I.

*First Report from the Front*

7th September, 1914.

My lord: I have the honor to report the proceedings of the field force

under my command up to the time of rendering this dispatch.

1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was

effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its

destination in this country well within the scheduled time.

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the

21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force

during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable from

which to commence operations which the French Commander in Chief, Gen.

Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in

prosecution of the campaign.

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on the

west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as

follows:

From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to

the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The

Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry

division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or

move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward

reconnoissance was intrusted to Brig. Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode with the

Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed Gen. Allenby to send forward a few

squadrons to assist in this work.

During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work,

some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took

place in which our troops showed to great advantage.

2. At 6 A.M., on Aug. 23, I assembled the commanders of the First and

Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position and

explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to

be Gen. Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the

immediate situation in front of us.

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that

little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with

perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I was

aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed

in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue

opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of my

aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.

About 3 P.M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effect

that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in

some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was

being particularly threatened.

The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high

ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche,

moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.

The right of the Third Division, under Gen. Hamilton, was at Mons, which

formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander of the

Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too

long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons.

This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P.M., I received a

most unexpected message from Gen. Joffre by telegraph, telling me that

at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and

the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the

Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of

Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and

the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on

the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre

between Charleroi and Namur.

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position,

I had previously [Transcriber: original 'previouly'] ordered a position

in rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of

Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, southeast of

Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold,

because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very

difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It

nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German

threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by

aeroplane [Transcriber: original 'areoplane'] reconnoissance; and as a

result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge

position at daybreak on the 24th.

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout

the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the

neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake

Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second

Divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the

neighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second

Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Division

on the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operation

from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.

The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched

themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to

withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further

loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P.M. Toward midday the

enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.

I had previously ordered Gen. Allenby with the cavalry to act vigorously

in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressure off.

About 7:30 A.M. Gen. Allenby received a message from Sir Charles

Fergusson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard

pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message Gen.

Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct support to

the Fifth Division.

During the course of this operation Gen. De Lisle, of the Second Cavalry

Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the further

advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank.

He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire

about 500 yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and the

Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the brigade.

The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of

communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and

23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south

of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.

With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled

to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of

the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great

losses in doing so.

At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west

of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the

fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position

between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as

was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of

the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his

intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not

a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat

exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped,

therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me

effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only

owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion

of the troops.

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a

position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered

to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5:30 A.M.

Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps,

covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry

division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of

Gen. Allenby, covered the west flank.

The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,

the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade

of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.

I ordered Gen. Snow to move out to take up a position with his right

south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south

of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to the

effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le

Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been

partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to the

information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy

against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my

exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to

envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I

determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could

put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my

troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and

reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders to

continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the general

line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The cavalry, under Gen. Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued

its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of

the Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had

intended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up the

gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and

could not get further in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9:30 P.M.

a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was

heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were

coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought

most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in

issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss

has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the

same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First

Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent

urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on

my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they

eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the

skillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an

exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were

able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6 P.M. the Second Corps had got into position with their right

on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line of

defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers,

the left being thrown back.

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good deal

scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th Gen, Allenby had

succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer

commanding the Second Army Corps.

On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions

under Gen. Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back

from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the fighting of

the 23d and 24th, I visited Gen. Sordêt, and earnestly requested his

co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his army

commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too

tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable

assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for

the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of

all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of

his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second

Corps and the Fourth Division.

At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against

them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it

impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face

of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action

and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me

to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable

of movement.

The French cavalry corps, under Gen. Sordêt, was coming up on our left

rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his

utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing

to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any

way.

There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops

showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a

splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

[Illustration: Map 1.--Showing the early stages of the retreat from

Mons, Aug. 22 to Sept. 1.]

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be

avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to

commence it about 3:30 P.M. The movement was covered with the most

devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself

suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the further

retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of

this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an

energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British

troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable

services rendered by Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army

under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been

accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,

intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct

the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the

27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line

Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's

pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to Gen. Sordêt and the French

cavalry division which he commands for materially assisting my

retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

Gen. D'Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French Reserve

Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on the enemy's

right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at

Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a

four days' battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch.

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have

suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the

fact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration by

rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German army

corps.

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the

two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and

devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by

divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller

units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed

by non-commissioned officers and men.

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable

work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their

skill, energy, and perseverance [Transcriber: original 'perseverence']

have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most

complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value

in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and

foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have

remained undaunted throughout.

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in

destroying five of the enemy's machines.

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I

received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during

this trying period.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff; Major Gen.

Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them have worked

day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice, and

devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me to Brig. Gen. Hon. W.

Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the personal Staff.

In such operations as I have described the work of the Quartermaster

General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major Gen. Sir William

Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties

with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it is

largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the

troops--inseparable from such operations--were not much greater.

[Illustration: Map. 2.--The retreat continued. From Compiègne, Sept. 1,

to the new position south of Meaux, Sept. 3 and 4.]

[Illustration: Map 3.--Commencement of the battle of the Marne, Sept. 6

(Sunday), morning.

Concentration of the Germans on a central point, and the position of the

British force when it resumed the offensive.]

Major Gen. Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant General, has also been

confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with

disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has

been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations

which arose.

I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I

desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during

the period under review; and, as I understand it is of importance that

this dispatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this

list, separately, as soon as I can. I have the honor to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

(Signed) J.D.P. FRENCH,

Field Marshal,

Commander in Chief, British Forces in the Field.