans at an

early hour and continued intermittently under reply from our own guns.

Some of their infantry advanced from cover, apparently with the

intention of attacking, but on coming under fire they retired. Otherwise

the day was uneventful, except for the activity of the artillery, which

is a matter of normal routine rather than an event.

Another hostile aeroplane was brought down by us, and one of our

aviators succeeded in dropping several bombs over the German line, one

incendiary bomb falling with considerable effect on a transport park

near La Fère.

A buried store of the enemy's munitions of war was also found, not far

from the Aisne, ten wagon loads of live shell and two wagon loads of

cable being dug up. Traces were discovered of large quantities of stores

having been burned--all tending to show that as far back as the Aisne

the German retirement was hurried.

There was a strong wind during the day, accompanied by a driving rain.

This militated against the aerial reconnoissance.

On Sunday, the 20th, nothing of importance occurred until the afternoon,

when there was a break in the clouds and an interval of feeble sunshine,

which was hardly powerful enough to warm the soaking troops. The Germans

took advantage of this brief spell of fine weather to make several

counter-attacks against different points. These were all repulsed with

loss to the enemy, but the casualties incurred by us were by no means

light.

In one section of our firing line the occupants of the trenches were

under the impression that they heard a military band in the enemy's

lines just before the attack developed. It is now known that the German

infantry started their advance with bands playing.

The offensive against one or two points was renewed at dusk, with no

greater success. The brunt of the resistance has naturally fallen upon

the infantry. In spite of the fact that they have been drenched to the

skin for some days and their trenches have been deep in mud and water,

and in spite of the incessant night alarms and the almost continuous

bombardment to which they have been subjected, they have on every

occasion been ready for the enemy's infantry when the latter attempted

to assault, and they have beaten them back with great loss. Indeed, the

sight of the Pickelhauben [German spiked helmets] coming up has been a

positive relief after long, trying hours of inaction under shell fire.

The object of the great proportion of artillery the Germans employ is to

beat down the resistance of their enemy by concentrated and prolonged

fire, to shatter their nerves with high explosives, before the infantry

attack is launched. They seem to have relied on doing this with us, but

they have not done so, though it has taken them several costly

experiments to discover this fact.

From statements of prisoners it appears that they have been greatly

disappointed by the moral effect produced by their heavy guns, which,

despite the actual losses inflicted, has not been at all commensurate

with the colossal expenditure of ammunition, which has really been

wasted. By this it is not implied that their artillery fire is not good;

it is more than good--it is excellent. But the British soldier is a

difficult person to impress or depress, even by immense shells filled

with a high explosive which detonate with terrific violence and form

craters large enough to act as graves for five horses.

The German howitzer shells are from 8 to 9 inches in calibre, and on

impact they send up columns of greasy black smoke. On account of this

they are irreverently dubbed "coal boxes," "black Marias," or "Jack

Johnsons" by the soldiers. Men who take things in this spirit are, it

seems, likely to throw out the calculations based on the loss of morale

so carefully framed by the German military philosophers.

A considerable amount of information has been gleaned from prisoners. It

has been gathered that our bombardment on the 15th produced a great

impression. The opinion is also reported that our infantry make such

good use of ground that the German companies are decimated by our rifle

fire before the British soldier can be seen.

From an official diary captured by the First Army Corps it appears that

one of the German corps contains an extraordinary mixture of units. If

the composition of the other corps is similar, it may be assumed that

the present efficiency of the enemy's forces is in no way comparable

with what it was when the war commenced.

The losses in officers are noted as having been especially severe. A

brigade is stated to be commanded by a Major; some companies of food

guards by one-year volunteers; while after the battle of Montmirail one

regiment lost fifty-five out of sixty officers. The prisoners recently

captured appreciate the fact that the march on Paris has failed and that

their forces are retreating, but state that the object of this movement

is explained by the officers as being to withdraw into closer touch

with the supports, which have stayed too far in the rear.

The officers are also endeavoring to encourage the troops by telling

them that they will be at home by Christmas. A large number of the men

believe that they are beaten. Following is an extract from one document:

"With the English troops we have great difficulties. They have a queer

way of causing losses to the enemy. They make good trenches, in which

they wait patiently; they carefully measure the ranges for their rifle

fire, and they open a truly hellish fire on the unsuspecting cavalry.

This was the reason that we had such heavy losses.

"According to our officers, the English striking forces are exhausted;

the English people really never wanted war."

From another source: "The English are very brave and fight to the last

man. One of our companies has lost 130 men out of 240."

The following letter, which refers to the fighting on the Aisne, has

been printed and circulated to the troops:

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915 · 第 11 / 31 题