THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
In the very beginning Russia had marked out one point for attack. This
was the city of Cracow. No doubt the Grand Duke Nicholas had not hoped
to be able to invest that city early. The slowness of the mobilization
of the Russian army made a certain prudence advisable at the beginning
of the campaign. But the great success of his armies in Lemberg
encouraged more daring aims. He had invested Przemysl, and Galicia lay
before him. Accordingly, he set his face toward Cracow.
Cracow, from a military point of view, is the gate both of Vienna
and Berlin. A hundred miles west of it is the famous gap of Moravia,
between the Carpathian and the Bohemian mountains, which leads down
into Austria. Through this gap runs the great railway connecting
Silesia with Vienna, and the Grand Duke knew that if he could capture
Cracow he would have an easy road before him to the Austrian capital.
Cracow also is the key of Germany.
Seventy miles from the city lies the Oder River. An army might
enter Germany by this gate and turn the line of Germany’s frontier
fortresses. The Oder had been well fortified, but an invader coming
from Cracow might move upon the western bank. The Russian plan no doubt
was to threaten both enemy capitals. Moreover, an advance of Russia
from Cracow would take its armies into Silesia, full of coal and iron
mines, and one of the greatest manufacturing districts in the German
Empire. This would be a real success, and all Germany would feel the
blow.
Another reason for the Russian advance in Galicia was her desire to
control the Galician oil wells. To Germany petrol had become one of
the foremost munitions of war. Since she could not obtain it from
either America or Russia she must get it from Austria, and the Austrian
oil fields were all in Galicia. This, in itself, would explain the
Galician campaign. Moreover, through the Carpathian Mountains it was
possible to make frequent raids into Hungary, and Russia understood
well the feeling of Hungary toward her German allies. She hoped that
when Hungary perceived her regiments sacrificed and her plains overrun
by Russian troops, she would regret that she had allowed herself to
be sacrificed to Prussian ambition. The Russians, therefore, suddenly
moved toward Cracow.
Then von Hindenburg came to the rescue. The supreme command of
the Austrian forces was given to him. The defenses of Cracow were
strengthened under the direction of the Germans, and a German army
advanced from the Posen frontier toward the northern bank of the
Vistula. The advance threatened the Russian right, and, accordingly,
within ten days’ march of Cracow, the Russians stopped. The German
offensive in Poland had begun. The news of the German advance came
about the fifth of October. Von Hindenburg, who had been fighting in
East Prussia, had at last perceived that nothing could be gained
there. The vulnerable part of Russia was the city of Warsaw. This was
the capital of Poland, with a population of about three-quarters of
a million. If he could take Warsaw, he would not only have pleasant
quarters for the winter but Russia would be so badly injured that no
further offensive from her need be anticipated for a long period. Von
Hindenburg had with him a large army. In his center he probably had
three-quarters of a million men, and on his right the Austrian army in
Cracow, which must have reached a million.
Counting the troops operating in East Prussia and along the
Carpathians, and the garrison of Przemysl, the Teuton army must have
had two and a half million soldiers. Russia, on the other hand, though
her mobilization was still continuing, at this time could not have
had as many as two million men in the whole nine hundred miles of her
battle-front.
The fight for Warsaw began Friday, October 16th, and continued for
three days, von Hindenburg being personally in command. On Monday
the Germans found themselves in trouble. A Russian attack on their
left wing had come with crushing force. Von Hindenburg found his left
wing thrown back, and the whole German movement thrown into disorder.
Meanwhile an attempt to cross the Vistula at Josefov had also been
a failure. The Russians allowed the Germans to pass with slight
resistance, waited until they arrived at the village Kazimirjev, a
district of low hills and swampy flats, and then suddenly overwhelmed
them.
Next day the Russians crossed the river themselves, and advanced along
the whole line, driving the enemy before them, through great woods of
spruce out into the plains on the west. This forest region was well
known to the Russian guides, and the Germans suffered much as the
Russians had suffered in East Prussia. Ruzsky, the Russian commander,
pursued persistently; the Germans retreating first to Kielce, whence
they were driven, on the 3d of November, with great losses, and then
being broken into two pieces, with the north retiring westward and the
south wing southwest toward Cracow.
Rennenkampf’s attack on the German left wing was equally successful,
and von Hindenburg was driven into full retreat. The only success
won during this campaign was that in the far south where Austrian
troops were sweeping eastward toward the San. This army drove back
the Russians under Ivanov, reoccupied Jaroslav and relieved Przemysl.
This was a welcome relief to Przemysl, for the garrison was nearly
starved, and it was well for the garrison that the relief came, for in
a few days the Russians returned, recaptured Jaroslav and reinvested
Przemysl. As von Hindenburg retreated he left complete destruction
in his wake, roads, bridges, railroad tracks, water towers, railway
stations, all were destroyed; even telegraph posts, broken or sawn
through, and insulators broken to bits.
It was now the turn of Russia to make a premature advance, and to pay
for it. Doubtless the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose strategy up to this
point had been so admirable, knew very well the danger of a new advance
in Galicia, but he realized the immense political as well as military
advantages which were to be obtained by the capture of Cracow. He
therefore attempted to move an army through Poland as well as through
Galicia, hoping that the army in Poland would keep von Hindenburg busy,
while the Galician army would deal with Cracow.
The advance was slow on account of the damaged Polish roads. It was
preceded by a cavalry screen which moved with more speed. On November
10th, the vanguard crossed the Posen frontier and cut the railway
on the Cracow-Posen line. This reconnaissance convinced the Russian
general that the German army did not propose to make a general stand,
and it seemed to him that if he struck strongly with his center along
the Warta, he might destroy the left flank of the German southern army,
while his own left flank was assaulting Cracow. He believed that even
if his attack upon the Warta failed, the Russian center could at any
rate prevent the enemy from interfering with the attack further south
upon Cracow.
[Illustration: GERMAN FRIGHTFULNESS FROM THE AIR
A gas attack on the eastern front photographed by a Russian airman.]
The movement therefore began, and by November 12th, the Russian cavalry
had taken Miechow on the German frontier, about twenty miles north of
Cracow. Its main forces were still eighty miles to the east. About this
time Grand Duke Nicholas perceived that von Hindenburg was preparing
a counter stroke. He had retreated north, and then, by means of his
railways, was gathering a large army at Thorn. Large reinforcements
were sent him, some from the western front, giving him a total of
about eight hundred thousand men. In his retreat from Warsaw, while
he had destroyed all roads and railways in the south and west, he had
carefully preserved those of the north already planning to use them in
another movement. He now was beginning an advance, once again, against
Warsaw. On account of the roads he perceived that it would be difficult
for the Russians to obtain reinforcements. Von Hindenburg had with him
as Chief of Staff General von Ludendorff, one of the cleverest staff
officers in the German army, and General von Mackensen, a commander of
almost equal repute.
The Russian army in the north had been pretty well scattered. The
Russian forces were now holding a front of nearly a thousand miles,
with about two million men. The Russian right center, which now
protected Warsaw from the new attack could hardly number more than two
hundred thousand men. Von Hindenburg’s aim was Warsaw only, and did
not affect directly the Russian advance to Cracow, which was still
going on. Indeed, by the end of the first week in December, General
Dmitrieff had cavalry in the suburbs of Cracow, and his main force was
on the line of the River Rava about twelve miles away. Cracow had been
strongly fortified, and much entrenching had been done in a wide circle
around the city.
The German plan was to use its field army in Cracow’s defense rather
than a garrison. Two separate forces were used; one moving southwest
of Cracow along the Carpathian hills, struck directly at Ivanov’s
left; the other, operating from Hungary, threatened the Russian rear.
These two divisions struck at the same time and the Russians found it
necessary to fight rear actions as they moved forward. They were doing
this with reasonable success and working their way toward Cracow, when,
on the 12th of December, the Austrian forces working from Hungary
carried the Dukla Pass. This meant that the Austrians would be able to
pour troops down into the rear of the Russian advance, and the Russian
army would be cut off. Dmitrieff, therefore, fell rapidly back, until
the opening of the Dukla Pass was in front of his line, and the Russian
army was once more safe.
Meanwhile the renewed siege of Przemysl was going on with great
vigor, and attracting the general attention of the Allied world. The
Austrians attempted to follow up their successes at the Dukla Pass by
attempting to seize the Lupkow Pass, and the Uzzok Pass, still further
to the east, but the Russians were tired of retreating. New troops had
arrived, and about the 20th of December a new advance was begun.
With the right of the army swinging up along the river Nida, northeast
of Cracow, the Russian left attacked the Dukla Pass in great force,
driving Austrians back and capturing over ten thousand men. On
Christmas Day all three great western passes were in Russian hands. The
Austrian fighting, during this period, was the best they had so far
shown, the brunt of it being upon the Hungarian troops, who, at this
time, were saving Germany.
Meantime von Hindenburg was pursuing his movement in the direction of
Warsaw. The Russian generals found it difficult to obtain information.
Each day came the chronicle of contests, some victories, some defeats,
and it soon appeared that a strong force was crushing in the Russian
outposts from the direction of Thorn and moving toward Warsaw. Ruzsky
found himself faced by a superior German force, and was compelled to
retreat. The Russian aim was to fall back behind the river Bzura, which
lies between the Thorn and Warsaw. Bzura is a strong line of defense,
with many fords but no bridges. The Russian right wing passed by the
city of Lowicz, moved southwest to Strykov and then on past Lodz. West
of Lowicz is a great belt of marshes impossible for the movement of
armies.
The first German objective was the city of Lodz. Von Hindenburg knew
that he must move quickly before the Russians should get up reserves.
His campaign of destruction had made it impossible for aid to be sent
to the Russian armies from Ivanov, far in the south, but every moment
counted. His right pushed forward and won the western crossings of the
marshes. His extreme left moved towards Plock, but the main effort was
against Piontek, where there is a famous causeway engineered for heavy
transport through the marshes.
At first the Russians repelled the attack on the causeway, but on
November 19th the Russians broke and were compelled to fall back.
Over the causeway, then, the German troops were rushed in great
numbers, splitting the Russian army into two parts; one on the south
surrounding Lodz, and the other running east of Brezin on to the
Vistula. The Russian army around Lodz was assailed on the front flank
and rear. It looked like an overwhelming defeat for the Russian army.
At the very last moment possible, Russian reinforcements appeared--a
body of Siberians from the direction of Warsaw. They were thrown at
once into the battle and succeeded in re-establishing the Russian line.
This left about ninety thousand Germans almost entirely surrounded, as
if they were in a huge sack. Ruzsky tried his best to close the mouth
of the sack, but he was unsuccessful. The fighting was terrific, but by
the 26th the Germans in the sack had escaped.
The Germans were continually receiving reinforcements and still largely
outnumbered the Russians. Von Hindenburg therefore determined on a new
assault. The German left wing was now far in front of the Russian city
of Lodz, one of the most important of the Polish cities. The population
was about half a million. Such a place was a constant danger, for it
was the foundation of a Russian salient. When the German movement
began the Russian general, perceiving how difficult it would have
been to hold the city, deliberately withdrew, and on December 6th the
Germans entered Lodz without opposition.
The retreat relieved the Russians of a great embarrassment. Its capture
was considered in Germany as a great German victory, and at this time
von Hindenburg seems to have felt that he had control of the situation.
His movement, to be sure, had not interfered with the Russian advance
on Cracow, but Warsaw must have seemed to him almost in his power.
He therefore concentrated his forces for a blow at Warsaw. His first
new movement was directed at the Russian right wing, which was then
north of the Bzura River and east of Lowicz. He also directed the
German forces in East Prussia to advance and attempted to cut the main
railway line between Warsaw and Petrograd. If this attempt had been
successful it would have been a highly serious matter for the Russians.
The Russians, however, defeated it, and drove the enemy back to the
East Prussian border. The movement against the Russian right wing
was more successful, and the Russians fell back slowly. This was not
because they were defeated in battle, but because the difficult weather
interfered with communications. There had been a thaw, and the whole
country was waterlogged. The Grand Duke was willing that the Germans
should fight in the mud.
This slow retreat continued from the 7th of December to Christmas Eve,
and involved the surrender of a number of Polish towns, but it left the
Russians in a strong position. They were able to entrench themselves so
that every attack of the enemy was broken. The Germans tried hard. Von
Hindenburg would have liked to enter Warsaw on Christmas. The citizens
heard day and night the sound of the cannon, but they were entirely
safe.
The German attack was a failure. On the whole, the Grand Duke Nicholas
had shown better strategy than the best of the German generals.
Outnumbered from the very start, his tactics had been admirable. Twice
he had saved Warsaw, and he was still threatening Cracow. The Russian
armies were fighting with courage and efficiency, and were continually
growing in numbers as the days went by.
During the first weeks of 1915 while there were a number of attacks and
counter-attacks both armies had come to the trench warfare, so familiar
in France. The Germans in particular had constructed a most elaborate
trench system, with underground rooms containing many of the ordinary
comforts of life. Toward the end of the month the Russians began to
move in East Prussia in the north and also far south in the Bukovina.
The object of these movements was probably to prevent von Hindenburg
from releasing forces on the west. Russia was still terribly weak in
equipment and was not ready for a serious advance. An attack on sacred
East Prussia would stir up the Germans, while Hungary would be likewise
disturbed by the advance on Bukovina. Von Hindenburg, however, was
still full of the idea of capturing Warsaw. He had failed twice but
the old Field Marshal was stubborn and moreover he knew well what the
capture of Warsaw would mean to Russia, and so he tried again.
The Russian front now followed the west bank of the Bzura for a few
miles, changed to the eastern bank following the river until it met
with the Rawka, from there a line of trenches passed south and east
of Balinov and from there to Skiernievice. Von Mackensen concentrated
a considerable army at Balinov and had on the 1st of February about
a hundred and forty thousand men there. That night, with the usual
artillery preparation, he moved from Balinov against the Russian
position at the Borzymov Crest. The Germans lost heavily but drove
forward into the enemy’s line, and by the 3d of February had almost
made a breach in it. This point, however, could be readily reinforced
and troops were hurried there from Warsaw in such force that on
February 4th the German advance was checked. Von Mackensen had lost
heavily, and by the time it was checked he had become so weak that his
forces yielded quickly to the counter-attack and were flung back.
This was the last frontal attack upon Warsaw. Von Hindenburg then
determined to attack Warsaw by indirection. Austria was instructed to
move forward along the whole Carpathian front, while he himself, with
strong forces, undertook to move from East Prussia behind the Polish
capital, and cut the communications between Warsaw and Petrograd. If
Austria could succeed, Przemysl might be relieved, Lemberg recaptured,
and Russia forced back so far on the south that Warsaw would have
to be abandoned. On the other hand if the East Prussia effort were
successful, the Polish capital would certainly fall. These plans, if
they had developed successfully, would have crippled the power of
Russia for at least six months. Meantime, troops could be sent to the
west front, and perhaps enable Germany to overwhelm France. By this
time almost all of Poland west of the Vistula was in the power of the
Germans, while three-fourths of Galicia was controlled by Russia.
Von Hindenburg now returned to his old battle-ground near the Masurian
Lakes. The Russian forces, which, at the end of January, had made a
forward movement in East Prussia, had been quite successful. Their
right was close upon Tilsit, and their left rested upon the town of
Johannisburg. Further south was the Russian army of the Narev. Von
Hindenburg determined to surprise the invaders, and he gathered an army
of about three hundred thousand men to face the Russian forces which
did not number more than a hundred and twenty thousand, and which were
under the command of General Baron Sievers. The Russian army soon found
itself in a desperate position. A series of bitter fights ensued at
some of which the Kaiser himself was present. The Russians were driven
steadily back for a week, but the German stories of their tremendous
losses are obviously unfounded. They retreated steadily until February
20th, fighting courageously, and by that date the Germans began to find
themselves exhausted.
Russian reinforcements came up, and a counter-attack was begun. The
German aim had evidently been to reach Grodno and cut the main line
from Warsaw to Petrograd, which passes through that city. They had now
reached Suwalki, a little north of Grodno, but were unable to advance
further, though the Warsaw-Petrograd railway was barely ten miles away.
The southern portion of von Hindenburg’s army was moving against the
railway further west, in the direction of Ossowietz. But Ossowietz put
up a determined resistance, and the attack was unsuccessful. By the
beginning of March, von Hindenburg ordered a gradual retreat to the
East Prussian frontier.
While this movement to drive the Russians from East Prussia was under
way, von Hindenburg had also launched an attack against the Russian
army on the Narev. If he could force the lower Narev from that point,
too, he could cut the railroad running east from the Polish capital. He
had hoped that the attacks just described further east would distract
the Russian attention so that he would find the Narev ill guarded.
The advance began on February 22d, and after numerous battles captured
Przasnysz, and found itself with only one division to oppose its
progress to the railroad. On the 23d this force was attacked by the
German right, but resisted with the utmost courage. It held out for
more than thirty-six hours, until, on the evening of the 24th, Russian
reinforcements began to come up, and drove the invaders north through
Przasnysz in retreat.
It was an extraordinary fight. The Russians were unable to supply all
their troops with munitions and arms. At Przasnysz men fought without
rifles, armed only with a bayonet. All they could do was to charge
with cold steel, and they did it so desperately that, though they were
outnumbered, they drove the Germans before them. By all the laws of war
the Russians should have been defeated with ease. As it was, the German
attempt to capture Warsaw by a flank movement was defeated. While the
struggle was going on in the north, the Austrian armies in Galicia
were also moving. Russia was still holding the three great passes in
the Carpathian Mountains, but had not been able to begin an offensive
in Hungary.
The Austrians had been largely reinforced by German troops, and were
moving forward to the relief of Przemysl, and also to drive Brussilov
from the Galician mountains. Brussilov’s movements had been partly
military and partly political. From the passes in those mountains
Hungary could be attacked, and unless he could be driven away there was
no security for the Hungarian cornfields, to which Germany was looking
for food supplies. Moreover, from the beginning of the Russian movement
in Galicia, northern Bukovina had been in Russian hands. Bukovina was
not only a great supply ground for petrol and grain, but she adjoined
Roumania which, while still neutral, had a strong sympathy with the
Allies, especially Italy. The presence of a Russian army on her border
might encourage her to join the Allies. Austria naturally desired to
free Roumania from this pressure. The leading Austrian statesmen, at
this time, were especially interested in Hungary. The Austrian Minister
of Foreign Affairs was Baron Stephen Burian, the Hungarian diplomatist,
belonging to the party of the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. It
was his own country that was threatened. The prizes of a victorious
campaign were therefore great.
The campaign began in January amid the deepest snow, and continued
during February in the midst of blizzards. The Austrians were divided
into three separate armies. The first was charged with the relief of
Przemysl. The second advanced in the direction of Lemberg, and the
third moved upon Bukovina. The first made very little progress, after a
number of lively battles. It was held pretty safely by Brussilov. The
second army was checked by Dmitrieff. Further east, however, the army
of the Bukovina crossed the Carpathian range, and made considerable
advances. This campaign was fought out in a great number of battles,
the most serious of which, perhaps, was the battle of Koziowa. At that
point Brussilov’s center withstood for several days the Austrian second
army which was commanded by the German General von Linsingen. The
Russian success here saved Lemberg, prevented the relief of Przemysl
and gave time to send reinforcements into Bukovina.
The Austrian third army, moving on Bukovina, had the greatest Austrian
success. They captured in succession Czernowitz, Kolomea, and
Stanislau. They did not succeed, however, in driving the Russians from
the province. The Russians retired slowly, waiting for reinforcements.
These reinforcements came, whereupon the Austrians were pushed steadily
back. The passes in the Carpathians still remained in Austrian hands,
but Przemysl was not relieved or Lemberg recaptured. On March 22d
Przemysl fell.
The capture of Przemysl was the greatest success that Russia had so far
attained. It had been besieged for about four months, and the taking of
the fortress was hailed as the first spectacular success of the war.
Its capture altered the whole situation. It released a large Russian
army, which was sent to reinforce the armies of Ivanov, where the
Austrians were vigorously attacked.
By the end of March the Russians had captured the last Austrian
position on the Lupkow pass and were attacking vigorously the pass of
Uzzok, which maintained a stubborn defense. Brussilov tried to push
his way to the rear of the Uzzok position, and though the Austrians
delivered a vigorous counter-attack they were ultimately defeated. In
five weeks of fighting Ivanov captured over seventy thousand prisoners.
During this period there was considerable activity in East Prussia, and
the Courland coast was bombarded by the German Baltic squadron. There
was every indication that Austria was near collapse, but all the time
the Germans were preparing for a mighty effort, and the secret was kept
with extraordinary success. The little conflicts in the Carpathians
and in East Prussia were meant to deceive, while a great army, with an
enormous number of guns of every caliber, and masses of ammunition
were being gathered. The Russian commanders were completely deceived.
There had been no change in the generals in command except that General
Ruzsky, on account of illness, was succeeded by General Alexeiev. The
new German army was put under the charge of von Hindenburg’s former
lieutenant, General von Mackensen. This was probably the strongest army
that Germany ever gathered, and could not have numbered less than two
millions of men, with nearly two thousand pieces in its heavy batteries.
On April 28th, the action began. The Austro-German army lay along the
left bank of the Donajetz River to its junction with the Biala, and
along the Biala to the Carpathian Mountains. Von Mackensen’s right
moved in the direction of Gorlice. General Dmitrieff was compelled to
weaken his front to protect Gorlice and then, on Saturday, the 1st
of May, the great attack began. Under cover of artillery fire such
as had never been seen before bridges were pushed across the Biala
and Ciezkowice was taken. The Russian positions were blown out of
existence. The Russian armies did what they could but their defense
collapsed and they were soon in full retreat.
The German armies advanced steadily, and though the Russians made a
brave stand at many places they could do nothing. On the Wisloka they
hung on for five days, but they were attempting an impossibility. From
that time on each day marked a new German victory, and in spite of the
most desperate fighting the Russians were forced back until, on the
11th, the bulk of their line lay just west of the lower San as far
as Przemysl and then south to the upper Dniester. The armies were in
retreat, but were not routed. In a fortnight the army of Dmitrieff had
fallen back eighty-five miles.
The Grand Duke Nicholas by this time understood the situation. He
perceived that it was impossible to make a stand. The only thing to do
was to retreat steadily until Germany’s mass of war material should
be used up, even though miles of territory should be sacrificed.
It should be a retreat in close contact with the enemy, so that the
Austro-German troops would have to fight for every mile. This meant a
retreat not for days, but perhaps for weeks. It meant that Przemysl
must be given up, and Lemberg, and even Warsaw, but the safety of the
Russian army was of more importance than a province or a city.
On May 13th the German War Office announced their successes in the
following terms: “The army under General von Mackensen in the course
of its pursuit of the Russians reached yesterday the neighborhood of
Subiecko, on the lower Wisloka, and Kolbuezowa, northeast of Debica.
Under the pressure of this advance the Russians also retreated from
their positions north of the Vistula. In this section the troops under
General von Woyrach, closely following the enemy, penetrated as far as
the region northwest of Kielce. In the Carpathians Austro-Hungarian and
German troops under General von Linsingen conquered the hills east of
the Upper Stryi, and took 3,660 men prisoners, as well as capturing
six machine guns. At the present moment, while the armies under General
von Mackensen are approaching the Przemysl fortresses and the lower
San, it is possible to form an approximate idea of the booty taken. In
the battles of Tarno and Gorlika, and in the battles during the pursuit
of these armies, we have so far taken 103,500 Russian prisoners, 69
cannon, and 255 machine guns. In these figures the booty taken by the
Allied troops fighting in the Carpathians, and north of the Vistula,
is not included. This amounts to a further 40,000 prisoners. Przemysl
surrendered to the Germans on June 3, 1915, only ten weeks after the
Russian capture of the fortress, which had caused such exultation.”
General von Mackensen continued toward Lemberg, the capital of Galicia.
On June 18th, when the victorious German armies were approaching the
gates of Lemberg, the Russian losses were estimated at 400,000 dead and
wounded, and 300,000 prisoners, besides 100,000 lost before Marshal
von Hindenburg’s forces in Poland and Courland. On June 23d Lemberg
fell. The weakness of Russia in this campaign arose from the exhaustion
of her ammunition supplies, but great shipments of such supplies were
being constantly forwarded from Vladivostock.
When the German army crossed the San, Wilhelm II, then German Emperor,
was present. It is interesting to look back on the scene. Here is
a paragraph from the account of the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau: “The
Emperor had hurried forward to his troops by automobile. On the way he
was greeted with loud hurrahs by the wounded, riding back in wagons.
On the heights of Jaroslav the Emperor met Prince Eitel Friedrich, and
then, from several points of observation, for hours followed with keen
attention the progress of the battle for the crossing.”
While the great offensive in Galicia was well under way, the Germans
were pushing forward in East Prussia. Finding little resistance they
ultimately invaded Courland, captured Libau, and established themselves
firmly in that province. The sweep of the victorious German armies
through Galicia was continued into Poland. On July 19th William the War
Lord bombastically telegraphed his sister, the Queen of Greece, to the
effect that he had “paralyzed Russia for at least six months to come,”
and was on the eve of “delivering a coup on the western front that will
make all Europe tremble.”
It would be futile to recount the details of the various German
victories which followed the advance into Poland. On July 24th, the
German line ran from Novogard in the north, south of Przasnysz, thence
to Novogeorgievsk, then swinging to the southeast below Warsaw it
passed close to the west of Ivangorad, Lublin, Chelm, and then south to
a point just east of Lemberg. Warsaw at that time was in the jaws of
the German nutcracker.
On July 21st, the bells in all the churches throughout Russia clanged a
call to prayer for twenty-four hours’ continual service of intercession
for victory. In spite of the heat the churches were packed. Hour after
hour the people stood wedged together, while the priests and choirs
chanted their litanies. Outside the Kamian Cathedral an open-air mass
was celebrated in the presence of an enormous crowd. But the German
victories continued.
On August 5th Warsaw was abandoned. Up to July 29th hope was
entertained in military quarters in London and Paris that the Germans
would stand a siege in their fortresses along the Warsaw salient,
but on that date advices came from Petrograd that in order to save
the Russian armies a retreat must be made, and the Warsaw fortresses
abandoned. For some time before this the Russian resistance had
perceptibly stiffened, and many vigorous counter-attacks had been made
against the German advance, but it was the same old story, the lack of
ammunition. The armies were compelled to retire and await the munitions
necessary for a new offensive.
The last days of Russian rule in Warsaw were days of extraordinary
interest. The inhabitants, to the number of nearly half a millions,
sought refuge in Russia. All goods that could be useful to the Germans
were either removed or burned. Crops were destroyed in the surrounding
fields. When the Germans entered they found an empty and deserted
city, with only a few Poles and the lowest classes of Jews still left.
Warsaw is a famous city, full of ancient palaces, tastefully adorned
shops, finely built streets, and fourscore church towers where the
bells are accustomed to ring melodiously for matins and vespers. In
the Ujazdowske Avenue one comes to the most charming building in all
Warsaw, the Lazienki Palace, with its delicious gardens mirrored in a
lovely lake. It is a beautiful city.
The fall of Warsaw meant the fall of Russian Poland, but Russia was
not yet defeated. Von Hindenburg was to be treated as Napoleon was in
1812. The strategy of the Grand Duke was sound; so long as he could
save the army the victories of Germany would be futile. It is true that
the German armies were not compelled, like those of Napoleon, to live
on the land. They could bring their supplies from Berlin day by day,
but every mile they advanced into hostile territory made their task
harder. The German line of communication, as it grew longer, became
weaker, and the troops needed for garrison duty in the captured towns,
seriously diminished the strength of the fighting army. The Russian
retreat was good strategy and it was carried on with most extraordinary
cleverness.
It is unnecessary to describe the events which succeeded the fall of
Warsaw in great detail. There was a constant succession of German
victories and Russian defeats, but never was one of the Russian armies
enveloped or destroyed. Back they went, day after day, always fighting;
each great Russian fortress resisted until it saw itself in danger, and
then safely withdrew its troops. Kovno fell and Novogeorgievsk, and
Ivangorad, then Ossowietz was abandoned, and Brest-Litovsk and Grodno.
On September 5th the Emperor of Russia signed the following order:
Today I have taken supreme command of all the forces of the sea and
land armies operating in the theater of war. With firm faith in the
clemency of God, with unshakable assurance in final victory, we
shall fulfil our sacred duty to defend our country to the last. We
will not dishonor the Russian land.
The Grand Duke Nicholas was made Viceroy of the Caucasus, a post which
took him out of the main theater of fighting but gave him a great field
for fresh military activity. He had been bearing a heavy burden, and
had shown himself to be a great commander. He had outmaneuvered von
Hindenburg again and again, and though finally the Russian armies under
his command had been driven back, the retreat itself was a proof of his
military ability, not only in its conception, but in the way in which
it was done.
The Emperor chose General Alexeiev as his Chief of General Staff. He
was the ablest of the great generals who had been leading the Russian
army. With this change in command a new spirit seemed to come over
Russia. The German advance, however, was not yet completely checked. It
was approaching Vilna.
The fighting around Vilna was the bitterest in the whole long retreat.
On the 18th of September it fell, but the Russian troops were safely
removed and the Russian resistance had become strong. Munitions were
pouring into the new Russian army. The news from the battle-front began
to show improvement. On September 8th General Brussilov, further in the
south, had attacked the Germans in front of Tarnopol, and defeated them
with heavy loss. More than seventeen thousand men were captured with
much artillery. Soon the news came of other advances. Dubno was retaken
and Lutsk.
The end of September saw the German advance definitely checked. The
Russian forces were now extended in a line from Riga on the north,
along the river Dvina, down to Dvinsk. Then turning to the east along
the river, it again turned south and so on down east of the Pripet
Marshes, it followed an almost straight line to the southern frontier.
Its two strongest points were Riga, on the Gulf of Riga, which lay
under the protection of the guns of the fleet, and Dvinsk, through
which ran the great Petrograd Railway line. Against these two points
von Hindenburg directed his attack. And now, for the first time in many
months, he met with complete failure. The German fleet attempted to
assist him on the Gulf of Riga, but was defeated by the Russian Baltic
fleet with heavy losses. A bombardment turned out a failure and the
German armies were compelled to retire.
A more serious effort was made against Dvinsk but was equally
unsuccessful and the German losses were immense. Again and again the
attempt was made to cross the Dvina River, but without success; the
German invasion was definitely stopped. By the end of October there
was complete stagnation in the northern sector of the battle line, and
though in November there were a number of battles, nothing happened of
great importance.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE ROAD TO PETROGRAD]
Further south, however, Russia had become active. An army had been
organized at her Black Sea bases, and for political reasons it was
necessary that that army should move. At this time the great question
was, what was Roumania about to do? To prevent her from being
forced to join the Central Powers she must have encouragement. It was
determined therefore that an offensive should be made in the direction
of Czernowitz. This town was the railway center of a wide region, and
lay close to Roumania’s northern frontier.
The Russian aggressive met with great success. It is true that it
never approached the defenses of Czernowitz, but Brussilov, on the
north, had been able to make great gains of ground, and the very fact
that such a powerful movement could be made so soon after the Russian
retreat was an encouragement to every friend of the Allied cause. This
offensive continued till up to the fourth week of January when it came
to an abrupt stop. A despatch from Petrograd explained the movement as
follows: “The recent Russian offensive in Bessarabia and Galicia was
carried out in accordance with the plan prepared by the Entente Allies’
War Council to relieve the pressure on the Entente forces while they
were fortifying Saloniki and during the evacuation of the Gallipoli
Peninsula.” Russia had sacrificed more than seventy thousand soldiers
for her Allies.
During the year 1916 the Russian armies seemed to have had a new
birth. At last they were supplied with guns and munitions. They waited
until they were ready. In March a series of battles was fought in
the neighborhood of Lake Narotch, and eight successive attacks were
made against the German army, intrenched between Lake Narotch and
Lake Vischenebski. The Germans at first were driven back and badly
defeated. Later on, however, the Russian artillery was sent to another
section, and the Germans were able to recover their position. During
June the Russians attacked all along the southern part of their line.
In three weeks they had regained a whole province. Lutsk and Dubno had
been retaken; two hundred thousand men and hundreds of guns, had been
captured, and the Austrian line had been pierced and shattered. Further
south the German army had been compelled to retreat, and the Russian
armies were in Bukovina and Galicia. On the 10th of August Stanislau
fell.
By this time two Austrian armies had been shattered, over three hundred
and fifty thousand prisoners taken, and nearly a million men put out
of action. Germany, however, was sending reinforcements as fast as
possible, and putting up a desperate defense. Nevertheless everything
was encouraging for Russia and she entered upon the winter in a very
different condition from her condition in the previous year. Then she
had just ended her great retreat. Now she had behind her a series of
successes. But a new difficulty had arisen in the loss of the political
harmony at home which had marked the first years of the war. Dark days
were ahead.