There was only one exception which we decided to recommend, and that was

in the case of borrowings by small States. We decided that each of the

great allied countries should contribute a portion of every loan made to

the small States who were either in with us now or prepared to come in

later on, that the responsibility should be divided between the three

countries, and that at an opportune moment a joint loan should be

floated to cover the advances either already made, or to be made, to

these countries outside the three great allied countries. That was the

only exception we made in respect of joint loans. Up to the present very

considerable advances have been made by Russia, by France, and by

ourselves to other countries. It is proposed that, if there is an

opportune moment on the market, these should be consolidated at some

time or other into one loan, that they should be placed upon the markets

of Russia, France, and Great Britain, but that the liability shall be

divided into three equal parts.

With regard to Russia, we have already advanced £32,000,000 for

purchases here and elsewhere outside the Russian Empire. Russia has also

shipped £8,000,000 of gold to this country, so that we have established

credits in this country for Russia to the extent of £40,000,000 already.

France has also made advances in respect of purchases in that country.

Russia estimates that she will still require to establish considerable

credits for purchases made outside her own country between now and the

end of the year. I am not sure for the moment that it would be desirable

for me to give the exact figure; I think it would be better not, because

it would give an idea of the extent to which purchases are to be made

outside by Russia. But for that purpose she must borrow. _The amount of

her borrowing depends upon what Russia can spare of her produce to sell

in outside markets and also on the access to those markets._

_If Russia is able within the course of the next few weeks or few months

to export a considerable quantity of her grain, as I hope she will be,

as in fact we have made arrangements that she should, [cheers,] then

there will not be the same need to borrow for purchases either in this

country or outside, because she can do her own financing to that

extent._

The two Governments decided to raise the first £50,000,000 in equal sums

on the French and British markets respectively. That will satisfy

Russian requirements for a considerable time. As to further advances,

the allied countries will consider when the time arrives how the money

should be raised according to the position of the money markets at that

time. I have said that we gave a guarantee to Russia that she need not

hesitate a moment in giving her orders for any purchases which are

necessary for the war on account of fear of experiencing any difficulty

in the matter of raising money for payments. We confidently anticipate

that by the time these first advances will have been exhausted the

military position will have distinctly improved both in France and in

Russia.

I may say that Treasury bills to the extent of £10,000,000 on the credit

of Russia have been issued within the last few days. At 12 o'clock today

the list closed, and the House will be very glad to hear that the amount

was not merely subscribed but oversubscribed by the market, because this

country is not quite as accustomed to Russian securities as France, and,

therefore, it was an experiment. I think it is a very good omen for our

relations, not merely during the war, but for our relations with Russia

after the war, that the first great loan of that kind on Russian credit

in the market has been such a complete success.

Now we have to consider the position of this country with regard to the

possibility of our gold flitting in the event of very great credits

being established in this country. The position of the three great

allied countries as to gold is exceptionally strong. Russia and France

have accumulated great reserves which have been barely touched so far

during the war. I do not think the French reserve has been touched at

all, or has been used in the slightest degree, and I think as far as the

Russian reserve is concerned it has only been reduced by the transfer of

£8,000,000 of gold from Russia to this country. Our accumulation of gold

is larger than it has ever been in the history of this country. It has

increased enormously since the commencement of the war. It is not nearly

as large as that of Russia, France, or Germany, but it must be borne in

mind that there is this distinction in our favor; up to the present we

have had no considerable paper currency, and this is the great free

market for the gold of the world. The quantity imported every year of,

what shall I call it, raw gold, comes to something like £50,000,000, and

here I am excluding what comes here by exchanges. The collapse of the

rebellion in South Africa assures us of a large and steady supply from

that country, and, therefore, there is no real need for any

apprehension.

But still it would not have been prudent for us to have overlooked

certain possibilities. I have already pointed out some of them--the

diminution of exports, the increase of our imports, the absorption of

our transports for war purposes, large credits established for our own

and other countries, and a diminution in our savings for investments

abroad. There is just a possibility that this might have the effect of

inducing the export of gold to other countries. We therefore have to

husband our gold and take care lest it should take wings and swarm to

any other hive. We therefore made arrangements at this conference

whereby, if our stock of gold were to diminish beyond a certain

point--that is a fairly high point--the Banks of France and Russia

should come to our assistance.

We have also made arrangements whereby France should have access to our

markets for Treasury bills issued in francs. We have also initiated

arrangements which we hope will help to restore the exchanges in respect

of bills held in this country against Russian merchants, who, owing to

the present difficulties of exchange, cannot discharge their liabilities

in this country. They are quite ready and eager to pay, they have the

money to pay, but, owing to difficulties of exchange, they cannot pay

bills owing in this country. We therefore propose to accept Russian

Treasury bills against these bills of exchange due from Russian

merchants, Russia collecting the debts in rubles in her own country and

giving us the Treasury bills in exchange. We hope that will assist very

materially in the working of the exchanges. It will be very helpful to

business between the two countries, and incidentally it will be very

helpful to Russia herself in raising money in her own country for the

purpose of financing the war.

We also received an undertaking from the Russian Government in return

for the advances which we were prepared to make, that Russia would

facilitate the export of Russian produce of every kind that may be

required by the allied countries. This, I believe, will be one of the

most fruitful parts of the arrangements entered into. An arrangement has

also been made about the purchases by the allied countries in the

neutral countries. There was a good deal of confusion. We were all

buying in practically the same countries; we were buying against each

other; we were putting up prices; it ended not merely in confusion, but

I am afraid in a good deal of extravagance, because we were increasing

prices against each other. It was very necessary that there should be

some working arrangement that would eliminate this element of

competition and enable us to co-ordinate, as it were, these orders.

There will be less delay, there will be much more efficiency, and we

shall avoid a good deal of the extravagance which was inevitable owing

to the competition between the three countries.

I have done my best to summarize very briefly the arrangements which

have been entered into, and I would only like to say this in conclusion.

After six months of negotiation by the cable and three days of

conferring face to face we realized that better results were achieved by

means of a few hours of businesslike discussion by men anxious to come

to a workable arrangement than by reams of correspondence.

Misconceptions and misunderstandings were cleared away in a second which

otherwise might take weeks to ferment into mischief, and it was our

conclusion that these conferences might with profit to the cause of the

Allies be extended to other spheres of co-operation. [Cheers.]

Britain's Unsheathed Sword

By H.H. Asquith, England's Prime Minister

Stating the estimated costs of the war to Great Britain,

outlining the operations of the French and British allied

fleets in the Dardanelles, declaring the Allies' position in

retaliation for the German "war zone" decree against Great

Britain, and reaffirming the chief terms of peace, stated in

his Guildhall speech of last November, on which alone England

would consent to sheathe the sword, the following speech,

delivered in the House of Commons on March 1, 1915, by Prime

Minister Asquith, is one of the most important of the war.

_In Committee of Supply._

_Mr. Asquith, who was loudly cheered on rising, moved the supplementary

vote of credit of £37,000,000 to meet the expenditure on naval and

military operations and other expenditure arising out of the war during

the year 1914-1915. He said:_

The first of the two votes which appear upon the paper, the one which

has just been read out, provides only for the financial year now

expiring, and is a supplementary vote of credit. The vote that follows

is a vote of credit for the financial year 1915-1916. I think it will

probably be convenient if in submitting the first vote to the committee

I make a general statement covering the whole matter. I may remind the

committee that on Aug. 6 last year the House voted £100,000,000 in the

first vote of credit, and that on Nov. 15 the House passed a

supplementary vote of credit for £225,000,000, thus sanctioning total

votes of credit for the now expiring financial year of £325,000,000. It

has been found that this amount will not suffice for the expenditure

which will have been incurred up to March 31, and we are therefore

asking for a further vote of £37,000,000 to carry on the public service

to that date. If the committee assents to our proposals it will raise

the total amount granted by votes of credit for the year 1914-1915 to

£362,000,000. I need not say anything as to the purposes for which this

vote is required. They are the same as upon the last occasion. But I

ought to draw attention to one feature in which the supplementary vote,

which comes first, differs from the vote to be subsequently proposed for

the services of the year 1915-1916. At the outbreak of the war the

ordinary supply on a peace basis had been voted by the House, and

consequently the votes of credit for the now current financial year,

like those on all previous occasions, were to be taken in order to

provide the amounts necessary for naval and military operations in

addition to the ordinary grants of Parliament. It consequently follows

that the expenditure charged, or chargeable, to votes of credit for this

financial year represent, broadly speaking, the difference between the

expenditure of the country on a peace footing and that expenditure upon

a war footing. The total on that basis, if this supplementary vote is

assented to, will be £362,000,000.

For reasons the validity of which the committee has recognized on

previous occasions, I do not think it desirable to give the precise

details of the items which make up the total, but without entering into

that I may roughly apportion the expenditure. For the army and the navy,

according to best estimates which can at present be framed, out of the

total given there will be required approximately £275,000,000. That is

in addition, as I have already pointed out, to the sum voted before the

war for the army and the navy, which amounted in the aggregate to a

little over £80,000,000. That leaves unaccounted for a balance of

£87,000,000, of which approximately £38,000,000 represents advances for

war expenditure made, or being made, to the self-governing dominions,

Crown colonies, and protectorates, as explained in the Treasury minute

last November, under which his Majesty's Government have undertaken to

raise the loans required by the dominions to meet the heavy expenditure

entailed upon them on the credit of the imperial exchequer. In addition

to that sum of £38,000,000 there has been an advance to Belgium of

£10,000,000, and to Serbia of £800,000. Further advances to these allies

are under consideration, the details of which it is not possible yet to

make public. The balance of, roughly, £28,000,000 is required for

miscellaneous services covered by the vote of credit which have not yet

been separately specified.

I think the committee will be interested to know what the actual cost of

the war will have been to this country as far as we can estimate on

March 31, the close of the financial year. The war will then have lasted

for 240 days and the votes of credit up to that time, assuming this vote

is carried, will amount to £362,000,000. It may be said, speaking

generally, that the average expenditure from votes of credit will have

been, roughly, £1,500,000 per day throughout the time. That, of course,

is the excess due to the war over the expenditure on a peace footing.

That represents the immediate charge to the taxpayers of this country

for this year. But, as the committee knows, a portion of the expenditure

consists of advances for the purpose of assisting or securing the food

supplies of this country and will be recoverable in whole, or to a very

large extent, in the near future. A further portion represents advances

to the dominions and to other States which will be ultimately repaid. If

these items are excluded from the account the average expenditure per

day of the war is slightly lower, but after making full allowance for

all the items which are in the nature of recoverable loans, the daily

expenditure does not work out at less than £1,200,000.

These figures are averages taken over the whole period from the outbreak

of the war, but at the outbreak of the war, after the initial

expenditure on mobilization had been incurred, the daily expenditure was

considerably below the average, as many charges had not yet matured. The

expenditure has risen steadily and is now well over the daily average

that I have given. To that figure must be added, in order to give a

complete account of the matter, something for war services other than

naval or military. At the beginning of the year these charges are not

likely to be very considerable, but it will probably be within the mark

to say that from April I we shall be spending over £1,700,000 a day

above the normal, in consequence of the war.

Perhaps now I may say something which is not strictly in order on this

vote, but concerns the vote of credit for the ensuing year, which

amounts, as appears on the paper, to £250,000,000. The committee will at

once observe an obvious distinction between the votes of credit taken

for the current financial year and that which we propose to take for the

ensuing year. As I have already pointed out, at the outbreak of war the

ordinary supply of the year had been granted by the House, and

accordingly the votes of credit for 1914-1915 were for the amounts

required beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament for the cost of

military and naval operations. When we came to frame the estimates for

the ensuing year, 1915-1916, the Treasury was confronted with the

difficulty, which amounted to an impossibility, of presenting to

Parliament estimates in the customary form for navy and army

expenditure, apart from the cost of the war. All the material

circumstances have been set out in the Treasury minute of Feb. 5, and in

principle have been approved by the House. As the committee will

remember, the total of the estimates which we have presented for the

army and the navy amount to only £15,000 for the army and £17,000 for

the navy, and the remainder of the cost of both these services will be

provided for out of votes of credit, and the vote of credit now being

proposed provides for general army and navy service in as far as

specific provision is not made for them in the small estimates already

presented. This vote of credit, therefore, has two features which I

believe are quite unique, and without precedent. In the first place, it

is the largest single vote on record in the annals of this House, and,

secondly, as I have said, it provides for the ordinary as well as for

the emergency expenditure of the army and the navy. The House may ask on

what principle or basis has this sum of £250,000,000 been arrived at. Of

course it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to give any exact

estimate, but as regards the period, so far as we can forecast it, for

which this vote is being taken, it has been thought advisable to take a

sum sufficient, so far as we can judge, to provide for all the

expenditure which will come in course of payment up to approximately the

second week in July--that is to say, a little over three months, or

something like 100 days of war expenditure.

As regards the daily rate of expenditure--I have dealt hitherto with the

expenditure up to March 31--the War Office calculates that from the

beginning of April, 1915, the total expenditure on army services will be

at the rate of £1,500,000 per day, with a tendency to increase. The

total expenditure on the navy at the commencement of April will, it is

calculated, amount to about £400,000 per day. The aggregate expenditure

on the army and the navy services at the beginning of 1915-1916 is

therefore £1,900,000 per day, with a tendency to increase, and for the

purpose of our estimate the figure we have taken is a level £2,000,000 a

day. On a peace footing the daily expenditure upon the army and the navy

on the basis of the estimates approved last year was about £220,000 per

day. So that the difference between £2,000,000 and £220,000 represents

what we estimate to be the increased expenditure due to the war during

the 100 days for which we are now providing.

There are other items belonging to the same category as those to which I

have already referred in dealing with the supplementary vote with regard

to advances to our own dominions and other States for which provision

has also had to be made, and the balance of the total of £250,000,000

for which we are now asking, beyond the actual estimated expenditure for

the army and the navy, will be applied to those and kindred or

emergency purposes. Before I pass from the purely monetary aspect of the

matter, it may be interesting to the committee to be reminded of what

has been our expenditure upon the great wars of the past. In the great

war which lasted for over twenty years, from 1793 to 1815, the total

cost as estimated by the best authorities was £831,000,000. The Crimean

war may be put down, taking everything into account, at £70,000,000. The

total cost of the war charges in South Africa from 1899 to March 31,

1903, was estimated in a return presented to Parliament at £211,000,000.

In presenting these two votes of credit the Government are making a

large pecuniary demand on the House, a demand which in itself and beyond

comparison is larger than has ever been made in the House of Commons by

any British Minister in the whole course of our history.

We make it with the full conviction that after seven months of war the

country and the whole empire are every whit as determined as they were

at the outset [cheers] if need be at the cost of all we can command both

in men and in money to bring a righteous cause to a triumphant issue.

[Cheers.] There is much to encourage and to stimulate us in what we see.

Nothing has shaken and nothing can shake our faith in the unbroken

spirit of Belgium, [cheers,] in the undefeated heroism of indomitable

Serbia, in the tenacity and resource with which our two great allies,

one in the west and the other in the east, hold their far-flung lines

and will continue to hold them till the hour comes for an irresistible

advance. [Cheers.] Our own dominions and our great dependency of India

have sent us splendid contributions of men, a large number of whom

already are at the front, and before very long, in one or another of the

actual theatres of war, the whole of them will be in the fighting line.

[Cheers.] We hear today with great gratification that the Princess

Patricia's Canadian regiment has been doing, during these last few days,

most gallant and efficient service. [Cheers.]

We have no reason to be otherwise than satisfied with the progress of

recruiting here at home. [Cheers.] The territorial divisions now fully

trained are capable--I say it advisedly--of confronting any troops in

the world, [cheers,] and the new armies, which have lately been under

the critical scrutiny of skilled observers, are fast realizing all our

most sanguine hopes. A war carried on upon this gigantic scale and under

conditions for which there is no example in history is not always or

every day a picturesque or spectacular affair. Its operations are of

necessity in appearance slow and dragging. Without entering into

strategic details, I can assure the committee that with all the

knowledge and experience which we have now gained, his Majesty's

Government have never been more confident than they are today in the

power as well as the will of the Allies to achieve ultimate and durable

victory. [Cheers.] I will not enter in further detail to what I may call

the general military situation, but I should like to call the attention

of the committee for a few moments to one or two aspects of the war

which of late have come prominently into view.

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