XLV. Having spoken in this discourse, of the favour that may be shewed
to a countryman in preference to a stranger, in case he is a man of
equal merit, I thought it would not be improper here, to take notice
of a moral point, which frequently occurs in practice, and in which
I have often seen men mistake, who in other respects are far from
absurd. Those, who have annexed to their charges the distribution of
honourable and useful employments, if they have not a perfect knowledge
of the competitors for a vacant place, commonly avail themselves of
judicial or extrajudicial informations touching their merits. This is
a case that often occurs in the appointment to such professorships in
many universities, as are in the disposal of the king, or his supreme
council; and in these instances, all the doctors of this university
of Oveido give their information to the royal council promiscuously.
It is to be supposed, that the person, who by his own or delegated
authority appoints to the office, when two persons of equal merit are
proposed to him, may very consistently chuse which he pleases; but with
respect to the equality of merit, if he is a stranger to the parties,
he must be guided by the informations he receives; and I have seen it
very common, when they had no just reason for doing it, for people to
give their information in favour of the man they liked best, and I have
known them go so far, as not only to recommend him in preference to his
competitor, but to represent him as the only person qualified to fill
the vacant office.
XLVI. I call this an error, because that in my opinion, such an
information upon the face of it, is injurious and void of all
probability, which I shall endeavour to demonstrate, by exposing
the malice and indirect proceeding of him, who between two equal
subjects, Peter and John for example, gives his information in favour
of Peter, in preference to John; for I perceive in such behaviour,
not only one, but three serious and distinct offences. And first, he
offends materially in his information, against the virtue of legal and
impartial justice, which requires, that he should represent people
according to the true degree of their merits; but he swerves from this
principle, who represents Peter as superior to John, when he is not
so in reality. Secondly, he behaves unworthily and unjustly to his
Prince, by usurping and preoccupying the right, which he has to chuse
between the parties. Thirdly, he is guilty of injustice to the said
John, who has a right to be represented according to the true degree of
merit he possesses; and the proposing him as inferior to Peter, when
in truth he is equal to him, is doing him a manifest injury, which
besides prejudicing him with regard to other contingencies, renders it
impossible in this instance, for him to partake of the king’s grace of
chusing him in preference to his competitor Peter.
XLVII. From what has been premised, it may be inferred, that no
contingent can ever happen, in which an informant or voter can
consistently shew favour, or be partial to any man, either in such
an instance as we have just mentioned, or in any other whatever,
judicial or extrajudicial; because as we have shewn, competitions
between subjects of equal merit do not admit of it, and if the merits
of the competitors are unequal, the injustice of such a proceeding
is self-evident; consequently, to him who acts conscientiously, all
recommendations or solicitations are useless and improper; for he will
not be biassed by friendship, country, gratitude, school-alliances,
religion, college-connections, or any other motives whatever. But
the misfortune is, that in the practice of the world, we see but few
examples of such disinterested and upright conduct, even in cases where
the merits of candidates are unequal; but on the contrary, whenever
an opposition is set on foot, the favourers of each candidate, are
more occupied in canvassing suffrages, than in studying questions,
and more busied in examining the connections of voters, than books of
faculty. The abuse is carried to such a length, that sometimes a man’s
acting with integrity is imputed to him as a crime. If a voter, who
is solicited by a man of eminence, answers ingenuously, and excuses
himself from complying with what is requested of him; they say he
is a rough, ill-bred, unpolished man: if he does not yield to the
solicitations of a benefactor, they call him ungrateful; and if he
does not give way to the intreaties of a friend, they exclaim that he
is callous to the feelings of friendship. Finally, it appears to me,
that a more intolerable error than this cannot exist, for I have seen
men much esteemed by the generality of mankind for their worth, who
have always prostituted their votes to these or some other temporal
motives; but in the name of reason, can a man have any friend so great
or so good as God? Is there any benefactor, to whom we owe so much
as to him? How shall we reconcile this? Can he be called a grateful,
an honourable, or a good man, who can be wanting in his duty to his
best friend and greatest benefactor, by acting unjustly to oblige a
creature, to whom he owes this or that limited respect, and to whom
also it is impossible he should owe any thing whatever, but what he
owes principally, and in the first instance to God? In vain I have
urged these arguments in various private conversations; and I believe
it is in vain also, that I now use them with the public at large; but
if they shall not be effectual to amend the abuse, they will at least
serve to disburthen my mind, and give vent to my chagrin.
ON
TRUE AND FALSE
URBANITY.