Austria was a model of tolerance. In Austria, Poles and Ruthenes,
Czechs, Germans, Italians, Serbo-Croatians, and Slovenes were entitled
to the public use of their own languages and enjoyed various degrees of
provincial self-government. The Austrian side of every Austro-Hungarian
banknote bore an indication of its value in every language of the
empire, whereas the Hungarian side was printed in Magyar alone. This was
done in order to foster the belief that Hungary was entirely Magyar.
In reality, Hungary is as polyglot as Austria. Exact statistics are not
obtainable, since the Magyar census returns have long been deliberately
falsified for "Magyar State" reasons. Roughly speaking, it may, however,
be said that, in Hungary proper, i.e., exclusive of Croatia-Slavonia,
where the population is almost entirely Serbo-Croatian, there are
perhaps 8,500,000 Magyars, including nearly 1,000,000 professing and a
large number of baptized Jews. Against this total there are more than
2,000,000 Germans, including the numerous colonies on the Austrian
border, the Swabians of the south, and the Saxons of Transylvania; more
than 2,000,000 Slovaks, who inhabit chiefly the northwestern counties;
between three and four million Rumanes, living between the Theiss and
the Eastern Carpathians; some 500,000 Ruthenes, or Little Russians, who
inhabit the northeastern counties; some 600,000 Serbs and Croats in the
central southern counties; 100,000 Slovenes along the borders of Styria
and Carinthia; and some 200,000 other non-Magyars, including about
90,000 gypsies, who speak a language of their own. Taking the population
of Hungary proper at 18,000,000, the Magyars are thus in a minority,
which becomes more marked when Croatia-Slavonia with its population of
2,600,000 southern Slavs is added.
[Illustration: Distribution of Nationalities in Hungary.]
It would have been possible for the Magyars, after the restoration of
the Hungarian Constitution under the Dual Settlement of 1867, to have
built up a strong and elastic Transleithan polity based on the
recognition of race individualities and equality of political rights for
all. The non-Magyars would have accepted Magyar leadership the more
readily in that they had been dragooned and oppressed by Austria during
the period of reaction after 1849 as ruthlessly as the Magyars
themselves. Deák and Eötvös, who were the last prominent Magyar public
men with a Hungarian, as distinguished from a narrowly Magyar,
conception of the future of their country, pleaded indeed for fair
treatment of the non-Magyars, and trusted to the attractive force of the
strong Magyar nucleus to settle automatically the question of precedence
in the State. But in 1875, when Koloman Tisza, the father of Count
Stephen Tisza, took office, these wise counsels were finally and
definitely rejected in favor of what Baron Bánffy afterward defined as
"national Chauvinism." Magyarization became the watchword of the State
and persecution its means of action. Koloman Tisza concluded with the
monarch a tacit pact under which the Magyar Government was to be left
free to deal as it pleased with the non-Magyars as long as it supplied
without wincing the recruits and the money required for the joint army.
The Magyar Parliament became almost exclusively representative of the
Magyar minority of the people. Out of the 413 constituencies of Hungary
proper more than 400 were compelled, by pressure, bribery, and
gerrymandering, to return Magyar or Jewish Deputies. The press and the
banks fell entirely into Jewish hands, and the Magyarized Jews became
the most vociferous of the "national Chauvinists."
Nothing like it has been seen before or since--save the Turkish
revolution of 1908, when the Young Turks, under Jewish influence, broke
away from the relatively tolerant methods of the old régime and adopted
the system of forcible "Turkification" that led to the Albanian
insurrections of 1910-12, to the formation of the Balkan League, and to
the overthrow of Turkey in Europe.
The bitter fruits of the policy of Magyarization are now ripening. The
oppressed Rumanes look not toward Austria, as in the old days when
their great Bishop Siaguna made them a stanch prop of the Hapsburg
dynasty, but across the Carpathians to Bucharest; the Serbo-Croatians of
Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia, and Dalmatia, whose economic and political
development the Magyars have deliberately hampered, turn their eyes no
longer, as in the days of Jellatchich, toward Vienna, but await
wistfully the coming of the Serbian liberators; the Ruthenes of the
northeast hear the tramp of the Russian armies; the Slovaks of the
northwest watch with dull expectancy for the moment when, united with
their Slovak kinsmen of Moravia and their cousins, the Czechs of
Bohemia, they shall form part of an autonomous Slav province stretching
from the Elbe to the Danube. For the Magyars, who have thrown to the
winds the wisdom of the wisest men, fate may reserve the possession of
the fertile and well-watered Central Hungarian plain. There they may
thrive in modesty and rue at their leisure the folly of having
sacrificed their chance of national greatness to the vain pursuit of the
"Magyar State Idea" under the demoralizing influence of Austro-German
imperialism.
THE WATCHERS OF THE TROAD
By HARRY LYMAN KOOPMAN
Where Ilium's towers once rose and stretched her plain,
What forms, beneath the late moon's doubtful beam,
Half living, half of moonlit vapor, seem?
Surely here stand apart the kingly twain,
Here Ajax looms, and Hector grasps the rein,
Here Helen's fatal beauty darts a gleam,
Andromache's love here shines o'er death supreme.
To them, while wave-borne thunders roll amain
From Samos unto Ida, Calchas, seer
Of all that shall be, speaks: "Not the world's end
Is this, but end of our old world of strife,
Which, lasting until now, shall perish here.
Henceforth shall men strive but as friend and friend
Out of this death to rear a new world's life."
The Union of Central Europe
An Argument in Favor of a Union of the States Now Allied With Germany
By Franz von Liszt
Professor Franz von Liszt, author of the following article, is
Director of the Criminal Law Seminar of the University of
Berlin, and is regarded as one of the leading experts on
criminal law in Germany. The article was published in the Neue
Badische Landes-Zeitung of Mannheim, and evoked bitter
criticism from many imperialistic quarters in the German
press.
When new directions of development are first taken in history, it
usually requires the lapse of several decades before we understand them
in their true importance, and it takes much longer before proper terms
describing them are adopted generally. In the interim, misconceptions of
all kinds are the necessary consequence of clouded perception and
confused terminology, especially when, for purposes of party politics,
there figures in a greater or less degree a certain unwillingness to
understand.
Such misunderstandings are not devoid of danger in times of peace; they
may become pregnant with fate when, as in our day, the leading nations
of the earth stand at the threshhold of a great change in their history.
I am anxious, therefore, to defend against objections raised with more
or less intentional misunderstanding the thoughts which I expressed in
my recently published essay, "A Central European Union of States as the
Next Goal of German Foreign Policy."
Let us for once put aside the word "Imperialism." Surely we are all
agreed as one that it is an absolute essential of life for the German
Empire to carry on world-politics, (Weltpolitik.) We have been engaged
in that since the eighties of the nineteenth century. The first colonial
possessions which the German Empire obtained were the fruits of a
striving for world-politics that had not yet at that time come to full
and clear consciousness.
But, conscious of our goal, we did not attempt the paths of
world-politics until the end of the last century. At the celebration of
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German Empire, on Jan. 18, 1896, our
Kaiser uttered the words: "The German Empire has become a world empire,
(Aus dem deutschen Reich ist ein Weltreich geworden.)" And the German
Empire's groping for its way in world-politics found its expression in
the first naval proposal of Tirpitz in the year 1898.
At that time the Imperial Chancellor Prince Hohenlohe expressly
designated the policy of the German Empire as "world politics." Thereby
a goal was sketched for the development of the German Empire. We have
not lost sight of it since then, keeping unconfused despite many an
illusion and many a failure. And today we all live in the firm faith
that the world war, which we are determined to bring to a victorious
conclusion by the exertion of all our forces as a people, will bring us
the safe guarantee for the attainment of our goal in world politics.
On that score, then, there is absolutely no difference of opinion. But
there does appear to be considerable difference of opinion as to the
conception of world politics. Under that name one may mean a policy
directed toward world domination (Weltherrschaft.) For that kind of
world politics the word "Imperialism," borrowed from the period of Roman
world domination of the second century of the Christian era, fits
precisely.
Imperialism aims, directly or indirectly, through peaceful or forceful
annexation or economic exploitation, to make the whole inhabited earth
subject to its sway. Imperialistic is the policy of Great Britain, which
has subjected one-fifth of the inhabited area of the earth to its sway
and knows no bounds to the expansion of English rule. Imperialistic,
too, is the policy of Russia, which for centuries has been extending its
huge tentacles toward the Atlantic and toward the Mediterranean, the
Pacific, and the Indian Oceans, never sated.
Such world domination has never endured permanently; it can endure least
of all in our days, in which an array of mighty armed powers stand
prepared to guard their independence. World domination sooner or later
leads inevitably to an alliance of the States whose independence is
threatened; and thereby it leads to the overthrow of the disturber of
the peace. That, as we all confidently hope, will be the fate of England
as well as of Russia in the present war....
World politics, however, may mean something else; policies based upon
world value, (Weltgeltung.) The policy based on world domination differs
from that based on world value, in that the former denies the equal
rights of other States, while the latter makes that its premise. The
State that asserts its rights to world values demands for itself what it
concedes to the others: its right to expand and develop its political
and economic influence, and to have a voice in the discussion whenever
the political or economical relations of the various States at any point
in the inhabited globe approach a state of change....
In this sense has the German Empire heretofore engaged in world politics
in contrast with Russia and England. That it cannot be carried on
successfully without overseas colonies, a strong foreign fleet, naval
bases, and telegraphic connections through cable or wireless telegraph
apparatus, needs no further elucidation. For this sort of world politics
also the name "Imperialism" may be used. But such use of the word is
misleading; I shall therefore hereafter avoid it.
And herein I think I have uncovered the deeper reason for an early
misunderstanding of great consequence. It seems as though in a
certain--to be sure, not a very great or very influential--circle of our
German fellow-citizens the opinion prevails that the German Empire
should substitute its claims for world domination for those of England.
Such a view cannot be too soon or too sharply rebuked.
The claim for world domination would set the German Empire for many
years face to face with a long series of bloody wars, the issue of which
cannot be in doubt a moment to any one familiar with history. The
enforcement of this claim, moreover, would of itself be the surrender of
the German spirit to the spirit of our present opponent in the war. The
idea of world domination, imperialism in the true sense of the word, is
not a product grown on German soil; it is imported from abroad. To
maintain that view in all seriousness is treachery to the inmost spirit
of the German soul.
Perhaps I am mistaken in taking it for granted that such thoughts are
today haunting many minds. Perhaps it is merely a matter of misapplied
use of a large sounding word. In that case, however, it is absolutely
necessary to create clear thinking. I take it for granted that I am
voicing the sentiments of the souls of the vast overwhelming majority of
Germans when I say: "We shall wage the war, if need be, to the very end,
against the English and Russian lust for world domination, and for
Germany's world value (Weltgeltung.")
But forthwith there appears a further difference of opinion, to be taken
not quite so seriously, which I shall endeavor to define as objectively
as possible. The German conservative press seems to be of the opinion
that the goal for the winning of which we are waging the great war, and
concerning which we are all of one mind, will be definitely attained
immediately upon the conclusion of the war.
I, on the other hand, am convinced that in order permanently to insure
for ourselves the fruits of victory, even after a victorious conclusion
of the war, we shall need long and well planned labors of peace....
In my essay I used the statement: "England's claim for the domination
of the sea, and therein for the domination of the world, remains a great
danger to the peace of the world." To this view I adhere firmly. Let us
take it for granted that the most extravagant hopes of our most reckless
dreamers are fulfilled, that England is crowded out of Egypt,
Mesopotamia, Persia, and is involved in a long-lasting war with the
native Indians. An impossibly large dose of political naïveté is needed
in order to make us believe that England would take this loss quietly
for all time.
We may differ on the question whether we should meet England's efforts
for rehabilitation of her world dominion in warlike, or, as I take it,
in peaceful ways; but it would be an unpardonable piece of stupidity for
us to rock ourselves to sleep in the mad delusion that those efforts
would not be exerted. Even were England forced to her knees, she would
not immediately give up her claim for world domination. We must count
upon that.
And, counting upon that, we must estimate our own forces very carefully;
rather account them weaker than they really are, than the reverse. I did
that in my essay, and that is why the conservative press was so wrought
up over it. To be sure, it carefully avoided discussing my reasons.
I started from the conception of world power which is fairly well
established in the present political literature. From a point of view
taken also by conservative writers I demanded as a characteristic of
world power, in addition to the size of territories and the number of
population, above all, the economic independence that makes it possible
for a State, in a case of need, to produce, without export or import,
all foodstuffs, necessities, raw materials, and all the finished or
half-finished products it needs for its consumers in normal times, as
well as to insure the sale of its surplus.
It is patent that this economic independence is influenced by the
geographical position of the fatherland and its colonies. Now, I
defended the theory (and my opponents made no attempt to confute it)
that even after a victorious war the German Empire would not have fully
attained this economic independence; that, accordingly, after the
conclusion of peace, we must exert every effort to insure this economic
independence in one way or another.
As to the course which we must follow to attain this goal, there may be
various opinions. I proposed the establishment of a union of Central
European States. The conservative press characterized that as "utterly
pretentious."...
If the course I have proposed is considered inadvisable, let another be
proposed. But on what colonies, forsooth, do those gentlemen count, that
could furnish us with cotton and ore, petroleum and tobacco, wood and
silk, and whatever else we need, in the quantity and quality we need?
What colonies that could offer us--do not forget that--markets for the
sale of our exporting industries? Even after the war we shall be
dependent upon exports to and imports from abroad.
And so there is no other way of safeguarding our economic independence
against England and Russia than by an economic alliance with the States
that are our allies in this war, or at least that do not make common
cause with our enemies. Aside from the fact, which I shall not discuss
here, that only such an alliance can insure a firm position for us on
the Atlantic Ocean, which in the next decades is bound to be the area of
competition for the world powers.
Politics are not a matter of emotion, but of calm, intelligent
deliberation. Let us leave emotional politics to our enemies. It is the
German method to envisage the goal steadily, and with it the roads that
lead to that goal. Our goal is not world domination. Whoever tries to
talk that belief into the mind of the German people may confuse some
heads that are already not very clear; but he cannot succeed in
substituting Napoleon I. for Bismarck as our master teacher.
Our goal can only be the establishing of our value in the world among
world powers, with equal rights to the same opportunities. And in order
to attain this goal we must, even after the conclusion of peace, exert
all our forces. A people that thinks it can rest on its laurels after
victory has been won runs the risk sooner or later of losing that for
which its sons shed their blood on the field of battle. With the
conclusion of peace there begins for us anew the unceasing peaceful
competition and the maintenance and strengthening of the world value
which we have won through the war. German imperialism is and will remain
the work of peace.
TWO POOR LITTLE BELGIAN FLEDGLINGS
By PIERRE LOTI.
Translation by Florence Simmonds.
[From King Albert's Book.]
At evening, in one of our southern towns, a train full of Belgian
refugees ran into the station, and the poor martyrs, exhausted and
bewildered, got out slowly, one by one, on the unfamiliar platform,
where French people were waiting to receive them. Carrying a few
possessions caught up at random, they had got into the carriages without
even asking whither they were bound, urged by their anxiety to flee, to
flee desperately from horror and death, from unspeakable mutilation and
Sadic outrage--from things that seemed no longer possible in the world,
but which, it seems, were lying dormant in pietistic German brains, and
had suddenly belched forth upon their land and ours, like a belated
manifestation of original barbarism. They no longer possessed a village,
nor a home, nor a family; they arrived like jetsam cast up by the
waters, and the eyes of all were full of terrified anguish. Many
children, little girls whose parents had disappeared in the stress of
fire and battle; and aged women, now alone in the world, who had fled,
hardly knowing why, no longer caring for life, but moved by some obscure
instinct of self-preservation.
Two little creatures, lost in the pitiable throng, held each other
tightly by the hand, two little boys obviously brothers, the elder, who
may have been five years old, protecting the younger, of about three. No
one claimed them, no one knew them. How had they been able to
understand, finding themselves alone, that they, too, must get into this
train to escape death? Their clothes were decent, and their little
stockings were thick and warm; clearly they belonged to humble but
careful parents; they were, doubtless, the sons of one of those sublime
Belgian soldiers who had fallen heroically on the battlefield, and whose
last thought had perhaps been one of supreme tenderness for them. They
were not even crying, so overcome were they by fatigue and sleepiness;
they could scarcely stand. They could not answer when they were
questioned, but they seemed intent, above all, upon keeping a tight hold
of each other. Finally the elder, clasping the little one's hand
closely, as if fearing to lose him, seemed to awake to a sense of his
duty as protector, and, half asleep already, found strength to say, in a
suppliant tone, to the Red Cross lady bending over him: "Madame, are
they going to put us to bed soon?" For the moment this was all they were
capable of wishing, all that they hoped for from human pity--to be put
to bed.
They were put to bed at once, together, of course, still holding each
other tightly by the hand; and, nestling one against the other, they
fell at the same moment into the tranquil unconsciousness of childish
slumber.
Once, long ago, in the China Sea, during the war, two little frightened
birds, smaller even than our wrens, arrived, I know not how, on board
our ironclad, in our Admiral's cabin, and all day long, though no one
attempted to disturb them, they fluttered from side to side, perching on
cornices and plants.
At nightfall, when I had forgotten them, the Admiral sent for me. It was
to show me, now without emotion, the two little visitors who had gone to
roost in his room, perched upon a slender silken cord above his bed.
They nestled closely together, two little balls of feathers, touching
and almost merged one in the other, and slept without the slightest
fear, sure of our pity. And those little Belgians sleeping side by side
made me think of the two little birds lost in the China Sea. There was
the same confidence and the same innocent slumber--but a greater
tenderness was about to watch over them.
What the Germans Desire
Not Conquest, but a New Economical System of Europe
By Gustaf Sioesteen
The subjoined letter from Berlin, published originally in the
Swedish Goteborgs Handels-Tidnung of Oct. 26, 1914, was
immediately translated by the British Legation in
Stockholm--this is the official English translation--and sent
by the legation to Sir Edward Grey. THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT
HISTORY is informed from a trustworthy source that the article
is interpreted in London as expressing the real aims of
Germany at the end of the war, should that power be
successful. The founding of a commercial United States of
Europe by means of an economical organization with new
"buffer" States to be created between the German Empire and
Russia, and with the other smaller European States, would be,
according to this interpretation, the purpose of Germany at
the conclusion of a victorious war. The passage in the Berlin
correspondent's letter declaring that only such an enormous
central European customs union, in the opinion of leading
German statesmen, "could hold the United States of North
America at bay" in order that, after this present war, the
"world would only have to take into account two first-class
powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America," is of
peculiar interest to Americans.
BERLIN, Oct. 21.
Counting one's chickens before they are hatched is a pardonable failing
with nations carrying on war with the feeling that their all is at
stake. When sorrow is a guest of every household, when monetary losses
cause depression, and the cry arises time after time, "What will be the
outcome of all this?" then only the fairest illusions and the wildest
flights of fancy can sustain the courage of the masses.
These illusions are not only egotistical but, curiously enough,
altruistic, since mankind, even when bayoneting their fellow-creatures,
want to persuade themselves and others that this is done merely for the
benefit of their adversary. In accordance with this idea, in the opinion
of all parties, the war will be brought to an end with an increase of
power for their native country, as also a new Eden prevail throughout
the whole civilized world.
The enemies of Germany, though they have hitherto suffered an almost
unbroken series of reverses in the war, have already thoroughly thrashed
out the subject as to what the world will look like when Germany is
conquered. In German quarters the press has likewise painted the future,
but the following lines are not intended to increase the row of fancy
portraits, but merely to throw light on what is new in the demands
conceived.