At the time of Sulla's death the unanimous opinion of Rome would have
fixed upon Cnaeus Pompeius as the one young man then alive who was
likely to follow in his footsteps and rule the Roman world by his own
will. And if there had been in Pompeius's character the qualities which
his rapid success seemed to promise, they would have been right. But the
life of Pompeius shows how much circumstances--chance, opportunity, the
good opinion of others, birth and wealth--can do for a man; and what
they cannot do, unless he has within himself the qualities of mind and
will which mark off the first-rate from the best second-rate. Greatness
was, as it were, thrust upon him; but since he was not great in himself
he could not achieve it. It is this that makes him so interesting a
failure. His failure was due to the fact that at a supreme crisis he was
called upon to do just the things he could not do. It was no accident
that enabled Julius Caesar to succeed where he failed. For Caesar
possessed in supreme degree the power to act with decision, which, when
combined with clear judgement, makes the great man of action. At the
crucial moment the judgement of Pompeius wavered: his will was
uncertain. In ordinary peaceful times his weaknesses might never have
been seen; but his life fell within an era of storm and stress when the
stuff of which men are made is tested and shown.
Tall, strongly built, with curly hair and large eyes that though
prominently set and wide open had a rather sleepy expression, Pompeius
when young was often likened to Alexander the Great. He had his regular
features and brilliant colouring, but in his eyes there was none of the
fire or mystery that made Alexander seem to his contemporaries as
beautiful as a god. His manners were grave and dignified. He gave all
who saw him an impression of his importance. Pompeius had a very strong
sense of his own importance. The thing he was most afraid of was of
being laughed at. When he suspected that any one was doing this, he lost
his temper.
[Illustration: POMPEIUS]
Pompeius belonged to a family old and honourable enough, though
plebeian, to make the senators at last accept him as one of themselves,
the more readily that he had acquired immense wealth in the
proscriptions. At the time of the civil war he was on the side of
Marius, and closely associated with him, while Marius and Cinna were in
power in Rome. His first wife Antistia was the daughter of a friend of
Cinna's. When Sulla landed, however, Pompeius soon saw which way things
were going. He collected an army and marched to join Sulla. Although he
was only twenty-three at the time, Sulla hailed him as one of the most
important of his supporters. He suggested to him that he should put away
his young wife Antistia and marry his own daughter-in-law. To this
Pompeius agreed, although Antistia loved him and was in the deepest
distress, since her father had been killed in the proscriptions;
moreover, her mother, when she heard how Pompeius intended to treat her
daughter, laid violent hands upon herself. In the proscriptions Pompeius
acquired so much wealth that within a few years he was one of the
richest men in Rome. His popularity was great and he could afford to
keep it up by giving splendid shows and presents to the people.
His wealth, his quick success, his great popularity filled the senators
with awe. They had a constant fear that he was to be the next Sulla.
They listened with respect to all that Pompeius said, though he was a
dull speaker; and regarded him as the first general of the day, though
he had really done nothing to deserve that title. But he was always
lucky in his campaigns, and again and again had the good fortune to be
made commander just at the stage when the fruits of a long struggle,
carried on by others, were ready to be gathered. In the means by which
he achieved success Pompeius was not over scrupulous. His want of
feeling in the matter of Antistia was only one sign of this. The same
kind of callousness was shown in the way he secured the final defeat of
Sertorius, not by action in the field but by a plot. After three years
of unsuccessful fighting Sertorius, much the ablest of Marius's
followers, who had raised the standard of revolt in Spain, was still as
far from being conquered as ever. Pompeius was tired of the war; so were
his troops. At last by the treachery of Perpenna and some other Romans
in his army, on whose minds secret emissaries from Rome had worked,
Sertorius was murdered. Pompeius then suppressed the revolt in Spain
with horrible cruelty and returned to Rome crowned with success.
He was made consul (70) although he had never held any of the junior
offices of State; but his consulship was marked by nothing more
important than his constant disagreements with his colleague Crassus,
who, though of patrician birth, inclined to the so-called Popular,
anti-Senatorial party. For the next two years he was little to the fore
until called upon, as the first general of the day, to deal with a
difficulty which represented a most serious danger to Rome. Rome
depended to a large extent on foreign corn. Yet this overseas corn
supply was almost suspended by the pirates of the Mediterranean.
Commander after commander failed to suppress them. Food prices in Rome
rose to famine heights. At last the tribune Gabinius proposed that a
special commander should be appointed, with unexampled power, both as
regards men and money; and that Pompeius should be the man. Caesar and
Cicero supported the plan. It was hotly opposed by those who thought
such powers dangerous; but in the end Pompeius was appointed. He showed
conspicuous energy and within forty days the seas were cleared.
[Illustration: A VASE in the shape of a galley]
A vivid account of Pompeius's operations against the pirates was given
by Cicero in the great speech he made in support of the proposal of
Manilius to give him the command in the East, in the place of Lucullus.
_Pompeius in his Prime_
You know well enough how quickly these operations against the
Pirates were conducted, but I must not on that account omit all
mention of them. What man ever existed that, either in the course
of business or in the pursuit of gain, was able to visit so many
places and to travel such long distances in so short a time as
this great blast of war, directed by Cn. Pompeius, swept over the
seas? Even when it was yet too early for a distant voyage, he
visited Sicily, explored the coast of Africa, thence crossed to
Sardinia, and protected these three great granaries of the
Republic with strong garrisons and fleets. Next, after returning
to Italy, he provided in the same way for the safety of the two
Spains and Transalpine Gaul, and sending ships to the Illyrian
coast, to Achaia, and all Greece besides, he established large
forces, military and naval, in the two seas of Italy. On the
forty-ninth day after he left Brundisium he brought the whole of
Cilicia under the dominion of the Roman people, and all the
Pirates, wherever they might be, either were captured and put to
death, or surrendered to his sole authority and command. Finally,
when the Cretans had followed him even into Pamphylia with envoys
begging for clemency, he did not disdain their offer of submission
and was content to demand hostages. The result was that this great
war, that lasted so long and reached so far, a war that harassed
every country and every people, was taken in hand by Pompeius at
the end of the winter, was begun in the early days of the spring,
and was finished by the middle of the summer.
Cicero, _De Lege Manilia_, §§ 34-5.
Pompeius used the renown won by this success to secure for himself the
fruits of the Asiatic victories won by Lucullus. On the one hand, he
worked in Rome against Lucullus so that he got the command transferred
to himself; on the other, by bribery and the arts of Clodius, Lucullus's
brother-in-law and aide-de-camp, he worked up a mutiny among his troops.
Then he went out to Asia and in a series of spectacular campaigns laid
the East at his feet. His progress through Asia was a parade; it was no
wonder that the Romans were dazzled by the news of the way in which he
overran kingdoms and conquered vast territories of enormous wealth.
Pompeius seemed to them a general of the rank of Hannibal or Alexander.
The Senate grew alarmed. They had not forgotten how Sulla had returned
from the East in 83 and set himself up as Dictator, master of Rome. If
Pompeius in 62 wanted to do the same there was nothing to prevent him.
He had a great army, devoted to him and ready to follow him in any
adventure. He was extremely popular with the people of Rome. He had
never shown any particular respect for the laws and customs of the State
when he wanted anything for himself. He had broken the rules Sulla had
laid down, by which no one could hold high command until he had passed
through all the lower offices. Now, while still in Asia, he demanded to
be allowed to stand as consul, in his absence, although he had never
been tribune or praetor. The Senate put difficulties in his way. Indeed
they did everything they could to irritate Pompeius and give him the
excuse for taking the strong line they dreaded. Only Julius Caesar, the
young and rapidly rising leader of the Popular party, backed him. The
Senate refused to allow Pompeius to stand for the consulship. Nepos, his
emissary, would actually have been killed in the streets if Caesar had
not saved him. Caesar pleased him by proposing that he should finish
rebuilding the Capitol.
The Senate's fears were groundless, as Caesar knew. Pompeius was not
like Sulla. Sulla always knew what he wanted. Pompeius had no clear aim.
Opportunities lay open before him which he did not desire or know how to
use. He wanted to be important, a big man of whom people spoke well, to
whom they looked up; but his timid mind shrank from responsibility. He
had never been fired by any great idea; he had no purpose that he wanted
to impress upon the world. He had not even got that harsh and cold
contempt for the mass of mankind that caused Sulla to feel a sort of
bitter pleasure in imposing his will upon them. Of Caesar's fire he had
nothing. Politically he had never taken a firm line. If no one in Rome
quite knew where he stood, Pompeius was in the same doubt himself. His
was a respectable nature with a natural inclination towards safety. But
in the Rome of his day things were in a state of uneasy movement; there
was no safety or quiet for any one who wanted at the same time to be a
big figure. Pompeius was later forced to take action. This action was
weak and irresolute because his mind had never been clear. Most people
are like Pompeius: they do not know what they want; or they want
something vague, like happiness or the good opinion of others; or they
want a number of things which cannot be had together. The mark of those
men who stand out in history is that they conceived clearly something
they wanted to have or do; and by force of will drove through to it.
Even when they failed, as Hannibal, for instance, failed, their failure
has in it something more magnificent than ordinary success. But this
power to will implies a readiness to make sacrifices. If you want one
thing you must be prepared to do without others. If you want to please
yourself you must be ready to displease other people. You cannot have
your own way and at the same time have the good opinion of everybody.
This Pompeius never saw.
[Illustration: A TRIUMPH
from a relief of the Empire]
When he returned from his great campaigns in the East in the year 62
Pompeius landed at Brundisium and dismissed his soldiers to their homes.
The senators heaved a vast sigh of relief. He was not going to be
dangerous. When Pompeius arrived in Rome without his army he found that
nobody much wanted him. People were more interested in the struggles
that had been going on at home--Catiline's conspiracy, Cicero's strong
line in putting the conspirators to death, the question whether Caesar
had been implicated, the friendship between Caesar and Crassus--than in
what Pompeius had been doing in the East. Without his army nobody was
afraid of Pompeius. He found Lucullus, in the Senate and political
circles generally, doing everything he could to thwart him, supported by
Cato the Younger, who thought that imperialism, Eastern conquests, and
new wealth were bad things, likely to ruin Rome. Pompeius celebrated a
stupendous triumph which made him the idol of the mob; but the Senate
would not hear of his being made consul or make grants of lands to his
soldiers. The Conservative party had thwarted Pompeius at every turn; he
was deeply hurt, and in his most sensitive part, his vanity. This hurt
finally drove him into an alliance with Caesar and Crassus, the leaders
of the Popular party, and his own most dangerous rivals. He disliked
Crassus and feared Caesar. At the moment his support was invaluable to
the Popular party; therefore Caesar set himself to overcome Pompeius's
distrust of himself and Crassus's deep detestation of Pompeius. He had
good arguments for each of them; and behind them a charm of manner that
few people could resist.
Three years after Pompeius returned from the East the three strongest
men in Rome were bound together. This first Triumvirate (60), as it was
afterwards called, was a private arrangement. People only learned of its
existence when they saw it at work. Pompeius married Caesar's daughter,
Julia, who, so long as she lived, kept him friendly with her father.
Caesar was made consul and at once confirmed all that Pompeius had done
in the East and made grants of lands to his soldiers. A big programme of
land reform was passed through. The corn distribution was reorganized.
People who criticized the Triumvirate too openly, like Cato, were
banished. Cicero also was exiled, since Clodius had sworn vengeance on
him. Caesar would have saved him by taking him with him to Gaul, as well
as his brother Quintus, who was one of his adjutants; but Cicero
refused. Caesar went off to Gaul the year after his consulship (58);
Pompeius and Crassus were left masters in Rome.
There were at the time incessant disorders in the city. The strife of
parties waxed bitter and furious. Fights between different political
clubs were of nightly occurrence. The ingenious Clodius had reorganized
the old associations of the workers into guilds of a more or less
political kind, and thus built up a machinery in every quarter of the
city which he handled with great adroitness at election times. Moreover,
he organized something like a voters' army of slaves and freedmen, which
turned out on his instructions, and lived on the free corn given out by
the State. Pompeius did nothing to cope with this state of things. He
fell, in fact, into a strange condition of indolence, and took hardly
any part in public affairs. The news of Caesar's victories in Gaul did
not rouse him, though Caesar's popularity increased daily and his own
declined.
Pompeius's sloth at this period is sometimes put down to his extreme
domestic happiness. Julia, his new wife, was but half his age, three and
twenty. She possessed a full measure of the irresistible charm of her
father; so long as she lived the bond between the Triumvirs was
unshakeable. But her husband's apparent indifference to public affairs
was due, in the main, to another reason; the one which explains so much
in Pompeius's action and inaction both at this time and later. He stood
aloof because he did not know what to do. The political tangle had
become a knot that must be cut. Pompeius was not the man to cut knots.
He let things slide.
[Illustration: A ROMAN VILLA ON THE COAST
Notice the roof garden]
Disorder grew and nothing was done to stop it. The Senate, alarmed by
Caesar's growing popularity--a fifteen days' festival was held in honour
of his victories in Gaul--began to attack his new land and other laws.
Pompeius did not trouble to defend them. Cicero had come back from
banishment and made alarmist speeches declaring that Caesar was aiming
at bringing the Republic to an end. Pompeius and Crassus quarrelled
again. Yet when Caesar called his friends to meet him at Lucca, where he
had gone into winter quarters (56), hardly any one in Rome refused to
go. Pompeius, despite his growing jealousy and uneasiness, was
reconciled to Crassus and the Triumvirate renewed. But as soon as he got
back to Rome again, away from Caesar's charm, he fell back into his old
moody indolence. In the course of the next few years he became openly
hostile to Caesar. Little heed was paid in Rome to what he was doing in
Gaul. The death and defeat of Crassus at Carrhae (53), produced no deep
stir. The disturbances in the city, which had been occasional, grew
constant. More interest was felt by the ordinary citizen and even the
ordinary senator in the brawls between Clodius and Milo than in anything
happening outside Rome.
The Government was quite helpless. Things were plainly going from bad to
worse. There was one strong man in the Roman world who might save the
State; but the price of his doing it was one that made the Conservatives
determined to have civil war rather. The clearer Caesar's outstanding
position became the more resentful were Pompeius's feelings against him.
Since his early youth he had been regarded by other people, and had come
to regard himself, as the great man. Now, however, when there was a real
opportunity for showing greatness he did not know how to do it; and saw,
too, another likely to carry off the prize.
Julia's death, two years after the meeting at Lucca, removed the one
human being who might have prevented an open breach between Pompeius and
Caesar, and left Pompeius's jealousy to rule unchecked in his mind.
Caesar, far from Rome, saw with clear eyes the meaning of what was
happening there; Pompeius, though on the spot, did not or would not
understand. He would never take action. For this very reason the
senators looked upon him as a safe man and gave him powers far greater
than any Caesar had or had ever asked for. He was made sole consul (52)
and head of a special court which was to try all cases of disorder.
Disorder had indeed been getting more and more serious; Clodius and Milo
were rival candidates for the consulship. There were open fights, day
and night, between their followers. At last Clodius was actually
murdered by Milo's ruffians on the Appian Way.
Pompeius did nothing, though in Rome he was all-powerful. Crassus was
dead; Caesar far away in Gaul and hard pressed there. When Pompeius fell
ill about this time prayers for his recovery were put up all over Italy;
and when the news came that he was better great public services of
thanksgiving took place. But as Plutarch says, this demonstration proved
to be one of the causes of the civil war which followed. 'For the joy
Pompeius conceived on this occasion, added to the high opinion he had of
his achievements, intoxicated him so far that, bidding adieu to the
caution and prudence which had put his good fortune and the glory of his
actions upon a sure footing, he gave in to the most extravagant
presumption and even contempt of Caesar; insomuch that he declared, "He
had not need of arms nor any extraordinary preparations against him,
since he could pull him down with much more ease than he had set him
up".' When people like Cicero expressed their fear that Caesar might
march upon Rome with his army he said, 'In Italy, if I do but stamp upon
the ground an army will appear.' Filled with such notions, he proceeded
recklessly to drive Caesar to desperation. He refused to disband his own
troops (two legions which he had lent to Caesar, and Caesar, on his
demand, had returned to him loaded with presents); instead of backing
Caesar's candidature for the consulship for the year in which he was due
to return from Gaul he opposed him in every way. Finally, he made it
quite clear that if Caesar came to Rome without his army he would be in
serious danger; and at the same time insisted that he should do so.
What this must lead to was plain enough to people in Rome. When they
heard that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon (49) at the head of his troops
(regardless of Sulla's law) they fell into a panic. The Senate was
terrified of Caesar and not much less afraid of Pompeius. But disunited
as the Conservatives were among themselves, he was the only man who
could hold them together at all, and their only general. If Pompeius had
acted firmly at the crisis, whether with Caesar or against him, he might
have prevented the civil war. But at a time when every day was vital he
did nothing at all for several days, remained in his own house without
giving any lead or staying in any way the gathering tumult and
excitement. Refugees began to pour into Rome. For some reason or other
every one took it for granted that Caesar was going to march on the
city, though as a matter of fact he had made no move. At last Pompeius
declared that the country was in danger and that every one should leave
Rome. He himself left the city to muster the great bodies of soldiers in
Italy into an army. Very soon afterwards the consuls fled, in such a
hurry that they left the State treasures behind them, and with most of
the senators joined Pompeius at Brundisium, whence they intended to sail
for Greece.
Perhaps only a poet could interpret what was happening, in this time, in
the mind of Pompeius. Lucan thus describes it:
_The Last Phase: the 'Shadow of a Mighty Name'_
You fear, Magnus, lest new exploits throw past triumphs into the
shade, and victory over the Pirates be eclipsed by the conquest of
Gaul; your rival is spurred on by the habit of continuous
enterprise and a success too proud to take the second place; for
Caesar will no longer endure a greater nor Pompeius an equal.
Which of them appealed more righteously to civil war, we are not
permitted to know. Each has the support of a mighty judge; the
gods approved the cause of the conqueror, Cato of the conquered.
They were not, indeed, equally matched. Pompeius was of an age
already failing in decay, and during the long repose of peace and
civil life had forgotten the practice of command; eager to be on
the lips of all, lavish in his gifts to the mob, swayed by the
breath of the people's will, and flattered by applause in the
theatre that he built. Careless, too, of gaining fresh stores of
strength, and relying over much on earlier success, he stands the
shadow of a mighty name; like an oak that, towering in some
fertile field, bears spoils offered by the people of old and
votive gifts of their leaders; no longer cleaving to the earth by
stout roots, it is kept upright by its own mere weight, and
thrusting leafless branches through the air, gives no shade save
from the naked trunk. Yet, though it rocks and soon will fall
before the first blast from the east, though around it so many
forest trees raise their stems unshaken, it is worshipped alone.
Lucan, _Pharsalia_, i. 121-43.
First in leaving Rome and then in leaving Italy Pompeius made fatal
mistakes. Caesar was soon master of Italy, almost without bloodshed.
Within the year he had reduced Spain and Sicily, the Roman granaries,
after severe fighting; built a fleet and sailed for Greece. There he
tried to induce Pompeius to meet him and so come to a settlement.
Pompeius refused.
He believed that his army was stronger than Caesar's. He and all his
friends were full of bitterness, and quite sure of victory. They had,
indeed, every advantage on their side, in numbers and supplies, and
could afford to wear Caesar down by a waiting policy. This was
Pompeius's own plan, and it was sound. But he allowed himself to be
overruled largely because of the gibes of his followers. He moved from
Dyrrachium, where he had held a very strong position, to the plains of
the Enipeus river. At Pharsalia a great battle took place (48). Pompeius
was defeated. His defeat was largely his own fault. He had 43,000 men to
Caesar's 21,000 and was especially strong in cavalry. By a skilful
stratagem Caesar defeated the cavalry; when Pompeius saw this he
believed the day was lost; left the field and hid himself in despair in
his tent. Deserted by their general his lines broke; the defeat became a
rout. His army was wiped out. Pompeius himself fled to Egypt with a
handful of attendants. There he was murdered by the Egyptians, under the
eyes of his wife and son.
Caesar, it is said, wept when Pompeius's seal-ring was handed to him,
and he knew that his great rival had perished. He set the statue of
Pompeius up again in Rome; and might, thereby, have seemed to rebuke,
almost in the words Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Marullus, the
fickle people of Rome who so soon forgot him who was once their idol.
_A Broken Idol_
_Marullus._ Wherefore rejoice? What conquest brings he home?
What tributaries follow him to Rome
To grace in captive bonds his chariot wheels?
You blocks, you stones, you worse than senseless things!
O you hard hearts, you cruel men of Rome,
Knew you not Pompey? Many a time and oft
Have you climb'd up to walls and battlements,
To towers and windows, yea, to chimney-tops,
Your infants in your arms, and there have sat
The livelong day, with patient expectation,
To see great Pompey pass the streets of Rome:
And when you saw his chariot but appear,
Have you not made a universal shout,
That Tiber trembled underneath her banks,
To hear the replication of your sounds
Made in her concave shores?
And do you now put on your best attire?
And do you now cull out a holiday?
And do you now strew flowers in his way,
That comes in triumph over Pompey's blood?
Be gone!
Run to your houses, fall upon your knees,
Pray to the gods to intermit the plague
That needs must light on this ingratitude.
Shakespeare, _Julius Caesar_, I. i.